

DRAFT

K.

This is the 1st working draft of vol. VI. It still need much work. The most problematic text is Mao's "Financial and Economic Problems in the Anti-Japanese War". It is stylistically uneven and often lacking in clarity as a result of weak sentence construction. This will have to be gone over a few times to clean it up. I have made numerous changes in punctuation and in capitalization of proper nouns. Also, in a couple of places the re-arrangement of words was necessary to eliminate ambiguity. You will note that the volume is a mix of Wade-Giles and Pin Yin — I will convert the Pin Yin to Wade-Giles at a later date.

I assume you will want to update the "Published's Note" and the "Note to the Reader", etc. In connection with this, the "Published's Note" remarks: 'We fondly hope that much more additional material could come to light enabling us to substantially improve on this'. Now, on more than one occasion I have raised the issue of other works from the period 1917-1949, and a host of other issue in my last note to you. You have largely IGNORED me in this regard. Whatever your reason for doing this, your refusal to address these concerns and to respond to me does NOT make for a good working relationship. (This is most especially so since your message of mid-January sought to not-so-subtly pressure me to get on with it.) If you are too busy, simply drop me a note saying that you cannot address these matters until much later (or whatever), but to leave me hanging in the lurch is incorrect.

D.



vol. 6



vol. 7



vol. 8



vol. 9

Cover

— As you can see, the Mao profiles on the cover vary from one volume to another. We can either simplify and standardize things by using only one of the profiles (I like the vol. 8 profile), or we can use the four different images, one for each volume.

My hope is that we standardize the cover and use the same Mao profile on vols. 6-9.

— As for the shade of yellow that forms the background color, I'll do what I can to match it.

— The written title will remain in brown and red, following the official SW, but unlike the official SW, the vol. number will be in red. This follows your edition of vols. 6-8 (but changes your vol. 9, which you had in brown). As I said earlier, I think this nicely sets off your edition from the official SW, while still establishing a continuity of your publication with the official SW.

Inside Cover
(Blank — no text)

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE

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Photo of Mao

- NOTE: The photo in the “official” SW has Mao looking to the left, and you have followed this in your Vols. 6-8. However, in vol. 9 Mao is looking to the right.**
- Was this difference planned (?) and intended to represent, albeit metaphoricly, Mao’s concern with the danger of revisionism?**
 - In which direction do you want Mao to be looking?**
- Again, we are looking for consistency.**

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SELECTED WORKS OF FROM MARX MAO TSE-TUNG TO MAO

Volume VI

I assume the publication information,
specified below, will be changed.
If so, to what?

COMMERCIAL
DISTRIBUTION

The belowtype face approximates vols. 7 and 8,
but vol. 9 is much more ornate and I do not
know the name of the font. I assume that the
type faces will be consistent across vols. 6-9.
If you want the more “decorative” vol. 9 font,
let me know, get me the name, and I’ll try to
find it. If I can’t, you’ll have to send me a
copy of the font (I can make whatever
conversions are necessary.

KRANTI PUBLICATIONS
SECUNDERABAD

First Edition
Second (Revised) Edition

1990
2007

— Other Publication Information
(that you think is necessary)

As you can see, I have omitted the information on pricing and the location of distributors, simply because this information is the most unreliable, i.e., most susceptible to change at any time.

— It will be necessary to write some kind of a “Note” on the “Second Revised Edition” explaining, among other things, that the first edition suffered from numerous stylistic and typographical errors due to the political conditions under which the volumes were prepared. This is perhaps most important for Vol. VI. The full content of this “Note” still has to be worked out.

— The .PFD versions that will appear on my Web site and my planned CD will have “From Marx to Mao” above my “Digital Reprints” logo at the bottom of this page

Words in red are mine and I'll remove them. Clearly, a 2nd edition will require a clean re-write. To be worked out latter.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

An authentic compilation of Mao's Collected Works is long overdue. Especially now, its need is all the more great and urgent. But there is very little hope of such a publication being brought out officially by the CPC. However, several writings of Mao, not covered by the CPC's official publication, i.e., *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volumes 1 - 5 — are available elsewhere. All [of] these lie scattered in a number of English editions by western scholars and in some remote research journals, etc. We do realize that even if all [of] these are put together it will not be the collected - works nor will [it] even be a good substitute. Yet we hope their presentation at [in] one place, chronologically arranged, will certainly facilitate easy and ready reference, [and] further stimulating the study of Mao's works. Hence this venture.

Many more works might have certainly remained in Chinese and even some available in English might have remained out of our reach. To come to the works included in this volume, we have neither the means nor the competence to vouchsafe about their authenticity and completeness. We appeal to the readers to bear these inevitable limitations in mind while using this book. Due to these and other reasons, if any errors crept into this publication, we earnestly hope to rectify them in future editions. We fondly hope that much more additional material could come to light enabling us to substantially improve on this.

As far as possible all [of] these writings are arranged strictly chronologically. Except [for] indicating the primary source quoted in the originals, no attempt is made to annotate or edit the texts in any respect or in any manner.

We mention our sincere thanks and acknowledgements to all [of] the pioneers who translated, edited and published these works in different forms earlier. We whole-heartedly extend our thanks to all [of] these comrades — the respected scholars and loving friends — whose unstinted co-operation and painstaking efforts contributed in a big way to the success of this venture.

We feel very happy that this volume could be brought out despite

many odds. We hope to bring out the other volumes also soon. We fondly hope that our effort will be well received by the warm and enthusiastic response of our esteemed readers.

Publishers

FROM MARX
TO MAO



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**The actual page #s will be inserted
during final stages of preparation**

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A STUDY OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION*

April 1917

Our nation is wanting in strength. The military spirit has not been encouraged; The physical condition of the population deteriorates daily. This is an extremely disturbing phenomenon. The promoters of physical education have not grasped the essence of the problem, and therefore, their efforts, though prolonged, have not been effective. If this state continues, our weakness will increase further. To attain our goals and to make our influence felt are external matters, results. The development of our physical strength is an internal matter, a cause. If our bodies are not strong we will be afraid as soon as we see enemy soldiers, and then how can we attain our goals and make ourselves respected? Strength depends on drill, and drill depends on self-awareness. The advocates of physical education have not failed to devise various methods. If their efforts have nevertheless remained fruitless, it is because external forces are insufficient to move the heart. . . .

If we wish to make physical education effective, we must influence people's subjective attitudes and stimulate them to become conscious of physical education. If one becomes conscious of the problem, a programme for physical education will come easily, and we will attain our goals and make our influence felt as a matter of course. . . .

I. AN EXPLANATION OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION

Physical education helps to maintain life. East and West differ in their interpretations of it. Chuang Tzu followed the example of the cook, Confucius drew on the lesson of the archer and the chari-

* Extracted from an essay published in *Hsin ching-nein* in April 1917.

oteer. In Germany, Physical education has gained the greatest popularity. Fencing has spread all over the country. Japan has *bushido*. Moreover, recently, following the traditions of our country, judo has developed there to an admirable degree. When we examine these examples, we see that they all begin with the study of physiology. . . .

2. THE PLACE OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION IN OUR LIFE

Physical education complements education in virtue and knowledge. Moreover, both virtue and knowledge reside in the body. Without the body there would be neither virtue nor knowledge. Those who understand this are rare. People stress either knowledge or morality. Knowledge is certainly valuable, for it distinguishes man from animals. But wherein is knowledge contained? Morality, too, is valuable; it is the basis of the social order and of equality between ourselves and others. But where does virtue reside? *It is the body that contains knowledge and houses virtue.* It contains knowledge like a chariot and houses morality like a chamber. The body is the chariot that contains knowledge, the chamber that houses virtue. Children enter primary school when they reach the proper age. In primary school, particular attention should be paid to the development of the body; progress in knowledge and moral training are of secondary importance. Nourishment and care should be primary, teaching and discipline complementary. At present, most people do not know this, and the result is that children become ill, or even die young, because of studying. In middle and higher schools, stress should be placed equally on all three aspects of education. At present, most people overemphasize knowledge. During the years of middle school, the development of the body is not yet completed. Since today the factors favouring physical development are few, and those deterring it numerous, won't physical development tend to cease? In the educational system of our country, required courses are as thick as the hairs on a cow. Even an adult with a tough, strong body could not stand it let alone those who have not reached adulthood, or those who are weak. Speculating on the intentions of the educators, one is led to wonder whether they did not design such an unwieldy curriculum in order to exhaust the students, to trample on their bodies and ruin their lives. . . . How stupid! The only calam-

ity that can befall a man is not to have a body. What else is there to worry about? If one seeks to improve one's body other things will follow automatically. For the improvement of the body, nothing is more effective than physical education. *Physical education really occupies the first place in our lives. When the body is strong, then one can advance speedily in Knowledge and morality, and reap far-reaching advantages.* It should be regarded as an important part of our study. Learning has its essential and its accessory parts, and affairs have their end and their beginning. To know what is first and what is last will bring one closer to the proper way.¹ This is exactly what I intend to say.

3. PREVIOUS ABUSES OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION AND MY METHOD FOR REMEDYING THEM

The three forms of education are equally important; students hitherto have paid much attention to moral and intellectual education but have neglected physical education. The unfortunate consequence has been that they bend their backs and bow their heads; they have "white and slender hands";² when they climb a hill they are short of breath, and when they walk in water they get cramps in their feet. That is why Yen Tzu had a short life, and Chia I died young. As for Wang Po and Lu Chao-lin, the one died young, and the other became a paralytic. All these were men of high attainments in morality and knowledge. But there comes a day when the body cannot be preserved. and then morality and wisdom are destroyed along with it. Only the men of the North are able "to lie under arms and meet death without regret".³ In the regions of Yen and Chao there were many heroes, and martyrs and warriors often came from Liangchow. At the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty, Yen Hsi-chai and Li Kangchu practiced both the literary and military arts. Yen Hsi-chai travelled over a thousand *li* (about 0.5 km.) to the north of the Great Wall to learn the art of fencing. He contended with brave soldiers and won. Hence he said: "If one lacks either the literary or the military arts, is this the true way?" . . . As far as we, students are concerned, *the installation of a school and the instruction given by its teachers are only the external and objective aspect.* We also have the internal, the subjective aspect. When one's decision is made in his heart, then all parts of the body obey its orders. Fortune and misfortune

are of our own seeking. "I wish to be virtuous, and lo, virtue is at hand."⁴ How much more this is true of physical education! If we do not have the will to act, then even though the exterior and the objective are perfect, they still cannot benefit us. *Hence, when we speak of physical education, we should begin with individual initiative.*

4. THE UTILITY OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION

Because man is an animal, movement is most important for him. And because he is a rational animal, his movements must have a reason. But why is movement deserving of esteem? Why is rational movement deserving of esteem? To say that movement helps in earning a living is trivial. To say that movement protects the nation is lofty. Yet neither is the basic reason. The object of movement is simply to preserve our life and gladden our hearts. Chu Hsi stresses respect, and Lu Chiu-yuan stresses tranquillity. Tranquillity is tranquil, and respect is not action; it is merely tranquil. Lao Tzu said that immobility was the ultimate goal; the Buddha sought quiet and methods of contemplation. The art of contemplation is esteemed by the disciples of Chu and Lu. Recently there have been those who, following these masters, have spoken of methods of contemplation, boasted about the effectiveness of their methods, and expressed contempt for those who exercise, thereby ruining their own bodies. This is perhaps one way, but I would not venture to imitate it. In my humble opinion, *there is only movement in heaven and on earth. . . .*

One often hears it said that the mind and the body cannot both be perfect at the same time, that those who use their minds are deficient in physical health and those with a robust body are generally deficient in mental capacities. This kind of talk is also absurd and applies only to those who are weak in will and feeble in action, which is generally not the case of superior men. Confucius died at the age of seventy-two, and I have not heard that his body was not healthy. The Buddha travelled continually, preaching his doctrine, and he died at an old age. Jesus had the misfortune to die unjustly. As for Mohammed, he subjugated the world holding the Koran in his left hand and a sword in his right. All these men were called sages and are among the greatest thinkers. . . .

Physical education not only strengthens the body but also en-

hances our knowledge. There is a saying: Civilize the mind and make savage the body. This is an apt saying. In order to civilize the mind one must first make savage the body. If the body is made savage, then the civilized mind will follow. *Knowledge consists in knowing the things in the world, and in discerning their laws. In this matter we must rely on our body, because direct observation depends on the ears and eyes, and reflection depends on the brain. The ears and eyes, as well as the brain, may be considered parts of the body. When the body is perfect, then knowledge is also perfect.* Hence one can say that knowledge is acquired indirectly through physical education. Physical strength is required to undertake the study of the numerous modern sciences, whether in school or through independent study. He who is equal to this is the man with a strong body; he who is not equal to it is the man with a weak body. The division between the strong and the weak determines the area of responsibilities each can assume.

Physical education not only enhances knowledge, it also harmonizes the sentiments. The power of the sentiments is extremely great. The ancients endeavoured to discipline them with reason. Hence they asked. "Is the master [*i.e.*, reason] always alert?" They also said: "One should discipline the heart with reason." But reason proceeds from the heart and the heart resides in the body. We often observe that the weak are enslaved by their sentiments and are incapable of mastering them. Those whose senses are imperfect or whose limbs are defective are often enslaved by excessive passion, and reason is incapable of saving them. Hence it may be called an invariable law that when the body is perfect and healthy, the sentiments are also correct. . . .

Physical education not only harmonizes the emotions, it also strengthens the will. The great utility of physical education lies precisely in this. The principal aim of physical education is military heroism. Such objects of military heroism as courage, dauntlessness, audacity, and perseverance are all matters of will. Let me explain this with an example. To wash our feet in ice water makes us acquire courage and dauntlessness, as well as audacity. In general, any form of exercise, if pursued continuously, will help to train us in perseverance. Long-distance running is particularly good training in perseverance. "My strength uprooted mountains, my energy dominated the world"⁵ — this is courage. "If I don't behead the Lou Lan, I swear I will not return" — this is dauntlessness. To re-

place the family with the nation — this is audacity. “[Yu] was away from his home for eight years, and though he thrice passed the door of it, he did not enter”⁶ — this is perseverance. All these can be accomplished merely on the basis of daily physical education. *The will is the antecedent of a man's career.*

Those whose bodies are small and frail are flippant in their behaviour. Those whose skin is flabby are soft and dull in will. Thus does the body influence the mind. The purpose of physical education is to strengthen: the muscles and the bones; as a result, knowledge is enhanced, the sentiments are harmonized, and the will is strengthened. The muscles and the bones belong to our body; knowledge, sentiments, and will be long to our heart. When both the body and the heart are at ease, one may speak of perfect harmony. Hence, physical education is nothing else but the nourishing of our lives and the gladdening of our hearts.

5. THE REASONS FOR DISLIKING EXERCISE

Exercise is the most important part of physical education. Nowadays students generally dislike exercise. There are four reasons for this: (1) They do not have self-awareness. If a thing is to be put into practice, one must first take pleasure in it. One must understand in detail the whys and the wherefores. To know in detail the whys and the wherefores is self-awareness. People generally do not know the interrelation between exercise and themselves — or they may know it in general terms but not intimately. . . . (2) They cannot change their long-established habits. Our country has always stressed literary accomplishment. People blush to wear short clothes.⁷ Hence there is the common saying, “A good man does not become a soldier”. . . . (3) Exercise has not been propagated forcefully. . . . (4) Students feel that exercise is shameful. According to my humble observation, this is really their major reason for disliking exercise. Flowing garments, a slow gait, a grave, calm gaze — these constitute a fine deportment, respected by society. Why should one suddenly extend an arm or expose a leg, stretch and bend down? Is this not strange? Hence there are those who know well that their body needs exercise and, moreover, wish very much to do so, but they cannot. There are those who can exercise only with a group, not by themselves, and those who can exercise in privacy but not in

public. In short, all this is due to feelings of shame. All four of these are reasons for disliking exercise. The first and the fourth are subjective, and changing them depends on ourselves; the second and third are objective, and changing them depends on others: "What the superior man seeks is in himself"⁸, that which depends on others is of lesser importance.

6. THE METHODS OF EXERCISE SHOULD BE FEW

Tseng Wen—cheng washed his feet before going to bed and walked a thousand steps after meals, benefiting greatly from this method. There was an eighty-year-old man who was still healthy. On being asked how he maintained his health, he replied, "I don't eat hearty meals, that's all." Nowadays the methods of exercise are very diverse, more than I can count. But although there may be several score or even several hundred, "A branch in the forest is sufficient for the bird to lodge in, and if it drinks at the river it does not drink more than what its stomach can hold."⁹ We have only this body and only these senses, bones, viscera, and veins. Even though there are several hundred methods of exercise all of them *are aimed at improving the circulation of the blood*. If one method can accomplish this, the result of a hundred methods is the same as that of one. Therefore the other ninety-nine methods can be dispensed with. "Our eyes can see only one thing at a time; our ears can hear only one sound at a time."⁹ To employ a hundred different methods to train the muscles and the bones only disturbs them. . . .

7. THE POINTS TO WHICH WE MUST PAY ATTENTION WHEN WE EXERCISE

We should have perseverance in all things. Exercise is no exception. Suppose there are two men who exercise. One practices and then stops, the other is unremitting in his practice. There will certainly be a difference in the results. First of all, perseverance in exercise creates interest. In general, that which is at rest cannot set itself in motion; there must be something to move it. And this something can only be interest. . . .

Interest arises from unremitting daily exercise. The best way is

to exercise twice a day — on getting up and before going to bed — in the nude; the next best way is to wear light clothes. Too much clothing impedes movement. If one does this daily, the idea of exercise is continually present and never interrupted. Today's exercise is a continuation of yesterday's exercise and thus leads to tomorrow's exercise. The individual exercise periods need not be long; thirty minutes are sufficient. In this way, a certain interest will naturally arise. *Secondly, perseverance in exercise can create pleasure. Exercise over a long time can produce great results and give rise to a feeling of personal value. As a result, we will be able to study with joy, and every day will see some progress in our virtue. Our heart is filled with boundless joy because we have persevered and obtained a result.* Pleasure and interest are distinct. Interest is the origin of exercise, and pleasure its consequence. Interest arises from the action, and pleasure from the result. The two are naturally different.

Perseverance without concentration of mind can hardly produce results. If we look at flowers from a galloping horse, even though we may look daily, it is like not having seen them at all. If one person's heart follows a swan in the sky, he cannot compete with the person who has meanwhile been studying carefully. Hence one should concentrate all one's effort on exercise. During exercise, the mind should be on the exercise. Idle and confused thoughts should all be put aside. . . .

The superior man's deportment is cultivated and agreeable, but one cannot say this about exercise. Exercise should be savage and rude. To be able to leap on horseback and to shoot at the same time; to go from battle to battle; to shake the mountains by one's cries, and the colours of the sky by one's roars of anger; to have the strength to uproot mountains like Hsiang Yu and the audacity to pierce the mark like Yu Chi — all this is savage and rude and has nothing to do with delicacy. In order to progress in exercise, one must be savage. If one is savage, one will have great vigour and strong muscles and bones. The method of exercise should be rude; then one can apply oneself seriously and it will be easy to exercise. These two things are especially important for beginners.

There are three things to which we must pay attention in exercise: (1) perseverance, (2) concentration of all our strength, and (3) that it be savage and rude. There are many other things that require attention. Here I have merely indicated the most important ones. . . .

NOTES

¹ The *Great Learning*, one of the four Confucian classics.

² *Nineteen Old Poems*, a famous collection of poems of the Han dynasty.

³ *The Doctrine of the Mean*, one of the Confucian classics.

⁴ The Confucian *Analects*.

⁵ From a poem attributed to Hsiang Yu.

⁶ This is a reference to Mencius.

⁷ The mode of dress of the swordsmen of King Wen of Chao, according to a chapter of the Taoist classic *Chuang Tzu*.

⁸ The Confucian *Analects*.

⁹ From *Chuang Tzu*.

¹⁰ From Hsun Tzu, a Confucian “realist”.



FROM MARX
TO MAO
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TO HAKURO TOTEN (Miazaki Toten)¹

April 1917

Dear Mr. Hakuro Toten,

We have long admired your integrity but regret not having had the privilege of your acquaintance. Even at this great distance your reputation is enough to inspire us.

Sir, you gave moral support to Huang² [when he was alive] and now mourn him with your tears. He is to be buried, and you have come across a myriad leagues of waves to bid him farewell at his grave. Your lofty friendship reaches as high as the sun and moon; your sincerity moves gods and spirits. Both are rare in this world, in the past as well today.

Chih-fan and Tse-tung are schoolboys in Hunan who have acquired some knowledge of the classics and have disciplined their aspirations. We long to have an opportunity to meet you, to learn deportment and receive instructions from you. We shall feel extremely honoured if our request is granted.

Students at the First Teachers' Training College, Hunan.

Signed
Hasiao Chin-fan
Mao Tse-tung

NOTES

¹ Hakuro Toten (1870-1922), a Meiji shishi (extremist patriot) and supporter of the revolutionary activities of Sun Yet-sen and his comrades.

² Huang Hsing (1874-1916), a revolutionary leader and supporter of Sun Yet-sen, who was buried on April 15, 1917.

TOWARD A NEW GOLDEN AGE*

July 1919

FROM MARY
TO MAO
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.... What is the greatest question in the world? The greatest question is that of getting food to eat. What is the greatest force? The greatest force is that of the union of the popular masses. What should we not fear? We should not fear heaven. We should not fear ghosts. We should not fear the dead. We should not fear the bureaucrats. We should not fear the militarists. We should not fear the capitalists. . . .

The time has come! The great tide in the world is rolling ever more impetuously! . . . He who conforms to it shall survive, he who resists it shall perish. . . .

As a result of the world war and the bitterness of their lives, the popular masses in many countries have suddenly undertaken all sorts of action. In Russia, they have overthrown the aristocrats and driven out the rich. . . . The army of the red flag swarms over the East and the West, sweeping away numerous enemies. . . . The whole world has been shaken by it. . . . Within the area enclosed by the Great Wall and the China Sea, the May 4th Movement has arisen. Its banner has advanced southward, across the Yellow River to the Yangtse. From Canton to Hankow, many real-life dramas have been performed; from Lake Tungting to the Min River the tide is rising. Heaven and earth are aroused, the traitors and the wicked are put to flight. Ha! We know it! We are awakened! The world is ours, the nation is ours, society is ours. If we do not speak, who will speak? If we do not act, who will act? If we do not rise up and fight, who will rise up and fight? . . .

It is not that basically we have no strength; the source of our impotence lies in our lack of practice. For thousands of years the Chinese people of several hundred millions have all led a life of

* This article was extracted from the manifesto written by comrade Mao for the first issue of his magazine, *Hsiang-chiang ping-lun*, in July 1919.

slaves. Only one person — the “emperor” — was not a slave, or rather one could say that even he was the slave of “heaven”. When the emperor was in control of everything, we were given no opportunity for practice. . . .

We must act energetically to carry out the great union of the popular masses, which will not brook a moment’s delay . . . our Chinese people possesses great intrinsic energy. The more profound the oppression, the greater its resistance; that which has accumulated for a long time will surely burst forth quickly. The great union of the Chinese people must be achieved Gentlemen! We must all exert ourselves, we must all advance with the utmost strength. Our golden age, our age of brightness and splendour lies ahead!

FROM MARX
TO MAO



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THE GREAT UNION OF THE POPULAR MASSES*

July — August 1919

FROM MARX

The decadence of the state, the sufferings of humanity, and the darkness of society have all reached an extreme. To be sure, among the methods of improvement and reform, education, industrialization, strenuous efforts, creation, destruction (of that which is bad and outmoded), and construction are all right, but there is a method more fundamental than these, which is that of the great union of the popular masses.

If we study history, we find that all the movements that have occurred in the course of history, of whatever type may be, have all without exception resulted from the union of a certain number of people. A greater movement naturally requires a greater union, and the greatest movement requires the greatest union. All such unions are more likely to appear in a time of reform and resistance. . . .

That which decides between victory and defeat is the solidity or weakness of the union and whether the ideology that serves as its basis is new or old, true or false. . . .

[The aristocrats and capitalists and other powerful people in society have carried their oppression to an extreme] . . . and consequently the decadence of the state, the sufferings of humanity, and the darkness of society have also reached an extreme. It is then that reform and resistance arise, and that the great union of the popular masses is achieved.

When the great union of the popular masses of France opposed the great union of the adherents of the monarchy and the victory of “political reform” had been attained, many countries followed the French example and undertook all sorts of “political reforms”. Af-

* This article was published in Nos. 2-4 of *Hsiang-chiang ping-lun*, July and August 1919.

ter last year's struggle in Russia, which pitted the great union of the popular masses against the great union of the aristocracy and the great union of the capitalists and led to the victory of "social reform", many countries — Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany — have followed Russia's example and have undertaken all sorts of social reforms. Although this victory is not complete. . . . it may certainly become so, and one can also imagine that it will spread throughout the whole world.

Why is the great union of the popular masses so terribly effective? Because the popular masses in any country are much more numerous than the aristocracy, the capitalists, and the other holders of power in society. . . .

We should know that our brothers of other lands have often employed this method in pursuing their interests. We must arise and imitate them, we must carry out our great union. . . . As soon as we arise and let out a shout, the traitors will get up and tremble and flee for their lives.

If we wish to achieve a great union, in order to resist the powerful people whom we face, who harm their fellow men, and in order to pursue our own interests, we must necessarily have many small unions to serve as its foundation. . . . Because our circumstances and professions are different, there are also certain differences, large or small, in the sphere of our common interests. . . . Hence, the method (union) for seeking our common interests also displays certain differences, large or small. . . .

We are peasants, and so we want to unite with others who cultivate the land like we do, in order to pursue our various interests. The interests of us who cultivate the land can only be protected by ourselves! . . . How do the landlords treat us? Are the rents and taxes heavy or light? Are our houses satisfactory or not? Are our bellies full or not? Is there enough land? Are there those in the village who have no land to cultivate? We must constantly seek answers to all these questions. . . . We are workers, we wish to unite with others who work like ourselves in order to pursue the various interests of us workers. . . . We cannot fail to seek a solution to such questions concerning us workers as the level of our wages, the length of the working day, and the equal or unequal sharing of dividends.

We are students, we are already living in the twentieth century and yet they still compel us to observe the old ceremonies and the

old methods. The country is about to perish, and yet they still paste up posters forbidding us to love our country. . . . We want our own union. . . . We are women, we are sunk even deeper in a sea of bitterness, we want to carry out our union. . . .

FROM MARX

TO MAO



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MISS CHAO'S SUICIDE*

November 16, 1919

FROM MARY
TO MARY
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A person's suicide is entirely determined by circumstances. Was Miss Chao's original idea to seek death? On the contrary, it was to seek life. If Miss Chao ended up by seeking death instead, it is because circumstances drove her to this. The circumstances in which Miss Chao found herself were the following: (1) Chinese society; (2) the Chao family of Nanyang Street in Changsha; (3) the Wu family of Kantzuyuan Street in Changsha, the family of the husband she did not want. These three factors constituted three iron nets, composing a kind of triangular cage. Once caught in these three nets, it was in vain that she sought life in every way possible. There was no way for her to go on living; the contrary of life is death, and Miss Chao thus felt compelled to die. . . . If, among these three factors, there had been one that was not an iron net, or if one of these nets had opened, Miss Chao would certainly not have died. (1) If Miss Chao's parents had not had recourse to compulsion but had yielded before Miss Chao's free will, Miss Chao would certainly not have died; (2) if Miss Chao's parents had not resorted to compulsion but had permitted Miss Chao to explain her point of view to the family of her future husband, and to explain the reasons for her refusal, and if in the end the family of her future husband had accepted her point of view and respected her individual freedom, Miss Chao would certainly not have died; (3) even if her parents and the family of her future husband had refused to accept her free will, if in society there had been a powerful group of public opinion to support her, if there were an entirely new world where the fact of running away from one's parents' home and finding refuge elsewhere were considered honourable and not dishonourable, in this case, too,

* Extracted from several articles published in the *Changsha Ta-kung-pao*, beginning on November 16, 1919.

Miss Chao would certainly not have died. If Miss Chao is dead to day, it is because she was solidly enclosed by the three iron nets (society, her own family, the family of her future husband); she sought life in vain and finally was led to seek death. . . .

Yesterday's incident was important. It happened because of the shameful system of arranged marriages, because of the darkness of the social system, the negation of the individual will, and the absence of the freedom to choose one's own mate. It is to be hoped that interested persons will comment on all aspects of this affair, and that they will defend the honour of a girl who died a martyr's death for the cause of the freedom to choose her own love. . . .

The family of the parents and the family of the future husband are both bound up with society; they are both parts of society. We must understand that the family of the parents and the family of the future husband have committed a crime, but the source of this crime lies in society. It is true that the two families themselves carried out this crime; but a great part of the culpability was transmitted to them by society. Moreover, if society were good even if the families had wanted to carry out this crime they would not have had the opportunity to do so. . . .

Since there are factors in our society that have brought about the death of Miss Chao, this society is an extremely dangerous thing. It was capable of causing the death of Miss Chao; it could also cause the death of Miss Chieh, Miss Sun, or Miss Li. It is capable of killing men as well as women. All of us, the potential victims, must be on our guard before this dangerous thing that could inflict a fatal blow on us. We should protest loudly, warn the other human being who are not yet dead and condemn the countless evils of our society. . . .

If we conduct a campaign in favour of marriage reform, it is first of all the superstitions about marriage that must be demolished, above all the belief that marriages are predestined by fate. Once these beliefs are demolished, the pretext behind which the arrangement of marriages by parents hides itself will disappear at the same time, and then the concept of 'incompatibility of husband and wife' will immediately appear in society. And with the appearance of the concept of incompatibility of husband and wife, the army of the family revolution will arise in countless numbers, and the great wave of the freedom of marriage and of the freedom to love will sweep over China. . . .

My attitude toward suicide is to reject it. . . . First of all, man's goal is to seek life, and he should not go against the grain of his natural tendency and seek death. . . . Secondly, although suicide results from the fact that society deprives people of all hope. . . . We should struggle against society in order to regain the hope that we have lost. . . . We should die fighting. . . . Thirdly, if people show respect for those who have courageously put an end to their own lives, that does not at all mean that they respect suicide as such, but rather that they respect the courageous spirit of resistance to brute force, which inspires the person who commits suicide

It is so much better to be killed in fighting than to take one's own life! The goal of struggle is not "to be killed by others" but "to aspire toward the emergence of a true personality". If a person does not attain this despite all his efforts, if he fights to the death and sacrifices himself, then he will be the most courageous of all on earth, and his tragedy will make a great impression on men's minds! . . .



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COMMUNISM AND DICTATORSHIP*

November 1920 — January 1921

FROM MARX
TO LENIN
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In his lecture at Changsha, Russell . . . took a position in favour of communism but against the dictatorship of the workers and peasants. He said that one should employ the method of education to change the consciousness of the propertied classes, and that in this way it would not be necessary to limit freedom or to have recourse to war and bloody revolution. . . . My objections to Russell's viewpoint can be stated in a few words: "This is all very well as a theory, but it is unfeasible in practice." . . . Education requires money, people and instruments. In today's world money is entirely in the hands of the capitalists. Those who have charge of education are all either capitalists or wives of capitalists. In today's world the schools and the press, the two most important instruments of education are entirely under capitalist control. In short, education in today's world is capitalist education. If we teach capitalism to children, these children, when they grow up will in turn teach capitalism to a second generation of children. Education thus remains in the hands of the capitalists. Then the capitalists have "parliaments" to pass laws protecting the capitalists and handicapping the proletariat; they have "governments" to apply these laws and to enforce the advantages and the prohibitions that they contain; they have "armies" and "police" to defend the well-being of the capitalists and to repress the demands of the proletariat; they have "banks" to serve as repositories in the circulation of their wealth; they have "factories", which are the instruments by which they monopolize the production of goods. Thus, if the communists do not seize political power, they will not be able to find any refuge in this world; how, under such circumstances, could they take charge of education? Thus, the capitalists will continue to control education and to praise their capital

* Extracted from two letters to Tsai Ho-sen, in November 1920 and January 1921.

will continue to control education and to praise their capitalism to the skies, so that the number of converts to the proletariat's communist propaganda will diminish from day to day. Consequently, I believe that the method of education is unfeasible. . . . What I have just said constitutes the first argument. The second argument is that, based on the principle of mental habits and on my observation of human history, I am of the opinion that one absolutely cannot expect the capitalists to become converted to communism. . . . If one wishes to use the power of education to transform them, then since one cannot obtain control of the whole or even an important part of the two instruments of education — schools and the press — even if one has a mouth and a tongue and one or two schools and newspapers as means of propaganda . . . this is really not enough to change the mentality of the adherents of capitalism even slightly; how then can one hope that the latter will repent and turn toward the good? So much from a psychological standpoint. From a historical standpoint . . . one observes that no despot imperialist and militarist throughout history has ever been known to leave the stage of history of his own free will without being overthrown by the people. Napoleon I proclaimed himself emperor and failed; then there was Napoleon III. Yuan Shih-Kai failed; then, also there was Tuan Chi-jui. . . . From what I have just said based on both psychological and a historical standpoint, it can be seen that capitalism cannot be overthrown by the force of a few feeble efforts in the domain of education. This is the second argument. There is yet a third argument, most assuredly a very important argument, even more important in reality. If we use peaceful means to attain the goal of communism, when will we finally achieve it? Let us assume that a century will be required, a century marked by the unceasing groans of the proletariat. What position shall we adopt in the face of this situation? The proletariat is many times more numerous than the bourgeoisie; if we assume that the proletariat constitutes two-thirds of humanity, then one billion of the earth's one billion five hundred million inhabitants are proletarians (I fear that the figure is even higher), who during this century will be cruelly exploited by the remaining third of capitalists. How can we bear this? Furthermore, since the proletariat has already become conscious of the fact that it too should possess wealth, and of the fact that its sufferings are unnecessary, the proletarians are discontented, and a demand for communism has arisen and has already become a fact. This fact confronts us, we

cannot make it disappear; when we become conscious of it we wish to act. This is why, in my opinion, the Russian revolution, as well as the radical communists in every country, will daily grow more powerful and numerous and more tightly organized. This is the natural result. This is the third argument. . . .

There is a further point pertaining to my doubts about anarchism. My argument pertains not merely to the impossibility of a society without power or organization. I should like to mention only the difficulties in the way of the establishment of such form of society and of its final attainment. . . . For all the reasons just stated, my present viewpoint on absolute liberalism, anarchism, and even democracy is that these things are fine in theory, but not feasible in practice. . . .

FROM MARX
TO MAO



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THE ROLE OF THE MERCHANTS IN THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION*

July 11, 1923

FROM MARX

The present coup d'état has roused the merchants, who have persistently ignored politics, and has led them suddenly to look up and pay attention to politics. This is most welcome news! . . . The Shanghai Chamber of Commerce . . . has published a declaration to the whole nation. The declaration says: "We venture to proclaim with sincerity to the Chinese and the foreigners that from the fourteenth day of this month our people do not recognize any action of Tsao Kun and Kao Ling-wei, following their usurpation of political power . . . as qualified to represent the country. . . ."

At the same time the Chamber of Commerce resolved not to recognize the national assembly, which "cannot represent the people's will", and resolved, moreover, to organize a democratic committee as the organ for dealing positively with the affairs of the nation. This action . . . may be regarded as the first gesture of the merchants to intervene in politics and as a manifestation of the fact that the merchants, who remained silent for three years, now speak in awesome tones.

The present political problem in China is none other than the problem of the national revolution [*kuomin ko-ming*]. To use the strength of the people to overthrow the militarists and foreign imperialism, with which the former are in collusion to accomplish their treasonable acts, is the historic mission of the Chinese people. This revolution is the task of the people as a whole. The merchants, workers, peasants, students, and teachers should all come forward to take on the responsibility for a portion of the revolutionary work; but because of historical necessity and current tendencies, the work for

* Extracted from the article "The Peking coup d'état and the Merchants", published in *Hsiang-tao*, Nos. 31-2, July 11, 1923.

which the merchants should be responsible in the national revolution is both more urgent and more important than the work that the rest of the people should take upon themselves. We know that the politics of semi-colonial China is characterized by the fact that the militarists and the foreign powers have banded together to impose a twofold oppression on the people of the whole country. The people of the whole country naturally suffer profoundly under this kind of twofold oppression. Nevertheless, the merchants are the ones who feel these sufferings most acutely and most urgently. Everybody knows that the *likin* and customs duties are matters of life and death for the merchants. The pressing demands for the merchants to "abolish the *likin* and raise the tariffs" are the expression of their most immediate interest. But abolishing the *likin* and raising the tariffs is not something that can be easily done, because abolishing the *likin* hurts the interests of the militarists and raising the tariffs hurts the interest of foreign imperialism. If the *likin* were abolished completely the militarists would grow thinner day by day, and the merchants fatter. In that case, the merchants would need only to shout in order to overthrow the militarists. But the clever militarists definitely will not do such a foolish thing as to lift a stone in this way and crush their own feet. And if one were to increase considerably the tariffs on foreign goods or even go so far as to abolish the tariffs fixed by the treaties and replace them by protective tariffs freely set by the Chinese themselves, thus removing the fetters encumbering the Chinese merchants, the industry and commerce of the country would develop rapidly and foreign goods would no longer be able to gain a foothold in China. The cunning foreign imperialists are even less likely to do such a foolish thing. . . . The positions of the foreign powers and the militarists on the one hand and the merchants on the other are truly incompatible. . . .

The merchants have hitherto "loved peace" and have never imagined the political transformation necessitated a revolution which could not be accomplished by a few telegrams in favour of "the reduction of the number of soldiers, the application of the constitution, and financial reforms". Still less did they imagine that revolution necessitated their personal participation, and that only by calling for the organization of all the people and creating a mass movement could a revolutionary force be brought into existence. They even went so far as to think that political reform did not require a political party and to call the revolutionary efforts of the

Kuomintang superfluous. It is impossible to compare these juvenile and timid attitudes with the present situation without being convulsed with laughter. . . . Judging from the actions of the Shanghai merchants in response to the coup d'état, we know that they have already changed their attitudes, cast away their pacifism, adopted revolutionary methods, drummed up the courage to shoulder responsibility for the affairs of the nation, and progressed rapidly. . . .

The Shanghai merchants have arisen and begun to act. We hope that the merchants outside of Shanghai will all rise up and act together. The present situation is extremely pressing, as though the fire were already singeing our eye-brows, and does not permit us to fall idly asleep once more. At present, we must unite the whole nation in order to carry out the revolution. Factionalism among the merchants cannot be tolerated. They must know that foreign powers and the militarists are the common enemies of all the merchants, as well as of the whole nation. Moreover, the advantages obtained after a successful revolution will be common advantages. It is essential to unite and struggle so as to overthrow the common enemy and assure the common interest. . . . The broader the organization of merchants, the greater will be their influence, the greater will be their ability to lead the people of the whole country, and the more rapid the success of the revolution!

In conclusion, we have the following warnings for the merchants of the whole country: (1) The great cause of revolution is no easy matter, even less so in China, a country under the twofold pressure of the foreign powers and the militarists. The only solution is to call upon the merchants, the workers, the peasants, the students, and the teachers of the whole country, as well as all the others who constitute our nation and who suffer under a common oppression, and to establish a closely knit united front. It is only then that this revolution will succeed. . . . We must no longer neglect the lesson to be learned from previous experience, when the Association of Merchants and Teachers refused participation of the workers. (2) Now that the merchants have already courageously taken the first step in the revolution, they must take the second step . . . endeavour to move forward, and never stop until they have attained their goal. Above all, they must never stop on meeting a slight obstruction, or set out on the false path of making an agreement with the foreign powers and the militarists. Everyone must believe that the only way to save both himself and the nation is through the national revolution. Many

revolutionary causes throughout history may serve as our reference and our guide. Circumstances call upon us to perform a historic task. We can no longer be negligent! To open a new era through revolutionary methods, and to build a new nation — such is the historic mission of the Chinese people. We must never forget it!

FROM MARX
TO MAO



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THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND THE FOREIGNERS*

August 29, 1923

FROM MARX

We often say: "The Chinese Government is the counting-house of our foreign masters". Perhaps there are some who don't believe this. We also say: "The false show of friendship by foreigners (especially Englishmen and Americans) is merely a pretense of 'amity' in order that they may squeeze out more of the fat and blood of the Chinese people." Perhaps there are some who don't believe this either. Ever since the prohibition against the export of cotton was repealed owing to the opposition of the foreigners, it has been impossible not to believe what we have just said to some extent. Now that the foreigners have put pressure on the government to abolish the cigarette tax in Chekiang and other provinces, it is impossible not to believe it a little more. . . .

Of the cigarettes produced by English and American companies, a small portion is imported from England, America, and Japan, and a large portion is manufactured by English and American merchants using Chinese tobacco and Chinese labour in factories set up in Shanghai, Hankow, and elsewhere in China. When the manufactured cigarettes leave the factory, small tax is paid, in accordance with "treaties". They are then transported in bulk to the various provinces, and China is not allowed again to tax them "freely". In Chekiang Province alone, the sale of cigarettes amounts to "over ten million yuan a year". There is no accurate total figure for the annual sale of cigarettes in the whole nation; estimating on the basis of sales in Chekiang alone, it must be above 200 million yuan. This is really "frightening to hear"! I ask my 400 million brethren to ponder awhile: What does the "amity" of the foreigners really mean?

* Extracted from the article "The cigarette tax", published in *Hsiang-tao*, No. 38, August 29, 1923.

The “Council of Ministers” of the Chinese Government is really both accommodating and agreeable. If one of our foreign masters farts, it is a lovely perfume. If our foreign masters want to export cotton, the Council of Ministers thereupon abolishes the prohibition of the export of cotton; if our foreign masters want to bring in cigarettes, the Council of Ministers thereupon “instructs the several provinces by telegram to stop levying taxes on cigarettes”. Again, I ask my 400 million brethren to ponder a little. Isn’t it true that the Chinese Government is the counting-house of our foreign masters?

FROM MARX

TO MAO



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THE BITTER SUFFERINGS OF THE PEASANTS IN KIANGSU AND CHEKIANG, AND THEIR MOVEMENT OF RESISTANCE*

November 25, 1926
FROM MARX

TO MAO

If one takes the boat from Wuhsi, the first place at which one arrives is the market town of Kushan. It is situated between the three *hsien* of Chiangyin, Shangshu, and Wuhsi. In these three *hsien* there are many big landlords who oppress the farmers very severely. Last autumn, a certain Kushan student who had studied in Japan, by the name of Chow Shui-ping, returned to this village. (Chou had first graduated from Wuhsi provincial Teachers' College). He could not bear the sight (of such oppression), and encouraged the tenant farmers to organize into a body called the "Tenant Farmers' Co-operative Self-Help Society". Chou moved from village to village speaking with tears in his eyes of the sufferings of the peasants. A large number of Kushan peasants followed him, and those in the neighbouring areas of Chiangyin, Shangshu, and Wuhsi *hsien* were all inflamed. They rose like clouds and opposed the rich but heartless big landlords, and with one voice demanded the reduction of rent. But before the peasants had completely united themselves, the bad landlords had already united themselves and the gentry and landlords of the three *hsien* — Chiangyin, Shangshu, and Wuhsi — acted simultaneously. Letters and telegrams fell like snowflakes on Sun Chuan-fang; Sun Chuan-fang of course obeyed the order of the landlords. Last November, he dissolved the "Tenant Farmers' Co-operative Self-Help Society" and arrested Chou Shui-ping, who was executed in January of this year. It seemed that the movement for rent reduction had been suppressed for a time. But when Chou Shui-

* Extracted from an article of the same title published in *Hsiang-tao*, No. 179, November 25, 1926.

ping's coffin was returned to Kushan to be exhibited in his house, the farmers went up to the coffin daily in crowds and kowtowed before it, saying, "Mr. Chou died for us, we will avenge his death." This year there was a big drought, and the harvest was poor; the farmers again thought of rising up to demand rent reduction. This shows that they are not in the least afraid to die. They know that a united struggle to reduce the exploitation of the avaricious and cruel landlords is their only way out.

Tzu Hsi is located in Chekiang, east of Ningpo. In recent months there occurred a great insurrection in the Shanpei area of this *hsien*. The peasants of this Shanpei area are violent by nature, and frequently indulge in armed combat. On top of this, in recent years the officials and police have been unreasonably oppressive and the bad landlords have stepped up their exploitation. So the accumulated exasperation of the peasants was already deep. By chance the climate this year was unstable, and as a result the rice and cotton crops failed, but the landlords refused to make any reduction whatever in their harsh rents. The peasants' insurrection against famine thereupon exploded. Once the farmers' insurrection broke out, all the elements *déclassés* joined them very courageously. In the morning of September 13, there assembled more than 2,000 people who went to the police station to report the famine, and clashed with the police. They burned down the police station, and distributed the arms of the police among themselves. Then they turned to go to the houses of the village gentry landlords to "eat up powerful families". After eating them up, and out of anger at the evils of the village gentry landlords, they destroyed the landlords' screens, paintings, and sculptured ancient doors and windows. They did this every day; they did not listen much to others' exhortation but let off their steam in this manner. The day after (each such outburst), the landlord in question ran to the city to report, and soldiers and police came down to the village and turned every thing upside down, but the leaders of the peasants had already mostly escaped. There was widespread propaganda about "Violation of the Law" and "Crimes", the farmers became fearful, and thus the movement was suppressed. The reason for the failure of this movement is that the masses did not fully organize themselves, and did not have leadership, so that the movement barely got started and then failed.

THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF AN WU-CHING'S MARTYRDOM

1929

FROM MARX

Young communists and non-communists who have brought new blood and new spirit to the revolutionary ranks are precious people. Without them the ranks can never be expanded and the revolution can never be won. However, their weakness lies in a lack of experience, and experience comes only from personal participation in revolutionary struggles. The inexperienced can become experienced if they begin from the lowest level and work steadily without a grain of dishonesty for several years.

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OPPOSE BOOK WORSHIP

May 1930

I. NO INVESTIGATION, NO RIGHT TO SPEAK

Unless you have investigated a problem, you will be deprived of the right to speak on it. Isn't that too harsh? Not in the least. When you have not probed into a problem, into the present facts and its past history, and know nothing of its essentials, whatever you say about it will undoubtedly be nonsense. Talking nonsense solves no problems, as everyone knows, so why is it unjust to deprive you of the right to speak? Quite a few comrades always keep their eyes shut and talk nonsense, and for a Communist that is disgraceful. How can a Communist keep his eyes shut and talk nonsense?

It won't do!

It won't do!

You must investigate!

You must not talk nonsense!

II. TO INVESTIGATE A PROBLEM IS TO SOLVE IT

You can't solve a problem? Well, get down and investigate the present facts and its past history! When you have investigated the problem thoroughly, you will know how to solve it. Conclusions invariably come after investigation, and not before. Only a block-head cudgels his brains on his own, or together with a group, to "find solution" or "evolve an idea" without making any investigation. It must be stressed that this cannot possibly lead to any effective solution or any good idea. In other words, he is bound to arrive at a wrong solution and a wrong idea.

There are not a few comrades doing inspection work, as well as guerrilla leaders and cadres newly in office, who like to make po-

litical pronouncements the moment they arrive at a place and who strut about, criticizing this and condemning that when they have only seen the surface of things or minor details. Such purely subjective nonsensical talk is indeed detestable. These people are bound to make a mess of things, lose the confidence of the masses and prove incapable of solving any problem at all. When they come across difficult problems, quite a number of people in leading positions simply heave a sigh without being able to solve them. They lose patience and ask to be transferred on the ground that they "have not the ability and cannot do the job". These are cowards' words. Just get moving on your two legs, go the rounds of every section placed under your charge and "inquire into everything"¹ as Confucius did, and then you will be able to solve the problems, however little is your ability; for although your head may be empty before you go out of doors, it will be empty no longer when you return, but will contain all sorts of material necessary for the solution of the problems, and that is how problems are solved. Must you go out of doors? Not necessarily. You can call a fact-finding meeting of people familiar with the situation in order to get at the source of what you call a difficult problem and come to know how it stands now, and then it will be easy to solve your difficult problem.

Investigation may be likened to the long months of pregnancy, and solving a problem to the day of birth. To investigate a problem is, indeed, to solve it.

COMMERCIAL III. OPPOSE BOOK WORSHIP

Whatever is written in a book is right — such is still the mentality of culturally backward Chinese peasants. Strangely enough, within the Communist Party there are also people who always say in a discussion, "Show me where it's written in the book." When we say that a directive of a higher organ of leadership is correct, that is not just because it comes from "a higher organ of leadership" but because its contents conform with both the objective and subjective circumstances of the struggle and meet its requirements. It is quite wrong to take a formalistic attitude and blindly carry out directives without discussing and examining them in the light of actual conditions simply because they come from a higher organ. It is the mischief done by this formalism which explains why the line and tac-

tics of the Party do not take deeper root among the masses. To carry out a directive of a higher organ blindly, and seemingly without any disagreement, is not really to carry it out but is the most artful way of opposing or sabotaging it. The method of studying the social sciences exclusively from the book is likewise extremely dangerous and may even lead one onto the road of counter-revolution. Clear proof of this is provided by the fact that whole batches of Chinese Communists who confined themselves to books in their study of the social sciences have turned into counter-revolutionaries. When we say Marxism is correct, it is certainly not because Marx was a "prophet", but because his theory has been proved correct in our practice and in our struggle. We need Marxism in our struggle. In our acceptance of his theory no such formalisation of mystical notion as that of "prophecy" ever enters our minds. Many who have read Marxist books have become renegades from the revolution, whereas illiterate workers often grasp Marxism very well. Of course we should study Marxist books, but this study must be integrated with our country's actual conditions. We need books, but we must overcome book worship, which is divorced from the actual situation.

How can we overcome book worship? The only way is to investigate the actual situation.

IV. WITHOUT INVESTIGATING THE ACTUAL SITUATION, THERE IS BOUND TO BE AN IDEALIST APPRAISAL OF CLASS FORCES AND AN IDEALIST GUIDANCE IN WORK, RESULTING EITHER IN OPPORTUNISM OR IN PUTSCHISM

Do you doubt this conclusion? Facts will force you to accept it. Just try and appraise the political situation or guide the struggle without making any investigation, and you will see whether or not such appraisal or guidance is groundless and idealist and whether or not it will lead to opportunist or putschist errors. Certainly it will. This is not because of failure to make careful plans before taking action but because of failure to study the specific social situation carefully before making the plans, as often happens in our Red Army guerrilla units. Officers of the Li Kuei² type do not discriminate when they punish the men for offenses. As a result, the offenders feel they have been unfairly treated, many disputes ensue, and the

leaders lose all prestige. Does this not happen frequently in the Red Army?

We must wipe out idealism and guard against all opportunist and putschist errors before we can succeed in winning over the masses and defeating the enemy. The only way to wipe out idealism is to make the effort and investigate the actual situation.

V. THE AIM OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INVESTIGATION IS TO ARRIVE AT A CORRECT APPRAISAL OF CLASS FORCES AND THEN TO FORMULATE CORRECT TACTICS FOR THE STRUGGLE

This is our answer to the question: Why do we have to investigate social and economic conditions? Accordingly, the object of our investigation is all the social classes and not fragmentary social phenomena. Of late, the comrades in the Fourth Army of the Red Army have generally given attention to the work of investigation,³ but the method many of them employ is wrong. The results of their investigation are therefore as trivial as a grocer's accounts, or resemble the many strange tales a country bumpkin hears when he comes to town, or are like a distant view of a populous city from a mountain top. This kind of investigation is of little use and cannot achieve our main purpose. Our main purpose is to learn the political and economic situation of the various social classes. The outcome of our investigation should be a picture of the present situation of each class and the ups and downs of its development. For example, when we investigate the composition of the peasantry, not only must we know the number of owner-peasants, semi-owner peasants and tenant-peasants, who are differentiated according to tenancy relationships, but more especially we must know the number of rich peasants, middle peasants and poor peasants, who are differentiated according to class or stratum. When we investigate the composition of the merchants, not only must we know the number in each trade, such as grain, clothing, medicinal herbs, etc., but more especially we must know the number of small merchants, middle merchants and big merchants. We should investigate not only the state of each trade, but more especially the class relations within it. We should investigate the relationships not only between the different trades but more especially between the different classes. Our chief

method of investigation must be to dissect the different social classes, the ultimate purpose being to understand their interrelations, to arrive at a correct appraisal of class forces and then to formulate the correct tactics for the struggle, defining which classes constitute the main force in the revolutionary struggle, which classes are to be won over as allies and which classes are to be overthrown. This is our sole purpose.

What are the social classes requiring investigation?

They are:

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TO MAO
★
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- The industrial proletariat
- The handicraft workers
- The farm labourers
- The poor peasants
- The urban poor
- The lumpen-proletariat
- The master handicraftsmen
- The small merchants
- The middle peasants
- The rich peasants
- The landlords
- The commercial bourgeoisie
- The industrial bourgeoisie

In our investigation we should give attention to the state of all these classes or strata. Only the industrial proletariat and industrial bourgeoisie are absent in the areas where we are now working, and we constantly come across all the others. Our tactics of struggle are tactics in relation to all these classes and strata.

Another serious shortcoming in our past investigations has been the undue stress on the countryside to the neglect of the towns, so that many comrades have always been vague about our tactics towards the urban poor and the commercial bourgeoisie. The development of the struggle has enabled us to leave the mountains for the plains.⁴ We have descended physically, but we are still up in the mountains mentally. We must understand the towns as well as the countryside, or we shall be unable to meet the needs of the revolutionary struggle.

VI. VICTORY IN CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE WILL DEPEND ON THE CHINESE COMRADES' UNDERSTANDING OF CHINESE CONDITIONS

The aim of our struggle is to attain socialism via the stage of democracy. In this task, the first step is to complete the democratic revolution by winning the majority of the working class and arousing the peasant masses and the urban poor for the overthrow of the landlord class, imperialism and the Kuomintang regime. The next step is to carry out the socialist revolution, which will follow on the development of this struggle. The fulfilment of this great revolutionary task is no simple or easy job and will depend entirely on correct and firm tactics on the part of the proletarian party. If its tactics of struggle are wrong, or irresolute and wavering, the revolution will certainly suffer temporary defeat. It must be borne in mind that the bourgeois parties, too, constantly discuss their tactics of struggle. They are considering how to spread reformist influences among the working class so as to mislead it and turn it away from Communist Party leadership, how to get the rich peasants to put down the uprisings of the poor peasants and how to organize gangsters to suppress the revolutionary struggles. In a situation when the class struggle grows increasingly acute and is waged at close quarters, the proletariat has to depend for its victory entirely on the correct and firm tactics of struggle of its own party, the Communist Party. A Communist Party's correct and unswerving tactics of struggle can in no circumstance be created by a few people sitting in an office; they emerge in the course of mass struggle, that is, through actual experience. Therefore, we must at all times study social conditions and make practical investigations. Those comrades who are inflexible, conservative, formalistic and groundlessly optimistic think that the present tactics of struggle are perfect, that the "book of documents"⁵ of the Party's Sixth National Congress guarantees lasting victory, and that one can always be victorious merely by adhering to the established methods. These ideas are absolutely wrong and have nothing in common with the idea that Communists should create favourable new situations through struggle; they represent a purely conservative line. Unless it is completely discarded, this line will cause great losses to the revolution and do harm to these comrades themselves. There are obviously some comrades in our Red Army who are content to leave things as they are, who do

not seek to understand anything thoroughly and are groundlessly optimistic, and they spread the fallacy that "this is proletarian". They eat their fill and sit dozing in their offices all day long without ever moving a step and going out among the masses to investigate. Whenever they open their mouths, their platitudes make people sick. To awaken these comrades we must raise our voices and cry out to them:

Change your conservative ideas without delay!
Replace them by progressive and militant Communist ideas!
Get into the struggle!
Go among the masses and investigate the facts!

TO MAO

VII. THE TECHNIQUE OF INVESTIGATION

1. Hold fact-finding meetings and undertake investigation through discussions. This is the only way to get near the truth, the only way to draw conclusions. It is easy to commit mistakes if you do not hold fact-finding meetings for investigation through discussions but simply rely on one individual relating his own experience. You cannot possibly draw more or less correct conclusions at such meetings if you put questions casually instead of raising key questions for discussion.

2. What kind of people should attend the fact-finding meetings? They should be people well acquainted with social and economic conditions. As far as age is concerned, older people are best, because they are rich in experience and not only know what is going on but understand the causes and effects. Young people with experience of struggle should also be included, because they have progressive ideas and sharp eyes. As far as occupation is concerned, there should be workers, peasants, merchants, intellectuals, and occasionally soldiers, and sometimes even vagrants. Naturally, when a particular subject is being looked into, those who have nothing to do with it need not be present. For example, workers, peasants and students need not attend when commerce is the subject of investigation.

3. Which is better, a large fact-finding meeting or a small one? That depends on the investigator's ability to conduct a meeting. If he is good at it, a meeting of as many as a dozen or even

twenty or more people can be called. A large meeting has its advantages; from the answers you get fairly accurate statistics (*e.g.*, in finding out the percentage of poor peasants in the total peasant population) and fairly correct conclusions (*e.g.*, in finding out whether equal or differentiated land redistribution is better). Of course, it has its disadvantages too; unless you are skillful in conducting meetings, you will find it difficult to keep order. So the number of people attending a meeting depends on the competence of the investigator. However, the minimum is three, or otherwise the information obtained will be too limited to correspond to the real situation.

4. Prepare a detailed outline for the investigation. A detailed outline should be prepared beforehand, and the investigator should ask questions according to the outline, with those present at the meeting giving their answers. Any points which are unclear or doubtful should be put up for discussion. The detailed outline should include main subjects and sub-headings and also detailed items. For instance, taking commerce as a main subject, it can have such sub-headings as cloth, grain, other necessities and medicinal herbs; again, under cloth, there can be such detailed items as calico, homespun and silk and satin.

5. Personal participation. Everyone with responsibility for giving leadership — from the chairman of the township government to the chairman of the central government, from the detachment leader to the commander-in-chief, from the secretary of a Party branch to the general secretary — must personally undertake investigation into the specific social and economic conditions and not merely rely on reading reports. For investigation and reading reports are two entirely different things.

6. Probe deeply. Anyone new to investigation work should make one or two thorough investigations in order to gain full knowledge of a particular place (say, a village or a town) of a particular problem (say, the problem of grain or currency). Deep probing into a particular place or problem will make future investigation of other places or problems easier.

7. Make your own notes. The investigator should not only preside at fact-finding meetings and give proper guidance to those present but should also make his own notes and record the results himself. To have others do it for him is no good.

NOTES

¹ See *Confucian Analects*, Book III, “Pa Yi”: “When Confucius entered the Ancestral Temple he inquired into everything.”

² Li Kuei was a hero in the well-known Chinese novel *Shui Hu Chuan (Heroes of the Marshes)* which describes the peasant war that occurred towards the end of the Northern Sung Dynasty (960-1127). He was simple, outspoken and very loyal to the revolutionary cause of the peasants, but crude and tactless.

³ Comrade Mao Tse-tung has always laid great stress on investigation, regarding social investigation as the most important task and the basis for defining policy in the work of leadership. The work of investigation was gradually developed in the Fourth Army of the Red Army on Comrade Mao Tse-tung's initiative. He stipulated that social investigation should be a regular part of the work, and the Political Department of the Red Army prepared detailed forms covering such items as the state of the mass struggle, the condition of the reactionaries, the economic life of the people and the amount of land owned by each class in the rural areas. Wherever the Red Army went, it first made itself familiar with the class situation in the locality and then formulated slogans suited to the needs of the masses.

⁴ Here “the mountains” are the Chinggang mountain area along the borders of Kiangsi and Hunan Provinces; the “plains” are those in southern Kiangsi and western Fukien. In January 1929, comrade Mao Tse-tung led the main force of the Fourth Army of the Red Army down from the Chinggang Mountains to southern Kiangsi and western Fukien in order to set up two large revolutionary base areas.

⁵ The “Book of documents” consisted of the resolutions adopted at the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in July 1928, including the political resolution and the resolutions on the peasant question, the land question, the organization of political power, etc. Early in 1929 the Front Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army published these resolutions in book form for distribution to the Party organizations in the Red Army and to the local Party organizations.

DECREE REGARDING MARRIAGE*

January 28, 1931

Under feudal domination, marriage is a barbaric and inhuman institution. The oppression and suffering borne by women is far greater than that of man. Only the victory of the workers' and peasants' revolution, followed by the first step toward the economic emancipation of men and women, brings with it a change in the marriage relationship and makes it free. In the Soviet districts, marriages now are contracted on a free basis. Free choice must be the basic principle of every marriage. The whole feudal system of marriage, including the power of parents to arrange marriage for their children, to exercise compulsion, and all purchase and sale in marriage contracts shall henceforth be abolished.

Although women have obtained freedom from the feudal yoke, they are still labouring under tremendous physical handicaps (for example, the binding of the feet) and have not obtained complete economic independence. Therefore on questions concerning divorce, it becomes necessary to protect the interests of women and place the greater part of the obligations and responsibilities entailed by divorce upon men.

Children are the masters of the new society. Under the old system little attention was paid to children. Consequently special regulations have been established concerning the protection of children.

These present regulations are hereby made public and shall enter into force as of December 1, 1931.

Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee

Hsiang Ying

Chang Kuo-tao, Vice-Chairmen

January 28, 1931

* This is the full text of a decree of the First Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, entitled "Provisional Marriage Regulations".

A LETTER FROM THE CHINESE WORKERS'
AND PEASANTS' RED ARMY TO
OUR BROTHERS THE SOLDIERS OF THE
WHITE ARMY ON THE SUBJECT OF THE
FORCED OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA BY
JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

September 25, 1931

Soldiers, Our Brothers!

Do not the Kuomintang militarists frequently tell you that it is your responsibility to “defend the country and protect the people”? But look, at present Japanese imperialist troops have already occupied all the most important cities of Manchuria. They have massacred the toiling masses of workers and peasants in Manchuria and our soldiers with guns, cannons, and bombs, and already regard Manchuria as their colony. May I ask: How are the Kuomintang militarists carrying out their responsibility to “defend the country and protect the people”? What do they tell you now?

Confronted by such violent behaviour on the part of Japanese imperialism, the Kuomintang militarists tell you “we must not resist”, they tell you “reasonable people should submit to violence”; they ask you to stretch out your neck and let the Japanese imperialist robbers butcher you; they ask you to submit peacefully and to become “men without a country”, slaves of Japanese imperialism. From this you can see that the Kuomintang militarists can only toady and capitulate to imperialism, can only act as the running dogs of imperialism. They cannot “defend the country” nor can they “protect the people”.

And yet, for the sake of enlarging their own spheres of influence, and of exploiting and butchering the Chinese people on a still larger scale, the Kuomintang militarists have, year after year, car-

ried on a confused military struggle among themselves. And in the name of these wars among militarists, they bravely urge you to go to the battlefield to kill your own brothers, to destroy the lives and property of the people; they levy vexing and irregular taxes, impress men into coolie service and requisition horses; they suck the last drop of blood of the toiling masses; they butcher the revolutionary workers and peasants; they force people to grow opium to poison the masses; they have created calamities (floods, drought, and famine) without precedent throughout China; in exploiting and butchering the masses they have shown great resolution and courage!

Especially when the masses of workers and peasants of our soviet area arose on their own initiative and drove out all the imperialists, overthrew the rule of the Kuomintang, confiscated all the land of the landlord class, enforced the eight-hour day, created the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and established the Soviet Government of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, all the militarists of the Kuomintang were mortally offended and manifested their resolution and courage. Once, twice, three times, they attacked us with the aid of the imperialists; they used airplanes, bombs, poison gas, cannons, and machine guns to butcher the people of the soviet area. If we do not destroy them root and branch, they will definitely not leave us alone, although their attacks have all been defeated through strenuous effort by us and by masses. They are also extraordinarily brave in attacking the people's soviet political power and the people's Red Army.

Soldiers, our brothers! You have had enough of the deception and oppression of such militarists. Think for a moment. Why do you risk your lives on behalf of these militarists? Can you say you do so in order to live and feed your families? In reality you yourselves often do not receive a copper of pay. You yourselves have neither enough to eat nor warm clothing. How can you feed a family? Your superior officers treat you like cattle, like cannon fodder; they want you to risk your lives to massacre your own worker and peasant brothers so that they can rise in rank and enrich themselves.

Soldiers, our brothers! You must think of another way out. There is a way out for you — revolution! You now have guns and cannons in your hands. First kill your reactionary superior officers then unite with the workers, peasants, and all the toiling masses of your area to overthrow the fucking Kuomintang Government [*Kuomintang ti tao cheng-fu*]; confiscate the land of the landlord class and distribute it among the poor peasants, confiscate the food and the houses of the

wealthy and distribute them among the poor; let the workers do only eight hours of work a day; then, organize yourselves to run your own affairs. In this way, you will have created a government of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, that is, a Soviet Government. You will have become the armed force of the workers and peasants — the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. If there is a Soviet Government and a Red Army near your garrison area, then when you have either taken as prisoners or killed your reactionary superior officers, present yourself there to join the Red Army. Only the Soviet Government and only the Red Army can protect the interests of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, overthrow the Kuomintang, overthrow imperialism, and really defend the people.

Soldiers, our brothers! Turn your guns in the opposite direction and fight to overthrow imperialism and the Kuomintang, which exploit, oppress, and butcher the Chinese labouring masses; fight to establish the Soviet Government and the Red Army of the workers, peasants, and soldiers! We your brothers, the hundreds of thousands of soldiers of the Red Army, truly welcome you to our ranks.

Down with imperialism and the Kuomintang!

Establish the Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Soviet Government!

Long live the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army!

Long live the victory of the Chinese Soviet Revolution!

Commander in-Chief of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and Commander of the First Army: Chu Teh

Chief of the Central Political Department of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army: Mao Tse-tung

Commander of the Second Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army: Ho Lung

Commander of the Third Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army: Peng Teh-huai

General of the Third Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army: Huang Kung-lueh

September 25, 1931

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS A LEAGUE OF ROBBERS!*

October 6, 1932

FROM MARX

Workers, peasants, and soldiers of all China! Exploited masses of the whole country!

TO MAO

The Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic long ago told the popular masses of the whole country that the League of Nations is a League of Robbers by which the various imperialisms are dismembering China. The principal task of the Lytton Commission of Enquiry sent to China by the League was to prepare the dismemberment of China and the repression of all the revolutionary movements that have raised the flag of the Chinese Soviets.

Now the Commission of Enquiry of the league of imperialist robbers — the Lytton Commission — has already published its report regarding the dismemberment of China. This report is an admirable document shown to the Chinese popular masses by the imperialists regarding the dismemberment they propose to inflict on China, and yet the Kuomintang, which is selling out and dishonouring the country, as well as the government which is the emanation of the Kuomintang, have accepted it completely! . . .

The Lytton Report is the bill of sale by which imperialism reduced the Chinese people to slavery! The Soviet Government calls on the popular masses of the whole country to participate in an armed uprising under the direction of the Soviet Government, to wage a national revolutionary war in order to tear to shreds the Lytton Report, and to oppose all the new projects of the imperialists for dismembering China, repressing the Chinese revolution, and attacking

* Extracted from a telegram of the Chinese Soviet Government, dated October 6, 1932.

the Soviet regions and the Soviet union. Let us hurl out of China, obtain the complete liberation and independence of the Chinese people! Let us defend the Soviet Union with arms in our hands, let us establish a close alliance between the toiling masses of China and of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government proclaims to the workers, peasants, and soldiers of the whole country, and to all the exploited popular masses, that if we really want to wage national revolutionary war and oppose the dismemberment of China by the imperialists, we must first overthrow the reactionary domination of the Kuomintang, these scavengers who pick up the scraps of the imperialist dismemberment of China, and who are repressing the national war! . . .

FROM MARX
TO MAO



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PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ON THE LAND INVESTIGATION CAMPAIGN*

August 29, 1933

FROM MARX

I. THE GREAT VICTORY

Under the call of the Party and the Central [Soviet] Government the Land Investigation Campaign has been unleashed widely. If we assume that the Land Investigation Campaign in the past was merely in the initial stage, then the land investigation of eight counties during June has achieved more than what has been accomplished over the half year since winter. Generally speaking, in the eight counties that have held meetings, the Land Investigation Campaign has advanced to a new phase having become a broad mass movement. Achievement in two counties, Juichin and Posheng are the greatest, and they have searched out two thousand and several hundred households of landlords and rich peasants, while the counties, Shengli, Yutu, Whichang, Tingtung, Changting, Shihcheng and Nighua, all have achieved initial results. In all the districts and *hsiang* that have achieved results in the land investigation a broad mass struggle has been unleashed. Many stalemate situations which prevailed in the past in the Soviet work and in the Party work have now become active. Many undesirable elements in the Soviets have been washed out, and the counter-revolutionary elements who were hidden in the countryside have been dealt with severe punishments. In a word, the feudal remnant forces have suffered disastrous defeat before the broad masses. On this basis various activities are ever more unfolded. In the regions where some results were achieved in the land investigation, the expansion of the Red Army and local armed forces, the promotion of economic construction bonds, and the growth of

* This is a translation from the document in *Tou-cheng (Struggle)*, No. 24, August 29, 1933.

co-operatives, as well as the programs of culture building like clubs, evening classes, and primary schools, all have gained extremely great achievements and all the work is being carried through ever more smoothly. Based on the activeness of the masses, large numbers of activists have joined the Party on their own, and are drawn into the Soviet's work. The best example is Jentien District of Juichin. With the assistance of the Central Government Work Corps the Land Investigation Campaign in Jentien has spurred the masses of the entire district who have in fifty-five days, thoroughly stamped out the feudal remnants, searched out some three hundred landlord and rich peasant families, brought before a firing squad the so-called "big tigers," twelve counter-revolutionaries, for execution and suppressed counter-revolutionary activities; they have arrested among the Soviet work personnel, the class heretics who have sneaked into the [district] Soviet. The entire district has searched out a land of 22,000 *mou* (*mou* = 0.0614 *ha*) and some 20,000 toiling masses in the district have each acquired in average an additional land of one *mou* and two *mou* and were distributed countless belongings of the *haoshen* and landlords. Relying on the unprecedented height of mass activism, they have expanded the Red Army [detachments] in fifty-five days by some 700 people, who have joined the Juichin Model Division, without a single person deserting. They have saved grains, to sell to the Red Army, which amounted to some 1900 *tan*. No other district of the whole county can match it. At the instance of various *hsiang* the entire district assumed the promotional sale of economic construction bonds worth 40,000 yuan. Landlord fines and rich peasant taxes which were collected totalled 7,500 yuan and those that can be continually raised will be 10,000 yuan. Co-operatives have grown rapidly and the institutions of culture and education such as clubs, study classes, evening classes also have increased. The number of Party members has expanded and the leadership of the Party has been strengthened. The labour union work, too, has moved forward. The entire district has transformed, to breath a fresh spirit. From one of the backward district of Juichin, it has altered its status in fifty-five days and became a first rate district comparable to Wuyang. We now want to ask: Why has Jentien District achieved such a great result? That we should point out: because of their understanding of the import of the task of land investigation and because of their formula of mobilization, their class line and their mass work, which have been resolutely carried out according to the cor-

rect directives of the Central Bureau [of the Soviet Areas] and the Central Government, they have performed a genuine Bolshevik work. In the way of appreciating the task, they were aware that the Land Investigation Campaign and the revolutionary war are closely linked together. Hence, they have carried through this task in earnest, firmly grasped the leadership of the Land Investigation Campaign, and developed the local work systematically. In the way of the mobilization formula, they firmly grasped the work of the most and relatively backward seven *hsiang* among the eleven *hsiang* of the entire district. In these seven *hsiang* Soviets they mobilized the labour unions, Poor Peasant Corps and other mass organizations through which they went out to mobilize the broad masses. In the way of the class line they resolutely executed the tactic of relying on the hired hands and poor peasant in alliance with the middle peasants, thus broadly developing the Poor Peasant Corps. They explained that land investigation is not land distribution and that class examination is not to examine the class of the middle and poor peasants and hired hands. The work of "class talk" has been done very sufficiently. When the landlords and rich peasants of Wofeng *hsiang* intimidated the middle peasants and drove a section of them into panic, our comrades paid a visit to several middle peasants and talked to them individually. After they had relayed [the talk] to other middle peasants, the middle peasants of Wofeng *hsiang* began to quiet down immediately. Actively supported by the land investigation policy of the [*hsiang*] Soviet they [the middle peasants] have moved into a joint attack on the landlords and rich peasants, from whom they have endured extortions previously, along with the poor peasants and hired hands. Comrades in Jentien District have once incorrectly classified the status of several peasant families but they have promptly corrected the mistake. As for directing the mass work, they first of all conducted widespread propaganda. What they held was not a district-wide or *hsiang*-wide meeting but a village or residence meeting. Thus, they got access to the broader masses for whom they have repeatedly conducted propaganda and agitation. Therefore, the masses of the entire district have come to understand clearly that the landlord investigation and class examination are their own responsibility and that they are for their own interests. They then went on to investigate class status, they spurred many people to go out to investigate, gathering data in detail on each status to be proven to the masses. Thus, no incident of mass discontent took place. And

then the approval of class status was decided first through the analysis of the land investigation committee, which was then referred to the Poor Peasant Corps for discussion and confirmation. It was further sent to the District Soviet for approval. Again, it was sent back to the concerned village to hold a meeting for further explanation and approval by a show of hands, and then the confiscation was executed. In distributing the property as well as the land, all the working personnel understood that they ought to be exemplary, not to take things but to distribute them entirely among the masses, allocation more to the village directly involved in the confiscation, and less to other villages. Thus they obtained complete satisfaction from the masses. The land was also promptly distributed. While the land elsewhere was distributed only after a prolonged delay, there was no such a phenomenon in Jentien District. Hence, it promptly spurred the masses. Their method of first breaking into large and backward villages, was also correct. They had no fear of these large villages, nor did they employ barbarous methods to deal with them. What they did with regard to the large villages was to concentrate fire power on them, making more and more propaganda beginning with local activists, to unit and educate them, and through them they reached out to other masses. With great patience they went on to carry through the village, the work of this nature. In appearance it looked tedious but in practice it was fast. In a period of fifty-five days they have spurred without exception all the large backward villages of Jentien District and in a very short time stamped out backwardness of these villages. They could not break into a village of Pokang *hsiang*. There were previously two "big tigers" who were restive all the time. They took a different method. First they captured these two rascals and convicted them in circuit court held in the locality. With the masses' enthusiastic support they were executed by a firing squad. Thereupon the mass struggle became intensive like a violent fire. They held ten mass tribunals and three circuit courts. All these followed the extremely broad mass line with many residents of the *hsiang* attending and other *hsiang* sending representatives from each village — a small *hsiang* sending a score of people or so, a large *hsiang* forty to fifty people. Therefore, every public trial and the result of a tribunal were all at once relayed to the *hsiang* and all villages of the entire district. It enabled them not only to punish or execute individuals who deserved it, but also to think immediately that the same dealing will have to be accorded to

similar evil-doers in their own locality. The Land Investigation Campaign in Jentien District can truly be regarded as a model for all the Soviet Areas! The work in Chiupao District of Juichin has achieved an extremely great result. They first firmly grasped three *hsiang* to work on. They called members of the land investigation committee of each *hsiang* to attend a three-day training session in the District Soviet, where the mobilization formula, the class line, and the method of winning the masses were clearly discussed. They initiated a measure for the problem of confiscation and distribution. Their measure has been that, in the confiscation of a landlord household, they called upon the masses of the village and the household to go together to a mass meeting where a confiscation and distribution committee was selected. Under the surveillance of the masses they proceeded to the confiscation, piling up the confiscated items on the terrace. Again with the masses' consent, they immediately distributed them to the masses who deserved. Edible items also called for disposal, that is, letting the people have a hearty eating together, slaughtering hogs and cooking rice. This measure in Chiupao District has scored the maximum effectiveness. Since their confiscation and distribution committee was not a standing organization but a provisional one, it has greatly enhanced intimate relations with the masses (with regard to the confiscation and distribution of land, it was still assumed by the regular land committee). It did not require all the items to be carried to the *hsiang* Soviet nor did it have to concentrate on a certain number of households only before taking up the distribution in others. It has thus avoided the shortcoming of being procrastinated and things being stolen away in the meanwhile. Like the class line and the work method in Chiupao District they were also generally correct. Therefore, they could spur the broad masses to commence the class examination on their own. They have carried it through in such a way that not a single landlord or rich peasant came to the *hsiang* Soviet or District Soviet to dispute his status; it was completely different from the land investigation of the past. In the past there were after all many landlords and rich peasants who had been classified, came to the Soviet for nuisance, arguing that they had been incorrectly classified. Not only the persons themselves but also even a *hsiang* representative and the man in charge of the Poor Peasant Corps came on their behalf of testify. This time, naturally, not only did they make no nuisance, but they could not do so even if they wanted to. Not a

single person of the clans and relatives came to their assistance. There was no possibility for them to make fuss as their power was shorn off. This even proves that Chiupao District has been extremely thorough in spurring the masses. Otherwise, it was impossible to carry it through to this extent.

All these glorious exemplary instances (the instances of this type are still many elsewhere) have given a Bolshevik reply to the call of the Party and the Central Government and have proven the absolute correctness of the directives of the Central Bureau and the Central Government. Whenever these directives were completely carried through, great victory was at once won. Whoever betrayed or ignored these directives, however, he committed mistakes in his work, achieved little or no result. Let me prove it again with facts.

2. SOME PLACES HAVE GIVEN UP THE LEADERSHIP OF THE LAND INVESTIGATION CAMPAIGN

In the combat task of the Land Investigation Campaign, after the Central Bureau issued the resolution on the land investigation, after the Central Government decreed the land investigation, and after the Eight-County Conference on Land Investigation was convened, the Land Investigation Campaign in various counties has not spread to all the places. For instance, the result of the land investigation in the entire province of Fukien was comparable only to that of one county alone, *i.e.*, Posheng. The result even in each of the counties Shengli, Yutu, Huichang, and Shihcheng was comparable only to that of one or two best districts of Juichin [County]. Many land investigation committees in various districts, as well as a few counties, have not firmly grasped the work of a [district-wide or] county-wide land investigation (Huichang, Yutu, Shihcheng, and Ninghua). In many districts and *hsiang* land investigation committees, district and *hsiang* [Soviet] chairmen did not assume leadership on the plea of being preoccupied elsewhere and left the land investigation unattended. As for the Party's leadership in the land investigation, in places where achievements were made in land investigation it has been clearly demonstrated that the party's leadership role has been resolute. The majority of the rank and file of the Party has engaged in numerous combat programs with Bolshevik bravery under the leadership of the branch and district committees. In places where little

or no achievement was made, however, it has been demonstrated that the Party organs have ignored the Land Investigation Campaign. For instance, after the Central Bureau's resolution on the land investigation was issued, the Huichang County Committee has not even once discussed the land investigation work for nearly two months. Not until the end of July did it hold a meeting to discuss the land investigation. The Hsiahsiao District Committee of Juichin [County] has entirely left the Land Investigation Campaign unattended over a period of time. Ward committees of Juichin City, though held a meeting once, did not push forward the suburban branches to head the leadership of land investigation, while each branch did not hold any meeting on the Land Investigation Campaign. At other places like Yutu, Shengli, Shihcheng, and Ninghua, the county committees and many district committees have not likewise exerted real efforts at paying attention to the land investigation work. The Party and the Central Government stated that: "The Land Investigation Campaign has become a struggle to spur the masses and deeply penetrate the rural classes, and a powerful method to thoroughly resolve the land question and purge the feudal and semi-feudal [forces]" (the Central Bureau's Resolution); that "the Land Investigation Campaign is the task, which the Soviets in various places cannot allow to relax for a moment" (the Central Government's Decree); and that "the Land Investigation Campaign is a most 'principal link' of the present work" (Conclusion of the Eight-County Conference). Nevertheless many of our comrades stated that they . . . "were very busy and have no time to attend to the Land Investigation Campaign". The Party Resolution stated: "To handle the Land Investigation Campaign with a perfunctory attitude of bureaucratism and formalism is most harmful." Notwithstanding, these comrades handled the Land Investigation Campaign with the style of bureaucratism.

3. IN CERTAIN PLACES THE PARTY HAS SURRENDERED TO THE LANDLORDS AND RICH PEASANTS

In places where the Land Investigation Campaign has been unleashed, there are yet many individual but serious mistakes. That is to say, in these local Party organs and Soviets there appeared frequently some individual comrades who have manifested their opportunistic vacillations in the Land Investigation Campaign which

is a violent class struggle. Mainly, when the Land Investigation Campaign was undergoing violent development they could not forsake clannish and parochial relations and covered up the landlords and rich peasants of the same clan and the same village, or they made an incorrect analysis of class status by classifying a landlord as a rich peasant and a rich peasant, a middle peasant. Some comrades working in the tribunal department have accepted, out of their extreme inadvertence, slanderous charges against those who were active in the land investigation, made by the landlords and rich peasants in the false name of the masses. On the other hand, we had some comrades in the security bureau as well as the tribunal department who could not keep up with the masses in pushing forward the struggle for class examination and in suppressing the counter-revolutionaries vigorously. Even when the masses made a request for arrest and execution by a firing squad of the landlords and rich peasants who had resisted the land investigation, some of them did not honor their request. For instance, the tribunal department of Juichin made many mistakes like this.

4. THE TENDENCY TO ENCROACH UPON THE MIDDLE PEASANTS IS THE MOST SERIOUS DANGER

The tendency of “left” opportunism occurred again in very many places during the land investigation of July. What should be pointed out emphatically here is the tendency to encroach upon the middle peasants, though it was clearly stated in the Central Bureau’s Resolution that:

“Special attention must be focused on the alliance with the middle peasants who will be the broadest basic masses in rural Soviets after the revolution. All our treatments and policies must win their approval and support. Every decision of the Poor Peasant Corps and the Soviet must have the support of the middle peasantry, secured through a village or residence meeting. All the voices of the middle peasant masses must be heard with care, and any attempt to encroach upon the interests of the middle peasantry must be severely dealt with.”

In the summary of the Eight-County Conference it was pointed out that:

“The aim of the land investigation is to examine classes and not to redistribute the land,” . . . [an] “alliance with the middle peasantry should start with non-encroachment on the interests of the middle peasants,” . . . “[I]n the beginning of the land investigation we should make widespread propaganda to the effect that the Soviet policy is to ally with the middle peasantry, not to encroach upon them. In the process of land investigation we should carefully determine the uncertain elements between the middle peasants and the rich peasants as not to misplace them.”

FROM MARX

But these directives were not heeded by comrades in many places. The land investigation in the confines of Juichin, once under way, has proceeded to examine the middle peasants, house by house and *mou* by *mou* so much so that it drove them to panic. In the end they rushed to the Soviet to ask for reclassification of their status into poor peasants. They argued that: “To be a middle peasant is very dangerous, for one would become a rich peasant if stretched. Change to a poor peasant, for it is a bit far way from becoming a rich peasant.” Does not such a despairing voice merit our attention? Comrades in Yangku *hsiang* of Huangpo District have told the masses: “Class examination is not for examining others, but only to examine the middle and rich peasant and landlord classes.” Comrades in Taching District have investigated so exhaustively by putting up markings, that it has caused the same panic among the middle peasants. In the Conclusion of the Eight-County Conference it was already stated that “such an idea as to assume that the land investigation is one of putting up markings is not correct”. However, these comrades did not pay heed to it at all. This method of such an exhaustive investigation by markings has appeared in every county. This is an extraordinarily serious situation. They have mixed up the land investigation for the land distribution. But if this method is to be employed in the land investigations campaign it would confound the objective of the struggle in the villages. In the past we pointed out that:

“Land investigation and land distribution must be strictly distinguished. Such a distinction is to be made not only for consolidating the land ownership of peasants so as not to cause panic out of the ill-defined land distribution, but also for victory in

the struggle for class Examination. We must concentrate all our energy, particularly in alliance with the middle peasants, to cope with the resistance of the landlords and rich peasants. In such an event we should not allow any dispute to take place within the ranks of peasants themselves.” (Conclusion of the Eight-County Conference)

Such a tactic is a most important part of the whole strategy in our leadership of the struggle of land investigation. Nevertheless it was what many comrades had still neglected. Such a negligence cannot be tolerated again, even for a moment. Those who have been admonished but still deliberately continue these mistakes, must be meted out with severe punishments by the higher Soviet of the locality. We need to wage thorough struggle within the Party and Youth League against the idea and action of any Party or Youth League members who encroach upon the interests of the middle peasants and violate the strategy of alliance with the middle peasants. In places where mistakes are already committed by confiscating, for example, the property and land of the middle peasant, the Soviet personnel should publicly admit their mistakes to the middle peasants in the locality and should redeem them forthwith. That Hsiangkuo County reinstituted many lands of the middle peasants last year, thus to win their satisfaction, is a very valuable lesson.

5. CLOSED-DOOR-ISM OF THE POOR PEASANT CORPS AND ITS NEGLIGENCE OF THE LEADERSHIP ROLE OF THE HIRED HANDS ARE WRONG

“Poor peasant masses are the pillars of the Party and the proletariat in the countryside and are the resolute supporters of a thoroughgoing execution of the land revolution.” “To rely on the poor peasants” is one of our important policies in the land investigation and in all the struggles for land, the Poor Peasant Corps is the organization that plays an extremely important role [here]. The Eight-County Poor Peasant Corps Representatives’ Conference has already pointed out that the past tendency of closed-doorism of the Poor Peasant Corps was wrong, and that the system of introduction should be discarded, and that the door should be kept wide-open to the poor peasants and workers so that they, male and female, old and young,

can all apply and join. In many places, however, the old method is still being followed and remains unchanged; without introduction one still cannot join the Poor Peasant Corps. Worse still, when non-member poor peasant masses in Taching District of Juichin had rushed to attend a Poor Peasant Corps meeting, the man-in-charge of the Corps simply refused to admit them. In Chuchajen District of Posheng, the Poor Peasant Corps did not admit even a single person during the month of July. In all the districts and *hsiang* where the land investigation has gained results, the Poor Peasant Corps has developed broadly and in places where the land investigation has gained no or little result, the phenomenon there is that the Poor Peasant Corps is in the state of closed-doorism. Likewise, the great leadership role of the hired hands in the Land Investigation Campaign was not appreciated by many comrades. The Party Resolution stated:

“The masses of the hired hands, who are brothers of the urban proletariat in the countryside, are the vanguard of the land revolution. Hence, the working personnel in the Soviets must maintain close contact with the [rural] labour unions through which activism of the masses of the [rural] workers can be developed and organized in order to make them the vanguard of the Land Investigation Campaign.”

Our Comrades who have carried work according to this directive are still few in number. The principal method here is to have the rural workers join up the Poor Peasant Corps and set up within it individual small groups of workers. Through these workers' small groups [*hsio-tsu*] we should go out to unite poor peasant activists, develop the Poor Peasant Corps, and promote advancement of the Land Investigation Campaign. The experience in Shanho *hsiang* of Huangpo District is valuable. When our comrades there twice failed to convene a Poor Peasant Corps meeting, they held a joint meeting of the rank-and-file members of the Agricultural Labour Union and the Handicraft Labour Union and spurred a few dozen workers to arise actively so that they each bring a poor peasant to join the Poor Peasant Corps. On the following day the Poor Peasant Corps again convened a meeting to which all attended as anticipated, and thus unleashed the Land Investigation Campaign. This experience in Shanho *hsiang* should be employed in all the villages. The high-level leadership organs of the labour unions here should provide the

low-level labour unions with positive leadership so as to regard the task of land investigation as one of the important tasks of the unions.

6. THE INCORRECT IDEA ABOUT THE QUESTION OF THE RICH PEASANTS

Our entire strategy in the agrarian struggle is to depend on the poor peasants, to resolutely ally with the middle peasants, to enable the poor peasants to play the vanguard role, and to unite all the revolutionary forces in order to eliminate the landlord class and combat the rich peasants. Concerning the question of rich peasants the Party has already correctly stated: "We must clearly distinguish the landlord from the rich peasant. In the unrelenting struggle to eliminate the landlord remnants we must under no circumstances allow any attempt to eliminate the rich peasantry." During the land investigation of July, we have not yet found a theory openly advocating the elimination of the rich peasants but we found the phenomenon in many places in which a rich peasant element was treated as a landlord thereby confiscating all his family property. The origin of this mistake is due to the elimination of labour power of the rich peasant. When we stated that "those who possess no labour power or only incidental labour power and exploit rent for land are landlords," in some places those who employed a considerable number of labouring elements in production, which was [thus] considered a kind of "incidental labour power," were construed as landlords. In some places the rich peasants who concurrently practiced usurious exploitation were regarded as "usurers," such rich peasants were treated in accordance with the measures of "eliminating usurers". In some places, old accounts were settled by going back to some years prior to the [1925-27] Revolution; someone who had employed regular farmhand five to six years or even a dozen years or so before the Revolution were also regarded as rich peasants; or well-to-do middle peasants who had employed regular farmhand merely for one or two years and have since never done so were also thrown into the rich peasant category. Even more serious was the case in the past in a certain place of Hsiangkuo County. The method there differentiated the landlords from the rich peasants by the type and extent of exploitation. Those who practiced three kinds of exploitation were called landlords, two kinds of rich peasants. For instance, if one

has hired regular farmhand, collected rent, and also extended loans, he was, in short, classified as a landlord regardless of how many people there were [then] in that family who could work. There was also the question of "reactionary rich peasants" which turned out to be considerable absurdity in many places. In Wuyang District there was a rich peasant family who was also a merchant having seven people to feed. In the past a member of the family who had joined the A-B Corps was killed two years ago. Because of this, the comrades there, two years later, insisted that they must confiscate the entire [family] property. In many other places many a similar incident took place. Many of the masses demanded punitive measures against those rich peasants who, prior to the Uprising, had taken part in, not very serious, counter-revolutionary activity, like participating in the type of "collecting thirty percent rent in grain" (as in Juichin), and have not since taken part in any counter-revolutionary activity over the post-Uprising years; and some of our comrades wanted, of necessity, to confiscate their property. Correctly speaking, our measure of dealing with the [rich peasant] elements of this type should be different in tactics in the consolidated region and in the non-consolidated region and in the non-consolidated border region. In the border region, unquestionably we employ a strict method of suppressing all the counter-revolutionary elements including the rich peasants; in the Central Area it should be determined according to situations. Those who have committed a serious counter-revolutionary action prior to the Uprising or those who are still engaged in counter-revolutionary activity should of course be subjected to resolute confiscation. Others should not be subjected to confiscation. Except the person in a certain family and the elements who are directly involved with him in counter-revolutionary activity, other people should not be subjected to confiscation. Such will be the correct treatment.

7. THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' INSPECTION
HAS NOT ASSUMED ITS OWN RESPONSIBILITY
AND COMMITTED SOME MISTAKES

Many of our comrades in the Department of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection do not understand that the duration of the Land

Investigation Campaign is the best opportunity to commence a thorough struggle, to combat bureaucratism, corruption and passive sabotage, and to drive class heretics out of the Soviet [organs]. Our work on these elements has been extraordinarily inadequate. Many of our comrades in the Department of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection have demonstrated, in the face of this violent class struggle, their passivism and vacillations, and their bureaucratism and formalism. In some extreme cases, for instance, the chief of the section of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the Municipal Soviet of Juichin and the chief of the tribunal section of the Municipal Soviet of Paopi committed an exceedingly serious crime of corruption (embezzlement of some 1,000 yuan of public funds). The chief of the section of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of Tutou District neither criticized nor arrested the chairman of the District Soviet who has abandoned and neglected the Land Investigation Campaign. In some places the prosecution drive of the department of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection has again gone into another wrong direction by treating the question of love as decadent and the taking of things of landlords as corrupt. They proceeded to prosecute these elements even on public trial. In some places they dismissed those who committed trivial mistakes in their duties, and they did not initiate self-criticism systematically to commence a thorough struggle. They spared themselves with this arduous work and substituted a simplified punitism for it. Needless to say, those among the working personnel of the Soviets who committed chronic and serious mistakes should be washed out resolutely, but to dismiss from duties those, whose mistakes did not reach this extent is an excess. As to the question of class heretics, it generally concerns only one's class origin, not one's work; only if one's background happens to be bad is he called a class heretic, and is dismissed regardless of how long a history of struggle he has behind him, regardless of how correctly he has carried on the policy of the Party and Soviet in the past and at present. True, we should resolutely wash out those class heretics and should without question wash out those whose class origin is bad and whose work is also bad (including the landlords, rich peasants, passive saboteurs, and corrupt and decadent elements). But if those who are not in this category are to be purged, it is an excess.

8. ON THE ART OF LEADERSHIP IN THE LAND INVESTIGATION STRUGGLE

If we understand the task and policy and yet if we do not possess the Bolshevik art of leading the mass struggle we still cannot commence the Land Investigation Campaign. In the opening of this essay mention has been made of very many good examples of leading the struggle in the places like Jentien District and others, but in many others places many mistakes were committed over this question. In some places we did not know how to use various methods to spur the struggle in the large backward villages where the landlords and rich peasants were concentrated. That is to say, if such a large village existed, we should first of all capture the most notoriously bad *haoshen* and landlords whom the masses called "big tigers." Only this way can we initiate the struggle in the locality. Nevertheless our comrades did not do this way. As regards the best method to spur the mass struggle through the utilization of the distribution of the confiscated items, they did not know how to use it in many places. In Watzu *hsiang* of Taching District of Juichin they distributed things, worst of all, only to land investigation cadres and poor peasants corps members while issuing none to others. The reason was that if one was not active he does not deserve it. In some places the distribution of confiscated things was very slow. In some extreme cases even when a month or so has passed after confiscation, distribution to the masses was not done. The distribution of the confiscated land was even more slower. Comrades in quite a few places did not know how to mobilize various departments of the Soviets and mass organizations; nor did they know how to mobilize the available Party and Youth League members to play the nucleus leadership role in the mass organizations, villages and residences. Unable to push forward the work they said there had been no way out here at the outset. In some places with the mass struggle for class examination already in full swing, many people came to report on the landlords and rich peasants and asked for examination and confiscation. At the time comrades could not immediately seize on the popular enthusiasm to lead the masses to further the struggle so as to carry the work of class examination into the villages. In some places, when the popular zeal in struggle, after a round of investigation, could not continue to surge upward and reached the state of stalemate,

our comrades were unable to use various methods to invigorate the masses, to make the struggle continually surge upward leading right up to the stage of eliminating all the feudal remnants. In many places, when the mass zeal in struggle, after going through the Land Investigation Campaign, had erupted, they did not know how to organize the zeal of this sort into other fronts. For instance, when the masses did secure things and land, they did not then at the mass meeting or at all other propitious opportunities incite the masses to enlist in the Red Army, purchase public bonds, to join co-operatives, to accelerate the harvest work and autumn cultivation, to set up clubs and study groups, and to develop evening and primary schools. They missed such a best opportunity, and only until the high-level [organ] pressed for these did they start all over again to wage propaganda and agitation. Such a leadership of tailism, following behind the popular enthusiasm in struggle is the most harmful one to the revolutionary work.

In many other places, on the other hand, there occurred again the evil phenomenon of savagery by a few people. We have emphasized that, in combatting the apathy in winning a great majority of the masses and the work style of commandism, we only need to be persevering and enduring with the work of spurring and winning the masses. Only then can we gain the support of the great majority of the masses and reach the goal of eliminating the feudal remnants. Such a mass work is the only guarantee for executing the class line. The Land Investigation Campaign should commence a broad propaganda campaign in all the villages and residences, to expound to the masses the need of the Land Investigation Campaign, explaining that the land investigation is not a land distribution, and that the class examination is not to examine the classes of middle and poor peasants and farmhands. Particularly important is to give a clear analysis as to what constitutes landlords, rich and middle peasants. Village and residence meetings should not be held only once. Especially, backward villages and residences should hold more than one meeting and should not let a single person of the revolutionary masses get away from listening to our propaganda. To reach this goal we should first explain clearly to all the active elements in the representative council of the *hsiang* Soviet, labour unions, Poor Peasant Corps, women workers' and peasants' associations, as well as other mass organizations, through whom we should wage propaganda to the broad masses. Class ex-

amination should be carried out not by a few people but by sparing many people. Passage of class status should be made not merely by the Poor Peasant Corps, the *hsiang* Soviet, and the district Soviet, but by a mass meeting held in the village or residence of the confiscates to secure popular approval; only then can confiscation be carried out. In distributing assets, we should issue them to the people of the village or residence involved to win popular satisfaction. All this is to win a great majority of the masses. The working personnel of the Party and Soviet should not lose sight of the great majority of the masses on every occasion and in every work. The masses we should face up to is the great majority of the masses; the deepening of our work among the masses is to penetrate the masses in all the villages, large or small, and in all the cities and towns, large or small. We should strictly combat the mistaken method of closed-doorism and commandism followed by a minority. Our comrades in many places, however, have never done [their work] this way. In Juichin [County], there are very many districts and *hsiang* where not one class discussion has been held with the masses (no analysis has been made as to what constitutes landlords, rich and middle peasants). In many places of Juichin and other counties it was discovered that they just set out to investigate [classes] in every instance without going through propaganda so as to drive the landlords and rich peasants to fabricate rumors and cheat the middle peasants or say that there were very many landlords and rich peasants in the *hsiang* or state that there were a few hundred landlord families who were going to be investigated (Juichin). Furthermore, our comrades did not know clearly the method of conducting "class talk's" to break up this kind of rumor. Landlords in Kuangchang said: "The land investigation is what the Central Government is going to make those who did not pay debt in the past, pay their debt to the Central Government." Yet our comrades did not go out immediately to break and expose such a devilish talk. In Several *hsiang* of Taching District they not only did not wage any propaganda, but the class examination was undertaken merely by a few people of the land investigation committee. Passage of class [status] did neither go through the mass meeting nor through the Poor Peasant Corps. They said: "The masses are unreliable and do not know how to analyze classes. To bring up class status at the mass meeting for passage is to cause dispute. It is all the more reliable to have it passed by the land

investigation committee alone.” This theory of the comrades in Taching District can truly be a fantastic story in the whole world! In goodly many places landlords and their properties were confiscated not in the daytime but in the evening. The only reason was that they were afraid that the landlords would run away. In one place a mass meeting was held using the technique of holding an “all-district meeting” but no more than a couple or hundred of people attended. Three people took turns to speak from the morning to the afternoon not letting the masses take intermissions, nor letting them drink water or eat. They said that they were afraid that the masses would run away. Such a barbarous method can also be a fantastic one of its kind.

9. DEVELOP A TWO-FRONT STRUGGLE TO OVERCOME THE MISTAKES AND WIN A THOROUGH VICTORY IN THE LAND INVESTIGATION CAMPAIGN

Undoubtedly the Land Investigation Campaign has been unleashed over vast areas. However, when this campaign is in progress, when we correctly estimate the achievement already gained and consolidate the foundation of growth of the campaign, we should yet realize with vigilance, obstacles to be encountered in the course of the campaign. Only through the unleashing of the fire power of the two-front struggle to clear away these obstacles, can we advance the Land Investigation Campaign even more rapidly. To start the fight against the Rightist thought, to combat the underestimation of the grave significance of the Land Investigation Campaign, to combat the compromise and the surrender to the landlords and rich peasants, and to combat the tailism in leadership of the mass struggle, are the responsibility of every Communist Party member. At the same time, attention of all the Party members should be focused on the danger of encroaching on the middle peasants and a “severe blow should be dealt to any attempt to violate the interests of the middle peasants,” for this is the sufficiently serious danger which has been manifested in the present work of land investigation. Incorrect ideas about the rich peasants, too, will undoubtedly affect the middle peasants. All barbarous acts of commandism are of the greatest harm to the alliance with the middle peasants. Only upon elimination of all obstacles in the course of the Land Investigation Campaign by the

fire power of the two-front struggle, the campaign will make great strides forward, and its thorough victory will be sufficiently assured.

FROM MARX
TO MAO



NOT FOR
COMMERCIAL
DISTRIBUTION

THE LAND INVESTIGATION CAMPAIGN IS THE CENTRAL IMPORTANT TASK IN THE VAST (SOVIET) AREAS*

August 31, 1933
FROM MARX

TO MAO
All the past experiences prove that only through the correct solution of the land question, only through the resolute class slogan under which the flame of class struggle in the countryside is whipped up to the highest degree, can we spur the broad peasant masses to participate under the leadership of the proletariat in the revolutionary war, in the construction of the Soviet Areas in the various spheres, and in the building of a firm revolutionary base to further strengthen the Soviet movement and score greater progress and victory.

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According to the experience in developing the land revolution, the growth of class struggle in the countryside calls for three general stages to follow, namely, 1) the stage of land confiscation and distribution, 2) the stage of land investigation, 3) the stage of land construction. Based on the three stages of development in the land struggle, there exist generally three types of regions regardless of any soviet area, namely, 1) the region where the struggle has deepened, 2) the region where the struggle has relatively fallen behind, 3) the region where the struggle is newly developing.

In the newly developing region, the development of land struggle is still at the stage of land confiscation and distribution. The central question at this stage is to overturn by armed power the political power of the landlord class, to establish a revolutionary provisional political power (the Revolutionary Committee), to build a local armed force of the workers and peasants as well as revolutionary mass organizations, to confiscate the land and property belong-

* Taken from *Hung-chi Chou-Pao (Red Flag Weekly)*, No. 59, August 31, 1933.

ing to the landlord class plus the land of rich peasants to be divided among the hired hands, poor peasants, middle peasants, to give the rich peasants the poor land, to nullify debts and to burn land titles and IOUs. Involved in the struggle at this stage is the whole range of struggle in which the revolution commences battle with the counter-revolution, leading to the defeat of the counter-revolution by the revolution and implementing the disposition of their land and property.

In the region where the struggle has deepened, a firm soviet political power has been established and local armed forces and revolutionary mass organizations have developed extensively; the feudal forces of landlords and rich peasants have been completely defeated and the land has been thoroughly distributed. The struggle of the peasant masses over the land question has advanced to the stage of improving the soil and developing soil productivity. Therefore, the central question here is one of land construction.

In the region where the struggle has fallen behind, its stage of development is between the two stages mentioned above. It has moved into the period of a formal political power from that of a provisional political power but it has not yet reached the period completely consolidating the political power. Here the open counter-revolutionary struggle of the landlords and rich peasants have been defeated by the revolutionary masses in the first period. From that time on, many of these elements would turn about, take off their counter-revolutionary mask and put on the revolutionary mask. They too approve the revolution and the land redistribution as well, and call themselves poor peasants and demand that the land be distributed to them accordingly. They act actively by virtue of their historical advantage in that "come to think of talking, they can talk; come to think of writing, they can write". Therefore, during the first period they have taken advantage of the opportunity to snatch away the fruit of land revolution. Facts in many places proved that they are dominating the provisional political power by sneaking into the local armed forces and manipulating the revolutionary organizations to get more and better land than what the poor peasants have obtained. Having moved into the second, some of those sham revolutionary elements have been washed out because of the pressure of the upper-level government as well as the advancement of mass struggle, and because the Revolutionary Committee has been reconstructed into the soviet, and the mass organizations and local armed

forces have undergone the preliminary reform and further growth. In many places the land has been divided twice, even three or four times, and the land stolen by the landlords and rich peasants has been in part liquidated. However, there are still many class heretics hidden among the Soviet mass organizations and local armed forces. There they "carry Red ribbons to be called comrades," there they fabricate rumors and hold secret meetings, there they accuse the masses of "left opportunism," of "random beating of local bullies," and of "public revenge for private animosity". Or they "speak articulately at a meeting but carry out none after the meeting". When the struggle becomes violent, they organize secret counter-revolutionary organizations like the KMT, the Social Democratic Party, the A-B Corps, and a New Communist Party, as well as all kinds of things, to subvert the revolution and try to murder revolutionary activities. In short, the landlord and rich peasant classes suppress the mass struggle through various methods and attempt to preserve their rights to political power, land and property, and perpetuate their remaining feudal forces. In these regions serious struggles are being waged between the revolutionary masses and the landlords and rich peasants. The struggle here, however, is not like the open struggle between the Red banner and the White banner during the first period but a struggle between the revolutionary peasant masses and the masked landlords and rich peasants elements. The struggle of this kind has its special difficulty, that is, the peasant masses cannot as nearly clearly recognize at a first glance hidden counter-revolutionary as the open counter-revolutionary. In addition, in view of the various deep-rooted feudal relations like the clannish ones, it is not an easy matter for the peasants to attain the degree of class consciousness, so that they can generally recognize that the feudal remnants should be stamped out eventually. This means that the Communist Party and the Soviet Government must certainly be patient in explaining to the peasants, they must engage in many trying tasks, and that they must have the correct class line and the [correct] method of the mass work. The central question here is the question of land investigation and class investigation. Unless this question is solved, revolutionary activeness of the peasant masses cannot be developed to the fullest, feudal remnant forces cannot be completely smashed; nor the soviet can [carry on] the important tasks as to attain the maximum degree of consolidation and expansion of the Red Army, to expand the local armed forces and implement land

construction as well as economic construction, and to develop culture and education. [Otherwise], in no way can all this gain its maximum success. Therefore, the Land Investigation Campaign is the most central and most important task in these regions.

Speaking of the Central Soviet Area [*i.e.*, Kiangsi Soviet], the largest part of the Area constitute the regions where the struggle of this kind has relatively fallen behind, such as the thirteen whole counties, Huichang, Hsianwu, Anyuan, Hsianfeng, Loan, Yuhuang, Kwangchang, Shihcheng, Chienning, Lichuan. Ninghua, Changting and Wuping; most of the counties like Juichin, Yutu, Posheng, Shengli, and Yungfeng; portions of the counties like Kunglueh, Wantai, Kanhsien, Shanghang, Yungting, and Hsinchuan; and even the county Hsiangkuo, also has two districts, Chunchun and Huangtang.

All these represent the regions where the land question has not yet been thoroughly resolved.

The peasant masses of these regions have not yet been spurred broadly; the feudal forces have not yet been beaten decisively, and in the Soviets, in the mass organizations, and in the local armed forces, there are still numerous class heretics who are surreptitiously active; there are still numerous counter-revolutionary secret organizations which are secretly engaging in the subversion of the revolution. For this reason, war mobilization and economic and cultural construction all have fallen far behind the advanced areas (nearly the entire county of Hsiangkuo, sections of the counties of Shengli, Kanhsien, Wangtai, Kunglueh, Yungfeng, and Shanghang, Huangpo District of Posheng, Wuyang District of Juichin, Hsianpo District of Yutu, Hsinan District of Yungting, and etc.). These regions occupy nearly 80 per cent of the Central [Soviet] Area in acreage and contain more than two million people. In this vast area to carry out an all-round deepening Land Investigation Campaign, to kindle to the maximum degree the flame of class struggle among the masses of two million people and more, to wage a final war against the feudal forces to destroy them once and for all, are the tasks that the Communist Party and the Soviet Government cannot afford to relax for a moment.

REPORT TO
THE SECOND NATIONAL CONGRESS
OF WORKERS' AND PEASANTS'
REPRESENTATIVES*

FROM MARX
January 23, 1934

TO MAO

I. THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MOVEMENT

Two years have elapsed since the First National Soviet Congress convened. Facts and events of the past two years tell us that the imperialist Kuomintang rule has further declined in the process of its debacle while the Soviet movement proceeded and developed vigorously towards its victory!

Now we have arrived at the era when the Chinese Revolution has become further acute and the whole world is passing its transitory period leading to a new turn of war and revolution. The opposition of the socialist world to the capitalist world has become much sharper. On the one hand, the socialist construction in the Soviet Union and the peace policy of the Soviet Government have achieved sweeping success, all conducive to the consolidation of the position of the Soviet Union, in sharp contradiction to the capitalist world where the eversharpening of the economic crises has led the imperialist powers to seek a workable solution in the attack on the Soviet Union and China. Preparations for the intervention against the Soviet Union have never ceased for a single minute while the imperialist division of China and the intervention against the Chinese revo-

* This is a report presented by comrade Mao before the Second National Congress of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, held in Juichin in Kiangsi, on January 23, 1934. Extracted from *Chinese Workers' Correspondence*, Shanghai, Vol. 4, No. 11, March 31, 1934. See also Mao's article, "Our Economic work", *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 141.

lution are in full swing.

But the world proletariat revolution and the revolution of the oppressed nations are extending in every direction precisely under the influence of the successful socialist construction in the Soviet Union and in face of the menace of the imperialist crisis and war. A part of the world revolution, the Chinese revolution, is growing out of the sharpening of the national crisis, the collapse of national economy, the success of the Soviet movement at an accelerated pace, resulting in pushing the Chinese revolution to the foreground in the world revolution.

The dominating factors of the present Chinese situation are: widespread civil war; death-and-life struggle between revolution and counter-revolution; sharp contrast between the worker-peasant Soviet power and the Kuomintang power of landlords and bourgeoisie. On the one hand, the Soviet power is summoning, organizing, and leading the country-wide masses to fight in national revolutionary war to overthrow the rule of landlords and bourgeoisie throughout the country; to oust imperialism from China; to liberate the millions of the masses from oppression and exploitation by imperialists and Kuomintang; to save the country from colonization and to build up Soviet China of complete freedom, independence and territorial integrity.

The growing acute contrast between the two powers cannot but promote the death-and-life struggle between them to assume more and more violent proportions. It had now come to the decisive historical stage of the struggle. The Kuomintang is launching its fifth offensive against us. The historical task of the Soviet power is: to summon, to organize and to lead all revolutionary masses both in the Soviet districts and in other parts of the country to fight in this decisive war; to mobilize broad worker-peasant masses to join the Red Army; to improve the political, cultural and technical levels of the Red Army; to enlarge the local armed forces and partisans; to agitate for broad partisan wars; to strengthen the concentrated and unified leadership of the Soviet over all Soviet districts and Red Army; to strengthen the working speed and quality of the Soviet work in every field; to strengthen the financial and economical work of the Soviet so as to guarantee the material demands of the revolutionary war; to develop the class struggle of the working masses; to organize the revolutionary initiative of the working masses into the struggle of smashing the fifth offensive of the enemy; to develop the

agrarian revolution of the peasants; to mobilize the broad masses to fight for the acquisition and protection of land; to call all working and peasant masses of the Soviet Districts and throughout China to fight with all efforts and at all cost in the revolutionary war. This is the way to smash the fifth offensive of imperialists and the Kuomintang, to save China from being colonized and to attain the soviet victory in one or several provinces and in the whole territory of China!

2. THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT

The greatest events in the past two years in China since the inauguration of the Provisional soviet Central Government were imperialist attacks and the fourth and fifth offensives waged upon revolution by counter-revolution. The occupation of Manchuria, Mongolia and North China by Japanese robbers and the intensified control of Tibet, Sikong, Yunnan, the Yangtze Valley by British, French and American imperialists, are all directed by the imperialists to wreck the Chinese Soviet power and to completely enslave the Chinese nation as a preliminary step towards the war against the USSR. The Kuomintang of landlords and bourgeoisie still sticks to its long followed policy of capitulation while, on the contrary, the anti-imperialist movement of the country-wide revolutionary masses, with the unprecedented national crisis before them, has developed with extreme violence.

At the present movement two powers of opposite directions are laid before the country-wide revolutionary masses: the Kuomintang which surrenders completely to imperialism with all means suppresses the anti-imperialistic masses; the Soviet which is determinably anti-imperialistic and does its best to support and lead the anti-imperialist movement.

In the past two years the Provisional Soviet Central Government has repeatedly circulated statements denouncing the predatory wars waged by the Japanese imperialists and the traitorous capitulation of Kuomintang. On April 14, 1932, the Provisional Central Government formally declared war on Japan and issued mobilization orders for war against her. The Provisional Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Council have more than once announced their readiness to conclude agreement with any armed unit of the Kuomintang for joint anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist military

movement under the following conditions: (1) Immediate stop of offensive against the Soviet districts; (2) guarantee of civil rights for the masses; (3) arming of the masses and creation of anti-Japanese volunteers. The Tankoo Agreement concluded between the Kuomintang and Japan on May 30, 1933, and Sino-Japanese direct negotiations since then are policies and actions against the national interests but repeatedly repudiated by the Provisional Central Government in its statements made public of late. The Soviet has supported the anti-Japanese struggle in any and every part of the country. To speak alone of the anti-Japanese strike of the textile workers in West Shanghai in 1932, the Soviet aided them with \$16,000.

In the Soviet territories, imperialist privileges have been abolished and imperialist influence wiped out. Imperialist pastors and fathers were ousted by the masses; estates of the people seized by imperialist missionaries were returned; missionary schools were turned into Soviet schools. In short, the Soviet districts in China alone are liberated from the imperialist yoke.

These facts point to one thing: the Soviet is the sole anti-imperialist government. The Soviet Government wants to make known to the country-wide masses: the greatest responsibility of the Soviet and the whole masses is to win victory over imperialists by means of direct war. The fulfilment of this work depends upon the development of the mass anti-imperialist struggle. First of all, the lackey of imperialism, the Kuomintang, should be smashed because it is the greatest obstacle on the way before the anti-imperialist Soviet and masses.

3. THE IMPERIALIST-KUOMINTANG OFFENSIVE REPULSED

Because the Chinese Soviet districts are the revolutionary base for the Chinese anti-imperialist movement, because the Chinese Red Army is the main pillar of the Chinese anti-imperialist forces, and because the Soviet movement and the revolutionary war are proceeding violently, the Kuomintang with the direct help of the imperialists and with all force at its disposal, waged four offensives and is now waging the fifth one against the Soviet and Red Armies in an attempt to put down the Chinese revolution and to fulfil its task of cleaning the ground for imperialism. But every offensive of impe-

rialism and the Kuomintang ended in glaring failure. The victories of the Soviet and Red Armies have further confirmed the belief of the country-wide masses that the Soviet and Red Armies alone are fighting for the national independence and freedom, and that they are the sole forces for the salvation of China.

The fourth offensive of the enemy began right after the Kuomintang had surrendered Manchuria to the Japanese and concluded the Shanghai Truce Agreement of May 5, 1932. The traitorous Kuomintang did not mobilize a single soldier to fight the Japanese aggression. On the contrary, despite the fact that the Soviet and Red Armies have more than once proposed to conclude an anti-Japanese military agreement with any anti-Japanese troops, the Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek, chief of all traitors, concentrated hundreds of thousands of troops to attack the Hupeh-Honan-Anhui and Hunan-Hupeh West Soviet districts and forced the Red Armies to withdraw from the cordon they formed around the district of Wu-Han. On our side, because of some tactical mistakes, coupled with our reluctance to have a direct clash with a force of the enemy which was overwhelmingly stronger than ours, the Fourth Red Army Corps was obliged to withdraw from the Hupeh-Honan-Anhui Soviet district and began the famous expedition to Szechuen where a new and big Soviet base embracing Tungkiang, Bachun, Nanking, Hsunhan and Suiting has been created. During the expedition, the Fourth Red Army corps had widely disseminated seeds of the Soviet in the comparatively revolutionary backward zones of the Northwest where broad revolutionary struggle of the masses have been brought up to develop. In not more than one year, the Fourth Red Army Corps has sovietized more than ten hsien and called forth leaning of the Szechuen toiling masses and soldiers of the White troops toward the Soviet revolution. Meantime the Second Red Army Corps which evacuated from the Hung Lake Zone not only has suffered no serious loss but also gained new success in the Szechuen-Hupeh-Hunan frontier regions in its operation in co-ordination with the Fourth Red Army Corps. Even in the Hung Lake zone, Red partisans are still active. In the Hupeh-Honan-Anhui Soviet District, we did not lose much of our base. On the contrary, we are now very successful there in the strife to consolidate our position and to develop partisan wars in the surrounding neighborhood.

As to the Central Soviet District (Kiangsi), it is the location of the Central Soviet Government headquarters of the country-wide

Soviet movement and the chief target of the offensive of the enemy. Around this district and its neighbouring Soviet zones the enemy has concentrated most of its forces in the so-called "Central Government" troops, the units under the command of militarists Chiang Kwang-lai, Tsai Ting-Kai, together with those under the command of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Hunan warlords. Through one year's hard struggles, we have gained unprecedented success. The biggest victory was that we gained in the spring of 1933 when the Red Armies of the Central Soviet District alone destroyed 23 regiments, 6 battalions and 2 companies of the enemy and smashed 3 divisions, 12 regiments, 3 battalions and 2 companies and captured twenty thousand rifles and one thousand machine guns and autorifles. Particularly in the battles of Tungpi and Hangpi, we annihilated a complete column of the crack troops of the enemy. These battles ended in the fourth offensive of Nanking with a complete failure to the enemy.

The failure of the fourth offensive of the enemy had brought along qualitative and quantitative growth of the Red Army. The commanders and fighters of the Red Army have become more determined politically and more skillful in military techniques, showing long strides of progress as compared with the time before the 4th offensive. Moreover, the Soviet territory has been enlarged. Besides the new Soviet district in Szechuen, we have now Fukien-Kiangsi province, another new Soviet district in the east part of Kiangsi, which increased the population of Soviet China by almost one million. Our old Soviet districts are further consolidated. This has been shown by the improvement of the Soviet work, by the rise of the militancy of the worker-peasant masses, by the development of class struggle both in cities and villages, and by the suppression of the remnants of counter-revolution in the Soviet districts. This sum-total of the success of the Soviet revolution has also its influence in the Kuomintang-ruled districts where the struggling spirit of oppressed worker-peasant masses has been further promoted, the soldiers and commanders of the White troops have shown their further wavering, and Chiang Kai-shek himself was even obliged to proclaim his desperate order of "Death punishment to all who do not fight the 'bandits' but demand to fight the Japanese".

Since the failure of the fourth offensive, the only manifestation of the Kuomintang has been to further shamelessly surrender to imperialism. From the imperialists the Kuomintang has received new loans and consignments of military supplies. Directly led by the

imperialists and with foreign advisers helping it reorganize its forces (training of new recruits, air forces, and the Blue Jacket officials), the Kuomintang has been enabled once more to proceed with its fifth offensive against the Soviet and Red Army. The struggle of the C.E.C. of the Party, namely, "to make it impossible for imperialist crisis to seek its way out, or in other words, to struggle for the independence and freedom of Soviet China". Indeed, the struggle against the fifth offensive is to determine whether China goes down to complete independence, freedom. and territorial integrity.

We have acquired all fundamental conditions to win our struggle against our enemy since our victory over the fourth offensive. We have to point out that enemy has far more difficulties than we; the wavering of the soldiers of the White troops; the hatred against the rulers of the workers-peasant masses together with the broad petty-bourgeoisie in the enemy-ruled districts; the disintegration of the militarists; the clashes and conflicts among the imperialists who are supporters of the Kuomintang; the financial and economical bankruptcy of the Kuomintang. These are all objective conditions that show the possibility of victory for the revolution.

4. FUNDAMENTAL POLICIES OF THE SOVIET

We get to know its environment, now and past, together with the tasks the environment calls forth, before we explain the fundamental policies of the Soviet. The Soviet has grown up from partisan wars and from many isolated and small districts beyond the boundaries of which is the world of the enemy. The enemy has been quite busy with the destruction and oppression of the Soviet. Yet the Soviet has been victorious. It is able to defeat the enemy and has grown up through its repeated victories over the enemy. This is the environment of the Soviet. In many respects, the environment of the Soviet at present is different from that of the past. It has a wider territory, broader masses and stronger Red Army. It has concentrated many of its scattered forces (although the work has not been complete). It has been organized into a state, the Soviet Republic of China, which has now its central and local organization. The central organ, the Provisional Central Government, is the nucleus of concentrated power depending upon the broad masses and their armed force — the Red Army. This Government is the power of

workers and peasants themselves. It is the revolutionary workers peasant democratic dictatorship which is ever enlarging its influence throughout the country by virtue of the growing confidence of the broad masses in it. Evidently, the Soviet now no longer has the same environment confronting it as in the partisan war stage. Yet it still has to face constant warfare which is becoming wider and more violent. The reason is that the opposition between it and the landlord-bourgeoisie Kuomintang is growing daily acute and the time has come when the two contending parties have to fight a decisive battle. In short, before it there is at present a big scale offensive of imperialists and the Kuomintang and that is its environment nowadays.

This very environment determines the tasks of the Soviets. It must do its best to mobilize, organize and arm the masses, concentrate all of its strength for the development of the revolutionary war and fight out the other dictatorship together with the imperialist rule that has acted as the supporter and director of that other dictatorship. The aim of knocking down imperialism and the Kuomintang is to unify China, to bring the bourgeois-democratic revolution to realization and to make it possible to turn the said revolution later to a higher stage of socialist revolution. This is the task of the Soviet.

From this we may understand what the various Soviet policies and tasks are. They are: to consolidate the victoriously established worker-peasant dictatorship; to develop this dictatorship to the whole country; to mobilize, organize and arm the Soviet and country-wide masses to fight in the determined revolutionary war to overthrow the imperialist Kuomintang rule and to consolidate and develop the worker-peasant dictatorship; to prepare the present bourgeois democratic revolution for its turn toward the socialist proletarian dictatorship in the future. All these form the starting point of the Soviet policies.

a. THE ARMED MASSES AND THE RED ARMY

Let us first speak of the armed masses and Red Army of the Soviet. To fight against the offensive of the enemy and to wage the revolutionary war, the first task of the Soviet is to arm the masses and to organize strong and iron Red Army, local forces and parti-

sans, and provisions, supplies, and transportation for the war. The Soviet has been successful in its work along this line during the past two years, particularly during the fourth offensive and the present determined struggle against the fifth one.

The formation of the Central Revolutionary Military Council has unified the leadership over the national Red troops and made the Red forces in every Soviet district and on any front to be able to fight and to operate in good co-ordination under the unified tactics. This is an important turn to convert the scattered activities of partisan troops into activities of regular and big scale Red Armies. The Revolutionary Military Council in the past two years has victoriously led the country-wide Red Armies, particularly those of the Central Soviet District, in the smashing of the 4th offensive and in the initial successes of the struggle against the fifth offensive. The Red Army is now several times bigger than it was two years ago. This work owes its success to the militancy of the broad worker peasant masses to join the Red Army, to the improvement of the mobilization methods, and to the determined execution of the special treatment for the red fighters by the Soviet. During May, 1933, in the Central Soviet District alone, the Red Army was increased by twenty thousand new fighters from the various hsien. This smashed the various opportunistic points of view that the masses are not willing to join the Red Army or that enlargement of the Red army cannot be achieved in new Soviet districts. There are many models of the work to enlarge the Red Army. For instance, in Chankanhsian, Kiangsi, 80 per cent of the men between 16 and 45 and in Shangwanshihsian, Fukien, 88 per cent of them are now serving in the Red Army. In these villages with the overwhelming majority of the adults going to bravely fight in the revolutionary war, the daily affairs of farming production are not only not affected, but also improved and enlarged! Why is that so? The village labour power has been readjusted and reorganized better, and the difficult problems confronting the families of the Red fighters have been solved through the efforts exerted by the Labour Co-operative and Farming Volunteers.

The strengthening of the Red Army has proceeded along with its enlargement. Now the Red Army is proceeding to assume the form of ironsides as regular revolutionary armed forces. The causes are: (1) growth of the percentage of worker-peasant toiling masses in it; (2) more worker cadres and universal practice of political commissioner system; (3) the progress of political training strengthened the

determination of the Red fighters to fight for the final victory of the Soviet, raised the class-conscious discipline and increased the relation between the Red Army and the masses; (4) general rise of military techniques; (5) better organization increased the organized strength. These have promoted the fighting strength of the Red Army and made it the formidable force of the Soviet.

Red Defence and Young Vanguards are ready made reservists for the Red Army on the fighting front, forces of defence for the Soviet districts and the bridge that is leading the present voluntary military system to the conscription system of tomorrow.

Partisan units are creator of new Soviet districts and inseparable detachments of the main force — the Red Army. In the past two years more of them are developed in the various Soviet districts with their political and military training considerably improved. They have in the past offensives of the enemy showed marvelous success in their work for the defence of the Soviet districts, and in their operation to take the troops of the enemy by surprise and to disturb their rear. Many of their performances were even thought by the enemy as miracles. Their activities have offered the greatest difficulties to the enemy in attempting to invade the Soviet districts. This has been particularly shown in the Central and Kiangsi-Chekiang Soviet districts.

To satisfy the Red Army with supplies and provisions, to organize the military transportation between the front and the rear and to organize sanitary organs and hospitals for the Red fighters are all tasks of decisive importance to the revolutionary war. Since we have not yet captured many central cities and since the economic blockade of the enemy against us is very strict, there are numerous difficulties confronting us in our work along this line. However, in the past two years the militancy the broad masses in the Soviet district has guaranteed continued supplies, provisions and transportation for the Red army. This is also one of our big successes.

The fundamental task of the Soviet is revolutionary war and to mobilize all mass strength to fight in the war. Around this fundamental task the Soviet has many urgent tasks. It has to practice wide democracy; to determinably suppress the counter-revolution under its jurisdiction; to promote class-struggle of the workers; to promote agrarian revolution of the peasants; to promote the militancy of the worker-peasant masses under the principle of workers leading the worker-peasant alliance; to administer the correct finan-

cial and economic policies so as to guarantee the material needs of the revolutionary war; to wage the cultural revolution so as to arm the heads of the worker-peasant masses. All these, together with other policies, are but directed to one goal: to overthrow the imperialist-Kuomintang rule through revolutionary war, to consolidate and develop the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship and to be prepared to proceed to the stage of proletarian dictatorship.

b. SOVIET DEMOCRACY

The Soviet of the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship is the government of the masses themselves, directly depending upon them maintaining the closest relation with them and, therefore, able to operate its maximum strength. It has already been the organizer and leader of the revolutionary war and the mass life. Its enormous strength is incomparable to any form of state in the history. It needs a strong power to cope with its class enemy. But to the worker-peasant masses it exercises no strong power but wide democracy. The wide democracy of the Soviet is, first of all, manifested in its election. The Soviet gives the right to vote to all oppressed and exploited masses regardless of sex. This right to the worker-peasant masses is unprecedented in human history. The experience of the past two years tells us that the Soviet has been very successful in its election. The particulars of the Soviet elections are as follows: (1) The names of the electors are written on a big red paper and an election meeting with no exploiters participating in it takes the place of the general mass meeting of the past. (2) The proportions of social composition are as follows: one from every fifteen workers and their family members; one from fifty peasants and poor people; all the city and village Soviet councils are formed this way. The method guarantees the leading position of the workers in the worker-peasant alliance. (3) According to the Election Act proclaimed by the Central Soviet Executive Committee in September 1933, the election units for the peasants are villages while workers have another rule. This makes the election universal among the peasants while the workers can also elect their best representatives to work in the Soviet Council. (4) During the two elections in 1932 and the election in the autumn of 1933 in many places more than 80 per cent of the electorate joined it. In some places, the sick people

and those on defense duty did not join. (5) In the autumn of 1932, the nominee system was introduced in the election. The electorate could consider beforehand who would be their best representatives. (6) In many city or village Soviet councils women form a percentage of above 25 per cent. In the Soviets of Shangtsaishihhsian and Shiatsaishihhsian, of Shanhan, in Fukien, the percentages of women are 60 and 66 per cent respectively. Broad woman masses are now participating in the affairs of state administration. (7) Before the election takes place the electors have the chance to hear reports about the past work of the city or village Soviet in a preparatory meeting. They are led to give criticisms of the past work. This was more universally practiced during the fall election of last year. All these have helped the masses in getting familiar with the Soviet election, primary step of state administration, and have guaranteed the consolidation of the Soviet power.

Next, the Soviet democracy is also manifested in the city and hsiang councils which form the foundation of the organization of the Soviet. Two years gives us now better organization of the councils. The characteristics are as follows: (1) The delegates are scattered evenly to live among the people so that they will have the closest relation with them (usually one delegate leads and lives with 30 to 70 people). This makes the council not separated from the masses. (2) The delegates are grouped in from 3 to 7 with their fellow members in the neighborhood having a head who serves as the immediate connector between them and the presidium of the council. The group has the regular task of summoning meetings of the people under them by order of the presidium to solve problems of minor importance. All groups in one village have a general head who is responsible for the whole village. This makes the connection between the presidium and the delegates very close and guarantees strong leadership over the work of each village. (3) There are various permanent or temporary committees under the city or hsiang Councils such as Cultural, Irrigation, Sanitary, Food, Red Army Families Defence, etc., which absorb the active elements among the masses to work. In this way, the Soviet work is made into the form of a net and the broad masses can directly participate in it. (4) Election of city or hsiang Soviet takes place once in six months and that of province or hsien Soviets once in a year. This makes it easy for the opinions of the masses to reach the Soviet. (5) Any delegate who commits serious errors may lose his seat through the sugges-

tion of ten or more electors, seconded by more than one-half of the whole electorate or through the resolution of the council meeting.

The city and hsiang Soviets are the foundation for the government organs of the Soviets above them; they are all formed by the Soviet congresses and their executives. Government workers are also appointed by election. If any one is found to be incompetent, he may be recalled by public opinion. The solution of all problems is based on public opinion. So the Soviet is really the government of broad masses.

The Soviet democracy is also shown by the fact that all revolutionary masses are given the right of free speech, free association, free assembly, free publication and free strike. The Soviet gives them all facilities such as meeting places, paper, printing shop, and other material needs. Moreover, to consolidate the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship, the Soviet always welcomes the supervision and criticism of the broad masses. Every revolutionary citizen has the right to disclose the error or shortcoming of any Soviet functionary in his work. Finally, the Soviet democracy is also found in the division or administrative districts. All the administrative districts from province down to hsiang are now smaller than before. This makes the Soviets of various grades to know exhaustively the demands of the masses and makes the opinions of the masses to be quickly reflected in the Soviets.

c. SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD LANDLORD-BOURGEOIS

The Soviet is not democratic to the exploiters — landlord and bourgeoisie who have been knocked down by the revolutionary masses. The Soviet maintain a different attitude toward them. Although overthrown, they still have a deep foundation and their remnants have not yet been wiped out. They have a superior knowledge and techniques. They are always thinking of the restoration of their power. Particularly in the course of the civil war, they are always seeking to support the attacking enemies through counter-revolutionary activities. Hence, the Soviet has to curb and oppress them from all sides.

First of all, the Soviet rules the exploiting elements out of the political power. In the Soviet Constitution, they are all deprived of the rights of election and military service. The Soviet has been

ceaselessly engaged in bitter struggles against the alien elements in the Soviet organs. The past experience tells us that this task has been very important work of the Soviet. Secondly, all landlords and bourgeoisie are deprived of the freedom of speech, publication, assembly and association.

Thirdly, counter-revolutionary activities are under the suppression of the revolutionary forces and revolutionary courts. The Soviet courts directly depend upon the mass armed forces, the activities of the State Political Defence Bureau, and the class struggle of the broad masses. All these have offered strict suppression to the counter-revolutionary activities in the Soviet districts. The well known cases were the suppression by the Soviet courts of the activities of A-B Corps in the Central and Hunan-Kiangsi Soviets, of the Social-Democrats in Fukien, of the Re-organizationists in Hupeh-Hunan west, Hupeh-Honan-Anhui, Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi, and Fukien-Kiangsi Soviet Districts and of the Trotskyist-Chen Groupings in Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi Soviet District. Through these suppressions, the State Political Defence Bureaus and the Soviet courts have acquired abundant experience and corrected many errors in the past that were committed through the diversion from the correct class line. The mass character of the Soviet court, namely, the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities by the Soviet courts in co-ordination with the mass struggle against counter-revolutionary intrigues, has been making long strides of progress. The practice of the Traveling Court is a proof of this.

The Soviet has formally proclaimed prohibition of corporal punishment. In the Soviet prisons, except for those prisoners who are sentenced to death punishment, all other prisoners are put under reformatory education; that is to say, the Soviet policy for prisoners is to train them in the communistic spirit and with labour discipline. In sharp contradiction to this situation is the practice in full bloom of medieval tortures in the Kuomintang courts and prisons. To put own counter-revolutionary intrigues, to keep the Soviet territory in revolutionary order and to abolish all feudal and barbarous remnants in the field of jurisdiction constitute the aim of the Soviet court. The improvement of the Soviet in this direction is of historical significance.

In summary, the Soviet has by far the widest revolutionary democracy for the broad masses and out of it rises its enormous power — a power which is built upon the determined faith and self-con-

scious needs of the millions of the worker-peasant masses. Having this power in operation, the Soviet shapes itself into a dictatorship and organizes the revolutionary war and the revolutionary court which wage violent attacks upon the class enemy from all directions. This brings about the enormous function of the Soviet court in the Soviet territory.

d. THE SOVIET LABOUR POLICY

The Soviet, based on the class character of its political power and on its enormous task of arming the toiling masses to fight out imperialists and the Kuomintang through a revolutionary war, must initiate class struggles of workers, defend their every day interests, develop their revolutionary initiative, organize this initiative in the enormous revolutionary war and turn the workers into active leaders for the revolutionary war and pillars for the consolidation and development of Soviet power.

Interests of the workers are completely protected under the Soviet labour policy. The labour situation under it as compared with that in the past while under the Kuomintang rule, or with that of the districts now still ruled by the Kuomintang, forms a sharp contrast which is comparable only to the difference between heaven and hell. Before the Soviet districts came to exist, that is to say, when the Kuomintang were the rulers, the workers were slaves of employers. The long working hours, the meagre wages, the brutal treatment, and the absence of any legal means whatsoever for protecting the interests of workers are what will remain permanently in the memory of every worker. All these disadvantages for the workers still exist in the Kuomintang-ruled districts and are aggravated. Lately, the real wages of workers in the white districts have been cut by more than 50 per cent. Cut of production, mass-dismissal, and lockout, have been the common methods of capitalists to launch attacks upon their employees. It logically follows that broad unemployment has been formed. To speak of industrial workers alone the unemployed now exceeds 60 per cent. In the Kuomintang-ruled districts, to strike is a criminal act in the eyes of the rulers. In March, 1933, the Kuomintang authorities at Hankow even proclaimed death punishment for strikers. Whenever there is a conflict between labour and capital, the Kuomintang never fails to stand on the side of the capitalist

to suppress the workers.

In the Soviet districts these things have been completely wiped out. Under Soviet power, workers are masters themselves and are leading the broad peasantry in the enormous task of consolidating and developing the Soviet. Hence the basic principle of the Soviet labour policy is to protect the interests of the workers and to consolidate and develop the Soviet power. The Labour Act proclaimed in December, 1931, was based on this principle. It was revised and reproclaimed in March, 1933, better applicable to towns, villages, big enterprises and small ones.

The eight-hour system is now universally observed in the Soviet districts. There is also a wide practice of labour agreement and collective agreement. In many urban and rural districts, there are Labour-Inspection offices which send our inspectors to examine whether the Soviet Labour Act is violated by employers or not. There is the Labour Court for cases in which the employer is accused of violating the Soviet Laws. To guard against control of labour by employers and to work for the interests of the unemployed, the Soviet has the absolute control of employment. All employers must go to the Soviet for hiring workers. Unemployment relief measures are in broader practice. Generally speaking, unemployed workers can now get concrete relief. Village workers have their own farming land. The social insurance system is administered by a Social Insurance Bureau established in the Soviet towns. These are what the workers cannot get at all in the Kuomintang-ruled districts, but what the Soviet considers as its big responsibility to fulfil.

Because of the determined execution by the Soviet of its labour policy, the living conditions of the workers in the Soviet districts are greatly improved. First of all is the wages. The real wages of the workers of the Soviet districts has been generally increased as compared with the pre-Revolutionary period. A comparison of wages of the workers in Tingchow before and after the revolution (see Table 1) may be taken as an example. From this table we can easily see the great difference in the wages of the workers in Tingchow before and after the revolution. The smallest increase is 32 per cent (carpenters) and the biggest is 1450 per cent (weaving workers). What a contrast it is as compared with the decreasing wages in the Kuomintang era! In other districts where the employers supply meals to the workers, the wage level is slightly lower. The wages of a carpenter and mason of Jukin is now 45 cents a day as compared with 25 cents a day in the pre-revolutionary period. The increase is 80 per cent.

Table I
Monthly wages of workers in Tingchow
before and after the revolution
(yuan)

Occupation	Maximum		Before the revolution	Minimum			Average
	Before the revolution	After the revolution	Differ-ence	Before the revolution	After the revolution	Differ-ence	
Fruit workers	10	32	22	2	22	20	30
Paper workers	10	35	25	3	31	28	33
Oil workers	6	18	12	3	12	9	15
Medicine workers	6	18	12	2	26	24	28
Tobacco workers	7	36	29	3.5	30	26.5	28
Printers	15	36	21	5	28	23	34
Metal workers	6	18	12	—	14	—	16
Dyeing workers	5.5	20	14.5	2	18	16	19
Oil-paper workers	5	21	16	2	17	15	19
Wine workers	6	20	14	3	18	15	19
Weaving workers	10	35	25	2	31	29	32
Carpenters	0.6*	0.8	0.2				
Boatmen	14	46	32				

for each trip from Tingchow to Shanghai

* Daily wage

Wages in the village are also increased. The following table is the comparison of daily wage scales, in cents, which prevailed in different periods in the Tienchen District of Kanhsien:

Table 2

Daily wages of workers in the Tienchen District
before and after the revolution
(100 cents = 1 yuan)

		Handi- craftsmen	Paper workers	Farming hands	Coolies
Maximum daily wage	Before the revolution	30	40	28	45
	Prior to May 1, 1931	30	40	30	67.5
	After the revolution	35	45	32	96
	Increase	5	5	4	51
Average daily wage	Before the revolution	22	22	10	26
	Prior to May 1, 1931	25	24	15	39
	After the revolution	30	30	20	50
	Increase	8	8	10	24
Minimum daily wage	Before the revolution	10	14	3	10
	Prior to May 1, 1931	15	21	6	—
	After the revolution	20	25	10	20
	Increase	10	11	7	10

This is the story of only one village. A similar situation is found in other villages. As to the wage scale prevalent in the state enterprises, there has been a general increase of from 20 per cent to 40

per cent in the past two years.

Generally speaking the wages of the workers are paid on time. Because of the superintendence of the Soviet, very few employers delay their wage payments to workers. Some stubborn capitalists did try to do so, but were brought under control by the Labour Court.

Concerning the legal working hour, the 8-hour system has been introduced to all Soviet cities and towns in the past two years, and in the villages there are but rare cases in which employees work more than eight hours a day. Employees between the age of 16 and 18 have shorter hours than do adults.

PROTECTION FOR WOMEN AND INFANTS

Equal work, equal pay, rest before and after confinement, prohibition of infant workers below fourteen years and so on, are in general practice.

As to apprentices, the apprenticeship period is shortened, treatment improved and feudal oppression abolished. The living conditions of apprentices have been made considerably better. The wages of apprentices are increased. For instance, in Kiangsi apprentices receive an allowance in the amount of from fifteen to thirty-six dollars annually.

Sanitary conditions and food supplies for the workers in general, and for the employees of the state enterprises in particular, have been greatly improved. In the cities, the workers' food is rated at least six dollars a month. In the villages, the farming employees eat the same food as served to their employers.

The Soviet workers are organized in their strong class trade union which is the pillar of the Soviet power, burg for the workers themselves and school in which the broad working masses learn communism. With its interests protected by the Soviets, the membership of the trade union is ever on the increase. According to the statistics of the All China Trade Union Federation, the trade union membership in Central Soviet District, together with its neighbouring Soviet zones, amount to 229,000. The distribution is as follows: Central Soviet District 110,000 persons; Hsiang-Kan (Hunan-Kiangsi) 23,000; Hsiang-O-Kan (Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi) 40,000; Min-Che-Kan (Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi) 25,000; Min-Kan (Fukien-Kiangsi) 6,000; North Fukien, 5,000. According to statistics compiled by the Central

Soviet District there are 3,676 non-trade union workers in the said district which means not more than 5 per cent of the whole working body. In other words, 95 per cent of the workers in the Central Soviet District are members in the trade unions. In the district of Hsinkuo this percentage reaches as high as 98 per cent. Can this be dreamed of in the Kuomintang-ruled districts? Except for the U.S.S.R., can this be dreamed of in any of the imperialist countries?

In short, in the course of only two years, the Soviet Labour Act has been generally observed in all towns and all villages. In the two years, the capitalists and the kulaks attempted to resist the Act. But the active struggles of the working masses, together with the close superintendence of the Soviet, have frustrated them. In dealing with independent producers and middle peasants who would have violated the Labour Act in their relation with farming hands or other employees, the method of convincing them with frank explanations has been used. All these account for the general improvement of the living conditions of workers, the development of their militancy in the revolution and their vital task in the revolutionary war and the Soviet reconstruction.

According to reports from Kun-lu Wantai, Lun-kan, Hsin-kuo, Shien-li, Sikiang, Yu-tu, Chinwu, Shanghan, Ninhua, Changting, and Hsinchien, out of the 70,580 trade union members in these twelve hsien, 19,960 are now serving either in the Red troops or in the local partisan units forming 28 per cent of whole membership, and also 6,752 in various Soviet organs forming 10 per cent. The two make a total of 38 per cent. The remainder amounts to 43,860 persons. It was they who cancelled the Second Government Bonds to the amount of \$43,855 and bought recently the Government Reconstruction Bonds to the amount of \$197,803. This means that every trade union member bought the bonds to the amount of \$4.5 on the average. Among them, 12,435 are members of the Communist Party or the Young Communist League, the percentage being 28 per cent.

From these statistics, one learns how ardently the working masses are joining the Red Army, support the revolutionary war and favour the Communist Party. But these are nothing but the outcome of the work of the Soviet for their interests and to promote their militancy. Some one said that workers gained nothing since the revolution, neither has their militancy been promoted. This is completely a vile slander!

THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION

The Chinese Soviet and Red Army have grown up from the development of the agrarian revolution, which liberates the broad peasantry from the brutal oppression and exploitation by landlords and the Kuomintang militarists. The principle of the land policy of the Soviet is to completely wipe out feudal and semi-feudal oppression and exploitation. In any village of the Kuomintang district, past or now, there are horrible land rents (60 per cent to 80 per cent), horrible usury (30 per cent to 100 per cent), and horrible, onerous taxes (there are above 1,700 different kinds of taxes throughout the country). Consequently, the land is concentrated in the hands of landlords and kulaks. The overwhelming majority of the peasantry lost their land and are obliged to live in extreme misery. The relentless exploitation has exhausted them of their means to combat catastrophe. The whole country is therefore, exposed to constant inundation or drought. The catastrophe stricken area in 1931 amounted to 809 hsien covering a population of 44,000,000. The exploitation has also exhausted the peasantry of their production power. Much land has been turned infertile or left uncultivated. Yet with their meager products, they have to face the dumping of imperialist agricultural productions. All these lead the Chinese rural economy to the state of complete bankruptcy, from which emerges the violent agrarian revolution.

The power of the agrarian revolution in the Soviet districts has wiped out all feudal remnants. The millions of the peasantry awakening from their long dark age confiscated land from all the landlords and fertile land from the kulaks, abolished usury and onerous taxation, knocked down all that are against the revolution and built up their own government. For the first time, the Chinese peasant masses have broken their way out of the hell and become masters themselves. This is the fundamental situation that distinguishes the rural district under the Soviet from those under the Kuomintang.

The First National Soviet Congress proclaimed the Land Act which has since served as the correct guidance for the proper solution of the land problems in this country. There have been numerous arguments over the analysis of classes in the villages owing to the acute class struggle. Based on the experience of the agrarian revolution, the People's Council has passed a resolution on the various problems of the struggle for land. Undoubtedly, this will pro-

mote the further development of the village struggle. As to the methods of partition in connection with the distance, fertility, infertility, forests, waters, etc., it is now of urgent need to work out a definite resolution out of the experience of all places so as to make it the guidance for the partition of land in the new Soviet districts.

The inspection movement mobilized by the Central Government is directed to thoroughly wipe out the feudal remnants and to make sure that the real benefits resulting from the agrarian revolution have gone to the farming employees and to the poor and middle peasants. According to the statistics of July, August, and September, 1933, through this movement in the Central Soviet District that further called forth the revolutionary militancy of the peasant masses, landlords to the number of 6,988 families and the kulaks to the number of 6,638 families were disclosed, with land totalling 17,539 *mou* being revoked, and money forfeits from the landlords and fines from the kulaks, totalling \$606,916, seized. The Farming Employee Trade Union and the Poor Peasant Corps have now formed the pillars of the Soviet in the villages! This is only the result of three months' work which indicates that the Soviet has still to pay closer attention to the class struggle in the villages. The result also shows that the land inspection movement is an effective means to further develop the village struggle and to annihilate the feudal remnants in the rural districts. The class line of the agrarian revolution is to depend upon the farming employees and poor peasants, to ally the middle peasants, to exploit the kulaks and to annihilate the landlords. The correct practice of this line is the key to the success of the agrarian revolution and foundation for all other policies of the Soviet in the villages. Hence the Soviet should deal seriously with those erroneous tendencies that attempt to infringe upon the middle peasants or to annihilate the kulaks. At the same time, it should also not let go any error of making compromise with the landlords and kulaks. That is the way to lead the agrarian revolution in the correct direction. In the past two years we have gained much experience in our mass work in the agrarian revolution. The summarized particulars are as follows:

(1) Full mobilization of agricultural workers, poor and middle peasants for struggle against landlords and kulaks is necessary in the partition and inspection movements. The work of partition and inspection should be done with concurrence of the masses. The determination of class should be passed by mass meeting. To conduct

this work solely through the activities of a few Soviet functionaries is liable to cause the danger of lowering the struggling spirit of the masses.

(2) When belongings other than land of the landlords and surplus draught animals and farming implements of the kulaks are confiscated, the greater part of them must be shared by the poor mass. It is bad to have them only shared by a few for it will lower the struggling spirit of the masses, on the one hand, and favor the opposition of the exploiters, on the other.

(3) The partition of the land should be completed in the shortest possible period. Unless it is demanded by a considerable mass of the peasants, re-partition is not a good policy, for otherwise the militancy of the peasant masses to promote agricultural production may be destroyed and the exploiters may take advantage of it to hinder the development of the struggle.

(4) The aim of the inspection movement is to disclose the exploiters, but not to disturb the exploited. So the inspection should not be made from house to house and from one piece of land to another. It should be done through the mobilization of broad masses.

(5) Those counter-revolutionary elements who work to hinder the partition and inspection movements should be seriously dealt with. They should be severely punished by mass judgement or through mass concurrence to serve imprisonment or even to face death penalty. This is necessary for otherwise the agrarian revolution will be handicapped.

(6) Class struggle should be promoted while clashes between families and localities should be avoided. The landlords and kulaks are always thinking of displacing class struggle with family or local struggle.

(7) The development of the agrarian revolution depends upon the class-consciousness and organizational strength of the basic masses in the villages. The Soviet functionaries must have, therefore, broad and deep propaganda in the villages and work to strengthen the organizations of farming employees and poor peasants.

The aim of the agrarian revolution is not only to solve the land problem of the peasants but also to promote them to increase the productivity of their land. Because of the adequate leadership of the Soviet, and the initiative of the peasant masses themselves, the agricultural production has been restored in most places and in some places it is even increased.

On this foundation, the living conditions of the peasantry have been much improved.

In the past, the peasants lived on tree bark or grain husks for months in a year. This situation no longer prevails and there is no more starvation in the Soviet districts. The life of the peasantry gets better and better year by year. They are no longer in rags. They eat meat on a more regular basis, which was a luxury to them in former times.

Which kind of government and which and which kind of life is liked by the peasants? We have this question for the peasants in the Kuomintang-ruled districts to answer.

FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE SOVIETS

The financial policy of the Soviets assured ample supplies demanded by the revolutionary war as well as all the money needed by revolutionary work. With a comparatively small territory characterized by economic backwardness and pursuing a policy of taxation beneficial to masses, the Soviet have got along fairly well in sharp contrast to the KMT who, controlling a vast territory and increasing its exploitations from day to day, is now facing financial bankruptcy. In accordance with the principle of class and revolution the Soviet raise its revenue from the following sources: (1) confiscation or requisition from all feudal exploiters, (2) taxation, (3) development of national economy.

Under the first heading, landlords and kulaks both in the KMT and Soviet districts are required to raise funds for the Soviets, which, as shown by the past experience, form the largest item in the revenue of the Soviet Government. This is in direct contradiction to the KMT, who always places the financial burdens on the shoulders of the toiling masses. The Soviet system of progressive taxation consists of two categories, namely, the commercial and agricultural taxes, both imposed on the exploiters. The commercial tax is again divided into two classes, viz. the customs duty and business tax. The former is designed to control importation with a tariff ranging from entire exemption to 100 per cent duty, free from any intervention from any foreign power. It means that only the Soviets can realize customs autonomy in China. After payment of the customs duty, all goods can flow freely within the

Soviet territory without having to pay any more taxes in contrast to the goods passing through the KMT territory which are still subject to various taxes similar to *likin*.

The business tax is again progressive. It takes more from the larger enterprises with higher profits, but less from the smaller enterprises with lower profits. Undertakings with less than \$100 capital, co-operatives, farmers selling their own surpluses, are all exempted.

The agricultural tax is likewise progressive. It is heavier for the larger families who have obtained more land but lighter for those who have got less land. The poor peasants and middle peasants pay less, but the kulaks pay more. Farm hands and families of the Red Army are all exempted. This tax may be reduced or exempted in case of a disaster.

On the other hand, the KMT lays the principal burden on the peasantry and the small proprietors. It collects the surtax on the regular ones at a much heavier rate. According to the *Ta Kung Pao* of Tientsin, March 21, 1933, the KMT collects as many as 1,756 taxes, and the Szechwan militarists have collected the land tax up to 1,987. In Shensi the KMT has increased the tax by 25 times.

The development of national economy as a source of the Soviet finances forms an important part of the financial policy of the Soviets. It has begun to make progress in Mien-che-kang and Kiangsi. The financial and economical organs ought to do more in this direction. Here it may be pointed out that the state banks must issue notes to meet the needs for the development of the national economy, considering financial needs as only secondary.

The use of money shall be governed by the principle of economy. Corruption and waste are the greatest crimes. Great achievements have been registered in the struggle against these crimes. "Save every penny for the revolutionary war" is the guiding principle of the Soviet accounting system.

With the expansion of the Red Army, with the development of the revolutionary war, the Soviets are of course facing financial difficulties which will, however, create conditions for their own solution. The Soviet finances will improve when conquering more territory from the KMT, developing the national economy on a larger scale, etc., with the financial burdens placed on the exploiters.

ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE SOVIETS

Confronted with an impoverished people, the KMT, however, spread lies against the Soviets, saying that the Soviet Government is bankrupt. The KMT is bent on the destruction of the Soviets not only by guns and cannon but by economic measures, the most ruthless of which is the "blockade". With the broad masses and the Red Army behind it, the Soviets have been able to smash the KMT drives, one after another. And it has, also, succeeded to a certain extent in economic reconstruction within its territory, a step which has been taken to break the blockade of the enemy.

Engaged in a battle against imperialism and KMT, at the same time located in an economically backward region encircled by the economic blockade of the enemy, the Soviets must proceed, whenever possible, with the economic reconstruction, concentrate its forces on war supplies, improve the life of the masses, consolidate the alliance between the workers and the peasants in the economic field, assure the leadership of the proletariat over the peasantry, and create the premises for the development of socialist construction in the future.

The central tasks involved in economic reconstruction of the Soviets are development of agricultural production, of industrial production, of foreign trade, and of co-operatives.

Agriculture in Soviet districts is apparently forging ahead at a big pace. Agricultural products in 1933 have increased 15 per cent on the average as against 1932. The rise in Mien-che-kang is 20 per cent. In the couple of years following the Soviet revolution, agricultural production showed a downward trend, but thanks to the certainty in the division of land, the promotion of the Soviets and the growth of enthusiasm among the masses, production has been moving upwards steadily. In some cases production has been restored to its original level, but in others it has exceeded the original level. Fallow land has been cultivated again, while new land has been reclaimed. Large masses of women have joined the shock-work in agricultural production. These are facts never witnessed under the KMT's rule. Satisfied with the land obtained, encouraged by the Soviets, the peasants have shown a great enthusiasm in working up the land allotted to them. Under present conditions, agricultural production shall be the first task in the economic reconstruction of the Soviets. It shall solve the food problem, as well as secure raw

materials for articles of everyday use. It shall emphasize afforestation and increases in livestock. Taking the small farm economy as a basis, plans must be worked out for certain branches of agriculture as, for example, cotton, whose production shall be fixed for each province.

The Soviets must lead the peasants to solve such vital problems as labour, oxen, fertilizers, seeds, irrigation, etc. Here the organized mobilization of the labour force and the participation of women in production are of vital importance. The Soviets must lead the peasantry in launching the Spring and Summer ploughing campaigns. About 25 per cent of the peasantry is in need of oxen, hence the necessity of organizing the oxen co-operatives. The Soviets must direct the greatest attention to irrigation. At present we are not in need of Soviet farms and collective farms, but for agricultural improvement an experimental station shall be set up in each district. In addition, agricultural research institutes shall be established and agricultural products showrooms arranged.

As a result of the blockade of the enemy, difficulties have arisen in our exportation, and many handicraft industries in the Soviet districts have declined. Tobacco and paper have suffered most. But these difficulties are by no means invincible. Owing to the large consumption of the people, the Soviet goods can find a big market within the Soviet territory. In the first half of 1933 the efforts of the Soviets and the development of the co-operatives resulted in the revival of many industries as, e.g., tobacco, paper, tungsten, camphor, fertilizers, agricultural instruments, etc. Attention shall be directed to cloth, drugs, sugar industries. New industries have sprung up in Mien-che-kang province (paper, cloth, etc.). To relieve the shortage in salt, nitrate-salt has been manufactured. It is hard to map out a plan for the scattered handicraft industries, but it is possible to elaborate a plan for the leading industries, above all, for the undertakings operated by the state and the co-operatives. The Soviet and co-operative controlled enterprises shall make an appraisal of the production of (raw) materials as well as market both in the White and Red districts.

The Soviet shall organize foreign trade and directly control the flow of such goods as the importation of salt and clothes, the exportation of food and tungsten. It shall see to it that food be equally distributed within the Soviet districts. This work began in Mien-che-kang at an early date, followed by Kiangsi in the Spring of 1933.

The inauguration of the foreign trade bureau produced the initial success in this direction.

In the Soviet territory the national economy is composed of three parts, namely state, co-operative and private enterprises. The state undertakings are at present very much limited in scope, but they have a bright prospect for the future. Within the pale of law, private economy is, far from being restricted, rather encouraged, owing to the Soviets need for private economy. Not only at the present time, but for a long time to come, private economy is predominant. It now assumes the form of small capital in the Soviet districts.

The co-operative enterprises are making a rapid advance. According to the statistics of September, 1933, there are 1,423 co-operatives in 17 hsiens with a total capital of \$305,531. In certain hsiens, like Suikin and Sinkuo, the number of co-operatives has doubled owing to the encouragement of the economic conference. At present the consumption and food co-operatives are of major importance. They overshadow the production co-operatives. As to the credit co-operatives, they are just in the initial stage. No doubt the development of the co-operatives constitutes an important lever of Soviet economy. Combined with state enterprises, it will become a mighty force in the economic field, assert its supremacy over private economy in a protracted struggle, and create conditions for the transition of the Soviet economy to a socialist economy. State enterprises shall be pushed, together with the large-scale development of the co-operatives, and at the same time, private economy will be encouraged.

As an aid to the development of the state enterprises and the co-operatives, \$3,000,000 in economic reconstruction bonds have been issued thus enlisting the support of the masses in Soviet economic construction. In face of millions of starving people and with an impoverished country, the Soviets alone boldly embark on economic reconstruction in a planned way which will carry out the task of saving millions now in distress from final collapse.

SOVIET CULTURE

For securing the victory of the revolution, for consolidating the Soviets, for drawing the gigantic forces of the masses into the revolutionary class struggle, and for creating a new revolutionary generation, the Soviets must proceed with far-reaching cultural reforms

designed to shake off the spiritual yoke of the reactionary ruling class, as well as to create a new Soviet culture for the workers and peasants.

As is known to all, cultural institutions of the KMT are without exception in the hands of the landlord and bourgeoisie, employed to spread demagogical propaganda to check the revolutionary thought of the oppressed classes. In support of illiteracy they exclude the workers and peasants from education. Educational appropriations have been used for attacking the revolution. Legions of colleges and universities have closed down, throwing out thousands of students. Over 80 per cent of the population under the KMT is still illiterate. Left-wing thought has been ruthlessly suppressed by the White Terror. Left-wing writers have been arrested by the fascist thugs. Educational institutions have become a hell for the masses, a fact that characterizes the educational policy of the KMT.

But in the Soviet territory all cultural and educational institutions are under the direct control of the workers and peasants, giving their children a preferred right to enjoy education. The Soviets have done their best in raising the cultural level of the masses. In spite of the Soviets being located in a backward region and threatened by war from all sides, cultural reconstruction has been going on at an accelerated pace.

For the 2,931 villages in Kiangsi, Fukien and Yeh-kang provinces there are 3,052 Leninist primary schools with 89,710 pupils; 64,612 evening schools with an attendance of 94,517; 32,388 reading groups with a membership of 155,371; 1,656 clubs with 49,668 workers. These are only the statistics compiled up from the data in the central Soviet districts.

A majority of the school children have attended the Leninist primaries. For instance, out of the 20,969 school children in Sinkuo, 12,860 have attended the Leninist primaries. The school children spend most of the time in reading and reserve only a small fraction of the time for family work. They also join the red boy scouts and learn practical communism therein.

Women, too, are very enthusiastic for education. In Sinkuo there are 15,740 pupils for the evening schools, out of which 4,988, or 31 per cent, are men, and 10,752, or 69 per cent, are women. Among the reading groups of Sinkuo we find that 40 per cent of the membership is men, while the female members amount to as high as 60 per cent. Not only eager for education, some of the women have occupied high positions in the cultural institutions. They serve as

heads of the primaries or evening schools, or as directors of the reading groups. The delegate council of woman workers and peasants is almost universal in the Soviets, directing close attention to the interests of the toiling women, including their education.

A vigorous campaign against illiteracy is in full swing. Evening schools for reading have been established (in Sinkuo the number of people who joined the reading groups, scattered all over the hsien, is 3,387). To help in learning to read, signboards inscribed with characters have been set up close to the highways.

The cultural advance of the Soviets may be illustrated by the increase in the circulation of newspapers. In the Central Soviet District we have some 34 newspapers, big and small. The *Red China*, organ of the Soviet Government, has increased its circulation from 3,000 to 40,000; the *True Word of the Youth* up to 28,000; the *Struggle* (organ of the Central Communist Party), 27,000; the *Red Star* (organ of the Red Army), 17,300 — increases that testify to the rapid advance of the masses in the cultural field.

The revolutionary arts of the Soviets have already made a good start with the formation of the Worker and Peasant Drama Club and the commencement of the Blue Shirt Movement extending in all directions in the villages. Red sports have been gaining ground everywhere. Gymnasium fields may be seen here and there.

Now the Soviets, though having not much to show in the construction of technical education, have nevertheless succeeded in establishing the Red Army University, The Soviet University, the Communist University and many higher schools under the direct control of the Ministry of Education, all calculated to train leaders for the revolutionary leadership. Colleges and high schools must follow closely on the heels of the development of the ordinary schools as is scheduled in the educational plan.

For training the revolutionary intelligentsia, and for the development of education and culture, the Soviets have utilized the services of the landlord-bourgeoisie intelligentsia — a point that cannot be overlooked in the cultural policy of the Soviets.

The general line of the cultural policy of the Soviets is to educate the broad masses in the spirit of communism, to subordinate education to the revolutionary war and the class struggle, and to link labour with education. In the educational field the central tasks confronting the Soviets are the enforcement of compulsory education throughout the whole land. The development of social education on

a wide scale, the rapid liquidation of illiteracy, the training of large numbers of cadres for revolution, all of these tasks can be performed only under the Soviets because they signal the sharpened class struggle and an unprecedented victory for spiritual emancipation.

MARRIAGE UNDER THE SOVIETS

To free women from the most barbarous marriage system handed down through thousands of years, the Soviets as early as November, 1931, proclaimed the equality of men and women in marriages by a new set of regulations which declared complete liberty of marriage and divorce, abolished the sale of women as wives, interdicted child marriage, provisions that have all been enforced throughout the Soviet territory. As a rule, a man of twenty may marry a girl of eighteen by simple registration with the Soviets, provided he is free from dangerous disease. Lineal descendants from the same grandfather, however, cannot marry each other within five generations. Divorce may be granted by the Soviets if one of the parties to the marriage insist on it.

This liberation of women from the feudal marriage fetters is made possible only under the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants subsequent to the overthrow of the landlord-bourgeoisie and the accomplishment of the land revolution. Men and women, particularly the latter, must first of all have political liberty, and also some measure of economic liberty as a guarantee for free marriage. More oppressed by the feudal marriage system than men, women have been given more protection in the matter of marriage, and the burden arising from divorce is imposed for the most part on the shoulders of men.

Of vital importance to the revolution are children who we may say are new revolutionaries, to whom protection must be afforded. The Soviets recognize the illegal children and give them protection. The protection of children has been laid down in the Soviet Law.

NATIONALITY POLICY OF SOVIETS

The point of departure for the Soviet nationality policy is the capture of all the oppressed minorities around the Soviets as a means

to increase the strength of the revolution against imperialism and the KMT. The oppressed minorities such as the Mongols, Tibetans, Koreans, Annamites, Miaos, etc., are all oppressed by Chinese monarchs, militerists, etc. General Geng Yu-hsiang massacred the Mohammedans in Kansu, while General Pei Tsung-shi butchered the Miaos in Kwangsi, to mention but two recent examples of the Kuomintang in maltreating the minorities. On the other hand, the ruling classes of the minorities, such as princes, living Buddas, Lamas, etc., have allied with the KMT in oppressing and exploiting the mass of people, especially the toilers. In the case of Tibet, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia, the ruling classes have directly surrendered to imperialism and accelerated the colonization of their country.

The Soviets, on the other hand, are decisively against the exploitation of the minorities by imperialism and the KMT. The constitution of the Soviets, as passed by the First Soviet Congress in November, 1931, is quite clear on this point (Article 14):

“Soviet China recognizes the complete self-determination of the minorities who may go so far as to secede and form independent free states. Soviet China shall see to it that the minorities be freed from the misrule of imperialism and KMT and secure complete emancipation from the misrule of their won princes and Lamas. In this regard the Soviets will gladly aid the minorities in carrying out this task. The Soviets will permit the development of national culture and languages among these minorities.”

Article 15 of the same constitution provides that

“Soviet China will give the right of asylum to the revolutionaries either from the nationalities in China or from other countries who should have been persecuted by the reactionary rule; it will help them in securing complete victory for the revolutionary movement sponsored by them.”

The fact that any Korean, Annam and Taiwan comrades attended the First Soviet Congress and the Second Soviet Congress is a concrete proof that the Soviet means what it says. The common revolutionary interests will unite the toilers of China with those of the minorities in a firm alliance. The free union of nationalities will replace national oppression, an event that is possible only under the

Soviets. To achieve complete emancipation the minority nationality shall, for its part, assist the Soviet Revolution in securing a victory on a national scale.

CONCRETE TASKS CONFRONTING THE SOVIETS
IN SHATTERING THE FIFTH CAMPAIGN
OF IMPERIALISM AND THE KMT

In the past two years the Soviets have scored successive victories over the KMT, as a result of which the relation of power between the Soviets and KMT has apparently changed in favour of the former, but at the expense of the latter. The Soviets have consolidated, but the KMT has been steadily on the decline. The masses in KMT territory have put up the revolutionary flag. But owing to the fact that the Soviets are situated in a region economically backward, with only a comparatively small area, we must extend our territory and fight for the realization of the task of capturing one or more provinces. We must shatter the illusions of those who are satisfied with the present limited area of the Soviets. The revolutionary masses under the Soviets are called on to fight for carrying out of the following urgent tasks:

RECONSTRUCTION OF RED ARMY

First of all the Central Revolutionary Military Committee shall be strengthened in its leadership of the whole Red Army so as to make it possible for the Red Army to act more efficiently under a unified, strengthened command. In the second place, the expansion of the Red Army to 1,000,000 as a slogan must be popularized among the toiling masses, enabling them to understand that a Red Army of 1,000,000 soldiers is a decisive factor in the struggle against imperialism and the KMT. Recruiting shall be made through political agitation instead of compulsion. At the same time, a sharp class struggle together with the Soviet laws shall be directed against the alien elements who blocked the expansion of the Red Army by desertions. The families of those in the Red Army shall be treated in a better way. Land shall be cultivated and ploughed for them, articles of everyday use supplied to them, in order to comfort them spiritu-

ally. The Soviets shall see to it that all those who sabotage the work in this respect shall be punished by law.

To consolidate the Red Army a political education is of special importance. It will enable those in the Red Army to fight consciously for the victory of the Soviets, to value conscious discipline as a guarantee for the victory of the revolution. The system of the political commissioners shall be observed in all the units of the Red Army: more workers drawn in to act as military or political directors, more cadres turned out from the Red Army schools, decisive blows directed against the landlord-bourgeois elements who try to sneak into the Red Army, and the technique of the Red Army improved.

The Red Guards and Youth Vanguards shall be universally formed in all the Soviet districts, all the grown boys and girls armed as a reserve in defense of the rear. Every youth vanguardist shall be made to understand that conscription plays a big role in the future large-scale civil wars against imperialism and the KMT. Conscription in general shall be popularized among the masses, model youth vanguards be formally incorporated into the Red Army, more Red Partisans organized in the bordering districts who may penetrate far into the White regions. A closer relation shall be maintained between the red armies and the toiling masses.

The supplies and transport for the Red Army shall be assured and taken care of by the financial and economic organs of the Soviets as well as by the transport and sanitary organs of the Red Army.

COMMERCIAL SOVIET ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

To crush the economic blockade of the enemy, to counteract the manipulation of the wicked merchants, to assure the revolutionary needs, to improve the lot of the workers and peasants, the Soviets must proceed at once with economic reconstruction in various fields.

In the first place, agricultural production shall be raised, enthusiasm of the masses for such production aroused, propaganda campaigns in ploughing and harvest time launched, all peasantry drawn into the production campaign (including peasant women). Labour mutual assistance and ploughing corps shall be widely organized, the oxen and seed problems solved with the aid of the Soviets. Our fighting slogans are "Liquidate all fallow land", "Increase the crops by 20 per cent." The food bureau of the Soviets shall maintain a

more close relation with the food co-operatives to assure ample food for the Red Army and the masses. The commissar of national economy shall map out a plan for the more important branches of agriculture, as food and cotton.

The tasks of Soviet economic reconstruction rest on the need for the revival of the handicraft industry and the needs of the war. In elaborating the plans for economic reconstruction, consideration must be taken of the needs of the revolutionary war, the needs of the masses and the possibility of exports to the White regions. Maximum energy shall be devoted to the leading industries as tungsten, coal, iron, lime, agricultural instruments, tobacco, paper, cloth, sugar, drugs, nitrate-salt, lumber, camphor, etc. Production co-operatives shall be organized for these industries, drawing in the unemployed, independent workers and peasants. Private investment being permitted, the Soviets shall not monopolize all the productive enterprises, but concentrate on those beneficial to the state. The vital means to raise production are more incentive to labour, competition in production, reward to those who have made achievements on the production front.

The exchange of Soviet surpluses (e.g., food, tungsten, lumber, tobacco, paper) for salt, cloth, oils, etc., from the White regions, as may be made possible through the development of foreign trade, serves as an important lever in breaking through the blockade of the enemy and in promoting the development of our national economy. The commercial institutions of the Soviets shall be consolidated while private merchants will be encouraged for exportation and importation of necessities. Large numbers of workers and peasants shall be organized in consumption co-operatives to be set up everywhere, and thus enabled to buy cheap, but still sell their products at higher prices to the White regions, a possibility that plays a vital role in the economic reconstruction of the Soviets. The Soviets must strengthen their leadership of the central consumption co-operatives, and see to it that such centers be established where they do not yet exist.

The solution of the capital problem involved in economic reconstruction is found in the absorption of capital from the masses through the development credit co-operatives which will smash usury to pieces. The money of the masses will flow into the state enterprises through such channels as economic bonds, subscriptions, to the stock of the state bank, etc. Capital in the Soviet districts will

be made mobile through the encouragement of private capital. The note issue of the Soviet banks shall correspond to the needs of the market and absorb the deposits from the masses, and to lend the money so gathered to production enterprises. The Soviet banks shall provide financial relief within the Soviet territory and lead the struggle of the co-operatives against the speculative merchants.

RECONSTRUCTION OF SOVIETS

The Central Soviet Government, inaugurated as the supreme leader of the Soviet movement in China, has a vital significance, and has in the past two years scored glorious success in the fight against imperialism and the KMT, but many weakness are found in the organization and work of the Central Government. The organization and work of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee shall be improved and strengthened, the commissariats shall have a sufficient working staff, more commissariats created, if necessary, so the Central Government can fulfil its role as the supreme leader of the revolution.

As an important link with the Central Government as well as with local Soviets, the provincial Soviet government has been lax in its work in certain respects, a defect which shall be overcome hereafter.

The village and town Soviets constitute the basis of the Soviet system and for this simple reason merit the utmost attention. Congresses shall be established in places where they do not yet exist, and their work strengthened. Presidia shall be set up, committees moved into the villages, militant workers and peasants drawn into the Soviets, relation between a delegate and a number of inhabitants established, and each village shall have a general delegate permitting him to call a conference of the delegates and inhabitants to discuss the work to be done. The village and town Soviets are the direct organs for the mobilization of the masses and do practical work in the village and street. The latter may compete with each other in order to raise the efficiency of their work. As regards the work done by local Soviets, the system of inspection shall rigorously be enforced. The district Soviets shall give an efficient leadership in regard to the lower Soviets.

The provincial Soviets shall direct maximum attention to the work in new Soviet territory where a revolutionary committee ex-

ists in place of the Soviets. In regard to organization and work, the revolutionary committee differs radically from the Soviets and its work (as arming the inhabitants, waging the mass struggle, clearing the counter-revolutionaries, etc.) shall be strengthened.

Soviet democracy has progressed far but not enough. A struggle shall be waged against bureaucratism and commandism still remaining among the Soviet functionaries. Persuasion shall replace commandism vis-à-vis the masses. The Worker and Peasant Inspection Commissariat shall draw in large masses for the critical examination of the work of the Soviet functionaries and lead the struggle in criticizing the evil functionaries, even punish them in accordance with Soviet laws, thus maintaining the good relations between the Soviets and the masses. In the Soviet elections more electors shall be drawn in and alien elements, bureaucrats, etc., barred. More workers shall be attracted into the Soviets in order to strengthen the workers' hegemony in the government. In order to get close to the masses, the Soviets must establish an intimate connection with the labour unions, the poor peasant unions, the co-operatives, etc.

All the work of the Soviets shall be adapted to the needs of the revolutionary war, any relaxation among the Soviet functionaries shall be stamped out, the functionaries aroused to enthusiasm and consciousness that they work for the worker and peasant democratic dictatorship. Slogans shall be put forward — "Subordinate all work to the revolutionary war!" "For the greater speed and better quality of the work!" — all to be brought before the functionaries of the Soviets. In this respect the responsible leaders of the Soviets, especially the Worker and Peasant Inspection Commissariat, must win over the Soviet functionaries by persistent persuasion and education.

The Soviets shall enforce the following laws: labour (eight-hours, minimum wages, etc.), land revolution (confiscation of land of the landlord, land inspection, etc.), culture and education, and, finally, all the laws and orders against the counter-revolutionaries (GPU and Soviet courts drawing in large masses in the struggle against the reactionaries).

ANTI-IMPERIALIST WORK

The Soviets must strengthen its leadership of the anti-imperial-

ist struggle throughout the whole country, as well as of the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants against the KMT in the White territory. Passivity on the part of the Soviets in this direction means connivance at the aggression of imperialism, prolongation of the KMT misrule and limitation on the development of the Soviets in the territorial aspect. The Soviets must look forward to the vast area of the KMT and lead the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie there in the struggle against imperialism and the KMT. By utilizing the concrete facts of the KMT's surrender to imperialism, the Soviets may arouse the masses in the White regions to a sharp struggle against imperialism and its lackey, the Kuomintang. The Soviets shall call on the masses to organize and arm themselves to fight for the independence of China, and to drive imperialism out of China; in Manchuria and Jehol where Japanese imperialism still marches on with bayonets, the people, revolutionary army and volunteers shall be organized, the existing volunteers shall be alienated from the influence of the KMT in a determined fight against Japanese imperialism. The Soviets must give aid to every anti-imperialist struggle of the workers, peasants and petty-bourgeoisie.

The Soviets shall aid in every way possible the revolutionary struggle of the workers against capital and of the peasants against the landlord, and lead it to victory. The functionaries of the Soviets must understand that expansion of the Soviet territory and success of the revolution on a national scale depends much on the work of the Soviets in the KMT area, that they have to devote the greatest attention to the White regions where the masses are subject to military slavery and other exactions and are most apt to accept our influence, the more so in the districts bordering on the Soviets.

By making use of every opportunity the Soviets in the borderland shall establish regular contact with the masses, organize their everyday struggle, organize their revolt, develop partisan fighting, and bring the new districts under the control of the Soviets. The work in the borderland is of special importance. The partisans must observe the fundamental policy of the Soviets and refrain from making indiscriminate attacks on the Tuhao without any regard to class distinctions. In addition, the opposition of the Reds to the Whites, the flight of the masses, the salt question, the refugee problem, etc., shall be solved on the class principle and in accordance with the principle of mass work. The causes of the opposition of the Reds to the Whites and the flight of the masses have to be removed, and in

the work in the borderland must be improved, factors that can play a decisive role in changing the White into Red districts.


(Thunderous and prolonged applause.)

NOTES

¹ *The Great Learning*, one of the four Confucian classics.

² *Nineteen Old Poems*, a famous collection of poems of the Han Dynasty.

³ *The Doctrine of the Mean*, one of the Confucian classics.

FROM MARX
TO MAO

NOT FOR
COMMERCIAL
DISTRIBUTION

PROCLAMATION ON
THE NORTHWARD MARCH OF
THE CHINESE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS'
RED ARMY TO FIGHT JAPAN*

FROM MARX

July 15, 1934

TO MAO

The hateful Japanese imperialism . . . intends to transform China into its colony and turn the people of all China into slaves without a country doomed to suffer eternally the massacre, rape, exploitation, and trampling of the Japanese bandits.

If their reaction toward the invasion of Japanese imperialism the Kuomintang militarists — Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Hsueh-liang, and all the others — have all capitulated and sold out. . . . Under the slogan “No strength to fight Japan” they have instituted ceaseless “campaigns of encirclement” of the Soviet Government, which is the only anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist government in all China, and the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. All this proves that the Kuomintang is the most faithful running dog of Japanese imperialism and that the Kuomintang militarists are the greatest traitors in all Chinese history. In the face of the ceaseless aggressions of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese Soviet Government has repeatedly called upon the Chinese masses to arm themselves for a national revolutionary war . . . and it is preparing for a direct combat with Japanese imperialism. Under . . . three conditions, the Soviet Government is willing to conclude an agreement regarding military operations with any armed force anywhere in China. . . . The Kuomintang attacks make it impossible for our Soviet Government to unite directly with the masses of all China and to wage a revolutionary war against Japanese imperialism together with the anti-Japa-

* Extracted from a proclamation published in 1934. (*Min-tsu chan-hsien hsun-pao*, No. 2, August 10, 1935).

nese volunteers in the Northeast, in order to drive the Japanese imperialist bandits out of China. . . .

Therefore, if the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is to mobilize all its forces to fight Japanese imperialism, it can do nothing else but fight a bloody war with the millions of Kuomintang bandit troops that are attacking us. Only thus can it protect and maintain the free Soviet area that has already been saved from imperialist bondage, so that it will not again be trodden underfoot and sold out by the imperialist running dogs, the Kuomintang bandits. We will definitely not abandon the revolutionary anti-imperialist bases that have been created as a result of countless bloody fights with Kuomintang bandit troops. But the Soviet Government definitely cannot sit by and watch the ruin of the Chinese people at the hand of the Japanese imperialism. The Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, fearing no difficulties and with the greatest resolution, are sending an advance guard detachment northward to fight the Japanese. If this detachment should encounter any armed force that will accept the three conditions we have put forth, the main units of our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army will follow the advance guard to unite with all armed forces in China for a common struggle against Japan. . . . More concretely, the Soviet Government proposes:

1. To oppose resolutely the selling out . . . of the whole of China by the Kuomintang Government. . . .
2. To proclaim the immediate breaking off of diplomatic relations with Japan. . . .
3. To call upon the masses of all China to arm themselves with the weapons that can be found in the Kuomintang arsenals and factories, as well as with all the imported weapons and to organize popular anti-Japanese volunteer units and guerrillas. . . .
4. To confiscate all the enterprises and property of the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese traitors. . . .
5. To organize everywhere anti-Japanese groups of the masses. Let the running dogs of imperialism, the Kuomintang, let the Kuomintang traitors who are selling out their country, shout "no strength to fight Japan". By mobilizing the masses of all China against Japan, by arming the masses of all China against Japan, we shall gain the strength to overthrow Japanese imperialism and the band of traitors of Kuomintang.

Mao Tse-tung

Chairman of the Provisional Central
Government of the Chinese Soviets

Chairman of the Military Committee of the
Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army

FROM MARX

TO MAO



NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

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TO LIN PIAO

1936

Comrade Lin Piao,

I entirely agree with your letter. One further point — of the three courses, “cultural” education (cultivating the ability to read, reading books and newspapers, and writing) is the most important, the basic component. According to what you and your colleagues say, equal emphasis will be given to theory and practice, and “cultural” tools are a part of the “practice” which links up theory with practice. “Cultural” tools can and should be used to link up the two. If the student, having learnt other things, can neither read books nor write, his future development after leaving the school will be limited. If you agree with me, then I think in the next four months there should be more “culture” classes (reading, writing and composition) in the second and third courses. My view is that these classes should be increased to a quarter or even one third of the total study hours (including homework) of a student. Please give your consideration to this problem. When the time comes for the periodic test, “culture” will be an important criterion of judgement. Salute!

DISTRIBUTION

WE ARE NOT GOING TO TURN THE COUNTRY OVER TO MOSCOW!*

July 23, 1936

FROM MARX

Question: In actual practice, if the Chinese revolution were victorious would the economic and political relationship between Soviet China and Soviet Russia be maintained within the Third International or a similar organization, or would there probably be some kind of actual merger of governments? Would the Chinese Soviet Government be comparable in its relation to Moscow to the present government of Outer Mongolia?

Answer: I assume this is a purely hypothetical question. As I have told you, the Red Army is not now seeking the hegemony of power but a united China against Japanese imperialism.

The Third International is an organization in which the vanguard of the world proletariat brings together its collective experience for the benefit of all revolutionary peoples throughout the world. It is not an administrative organization nor has it any political power beyond that of an advisory capacity. Structurally it is not very different from the Second International, though in content it is vastly different. But just as no one would say that in a country where the Cabinet is organized by the social-democrats, the Second International is dictator, so it is ridiculous to say that the Third International is dictator in countries where there are communist parties.

In the U.S.S.R., the Communist Party is in power, yet even there the Third International does not rule nor does it have any direct political power over the people at all. Similarly, it can be said that although the Communist Party of China is a member of the Comintern, still this in no sense means that Soviet China is ruled by Moscow or by the Comintern. We are certainly not fighting for an eman-

* An extract from Edgar Snow's interview with comrade Mao Tse-tung, July 23, 1936.

cipated China in order to turn the country over to Moscow!

The Chinese Communist Party is only one party in China, and in its victory it will have to speak for the whole nation. It cannot speak for the Russian people or rule for the Third International but only in the interest of the Chinese masses. Only where the interests of the Chinese masses coincide with the interests of the Russian masses can it be said to be obeying the will of Moscow. But of course this basis of common benefit will be tremendously broadened, once the masses of China are in democratic power and socially and economically emancipated like their brothers in Russia.

When Soviet governments have been established in many countries, the problem of an international union of soviets may arise, and it will be interesting to see how it will be solved. But today I cannot suggest the formula, it is a problem which has not been and cannot be solved in advance. In the world of today with increasingly close economic and cultural intimacies between different states and peoples, such union would seem to be highly desirable, if achieved on a voluntary basis.

Clearly, however, the last point is of utmost importance; such a world union could be successful only if every nation had the right to enter or leave the union according to the will of its people, and with its sovereignty intact, and certainly never at the "command" of Moscow. No communist ever thought otherwise, and the myth of "world domination from Moscow" is an invention of the fascists and counter-revolutionaries.

The relationship between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union, now and in the past, has always been based on the principle of complete equality. When the people's revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian Republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at its own will. The Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples, likewise, will form autonomous republics attached to the China federation.

Question: With the achievement of victory of a Red movement in China, do you think that revolution would occur quickly in other Asiatic colonial or semi-colonial countries such as Korea, Indochina, the Philippines, and India? Is China at present the "key" to the world revolution?

Answer: The Chinese revolution is a key factor in the world situation and its victory is heartily anticipated by the people of every country, especially by the toiling masses of the colonial countries.

When the Chinese revolution comes into full power, the masses of many colonial countries will follow the example of China and win a similar victory of their own. . . .

FROM MARX

TO MAO



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TO HSU TEH-LI¹

February 1937

Old Comrade Hsu, **FROM MARX**

You were my teacher twenty years ago; you are still my teacher; you will continue to be my teacher in future. When the revolution failed and many members left the Party, even defecting to the enemy, you joined [the Party] in the autumn of 1927 and adopted an extremely active attitude. From then until now you have shown through a long period of bitter struggle greater positiveness, less fear of difficulty and more humility in learning new things than many younger members of the party. "Age", "declining physical and mental abilities", and "hardships and obstacles" have all surrendered to you, in spite of the fact that they have served as excuses for the timidity of many people. You know a great deal but always feel a deficiency in your knowledge, whereas many "half-buckets of water" [people of superficial knowledge] make a lot of noise. What you think is what you say or what you do, whereas other people hide filthy things in a corner of their minds. You enjoy being with the masses all the time, whereas some others enjoy being without the masses. You are always a model of obedience to the Party and its revolutionary discipline, whereas some others regard the discipline as restraint for others but not for themselves. For you, it is "revolution first", "work first", and "other people first", whereas for some others it is "limelight first", "rest first", and "oneself first". You always pick the most difficult things to do, never avoiding your responsibilities, whereas some others choose easy work to do, always shunning responsibilities. In all these respects, I admire you and am willing to continue to learn from you. I also hope that other members of the Party will learn from you. I write this congratulatory letter to you on your sixtieth birthday with my wishes that you will enjoy good health and a long life and continue to be a model

for all the members of our revolutionary Party and all the people.

Revolutionary Salute!

NOTES

¹ Hsu Teh-li (1877-1968) went to Japan and joined Sun Yat-sen's Alliance Society (Tung Meng Hui) in 1912. Hsu visited France, Germany and Belgium in 1920-23 as a student and a worker and also Russia to study at the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow in 1928-30. At the age of 57 he joined the Long March.

TO MAO



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LETTER TO THE SPANISH PEOPLE*

May 15, 1937

FROM MARX

People of Spain, Comrades in arms:

We, the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Red Army, and the Chinese Soviets, regard the war fought by the Spanish Republican Government as the most sacred war in the world. This war is being waged not only for the life of the Spanish people, but also for the oppressed peoples of the world, because the Spanish Government is resisting German and Italian fascism, which, with their Spanish accomplices, are destroying the culture, civilization, and justice of the world. The Spanish Government and the Spanish people are fighting the German and Italian fascists, who are in league with and giving support to the Japanese facial invaders of China in the Far East. . . . Were it not for the support received from German and Italian fascism, Japanese fascism could not, as it is now doing, attack us like a mad dog. . . .

We do not believe that the struggle of the Chinese people can be separated from your struggle in Spain. The Communist Party of China is supporting and encouraging you, the Spanish people, by struggling against Japanese fascism. The Communist Party of China, the Chinese Soviets, the Chinese Red Army, and the Chinese people are greatly moved by your defence of Madrid and by your victories on the northern and southern fronts. Each day our press here in the Soviet regions publishes reports and articles about your heroic struggle. . . . We firmly believe that the unity of your various parties in the People's Front is the basis for your final victory. . . .

We know that your victory will directly aid us in our fight against Japanese fascism. Your cause is our cause. We read with emotion of

* Extracted from a letter dated May 15, 1937, published in *Chieh-fang*, No. 4, June 1937.

the International Volunteers organized by people from every land, and we are glad that there are Chinese and Japanese in their ranks. Many comrades of the Chinese Red Army also wish to go to Spain to join you. . . . Were it not that we are face to face with the Japanese enemy, we would join you and take our place in your front ranks.

As many of you know, the Chinese Red Army has carried on a ceaseless and hard struggle for ten years. We fought without resources, through hunger and cold, with insufficient arms, ammunition, and medical supplies, until at last we won our victories. We know that you and your army are also passing through great hardships such as we also have passed through, and we are certain that you will be victorious. Our ten years' struggle has proved that if a revolutionary people and their revolutionary army are not afraid of suffering, but continue to fight heroically and unyieldingly against the enemy, they will be victorious. . . .



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LETTER TO COMRADE BROWDER*

July 24, 1937

FROM MARX

Dear Comrade Browder:

Taking advantage of the visit of a comrade, I am sending this letter to you, honoured Comrade Browder, the good friend of the Chinese people and the leader of the American people. . . .

We have heard from several American comrades and from other quarters that the American Communist Party and the great mass of the American people are profoundly concerned about China's anti-Japanese struggle, and they have already aided us in several ways. This gives us the feeling that our struggle is not an isolated one, that we are receiving heroic assistance from abroad; at the same time, we have the feeling that, when we obtain victory, this victory will be of great assistance to the struggle of the American people for liberation.

Today's world is on the eve of a great explosion, and the working class of the whole world, as well as all the peoples seeking liberation, must certainly unite and carry on a common struggle.

Revolutionary greetings!

Mao Tse-tung

June 24, 1937

* Extracted from *Mao Tse-tung lun-wen-chi*.

INSCRIPTION FOR THE FOUNDING OF THE NORTH SHENSI PUBLIC SCHOOL

1937
FROM MARX

We must educate a lot of people — the sort of people who are the vanguard of revolution, who have political farsightedness, who are prepared for battle and sacrifice, who are frank, loyal, positive, and upright; the sort of people who seek no self-interest, only national and social emancipation, who show, instead of fear, determination and forwardness in the face of hardships; the sort of people who are neither undisciplined nor fond of limelight, but practical, with their feet firmly on the ground. If China possesses many such men, the tasks of the Chinese revolution can easily be fulfilled.

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SPEECH AT THE MEETING
CELEBRATING THE COMPLETION OF
THE BUILDING OF THE
ANTI-JAPANESE MILITARY AND
POLITICAL UNIVERSITY
FROM MARX
TO MAO¹⁹³⁷

What I want to say to you, Comrades, is that, in short, the success of this great enterprise is due to [our] overcoming difficulties and uniting with the masses. The experience of the struggle in the past ten years, the cave [-buildings] you have dug, and the future course of the Resistance War have proved or will prove that if we continue to overcome difficulties and unite with the masses we shall be ever victorious!

To overcome natural difficulties by defeating the foes and to overcome military difficulties by defeating the Japanese bandits have something in common but quite a lot of differences. The latter is harder and more arduous. Therefore in addition to orienting oneself towards overcoming difficulties and uniting with the masses, the Resistance War requires skills in strategy and tactics, in mobilizing, organizing, and leading the masses, and in winning allies.

You have now the spirit to overcome difficulties and unite with the masses. If you can use your talents to develop from this basis, it is entirely possible to defeat Japan and drive the Japanese out of China.

ON LU HSUN*

1937

Comrades,

Our main tasks at the present moment are those of the vanguard. At a time when the great national Resistance War is making rapid progress, we need a large number of activists to play the leading role [in it] and a large number of vanguards to find the path. Vanguards must be frank, positive, and up-right people. They seek no self-interest, only national and social emancipation. They fear no hardships, instead, in the face of hardship they are determined and forever moving forward. Neither undisciplined nor fond of lime-light, they have their feet firmly on the ground and are realistic. They are the guides on the road of revolution. In the light of the present state of the war, if the Resistance is the concern only of the government and armed forces, without the participation of the broad masses, we cannot be certain that we shall win the final victory. We must now train a large number of vanguards who will fight for our national liberation and can be relied upon to lead and organize the masses for the fulfilment of this historic mission. First of all, the numerous vanguards of the whole country must urgently organize themselves. Our communist party is the vanguard of national liberation. We must fight to the bitter end in order to accomplish our tasks.

Today we commemorate [the death] of Lu Hsun. We must first of all understand him and his place in the history of our revolution. We commemorate him not only because he was a distinguished writer but also because he, at the forefront of national emancipation, dedicated all his strength to the revolutionary struggle. (We commemorate him not only because he wrote well, becoming a great literary

* Speech at the meeting Commemorating the First Anniversary of the Death of Lu Hsun held in the North Shensi Public School on October 19, 1939. Reproduced from the fortnightly *July* (*Chi-yueh*), March 1938.

figure, but also because he was a vanguard for national liberation and gave tremendous help to the revolution.) Although he did not belong to the Communist Party organization, his thinking, action, and writing were all Marxianized. He showed more and more youthful energy as his life drew to its end. He fought consistently and incessantly against feudal forces and imperialism. Under despicable circumstances of enemy pressure and persecution, he struggled (suffered) and protested. In a similar way, Comrades, you can also study revolutionary theories diligently while [living] under such adverse material conditions [because] you are full of militant spirit. The material arrangement of this school is poor, but here we have truth, freedom, and a place to train revolutionary vanguards.

Lu Hsun emerged from the decaying feudal society. But he knew how to fight back against the rotten society and the evil imperialist forces of which he had had so much experience. He used his sardonic, humorous, and sharp (powerful) pen to depict the force(s) of the dark society (and of the ferocious imperialists). He was really an accomplished "painter". In his last years he fought for truth and freedom from the standpoint of the proletariat and national liberation.

Lu Hsun's first characteristic was his political vision. He examined society with both a microscope and a telescope, hence with precision and farsightedness. As early as 1936 he pointed out the dangerous tendencies of the criminal Trotskyites. Now the clarity and correctness of his judgement have been proved beyond doubt by the facts — the obvious fact that the Trotskyite faction has turned into a traitorous organization subsidized by Japanese special agents.

In my view, Lu Hsun is a great Chinese saint — the saint of modern China, just as Confucius was the saint of old China. For his immortal memory, we have established the Lu Hsun Library and the Lu Hsun Teachers' Training School in Yenan so that future generations may have a glimpse of his greatness.

His second characteristic was his militancy, which we mentioned a moment ago. He was a great steadfast tree, not a blade of wavering grass, against the onslaught of dark and violent forces. Once he saw a political destination clearly he strove to reach it, never surrendering or compromising half way. There have been half-hearted revolutionaries who fought at first but then deserted the battlefield. Kautsky and Plekhanov of foreign countries (Russia) were good examples [of this]. Such people are not infrequently found in China.

If I remember correctly, Lu Hsun once said that at first all [of them] were “left” and revolutionary, but as soon as pressure came, [they] changed and presented their comrades [to the enemy] as a gift. Lu Hsun bitterly hated this sort of people. While fighting against them, he educated and disciplined the young writers who followed him. He taught them to fight resolutely, to be vanguards, and to find their own way.

His third characteristic was his readiness to sacrifice himself, completely fearless of enemy intimidation and persecution and utterly unmoved by enemy enticement. With merciless pungency his sword-like pen cut all those he despised. Among the bloodstains of revolutionary fighters he showed his tenacious defiance and marched ahead while calling [the others to follow him]. Lu Hsun was an absolute realist, always uncompromising, always determined. In one of his essays he maintained that one should [continue to] beat a dog after it had fallen in water. If you did not, the dog would jump up either to bite you or at least to shake a lot of dirty water over you. Therefore the beating had to be thorough. Lu Hsun did not entertain a speck of sentimentalism or hypocrisy.

Now the mad dog, Japanese imperialism, had not been beaten in water yet. We must learn this “Lu Hsun spirit” and apply it to the whole country.

These characteristics are the components of the great “Lu Hsun spirit”. Throughout his life Lu Hsun never deviated from this spirit and that is why he was an outstanding writer in the world of letters and a tough, excellent vanguard in the revolutionary ranks. As we commemorate him, we must learn his spirit. [We] must take it to all the units engaged in the Resistance War and use it in the struggle for our national liberation.

BASIC TACTICS

April 1937

FROM MARX CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY REMARKS TO MAO

I. HOW THE POPULAR MASSES CARRY OUT MILITARY ACTION

How is it that the bare-handed masses, banded together in ill-armed military units without guns or bullets, are able to charge the enemy, kill the enemy, and resolutely carry out effective action in the war? This is a very widespread and very reasonable query. But if we know the function of the weapons used by an army and the aim of an army's action, we can then understand how our popular masses, although bare-handed, still have weapons and can engage in action to subdue the enemy.

The principal function of an army's weapons is simply to kill the enemy, and an army's final aim is simply to reduce or destroy the enemy's fighting strength. Well, in our daily life, is there any object that cannot be used to kill the enemy or any type of action that cannot reduce or destroy his fighting strength? For example, a kitchen knife, a wooden cudgel, an axe, a hoe, a wooden stool, or a stone can all be used to kill people. Such actions as cutting electric lines, destroying bridges, starting rumors, spreading poison, or cutting off supplies can everywhere inconvenience the enemy or reduce his fighting strength. All these are methods we may be unwilling to utilize or unable to employ. If we really want to kill and exterminate the enemy, there are weapons for us everywhere and work for us to be doing at all times, in order to ensure effective united action by the army and the people.

2. POINTS OF SPECIAL ATTENTION

After from this, we must pay special attention to the present war on the national level, which has become cruel beyond our imagination and has also lasted a long time. We must not, because we are undergoing the suffering of a war more cruel than any seen in the past, immediately capitulate; nor must we, under the influence of a long war, suddenly lose our endurance and give way to lassitude. We must inspire ourselves with the most resolute spirit of unyielding struggle, with the most burning patriotic sentiments, and with the will to endurance, and carry out a protracted struggle against the enemy. We must know that, although the circumstances and the duration of the war are cruel and protracted, this is nothing compared to what would happen if the war were lost; if our country were destroyed and the whole of our people reduced to a position of irretrievable ruin, the suffering would be even more cruel and would never come to an end. Therefore, however cruel the war may be, we must absolutely and firmly endure until the last five minutes of struggle. This is especially the case with our present enemy, who finds his advantage in a rapid decision in the war, whereas our advantage is to be found in the strategy of a protracted war.

3. WE MUST NOT FEAR THE ENEMY

When we see the enemy, simply because he has a weapon in his hands, we must not be frightened to death like a rat who sees a cat. We must not be afraid of approaching him or infiltrating into his midst in order to carry out sabotage. We are men; our enemies are also men; we are all men, so what should we fear? The fact that he has weapons? We can find a way to seize his weapons. All we are afraid of is getting killed by the enemy. But when we undergo the oppression of the enemy to such a point as this, how can any one still fear death? And if we do not fear death, then what is there to fear about the enemy? So when we see the enemy, whether he is many or few, we must act as though he is bread that can satisfy our hunger, and immediately swallow him.

4. DEFINITION OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

When it is not advantageous for our main land army to meet the enemy in large-scale engagements and we, therefore, “send” out commando units or guerrilla units, which employ the tactics of avoiding strength and striking at weakness, of flitting about and having no fixed position, and of subduing the enemy according to circumstances, and when we do not oppose the enemy according to the ordinary rules of tactics, this is called employing guerrilla tactics.

FROM MARX

CHAPTER II TO MAO TACTICS

At a time when our country's national defense preparation are not completed, and when our weapons are inferior to the excellent equipment with which the enemy has provided himself, we must observe the following principles whenever we wish to wage a battle with the enemy:

I. PRECAUTIONS WHEN ON THE MARCH

When we are on the march, we must send plainclothes units armed with pistols ahead of our vanguard, behind our rear guard, and to the side of our lateral defenses, in order to spy out the situation and to forestall unexpected attacks by the enemy, or superfluous clashes.

2. PRECAUTIONS DURING HALTS

When we encamp, if there is a presumption that the enemy may be near, we should send every day a guerrilla company — or at least a platoon — toward the enemy's defenses to carry out reconnaissance at a distance (from 20 to 30 *li*) or to join up with the local forces and carry out propaganda among the masses, in order to in-

spire them to resist the enemy. If this unit discovers the enemy, it should, on the one hand, resist him and, on the other hand, report to us so that we can prepare to meet the foe or to retreat without being drawn into an unnecessary battle.

3. WE MUST NOT ATTACK STRONG POSITIONS

If the enemy guards his position firmly or defends a strong strategic point, then, unless we have special guarantees of success, we must not attack him. If we attack him, we will waste considerable time, and our losses in killed and wounded will certainly be many times those of the enemy. Moreover, in guerrilla warfare, our artillery is not strong: if we recklessly attack a strong position, it will be very difficult to take it rapidly, at one stroke, and, meanwhile, it will be easy for the enemy to gather his forces from all sides and surround us. On this point, the army and the people must be absolutely firm of purpose and cannot act recklessly in a disorderly fashion because of a moment's anger.

4. DO NOT FIGHT HARD BATTLES

If we do not have a 100 per cent guarantee of victory, we should not fight a battle, for it is not worth while to kill 1,000 of the enemy and lose 800 killed among ourselves. Especially in guerrilla warfare such as we are waging, it is difficult to replace men, horses, and ammunition; if we fight a battle and lose many men, and horses, and much ammunition, this must be considered a defeat for us.

5. WE MUST NOT FIGHT IF THE SITUATION OF THE ENEMY IS NOT CLEAR

When we are encamped in a certain place and suddenly discover the enemy but are not informed regarding his numbers or where he is coming from, we must absolutely not fight, but must resolutely retreat several tens of *li*. It is only if we are right up against the enemy that we should send covering units, for, if the enemy comes to attack us, it is certainly because his forces are superior or he has

a plan, and we must under no circumstances fall into his trap. If the enemy is in force, it is obviously advantageous to retreat. If his numbers are small and we retreat, nothing more than a little extra fatigue is involved, and there will always be time to return and attack him again later.

6. WE MUST ORGANIZE THE MASSES AND UNITE WITH THEM

Modern warfare is not a matter in which armies alone can determine victory or defeat. Especially in guerrilla combat, we must rely on the force of the popular masses, for it is only thus that we can have a guarantee of success. The support of the masses offers us great advantages as regards transport, assistance to wounded, intelligence, disruption of the enemy's position, etc. At the same time, the enemy can be put into an isolated position, thus further increasing our advantages. If, by misfortune, we are defeated, it will also be possible to escape or to find concealment. Consequently, we must not lightly give battle in places where the masses are not organized and linked to us.

7. USING THE MASSES TO MAKE A SURPRISE ATTACK AND BREAK A BLOCKADE

When the enemy surrounds us and blockades us, we should rouse the popular masses and cut the enemy's communications in all directions, so that he does not know that our army is already near him. Then, we should take advantage of a dark night or of the light of dawn to attack and disperse him.

8. SURPRISE ATTACKS ON ISOLATED UNITS

When we have reconnoitered the enemy's position and have kept our men at a distance of several *li* and when he has unquestionably relaxed his precautions, then we advance rapidly with light equipment, before dawn when the enemy does not expect us, and exterminate him.

9. USING THE POPULAR MASSES TO HARRY THE ENEMY

On the basis of a decision by the main force of the army, in time of battle, we send out part of our forces, divided into several units — the smallest element being a platoon — to lead the local militia, police, volunteer army, or other popular masses of the peasantry and the workers. These groups use a great variety of flags, occupy mountaintops or villages and market towns, use brass gongs, spears, rudimentary cannon, swords and spikes, trumpets, etc. They scatter all over the landscape and yell, thus distracting the enemy's eyes and ears. Or, both night and day, on all sides, they shoot off isolated shots to cause panic among the enemy soldiers and fatigue their spirit. Then, afterward, our army appears in full strength when the enemy does not expect it and disperses him by a flank attack.

10. CIRCLING AROUND TO GET AWAY FROM THE ENEMY

When we are faced with a large enemy force and do not have sufficient strength to meet its attack, we use the method of circling around. We hasten to a place where there are no enemy troops, and we use mountain trails so that the enemy cannot catch up with us. At the same time, along the way, we utilize the popular masses, getting them to carry on reconnaissance work in the front and the rear, so that we are not attacked by the enemy from either direction.

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II. GETTING OUT OF DIFFICULT SITUATIONS

Presume that in the rear there is a pursuing army and in the front an obstacle, or that the pursuing army is too strong for us. As a plan to get out of such a difficult situation, we can send a part of our forces 4 or 5 *li* off, to lure the enemy up a big road, while our main force follows a side road and escapes the enemy. Or we can make a detour around to the enemy's rear and attack him there by surprise. Or we can use the local militia and the police to go along another route, leaving some objects, making footprints in the road,

sticking up notices etc., so as to induce the enemy to follow them. Then, our main force suddenly rushes out from a side road, striking at the enemy from the front and the rear, encircles him on all sides, and annihilates him.

12. "CAUSE AN UPROAR IN THE EAST,
STRIKE IN THE WEST"

When the army wants to attack a certain place, it does not advance there directly but makes a detour by some other place and then changes its course in the midst of its march, in order to attack and disperse the enemy. "The thunderclap leaves no time to cover one's ears."

13. CONCEALED ATTACKS FROM AMBUSH

When the enemy is pursuing us in great haste we select a spot for an ambush and wait until he arrives. Thus, we can capture the enemy all at one stroke.

14. AMBUSHING THE ENEMY
IN THE COURSE OF HIS MARCH

When we learn from reconnaissance that the enemy plans to advance from a certain point, we choose a spot where his path is narrow and passes through confusing mountainous terrain and send a part of our troops — or a group of sharp-shooters — to lie hidden on the mountains bordering his path, or in the forest, to wait until his main force is passing through. Then we throw rocks down on his men from the mountains and rake them with bullets, or shoot from ambush at their commanding officers mounted on horseback.

15. MAKING A STRONG DEFENSE
BY EMPTYING THE COUNTRYSIDE

When our spies have informed us that the enemy is about to arrive, and if our force is not sufficient to give battle, we should then

carry out the stratagem of “making a strong defense by emptying the countryside”. We hide the food, stores, fuel, grain, pots and other utensils, etc., in order to cut off the enemy’s food supply. Moreover, as regards the popular masses of the area in question, with the exception of old men, women, and children, who are left behind to provide reconnaissance information, we lead all able-bodied men to hiding places. Thus, the enemy has no one to serve as porters, guides, and scouts. At the same time, we send a few men to the enemy’s rear communication lines, to cut off his supplies, capture his couriers, and cut or sabotage his communications facilities.

16. MEETING A SUPERIOR ENEMY

(1) When the enemy advances, we retreat. If the enemy’s forces were weaker than ours, he would not dare advance and attack us. So, when he advances toward us, we can conclude that the enemy is certainly coming with a superior force and is acting according to plan and with preparation. It is, therefore, appropriate for us to evade his vanguard, by withdrawing beforehand. If we meet with the enemy in the course of our march and either do not have clear information regarding him or know that his army is stronger than ours, we should, without the slightest hesitation, carry out a precautionary withdrawal.

As to the place to which we should withdraw, it is not appropriate to go long distances on the main roads, so that the enemy follows us to the end. We should move about sinuously in the nearby area, winding around in circles. If the enemy appears ahead of us, we should circle around to his rear, if the enemy is on the mountains, we should descend into the valleys; if the enemy is in the middle, we should retreat on the two sides; if the enemy is on the left bank of the river, we should retreat on the right bank; if the enemy is on the right bank, we should retreat on the left bank.

Moreover, in withdrawing, when we come to a crossroads, we can deliberately leave some objects in the branch of the road we do not take or send a small fraction of our men and horses that way, in order to leave some tracks or write some notices or symbols. Or we can write some distinguishing marks on the road we do take to indicate that it is closed. Thus, we induce the enemy to direct his pur-

suit and attack in the wrong direction.

At such times, it is best to evacuate the popular masses and such armed forces as the militia, police, volunteer army, etc., by various routes in all directions, in order to confuse the enemy's eyes and ears. We can leave behind part of our men, who bury their uniforms and weapons and disguise themselves as merchants, street vendors, etc. They spread rumors or pretend to be obliging in order to spy out information regarding the enemy's numbers, his plans, the location and routine of his camps, and the precautions he is taking. If the enemy questions them about the direction in which we have withdrawn and the strength of our force, they should talk incoherently, pointing to the east and saying the west, pointing to the south and saying the north, replacing big by small and small by big, talking at random and creating rumors. They wait until our army is about to attack, and then they dig up their uniforms and put them on, take out their weapons, and attack the enemy from within his midst, thus completely routing him and leaving him with nowhere to turn.

(2) When the enemy retreats, we pursue. When the enemy army retreats, it is appropriate to take advantage of the situation to advance. On such an occasion, the enemy's military situation must have undergone a change, otherwise he would not have retreated, and he is certainly not prepared to join battle against us with any resolution. If we take advantage of the situation and make a covering attack on his rear, the enemy's covering units will certainly not be resolved to fight, and in the context of the enemy's over-all plan it will be difficult for his forward units to return and join in the fray. In rough mountainous terrain, where the paths are narrow and rivers and streams intertwined so that there are many bridges, even if the enemy's forward forces were to turn back, this move would require much time. So, by the time he turns back, his rear will already have been annihilated and he will already have been disarmed.

At this time, the organizations of the popular masses, should devise methods for destroying the bridges on the route over which the enemy is retreating, or cutting the wires of his communications system. Or, best of all, they should wait until the bulk of the enemy's army have retreated and, taking advantage of the protection afforded by our guards and army, block the enemy's path of retreat, so that, although his forces may want to turn back, they cannot do it, and,

although they yearn for help, they cannot obtain it.

But, at such a time, the most important task of the popular masses is to spy out the direction in which the enemy is withdrawing, in order to ascertain whether or not there may be an ambush or a feigned retreat intended to encircle us from two sides, and report to us immediately so that our army can pluck up courage and pursue the enemy or devise a method of evading him.

(3) When the enemy halts, we harass him. When the enemy is newly arrived in our territory, is not familiar with the terrain, does not understand the local dialect, and is unable to gain any information from the scouts he sends out, it is as though he had entered a distant and inaccessible land. At such a time, we should increase our harassment — shooting off guns everywhere, to make him ill at ease day and night — so exercising a great influence on both his mind and body under such circumstances. I fear that any army, however overbearing, will begin to waver and will become weary. We need only await the time when his spirits are wavering and his body weary, and then, if our armies rush in all together, we can certainly exterminate him completely.

17. DEALING WITH A WEAK ENEMY

Fighting as we are for the existence of our nation and the achievement of the aims of guerrilla warfare — which are to destroy the enemy and to stir up the courage of the popular masses — when we are faced with a weak enemy, naturally we should unite with the popular masses of the place in question to surround him and exterminate him at one stroke.

18. AROUSING THE MASSES

There are always a good many among the popular masses who forget the great cause for the sake of petty advantage. Frequently having received great favors from the enemy, they act contrary to conscience and aid the forces of evil. For this reason, before the arrival of the enemy in a given place, we must do our utmost to whip up the spirits of the popular masses, to rouse their will to resist and to endow them with an unshakable resolve to fight to the end, with-

out seeking advantage, without compromise or surrender. We must induce them to follow our orders sincerely and to cooperate with our army to resist the enemy. At the same time, we should also organize “resist-the-enemy associations”, “associations for national salvation”, and other types of professional bodies to facilitate the transmission of orders and the evacuation of villages in time of necessity and to clean out traitors and prevent their utilization by the enemy.

FROM MARX CHAPTER III TO MAO THE AIM OF THE WAR

The ultimate aim of guerrilla warfare is certainly to disarm the enemy, to destroy his fighting strength, to get back the territories he has occupied and to save our brethren whom he is trampling under foot! But when, because of objective circumstances and other factors of various kinds, it is impossible to attain this goal, it sometimes happens that the areas unaffected by the fighting are controlled by the enemy in all tranquillity. This should not be. Because of this possibility, we must think up methods for inflicting economic and political damage in these areas and destroying communication facilities, so that, although the enemy has occupied our territory, it is of no use to him and he decides to withdraw on his own initiative.

In guerrilla warfare, we must observe the principle: “To gain territory is no cause for joy, and to lose territory is no cause for sorrow.” To lose territory or cities is of no importance. The important thing is to think up methods for destroying the enemy. If the enemy’s effective strength is undiminished, even if we take cities, we will be unable to hold them. Conversely, when our own forces are insufficient, if we give up the cities, we still have hope of regaining them. It is altogether improper to defend cities to the utmost, for this merely leads to sacrificing our own effective strength.

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATION

I. OPPORTUNITIES FOR ORGANIZATION

(1) When we are devoting ourselves to warfare in an open region, it is the sparsely populated areas, with a low cultural level, where communications are difficult and facilities for transmitting correspondence are inadequate, that are advantageous.

(2) Narrow mountainous regions, rising and falling terrain, or areas in the vicinity of narrow roads — all of which are inconvenient for the movement of large bodies of troops — are also advantageous.

Opportunities also exist:

(3) When the people in the enemy's rear are in sympathy with our army.

(4) When the enemy is well-armed, and his troops numerous and courageous, so that we have to evade direct clashes.

(5) When the enemy has penetrated deeply into our territory and we are preparing everywhere to carry out measures of harassment and obstruction against him.

(6) Dense forests or reedy marshes, in the depths of which we can disappear, are most advantageous for this purpose, especially in the late summer and autumn, when we find ourselves behind a curtain of green.

2. FORMS OF ORGANIZATION.

The action of a guerrilla unit takes one of the following forms:

(1) We send out a large cavalry unit from our main force, together with mounted artillery, or cavalry accompanied by a platoon or more armed with light automatic weapons. They penetrate as rapidly as possible into the enemy's rear destroy there all his communications links, and carry out the thorough and complete destruction of all his storehouses of food, grain for his horses, and ammunition. Moreover, they send out a small group of their forces to destroy all places of military significance in the enemy's rear. Once

these forays have been carried out, the group fights its way out in another direction and rejoins the main force.

(2) We send out cavalry or a special task group of infantry. Their strength should be from a platoon to a few companies. They should penetrate as deeply as possible into the enemy's rear and, moving rapidly and unpredictably, should carry the battle from one place to another. When there is no alternative, or when the enemy is not expected to arrive before a certain time, they can also dwell temporarily in secret where they are. As required by the exigencies of the situation, they can employ either all or a part of their forces. They return when the time comes that they can no longer stay in the enemy's rear, or when the task entrusted to them is completed, or because the enemy has already discovered our traces and our intentions, and has taken effective measures of defense.

(3) In the enemy's rear, we choose some young, strong, and courageous elements among the local population and organize some small groups who will accept the leadership of the experienced and trained persons we send out or of experienced persons whom we had trained previously in the place in question. The secret activity of these small groups involves moving from their own area to another one, changing their uniforms, unit numbers, and external appearance, and using every method so as to cover their tracks to the utmost.

(4) Or we seek volunteers from our army and provide them with high-quality light weapons, in order to form them into special guerrilla units under the leadership of such officers as have benefited from experience and study.

(5) Guerrilla units can be classified according to their nature. Those formed of selected volunteers are called special guerrilla units. Those organized generally from a part of our army are called basic guerrilla units. Those organized from the local population are called local guerrilla units. When basic and local guerrilla units engage in combined actions, they are subject to the unified command of the commander of the basic unit.

(6) As for the choice of the members of a guerrilla unit, the members of a basic guerrilla unit should be taken from among those soldiers who are healthy, firm of purpose, patient, courageous, and quick-witted. Moreover, the soldiers themselves be willing to join the group in question. In the case of the independent actions carried out by these men in the course of guerrilla operations, there is

generally no way to verify whether or not their tasks are executed in accordance with orders, and frequently they act beyond the knowledge of the responsible commander. For this reason, the choice and training of members of guerrilla units should have as its central theme "faithfully carrying out one's task."

(7) The choice and the nomination of the commander of a guerrilla task group or small group requires even greater forethought and reflection. The capacity of the commanders for faithful and courageous action, their military knowledge — especially their knowledge of guerrilla tactics — their possession of a lively intelligence and the ability to adapt rapidly to changing circumstances, their loyalty, and their daring are indispensable conditions for carrying out plans and completing our tasks.

3. NUMBER OF TROOPS

The number of men belonging to a guerrilla unit is determined by the tasks, but it commonly ranges from five or ten men to something over a thousand. However, the maximum strength of such a unit may not exceed one regiment. If the number of soldiers is too large, the movements of our forces will be encumbered, there will be greater difficulties regarding food supply, and it will be difficult to conceal the troops by the use of false uniforms. Because of these problems, our plans may be discovered or revealed before they have been carried out. Moreover, replenishing our supplies of ammunition will be a problem. Furthermore, we will often have difficulties because of poor roads, with the result that not only will all our plans prove merely illusory, but also we will often fall into difficulties to no good purpose in going and returning.

The great superiority of a small guerrilla unit lies in its remarkable mobility. With very little expenditure of time and effort, one can get food, and it is also easy to find a place to rest, for one does not need much in the way of rations or a place of shelter to camp. Still less is one held up by bad roads, and supplies of ammunition and medicine are also easy to replenish. If we do not succeed in our operation, we can retreat in good order.

4. TYPES OF SOLDIERS

As for the type of soldiers employed in guerrilla units, cavalry, engineers, and highly mobile infantry troops are excellent. Cavalry is entrusted with the task of creating disorder on the enemy's flanks, and also, when we are pursuing the enemy, with that of maintaining pressure on his rear guard and creating confusion on his flanks and in his rear. Moreover, at all times, cavalry is the guerrilla unit's only instrument for transmitting correspondence and for reconnoitering. Hence, the cavalry is indispensable to any guerrilla unit. Engineers are used for destroying communications in the enemy's rear (such as railroads, telephone and telegraph lines, bridges, etc.) As for the highly mobile infantry units, they are useful to startle the enemy and produce in him a feeling of insecurity night and day.

5. WEAPONS

Apart from the rifles of the infantry and the cavalry, light machine guns, hand grenades, etc., guerrilla units should also be supplied with pistols and submachine guns.

To the extent that the terrain permits it, one can also add heavy machine guns, mortars, and small cannons.

6. MEN AND BAGGAGE

Convenience of movement and agility being the characteristics of a guerrilla unit, the baggage train, cases of equipment and ammunition, etc., should all be kept as simple as possible for the sake of convenience. The combatant and noncombatant members of the unit should all be organized as most appropriate for guerrilla warfare, and all other persons who are not indispensable should be kept to the strict minimum.

(1) The officers and men in each guerrilla squad should not exceed 8; each platoon should not exceed 26; and each company should not exceed 100.

(2) When automatic weapons are somewhat more numerous, the number of men can be still further reduced, and guerrilla units composed of 5 or 6 men can be sent out repeatedly, in order to achieve

the greatest results in terms of harassing the enemy or securing intelligence.

(3) Each commanding officer of a unit should have only one orderly at most. Apart from this according to the complexity of the tasks, two or three officers should share the services of one orderly. Even more attention should be accorded to not abusing this rule by unnecessarily increasing the number of couriers as a substitute for orderlies and to seeing that an unnecessarily large number of men are not sent to carry out a given task, thereby reducing the fighting strength of one's own unit. Hence, when one sends out couriers, one must reflect carefully on whether they can accomplish their task or not.

(4) It is preferable that each mass unit should not carry bundles of food. When the dry rations carried separately by each soldier are exhausted, one should take advantage of opportunities to borrow the pots and pans of the population so as to prepare supplementary rations. If it is necessary to carry bundles, each unit should not carry more than two.

(5) Bundles of writing materials should not be carried in excess of needs. Normally, two bundles per regiment, one per battalion, and one per company are permissible. The weight of each bundle should not exceed 40 kilograms.

(6) Each officer and soldier should carry his own bedding, knapsack, etc. Bearers should not be engaged to transport these items. This rule should be firmly established in advance.

7. OBJECTS TO BE CARRIED

A guerrilla unit preferably should have the following things:

(1) Equipment and explosives for destroying railroads, telephone and telegraph lines, arsenals, etc.

(2) Medicines. Those needed in case of emergencies should be carried according to the season, but dressings, etc., should be provided on a permanent basis.

(3) A compass, and maps of the area in which the guerrilla unit operates.

(4) Light radio equipment, which is especially important in order to be able to report at all times on the situation of the enemy and to listen in on the enemy's reports.

(5) A certain quantity of gold coins, to provide for unexpected needs and for buying food.

8. DISCIPLINE

Whether or not the military discipline of a guerrilla unit is good influences the reputation of our whole army and its ability to secure the sympathy and support of the popular masses. Only strict discipline can assure the complete victory of all our independent actions. Consequently, our attitude toward those persons who violate military discipline, harm the people's interest, and do not resolutely execute the orders of their superiors, should consist in punishing them severely without the slightest regard for politeness. The application of military discipline in a partisan unit does not aim exclusively at punishment. Rather, it aims at strengthening the political instruction of the officers and men and raising their level of political consciousness, thereby indirectly eliminating a large number of actions contrary to military discipline and causing the officers and soldiers to understand the psychology of the masses, so that at appropriate times they can unite effectively with the common people.

9. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

(1) Each guerrilla task group and small group should have a political director, and in the headquarters of the guerrilla unit there should be a political training department, for directing the political work of officers and soldiers and dealing with the human problems of all the political instructors.

(2) Each mess unit of a guerrilla unit should establish a special commissioner in order to guard against the infiltration and activity of reactionary elements and to encourage those soldiers without clear ideological consciousness who are wavering in their purposes.

(3) In order to prevent desertion by the soldiers, a committee against desertion, as well as "groups of ten," should be organized in each guerrilla unit. The groups of ten and the committee against desertion are negative methods for preventing desertion. Their organization and work should be carried out roughly as follows:

a. In order to prevent desertion, every guerrilla unit should establish a desertion committee and every mess unit should organize a group of ten.

b. The committee against desertion should be composed of from seven to nine people, one of them being the chairman and the others members. It should be composed of lower-level cadres who can endure difficulties and whose thinking is friary, as well as heads of the groups of ten. The groups of ten are composed of ten men in all, one of them being the head and the others members. They are made up of faithful and reliable soldiers.

c. The over-all activity of the groups of ten is subordinated to the committee against desertion. As regards military matters, it is subordinated to the commander of the unit and to the committee against desertion. In other work, it is subordinated to the political training department. Both groups of ten and committees against desertion must accept the guidance of their commanding officer.

d. The work of the group of ten should take account of all the actions and talk of the officers and soldiers, especially of "camp idlers" and such. Unstable elements should be secretly watched, even if they are members of the group of ten or their friends.

e. Meetings should be held once a week to review the work and to report to the commanding officer and the committee against desertion regarding the situation in general at all times. After each extreme difficulty or when our army has suffered a slight defeat and is staying in its base camp, special attention should be paid to unfavourable attitudes that may develop among the soldiers and to conversations that may endanger the morale of the soldiers.

f. The work of the committee against desertion consists above all in reviewing the work of the groups of ten and in admonishing and guiding them at the appropriate times. The committee may also call conferences of the heads of all the groups of ten, or plenary conferences of all the members of the groups, to discuss the progress of the work as a whole.

The soldiers' life is rather like living in the desert, and every day the men undergo the fatigue of political study and training in

the art of combat. This may easily engender feelings of disgust and opposition. In order to provide entertainment for the army and to compensate for a dull life, one should establish in a guerrilla unit clubs or amusement rooms. (For details of the organization and activities of such clubs, see the account in Chap. XV, 10.)

10. SPECIAL FORMS OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION

(1) In order to make up for insufficient supplies of ammunition and poor marksmanship, every company should have from three to nine sharpshooters, to be employed exclusively for shooting from ambush at long distances or for shooting at special targets (enemy officers, machine-gunners or artillery-men, couriers, etc.).

(2) The commander of each task group and small group should choose particularly sharp-eyed couriers to serve as observes. Normally, a task group commander should have two of these, and a small group commander one. These men serve exclusively to remedy the insufficiency of battlefield observation.

(3) Each task group and small group of a guerrilla unit should have two nurses, who devote themselves exclusively to emergency care of sick officers and soldiers and to instruction in hygiene.

(4) In order to obtain reliable information regarding the enemy's disposition, so as to be able to oppose him without losing any opportunities, all guerrilla units should establish groups of scouts. Normally, it will be sufficient if each unit has one platoon, each task group has one squad, and each small group a smaller element. A network of local scouts should also be established by the group of scouts wherever they go, or by scouts concealed in advance.

CHAPTER V

TASKS

The principal object of the action of a guerrilla unit lies in dealing the enemy the strongest possible blows to his morale, and in creating disorder and agitation in his rear, in drawing off his princi-

pal force to the flanks or to the rear, in stopping or slowing down his operations, and ultimately in dissipating his fighting strength so that the enemy's units are crushed one by one and he is precipitated into a situation where, even by rapid and deceptive actions, he can neither advance nor retreat.

(1) Destroy railroads and highways within the area of action, as well as important structures along the roads. Telephone lines and telegraph systems are especially important.

(2) Destroy the enemy's principal or secondary supply depots.

(3) Destroy the enemy's storehouses of food and military equipment.

(4) Strike in the enemy's rear, at his baggage train, or at his mounted and unmounted couriers, as well as at his mounted scouts, etc. Also seize the provisions and ammunition that the enemy is bringing up from the rear to the front.

(5) Strike at the enemy's independent task groups and at the inhabited areas that he has not yet solidly occupied.

(6) Mobilize and organize the popular masses everywhere and aid them in their own self-defense.

(7) Destroy airfields and military depots of the air force in the enemy's rear.

NOT FOR
CHAPTER VI
COMMERCIAL
OPERATIONS
DISTRIBUTION
I. ACTION

1. The first principle lies in careful and secret preparation, and in rapid and sudden attack. Fierce wind and heavy rain offer a favorable occasion for a guerrilla attack, as do thick fog, the darkness of night, or circumstances in which it is possible to strike at an exhausted enemy.

2. The operations of a guerrilla unit should consist in offensive warfare. Whether its numbers be great or small, such a unit can nonetheless appear where it is not expected and, in its attacks, take advantage of the enemy's lack of preparation. But when there are

indications that the situation is unfavourable, or when there is no certainty of victory, it is appropriate to withdraw rapidly, so as not to suffer damaging losses. If the attack originally planned by the guerrilla unit fails to give an advantageous result, and, the enemy goes over to the offensive, a guerrilla unit should withdraw quickly. Only when the enemy pursues us, and it is impossible to evade his attacks, can we fight a defensive action and then gradually withdraw.

2. THE USE OF TACTICS

1. The redoubtable force of a guerrilla unit definitely does not depend exclusively on its own numerical strength, but on its use of sudden attacks and ambushes, so as to "cause an uproar in the east and strike in the west," appearing now here and now there, using false banners and making empty demonstrations, propagating rumors about one's own strength, etc., in order to shatter the enemy's morale and create in him a boundless terror. In addition, we must pay attention to such principles as: "The enemy advances, we retreat, the enemy retreats, we advance, the enemy halts, we harass him," camouflaged attacks, etc.

2. A really excellent stratagem for bringing the enemy to his destruction lies in mobilizing the popular masses, in making a strong defense by emptying the countryside, in luring the enemy to penetrate our lines deeply, in cutting his communications, in placing him in a position where he has difficulties with his food supply, where his men are weary and the terrain is unfavorable and then launching an attack.

3. By such tactics as sudden attacks, ambushes, making a strong defense by emptying the countryside, etc., a guerrilla unit should make every effort to avoid positional warfare, and all frontal engagements. Before the local guerrilla units have received regular military training, they should not be launched against the enemy in a regular and prolonged battle. For this reason, when local guerrilla units are first formed, they should be used only in conjunction with actions by basic or special guerrilla units. It is only after a certain period that they can act independently.

4. If we strike at the point where the enemy feels the greatest difficulties, in order to draw his main force to come to the relief of the position, then, afterward, we send our main force somewhere

else, either to attack other isolated and weak forces of the enemy or to attack his reinforcements on the march.

3. ADVANTAGEOUS AND DISADVANTAGEOUS TERRAIN

1. Because open terrain affords very little good cover, it is slightly disadvantageous for us when guerrilla units operate there. Covered, mountainous, or broken terrain are advantageous for us.

2. A guerrilla unit should be thoroughly familiar with the terrain in its region of action and should think frequently about the ways in which it can appear from a place where the enemy army does not expect it, following secret and hidden routes such as valleys, forests, or narrow winding paths, so as to approach close to the enemy army and take advantage of a situation in which the enemy, persuaded he is quite secure, has taken no measure of defence whatsoever. Then, following the principle that the "thunderclap leaves no time to cover one's ears," the unit can strike sudden blows and then vanish into hiding without a trace, thus reducing the enemy to a level where he does not feel secure whether he is withdrawing or advancing, attacking or defending, moving or remaining still, sitting or lying down.

3. Relatively large villages, market towns, and places where there is a reasonably large amount of grain and other moveable property are frequently the objects of enemy attack and harassment. A guerrilla unit should regularly spy out the enemy's traces, and prepare an ambush so as to attack him when he is in the midst of his march.

4. A guerrilla unit should use every method, within its area of action, to prevent the enemy's small units from entering, and his main force from concealing itself there. In case of necessity, a guerrilla unit should also strive to unmask the military strength, disposition, and plans of the enemy operating outside its area of action.

4. SEASONS

A guerrilla unit must consider the seasons (winter, summer, or autumn are suitable for operations), with reference to the strength of our forces and those of the enemy, and especially with reference to the weapons of war; it must also be thoroughly familiar

with the organization of the enemy's rear. Whether or not each season is favourable to us is also determined with reference to the terrain.

5. SECRET ACTION

The peculiar quality of the operations of a guerrilla unit lies entirely in taking the enemy by surprise. Consequently, we must take every possible measure to preserve military secrecy, as described in detail below:

(1) The commander of the unit should explain to his subordinates their tasks and the plan for the operation only just before the action begins, or while they are advancing. In case of necessity, he should explain the whole plan only by stages, so that others learn about each stage only when required.

(2) The best method for the transmission of orders in a guerrilla unit is by oral explanations from the commander to his subordinates. It is necessary to limit written orders insofar as possible, in order to avoid leakage of military secrets.

(3) One should not discuss the whole of one's actions and plans with guides or the local population. This is the case even with regard to local populations favourable to us; it is even more necessary to forbid such talk when we are about to attack a certain place.

(4) We should send out faithful and reliable scouts in advance to observe the point where we are going to camp or to lie in ambush along important roads in the enemy's rear, in order to cut off his information.

(5) When we advance, our rear guard should take full responsibility for obliterating and removing all secret signals and road signs. We should also advance by circuitous route, so that the enemy does not know the direction of our advance.

(6) Fixed code names should be used in place of all unit designations, and the use of the real names of units should be strictly prohibited.

(7) Except in case of necessity, all documents should be burned immediately after they have been read.

(8) Apart from the methods already enumerated, the true plans of a guerrilla unit can also be obscured in certain cases by using the local population for the deliberate propagation of false information

about the operations of the guerrilla unit, in order to deceive the enemy.

6. ARRANGEMENTS AND PREPARATIONS FOR MOVEMENT

In order that our movements may be rapid, apart from doing our utmost to simplify all our organization, we should at all times maintain excellent preparations for action (investigation and intelligence regarding the front, care of sick soldiers, preparation for guides, preferably employing local peasants whose sympathies lie with the guerrillas, or other reliable persons), and we should also preferably carry three days' dry rations. If this is done, then when we want to move, we move, and when we want to stop, we stop, and there is no need for special arrangements.

7. THE CONDITIONS FOR VICTORY

1. A condition for the victory of a guerrilla unit is that the officers and soldiers have an absolutely courageous and resolute spirit. They must also be filled with a spirit of action in common, and be thoroughly alert and resolved to carry out their own tasks. Apart from this, they must have healthy bodies and be able to endure boundless hardships, be good at the use of their weapons, etc.

2. A guerrilla unit should not lose heart in difficult times, nor should it cease its activity if it encounters difficult circumstances. As regards their confidence in ultimate victory, their confidence in the success of their cause, and especially their hatred of our national enemy, such circumstances should only strengthen their purpose to advance courageously in spite of all obstacles.

8. UNITED ACTIONS

If a small guerrilla unit, because its numbers are insufficient, cannot carry out a task assigned to it, it can unite temporarily with a few other guerrilla units, in order to fulfill its task.

Guerrilla operations are best carried out under cover of night.

CHAPTER VII

SURPRISE ATTACK

I. POINTS THAT SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED
REGARDING OUR TASKS BEFORE A SURPRISE ATTACK

When a guerrilla unit has finished concentrating for an attack, and when plans for scouts, courier service etc., have all been satisfactorily completed, and one is preparing a surprise attack on a certain inhabited place, the commander of the guerrilla unit must first form a clear idea about each of the following points.

(1) What is the strength of the military forces defending the given inhabited place? How are they deployed? How are they armed? What is their fighting capacity? How many scouts to sound a warning have they sent out?

(2) Is there any other enemy nearby? If there is, how far away is he? Can he quickly come to the aid of the defending forces? Can we imagine how he would come to aid them? From what direction he would come?

(3) What sort of roads are there that could be followed by the guerrillas and by the enemy? What hidden roads are there in the vicinity of the place we intend to attack by surprise? What route will we take to get to the place we are attacking? The preceding three points are not only things we should know in view of carrying out a surprise attack; we must also not fail to consider them with reference to our withdrawal after the attack.

(4) As for fixing the time of a surprise attack, it is best to carry it out at night, for, under the cover of darkness, even if the attack should fail, it can still inspire panic in the enemy. But we can attack at night only if we are thoroughly familiar with the terrain, and have clearly understood the enemy's dispositions or have extremely good guides. Otherwise, we should choose instead to carry out such surprise attacks at daybreak. If a surprise attack is to be directed against a supply depot, it should be carried out in the dead of night, for the men, horses, and military equipment in such a depot will be on the move again very early, at daybreak.

(5) Can the population of the given inhabited place aid the enemy or not? How can we prevent the population from bringing

trouble on itself in this way?

While we should think through our plans at length, we should avoid overly subtle plans.

2. POINTS FOR ATTENTION BEFORE SETTING OUT

1. Before setting out, a guerrilla unit should complete all its preparations for the march (see below). Moreover, it should consider taking stretchers for transporting wounded soldiers.

2. The method for a surprise attack on the enemy should be thoroughly understood beforehand not only by the commander of the unit and the commanders of each task group, but also by all the members of each independent task group. The best mode of transmitting this information is through oral explanations by the commander and his staff. Written orders of all kinds should be held to a minimum, in order to avoid having their contents divulged by loss or mistake.

3. Prior to setting out, all officers at every level should appoint a replacement, in order, on the one hand to express their resolution to sacrifice themselves and, on the other hand, to avoid the risk that, if they are wounded or killed, the action of the guerrilla unit may fail to attain its objective because of them, thus influencing the whole situation.

3. POINTS FOR ATTENTION WHILE ON THE MOVE

1. We must make the greatest efforts to conceal the movements of a guerrilla unit and to prevent discovery by the enemy. Consequently, while advancing, we must leave the highroads and avoid large villages, and choose out-of-the-way places or even places where there are no roads at all, advancing along narrow winding trails. But we should keep away from miry roads, so as to avoid excessive fatigue.

2. When advancing, we should not proceed for long time on the same road, for this makes it easy for the enemy to discover our tracks. From the standpoint of keeping our movements secret, it is also generally appropriate to move by night, even when we are advancing a long distance.

3. When we are advancing, for the sake of concealing ourselves,

we should hold the number of people we send out for reconnaissance to the very lowest level. In general, it will be sufficient to send just a few scouts along the road, but we must have very good guides.

4. If we are not absolutely certain that there are no enemy spies coming to observe us, it is best to divide our forces into small groups, which advance separately in different directions and then concentrate at a point which has been secretly designated.

5. When a guerrilla unit is on the move, it should be constantly prepared for a meeting with the enemy. For this reason, the commanding officer of a guerrilla unit generally advances, accompanied by his staff, just behind the scouts, behind the elite soldiers, or ahead of the staff of the unit (the staff is entrusted to the leadership of the second in command). Thus, it is easy to obtain a clear picture of the situation, and decisions can be taken very rapidly. If the commander sees that it is possible to advance, he advances; if he becomes aware of difficulties, he withdraws. All that is required is for two or three officers to hold a discussion, and then the decision can be made. Thus, we avoid sending orders back and forth, with the consequent wasting of opportunities, and we diminish command from the rear, and its attendant evil of taking action not in keeping with the circumstances.

6. Apart from the scouts sent out along the road, the soldiers of the guerrilla unit should not load their rifles, so as to avoid accidental discharges during the march and discovery by the enemy.

4. MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IF THE ENEMY IS ENCOUNTERED WHILE ON THE MARCH

1. Under no circumstances should a guerrilla unit provoke a pointless battle before it has reached its objective. Even though a guerrilla unit may encounter the enemy in the course of its march, it should devise a way for getting around him — if necessary, departing from the original plan. If there is no way of avoiding battle, we should emerge from ambush, after rapid preparations, so as to appear where the enemy does not expect us and annihilate him by a surprise attack. At the same time, when we are carrying out such a maneuver, we should pay attention to whether the enemy halts or advances, and send out scouts to reconnoiter from all directions. If the enemy army is not prepared for battle or if, although he is in

some strength, he is not on the alert, we should charge him immediately. Otherwise, we should remain in hiding and quietly await an opportunity.

2. When, in the course of our march, we encounter enemy outposts or scouts, we should avoid being seen by them and circle past them in strict silence. But if we encounter a situation in which we judge there is an opportunity to be grasped, we should act rapidly and capture them without firing a shot.

5. DISPOSITION OF TROOPS DURING A SURPRISE ATTACK

When a guerrilla unit carries out a surprise attack, the disposition of its troops should be more or less as follows:

1. We should launch a fierce attack by our main force on the point in the enemy's disposition where it hurts the most — a really swift and resolute sudden blow. We should also send another force around to carry out energetic action on the enemy's flanks and in his rear, in order to confuse his judgement, and prevent him from fathoming where our main force is located.

2. We should attack one point in the enemy's disposition with all our might, but we should also carry out feigned deployments in other places and make an empty demonstration with a few scattered soldiers, so as to confuse the enemy's eyes and ears, and disperse his forces.

3. If we can determine beforehand the enemy's line of retreat, then we should, within the limits of what is possible, send a part of our forces to intercept him. If the enemy has his heavy artillery and logistic supply installed outside the village, then we should designate a special small group to seize them.

4. If the guerrilla unit is numerically strong, it should be divided into several columns and should carry out the attack from two, three, or several directions, attempting to cut off the enemy's retreat. But we should consider the matter thoroughly, so as to avoid causing confusion in our own ranks, which might result in erroneously taking our own troops for those of the enemy. Because of this possibility, it is necessary, in advance of the action, to agree on signals.

5. In the case of a surprise attack on the enemy, if there is reason to fear that enemy reinforcements may arrive from a certain di-

rection, we should send a small body of troops in advance of the action to the route where the reinforcements may arrive, so as to obstruct their advance, or report this peril to the main force.

6. At the time of a surprise attack, the choice of the point on which the brunt of the attack will fall, and the geographical distribution of our forces (in general, two-thirds of our men are used for the principal direction of attack, and only one-third for the auxiliary directions of attack) must absolutely be such as to prevent the enemy forces from spreading out or receiving reinforcements and to make it possible for us to smash them one by one.

7. The various task groups making up a guerrilla unit should divide their forces within a very short distance of the point where the attack is to be made, and from there make a separate but coordinated advance. The best place for this is the point from which the charge will be made. In this way, we can avoid such misfortunes as losing our way, or the premature division of our forces, and we can also guard against the danger of surprise attacks by the enemy. For the farther apart are the various independent columns or groups, the more likely they are to be separated by the terrain, and the more difficult it will be to expect them all to strike at the same moment.

6. THE SUCCESS OF A SURPRISE ATTACK.

In general, we charge the enemy when he is not prepared, in circumstances where he is frightened and flustered. If we really want to strike when the enemy is not expecting us and attain success, the following points should be attended to:

(1) We must act rapidly and secretly and not allow our plans to be revealed prematurely.

(2) We must strike at a time when the enemy's warning system is not very alert.

(3) We must make an empty display, and attack in several places at once, so that the enemy's reaction is confused, his forces are frightened and hamper one another, and he cannot use all his strength to resist us stubbornly.

(4) In carrying out the surprise attack, we must attack at the appointed hours; there must be no noise; no shots must be fired; there must be no battle cries. We must make every soldier understand the use of the arms employed in a surprise attack, which are

the bayonet and the hand grenade. We must not return fire simply because we hear the gunfire of the enemy. It is only when we have an opportunity to take advantage of the situation to attack the enemy that we should launch our attack, with our vanguard well supported by our rear guard, choosing frontal, flanking, or direct blows.

7. DISPOSITIONS FOLLOWING THE SUCCESS OF A SURPRISE ATTACK.

1. As soon as the tasks of a surprise attack have been carried out, a guerrilla unit should rapidly withdraw. Before withdrawing, it is best to go a few li in a false direction, and then afterward turn and go in our true direction, so that the enemy will be unable to discover our tracks, and will not be able to follow us.

2. It is not appropriate for a guerrilla unit to take along prisoners, or to acquire large amounts of booty, which hinder our movement. It is best to require the prisoners first to hand over their weapons, and then to disperse them or to execute them. As for booty, it should be dispatched by the local government, or by the population.

3. During the battle, three officers and men out of every company should be given the exclusive task of picking up and gathering together abandoned rifles and ammunition. After a victorious battle, we should devote all our efforts to collecting everything on the battlefield, and we can also call upon the population of nearby areas to gather such things together, so that not the smallest trifle is left behind.

8. DISPOSITIONS FOLLOWING THE DEFEAT OF A SURPRISE ATTACK.

If a surprise attack is defeated, we should rapidly withdraw to the place of assembly designated in advance. The usual assembly point is in the place where we encamped the previous night. If our forces are sufficient, we can leave a reserve unit along the designated withdrawal route, to look out for prisoners and wounded men.

CHAPTER VIII

ESPIONAGE

I. POINTS FOR ATTENTION WHEN
CARRYING OUT ESPIONAGE.

1. All reports on the situation should be transmitted without loss of time to one's superiors or to friendly armies.

2. The reports which we collect absolutely must be in full detail. All sloppy and negligent reporting must be severely prohibited.

3. The scope of espionage is not limited merely to the situation of the enemy; spies should also pay attention to the terrain. We should be informed of all aspects of the terrain that are disadvantageous to us, especially those aspects favourable to the enemy, such as narrow roads, river crossings, circuitous routes for avoiding these river crossings and narrow roads, etc.

4. We should bend every effort to obtain complete and detailed information regarding all matters having any relation to our guerrilla unit; our efforts should never cease until we understand the situation thoroughly.

5. We should pay attention to the sentiments of the people toward ourselves and the enemy. Are the people actively aiding us? How is their positive attitude manifested?

2. METHODS OF ESPIONAGE

Apart from sending out courageous and intelligent individuals (i.e., spies) to carry out espionage on every hand, a guerrilla unit must unite closely with the popular masses of the place in question. Moreover, in strategically important places, we use reliable local inhabitants or those among the people who sympathize with the guerrilla unit (for example, we can make use of feudal relationships and find a relative, or someone belonging to the family of person who has been executed by the enemy; we can also employ those among the people who hate the enemy, etc.). We give these people a relatively good salary, establish a secret espionage network, as well as a system of sentries, so that we can transmit information with facility.

3. ESPIONAGE REGARDING
THE NUMBER OF THE ENEMY'S TROOPS,
HIS TACTICAL SKILL, AND HIS ARMAMENT

1. Where are so and so many enemy infantrymen, cavalrymen, artillery-men, and other units to be found? How many armored cars and trains, tanks and air planes does the enemy have? And where are they?

2. What kind of defensive works does the enemy have in his front, in his rear, and around his cities and other places? What kind of forces are defending?

3. Where are the enemy's encampments and arsenals?

4. What about the enemy's reserves and flanking troops? Where are they?

5. How is the morale of the enemy soldiers? Are they prepared to fight or not? What are their relations with the people and with their own officers?

6. What about the enemy army's supplies of military equipment, bedding and clothes, food, and other items?

4. ESPIONAGE REGARDING THE TERRAIN

1. First of all, we must pay attention to the important roads within this area, as well as their direction, their width, their type of surface, whether or not they are muddy, etc., and whether or not they are suitable for use by all types of forces.

2. Are there any forests or not? If there are, we must pay attention to the kinds of trees, and to their area.

3. We must consider rivers, their width and depth, their rate of flow, the slope and type of soil of the banks. Are there bridges, ferries, or other means for crossing the river? If there are bridges, will they bear up under artillery, the baggage train, and other types of unit?

4. Are there any marshes? Where? What is their area? Can they be crossed or not? If so, we must note what kinds of troops can get through them.

CHAPTER IX

AMBUSHES

I. TYPES OF AMBUSH

When we emerge suddenly from hiding, and strike a sudden blow at the enemy who is just passing by, this is called an ambush. The sole habitual tactic of a guerrilla unit is the ambush. By means of an ambush it is extremely easy to obtain a good result, and as a general rule they are always advantageous. Such action is divided into the following types:

(1) Ambush by luring the enemy. This occurs when our troops, so to speak, prostrate themselves and hold out both arms, enticing the enemy to penetrate deeply. It is carried out by first placing our main force in ambush along the two sides of the road, or in a hiding place on one side, and then attacking the enemy with a small force. This force then feigns defeat and withdraws, luring the enemy deep into our lines, after which the main force rushes out from one side or both sides and carries out a surprise attack.

(2) Waiting ambushes. These are very similar to ambushes by luring the enemy, but it is not necessary for a part of our forces to feign defeat. Instead, we establish an observation post on some height, to observe the movements of the enemy army, and when his main force has reached the appropriate point, we rush out and attack him by surprise.

2. SPOTS FOR CARRYING OUT AMBUSHES, AND OBJECTIVES TO BE ATTACKED

Ambushes can be carried out against a variety of objectives such as isolated enemy soldiers, couriers, whole mobile units, logistic convoys, transport columns, trains, etc. Further details are given below.

(1) When ambushing the enemy's cavalry or infantry, we should choose a spot where they cannot use their weapons and where it is not easy for them to manifest their full strength.

(2) Ambushes against logistic convoys or transport columns

should be carried out in the midst of a forest or in the countryside.

(3) Ambushes of small enemy units, or whole mobile units or motorized transport columns are most valuable. But we must first understand their plans, the direction in which they are advancing, and the time it will take them to pass. We must also reflect in detail on the location for the ambush and carefully seek out a place likely to contribute to a favourable result. At the same time, we must carefully select in advance the route for our own withdrawal.

(4) When a guerrilla unit carries out an ambush against a rail-road train, our forces can be split into three parts. The first part should take up battle positions near the railroad, to guard against resistance from the train. The second part should take up a position on the two sides of the train, and shoot into the carriage. The third part has the task of charging and boarding the train to make a search, unloading the cargo, taking charge of the weapons, etc .

3. THE TERRAIN IN AMBUSHES

The point at which an ambush is carried out must have the following features:

(1) It must have good cover, in order to prevent our being observed by the enemy and, at the same time, permit us to observe the enemy.

(2) It must permit us to employ our maximum fire power.

(3) It must allow us to leap out rapidly at one bound from ambush and come to grips with the enemy. Hence, between the point where we lie in ambush and the enemy, there should be a dense forest, a damp depression, a narrow road, or some other intervening ground.

4. THE DISTANCE FROM WHICH AN AMBUSH SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT

If the guerrilla unit which carries out a surprise attack is in sufficient strength so that it wants to come to grips with the enemy at one bound, then it should stage its ambush near the side of the road. If, on the other hand, the enemy is in considerable strength, and our plan is merely to harass him and cause confusion, then we

should remain in a place some distance from the road.

5. IMPORTANT TRICKS FOR AN AMBUSH

1. An ambush can most advantageously be carried out in silence. Whether by day or night, loud talking should be absolutely forbidden, as should patrolling along the front.

2. Remaining a long time in ambush can easily lead to discovery of our plans and an increase in the danger. Because of remaining too long in ambush, the state of tension of our men is gradually weakened, and they can no longer maintain their vigilance. Hence, one can easily be discovered by the enemy. A point that especially merits attention is that, if we have already been discovered by the enemy, we should immediately either launch our attack or withdraw.



SURPRISE ATTACKS ON THE ENEMY'S FORAGING UNITS

I. OCCASIONS FOR SURPRISE ATTACKS

A charge against the enemy's foraging units should be carried out under the following circumstances:

- (1) It can be executed when the enemy unit is nearing a village.
- (2) We can wait until the enemy enters a village and has scattered in all directions to forage from door to door, and then carry it out.
- (3) We can wait until the enemy has finished foraging and is returning loaded with booty, and then attack by surprise from ambush.
- (4) Which of the above types of attack is most appropriate should be determined with reference to the circumstances, by the persons who are responsible for the guerrilla unit. They should carefully evaluate all the factors and make arrangements adapted to circumstances.

2. SURPRISE ATTACKS IN A VILLAGE

It is most advantageous to attack the enemy's foraging units in a village. At such a time the greater part of the enemy's foraging unit is scattered all over the place, and it is not easy for them to gather together quickly. But, in carrying out this type of surprise attack we must steal by the enemy's warning outposts or capture his sentinels without the slightest sound; only then can we make our attack.

3. SURPRISE ATTACKS OUTSIDE A VILLAGE

If the force carrying out a surprise attack is especially weak, it must wait until the foraging is completed and until the foraging column has reached a place favourable to a surprise attack — such as when it is passing through a forest, across a bridge, or along a narrow road — before attacking.

4. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SURPRISE ATTACK

When a guerrilla unit has attacked and dispersed the enemy unit covering a foraging operation, it can reckon only that it has completed part of its attack. It must also destroy or capture all of their wagons. Consequently, the guerrilla unit should first engage the enemy covering unit in combat and then attack the logistic convoy with its main force and capture it.

5. POINTS TO WHICH THE GUERRILLA UNIT SHOULD PAY ATTENTION

It is easy to obtain the assistance of the local population when attacking one of the enemy's foraging units. Hence, within the limits of what is possible, part of the property seized should be given to the popular masses, to heighten their courage.

CHAPTER XI

SURPRISE ATTACKS
ON THE ENEMY'S TRANSPORT UNITS

An attack on a transport column is one of the most advantageous forms of action for a guerrilla unit, since we can obtain in this manner the weapons, food, and supplies we need.

FROM MARY
1. SUDDEN SURPRISE ATTACKS

With such attacks, we can frighten the enemy out of his wits, and precipitate him into a state of complete confusion. The coolies of the transport units are, in large part, timid peasants forcibly impressed. Moreover, the size of the covering force is limited, and it is generally spread out over a very long distance. If we overturn one of the wagons, we can make all the wagons behind it stop too.

2. METHODS OF ATTACK

1. The guerrilla unit must not forget that its task is not to defeat the enemy, but to capture the enemy's wagons. Consequently, we should detail only a part of our forces to do battle with the enemy's covering unit. The rest of our men should be ordered to plunder, pursue, and demolish the materials he is transporting. Hence, whenever we carry out such a surprise attack, we should do our best to contrive matters so as to open fire rapidly against the transport unit and cause them to stop, in order to increase their confusion and fear.

2. In order to stop the whole transport column, it is only necessary to shoot at the front part of it, because, under conditions of mass anxiety and bewilderment, when the wagons in front stop, they will interfere with one another, fall over on the side of the road, and bring about a situation of extreme confusion. If there are a large number of transport wagons, and if, because the front of the column is under fire, the wagons at the rear endeavor to turn around and escape, the guerrilla unit should send out a small number of riflemen to shoot furiously from cover at the tail end of the column, so that it does not dare turn around.

3. If the unit carrying out the surprise attack is in an inferior position, and the covering unit is taking active precautionary measures, the guerrilla unit should exhaust the enemy by incessant false alarms, and then when the transport column is passing through a forest or valley or along a narrow road in some other type of terrain, where the enemy's logistic convoy cannot easily turn around, the attack should be swiftly carried out.

It is not often advantageous to carry out a surprise attack on a baggage train in a village, for the covering unit and the logistic convoy can easily make use of the houses and other cover, and offer strong resistance.

4. If the covering unit has already been dispersed by our attack, the resistance of the transport unit has also been overcome, and enemy reinforcements cannot arrive in time, the guerrilla unit can then destroy the wagons and the goods they are carrying or destroy completely whatever the guerrillas cannot carry away or have no use for.

CHAPTER XII

THE CORRESPONDENCE NETWORK OF A GUERRILLA UNIT AND THE DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES IN THE REAR

I. THE OBJECT OF THE NETWORK

So that they may be able to call upon one another for aid and receive information at all times regarding the situation of the enemy, guerrilla units should do their utmost to maintain the closest and most solid relations with the local population for the exchange of correspondence.

2. MEANS FOR MAINTAINING RELATIONS

In order to set up such a correspondence network, we should, in addition to utilizing the telephone in the greatest possible measure,

employ all means at hand. These include runners, messengers on horseback, messengers on bicycles, secret couriers posted in advance for transmitting information, as well as transmittal by sentries, and even signals and pre-established signs, etc.

3. METHODS FOR TRANSMITTING REPORTS

1. A network for important correspondence should be set up. Reports of an urgent character can best be transmitted by messengers on horseback. When this is impossible, we should send out reliable individuals particularly good at going on foot. It is also possible to arrange in advance for the transmittal of secret letters. There are times, too, when we must send out several men, each of them taking a different route, to make certain that the report in question will reach its destination. (This method should be limited to the most important reports.)

2. As for ordinary reports that are not particularly important, they are commonly transmitted by runners or messengers on bicycles. There are times when one can also use faithful individuals from among the local population who are thoroughly familiar with the routes to carry such reports.

4. SIGNALS FOR COMMUNICATIONS

For the sake of convenience in guiding each guerrilla group or unit by day or by night, in its actions in mountainous terrain or in forests, the commander of a guerrilla unit should establish in advance a certain number of basic signals and signs (such as signals fires at night, smoke signals by day, coloured pennants, flags, semaphore signaling by flags, paper signals, whistles, bugle calls, etc.).

5. DISPOSITIONS REGARDING ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE REAR

Should we or should we not destroy the routes of communication in the enemy's rear? We must reflect in detail about this problem. If we conclude that, in the future, our own army will not need

to utilize these roads, or will not be able to utilize them, then we can destroy them.

6. POINTS FOR ATTENTION IN DESTROYING ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION

If we want to destroy routes of communication, we must be thoroughly familiar with the terrain. It is only then that, moving rapidly and elusively, we appear suddenly and quickly withdraw. In eliminating the enemy's sentries, we must not fire a shot, in order not to alert them and give them a chance to flee.

7. PRECAUTIONS WHEN BEGINNING THE DESTRUCTION OF ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION

When we begin the destruction of routes of communication, we must first send out a detachment to the place where the presence of the enemy has been reported, in order to keep an eye on the enemy's patrols and his small detachments, so that they cannot quickly and secretly get close to the point where our own unit is at work. If, while beginning work, we are discovered by the enemy, we should shoot at him to keep him from coming nearer.

8. METHODS OF DESTROYING WORKS ON THE GROUND

1. Railroads should be destroyed at the points where they are most difficult to repair, such as at curves, at points where the railway is hidden from view, where the enemy's precautions are lax, where we can work under cover, or where we can destroy a large length of track. When destroying the rails, we should bend them, or hollow out the ground beneath them. In low-laying places we should dig ditches. As for tunnels, we should obstruct them.

2. Railroad ties, wooden bridges, telegraph and telephone poles, etc., should be burned up. Wires should be carried away or dropped into the water.

3. Signals switches, semaphores, railroad carriages, etc., located in the stations should be destroyed, preferably by blowing them up

with explosives.

4. In destroying cobblestone roads, highways, bridges, and other constructions, we must in all cases choose a method of destruction appropriate to the nature of the construction.

CHAPTER XIII

REGULAR HIDING PLACES AND PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN WHEN WE HALT

I. MARSHALING OUR TROOPS

The problem is not merely one of resting and marshaling out troops. We require a place that can also be used for conserving ammunition and food and for receiving and looking after wounded and sick soldiers. Hence, the place in question commonly serves also as a supporting point in time of battle. As soon as we are the objects of the enemy's pursuit and attack, we withdraw there, and secretly hide, so as to await an opportunity to act or to begin resisting the enemy again.

2. THE CHOICE OF A SPOT

1. A hiding place where we can rest for a long time may conveniently be found deep in the forest, in a thatched hut near a marsh, in a cave under the ground or in a mountainside, on a lonely farm, or in a small and secluded hamlet. Because of the sympathy it enjoys a small guerrilla unit normally has no difficulty at all in finding a regular hiding place.

2. A guerrilla unit must absolutely maintain the strictest secrecy regarding the hiding places it has selected. Even one's closest friends and relatives must not be informed if they have no connection with the guerrilla unit in question. If our original hiding place has been discovered by the enemy, then, in general, we should not wait for the enemy to come and attack us but must quickly remove elsewhere.

3. Sometimes such hiding places also serve as store-houses for

military equipment, powder, and provisions, and also for receiving wounded and sick soldiers. More often, a separate secret location in the vicinity of the hiding place is selected for each type of store-house because there are people continually going in and out of a hiding place and it can very easily be discovered by the enemy.

4. The more individuals there are among the people who support the guerrillas, so that the guerrilla unit can also maintain a communications network among the people, the easier it is for the guerrilla unit to find a hiding place. There are times when, in order to evade the enemy's pursuit and attack, and find a good place to hide, a given guerrilla unit must be split up, each of its members being obliged to find a way to hide himself in one of the houses of the local population. In such circumstances, the local population is the only hope of salvation of the members of the guerrilla unit.

3. THE QUESTION OF PROVISIONS

In places where the local population is hostile to the guerrillas, there is no alternative to foraging backed by force, but one should send reliable people from among the detachment, in order to guard against pillaging. When the guerrilla unit does not fear discovery, it can send out a special small unit to forage for food, to collect contributions of food, or to demand food supplies from the local authorities.

4. CHANGING ONE'S HALTING PLACE

The best method by which a guerrilla unit can maintain its own security is through the agility of its action. In case of necessity, the unit can make a habit of changing its halting place every night (if, during the day, it has been in village A, at twilight it moves to village B).

5. OCCUPYING A HALTING PLACE

When a guerrilla unit encamps, the arrangement of its forces should be determined entirely by the nature of its action, but it should

not occupy a large village that its own forces are insufficient to hold. If a guerrilla unit cannot do otherwise, and finds itself in such a place, it should occupy only a few collective dwellings situated apart and convenient for defense. The best thing is to be located in a village where one can keep a lookout in all directions, especially on the road along which the enemy might come. We must absolutely not disperse the members of the unit to stay in different houses, acting, for the sake of individual convenience, in a way of which the enemy could take advantage. In order to keep the enemy from knowing where we are staying, the best method is to enter the village only late at night. Moreover, we should look about carefully and all sides of the village and not allow anyone at all to come out.

6. THE DEGREE OF PRECAUTIONS

In order to avoid excessive fatigue to the members of a guerrilla unit, and to assure them of a real rest, it is not necessary to send out large numbers of scouts to sound a warning. It suffices to arrange for military outposts and concealed scouts in all adjoining places and along all roads (those which the enemy must take, or those related to us). We should also send out spies to places from 2 to 4 li away. This distance will be sufficient.

Whether or not the enemy attacks us, we must always fix an assembly point at a distance of from 10 to 16 li, for use in case of withdrawal. Moreover, the roads leading to the assembly point should be designated and marked in advance (but there must be at least two roads giving access to such a place).

7. PREPARATIONS

When a guerrilla unit is staying in a place, all its members, whether they be officers or soldiers, must at all times take measures to prepare for battle. Especially after twilight, every officer and soldier must gather together the arms and other equipment he carries with him, and arrange them in proper order, so that it will be convenient, in case there is an alarm in the dark, for him to go out quickly and meet the attack.

8. WHEN THERE IS ANXIETY ABOUT A SURPRISE ATTACK BY THE ENEMY

1. If the guerrilla unit itself is especially alert, if its intelligence network is organized with exceptional discretion, and if the people of the area are in sympathy with us, so that they regularly report all movements to us, then it is extremely difficult for the enemy to mount sudden surprise attacks. But whatever the circumstances may be, we must always exercise due caution.

2. In order to prevent the enemy relying on a hostile population from coming and making a surprise attack on us, we must take special precautionary measures. Thus by methods of intimidation we warn the local population, we arrest and detain people. But at the same time, the unit must exercise caution and be prepared.

3. If there is an alarm, we should assemble the whole unit in a building that has been prepared for defense. We should dispatch to this building advance sentries and observers as required. The entrance to the building should be closed by movable obstacles, and we should establish in advance signals for the defense. Weapons and other equipment should be properly prepared and placed within reach of each man.

4. When circumstances are extremely critical, part of a friendly unit should take over responsibility for the security of our position and the place in which our army is staying, as well as for sending out spies far and wide to add to the warning system. They report constantly to the guerrilla task group on the situation of nearby enemy forces.

5. When we use artificial obstacles to block the roads, we must make provision for communication with our first line and reserves, as well as with the local population and our correspondence network.

6. In case of necessity, the roads within villages can be completely blocked off, or we can leave a way through. Whenever possible, each guerrilla task group should have a prepared position.

9. DISPOSITIONS IN CASE OF AN ENEMY SURPRISE ATTACK

1. When we discover that the enemy is moving toward us, if we find out from reconnaissance that he is not in strength, we should

annihilate him with one sudden blow. If the enemy forces are several times more numerous than ours, we should rapidly withdraw. But while we are withdrawing we should give the enemy a false impression of the direction in which we are moving, so as to conceal our actual route of withdrawal.

2. If the enemy attacks us by surprise and we do not succeed in evading him, we should exploit in full measure the advantages of a village for defensive action, resist him firmly, and then later take advantage of an opportunity to withdraw.

3. If we have already lost a village, we should reply by a counterattack or counterblows in order to take it back quickly and save our captured comrades, or those comrades who are clinging to a position and defending it stubbornly to the death. If our action is rapid, we can always attain such objectives, because after a victory the enemy is often in great confusion and lax in his precautions.

4. The best occasion for carrying out such counter-blows, or such a counteroffensive, is just after the victory of the enemy's surprise attack. The sacrifices of a charge under such circumstances are less than those from running away, or from stopping and giving battle in unfavourable terrain following the enemy's attack.

NOT FOR
CHAPTER XIV
COMMERCIAL
TRAINING
I. THE SCOPE OF TRAINING

Training is not limited to the military arts; we must also pay attention to political training, to the literacy movement, to training in hygiene, etc. Consequently, when a guerrilla unit is engaged in drill, literacy training should represent an appropriate part of the whole, and can be given in all places and at all times.

For the purpose of achieving a full and satisfactory result from all the kinds of training carried out in a guerrilla unit, we must increase the will to study on their own initiative among the officers and soldiers. Apart from the political aspect, and in addition to increasing political consciousness, we must also promote amusements

for the army, mitigate a painful and tedious existence, assist the people in their own self-defense, and cause the armed force of the popular masses to unite closely with us.

2. TRAINING IN ALL SUBJECTS

The consequence of training in all subjects, though it is difficult to reduce it to uniformity, is, as regards methods in general, to proceed from the superficial to the profound, first the broad and then the rigorous, from the simple and easy to the complex and difficult, first the partial and then the universal. In all fields, one must demonstrate one's theories by concrete experience, so as to strengthen the students' confidence.

3. CULTIVATING THE PEOPLE'S CAPACITY FOR SELF-DEFENSE

The most pressing and most important task of a guerrilla unit is to carry out guerrilla attacks without ceasing in the places occupied by the enemy, to seize and kill all traitors and reactionaries, and to protect the popular masses. At the same time, a guerrilla unit must investigate the concrete offenses of the enemy and use every possible method to discover and smash his tricks and plots. Therefore:

1. It is advantageous to make known our good government, to make great efforts to unite with the popular masses, and to support the forces of the popular masses. Such actions can also be carried out on the territory of the enemy. We should also use every possible method and devote all our strength to encourage the people to imitate our own actions, stimulate them to fight the enemy actively, and guide their combat.

2. Our action in supporting the people's capacity for self-defense should be of long duration, and not ephemeral. We must do the best we can to let people know that, at all times, a guerrilla unit struggles and sacrifices itself for the popular masses and, even in the case of the most dangerous crisis, will absolutely not harm the popular masses. If the local population meets with a defeat in its first military action, after we have drawn it into the war, its spirit of struggle will necessarily be dissipated to some extent. When the masses falter in this way, we must devise a way to rouse their en-

thusiasm and to bring their spirit of struggle to a high level once more.

3. A guerrilla unit constitutes the most conscious and advanced segment of the people. Hence, they should first unite those among the popular masses who are dissatisfied with the enemy and who accept the leadership of those we send among them. We must also aid the people to establish plans, to get arms, and to establish liaison and mutual assistance with mass organizations in neighboring villages and even in other cities that are victims of the enemy's oppression. But, in carrying out all such work, we must maintain the strictest secrecy.

4. TRAINING IN HYGIENE

1. In order to strengthen its own fighting capacity, every mess unit should designate one or two soldiers as nurses, to treat the ailments of the officers and soldiers when they arise and, also to explain the rudiments of hygiene, as well as to assist, direct, supervise, and encourage all matters of hygiene in the unit.

2. Replenishing stocks of medicines is an extremely difficult matter in a guerrilla unit. Hence we should, in accordance with the seasons etc., prepare certain medicines especially for emergency care, and other normally indispensable medicines. As regards wounded and seriously ill members of the unit, when there is no alternative, they are entrusted to fellow soldiers with some slight medical knowledge or to local inhabitants sympathetic to us.

5. MILITARY TRAINING

Military training all relates to the enemy army. Its purpose is to create greater skill than that of the enemy in each specialized art.

1. *Subjects.* The items requiring particular attention are dispersing, assembling, marksmanship, maneuvering an army, mountain climbing, construction of military works, night fighting, mountain fighting, fighting on narrow roads, espionage and security measures, searches, liaison, and other such actions.

2. *Methods.* In carrying out military instruction, particular attention should be paid to all methods of teaching and explanation,

which should be more or less as described below:

(a) For theoretical instruction one can employ the method of giving suggestions and the method of questions and answers. All methods of teaching that adopt the style of speechmaking and injecting [ideas into the students' heads] should be eliminated in so far as possible.

(b) When explaining actions, we should pay attention to linking our talks with the living reality, so that it will be easy for the soldiers to understand us.

(c) We should devote more time to concrete demonstrations of actions and less time to talking about empty theories. Consequently, the greatest effort should be made to diminish the duration and number of classroom sessions and the numbers of practical exercises should be increased.

(d) All explanations in the classroom should in so far as possible correspond to the exercises outside.

(e) All demonstrations of actions should be carefully prepared in advance before they are executed. All negligent and perfunctory behaviour — doing things any old way — must absolutely be eliminated.

(f) With respect to all activities, we should devise a way to incite the officers and soldiers to carry out a competition, in order to increase the spirit of initiative and the positive attitude they manifest in their work, and to speed up the work.

(g) Increase applied training, diminish training according to a fixed pattern, and correct the erroneous idea that training according to a fixed pattern is useful in maintaining military discipline.

(h) The plan of training should be suited to the circumstances, time, and place in which it is to be carried out. The training plan must absolutely not be rigid; we must seize every occasion and strive to give training adapted to the circumstances. This is done more or less as indicated below:

i. We utilize the time when the army is on the march to carry on direction finding, recognizing differences in terrain, estimating distances, reconnaissance action, and designating objectives and the utilization of terrain.

ii. When we are in camp, we utilize preparations for se-

curity measures in order to carry out exercises in all kinds of observation and precautions, beginning with the role of advanced sentries. We also provide training in construction of military works.

iii. We utilize the opportunity provided by a battle, and before setting out or before the fighting begins, we explain, on the basis of the tasks we have been ordered to perform, such forms of action as ambushes, surprise attacks, main attacks, and supporting attacks, etc.

iv. We utilize the opportunity, when we are awaiting the moment for action, to explain in practical terms how we resist the charges of the enemy, as well as shooting and other such military actions.

v. We utilize post-battle exposition and criticism (such exposition and criticism should be based on a minute investigation of the facts, carried out beforehand) to point out the strength and weaknesses in our actions during the battle and what was appropriate and inappropriate in the individual commands, thus giving a concrete lesson to all of officers and men.

vi. We utilize the time offered by morning and evening roll calls to give various kinds of talks.

vii. We utilize the occasion offered by the recreation period to put on games, dances, and modern-style plays, having military significance, thus imperceptibly increasing the officers' and soldiers' desire to correct themselves, and increasing their willingness to follow good examples.

viii. We utilize each occasion of reward and punishment to carry out thorough propaganda among the officers and soldiers, in order to increase the soldiers' sense of achievement and their shame in doing evil, and thus, little by little, fostering a good military discipline.

6. POLITICAL TRAINING

In order to assure that all the independent actions of a guerrilla unit attain complete victory, apart from reinforcing military training, the most important thing is that we must make certain that the officers and soldiers have a high level of "political consciousness"

and of “devotion” to their own cause. Political training is the only method by which this objective can be attained. Its content is described in detail later on.

7. THE LITERACY MOVEMENT

In order to increase the cultural level of the officers and soldiers, so that they may more easily absorb all kinds of training, each mess unit must carry out literacy training. The methods are as follows:

1. The “A” class includes all those who know about fifty characters.
2. The “B” class includes those who know above twenty characters.
3. The “C” class includes those who know no characters at all.
4. The teachers of the various classes consist of those in the unit with a relatively high cultural level.
5. When we halt, there should be an hour each day devoted to the study of characters. When we are on the march, we can carry out instruction either while moving or during rest periods. In such training, the important thing is regularity rather than speed. In general, if the soldiers learn two words a day, it is excellent.

DISTRIBUTION

CHAPTER XV

POLITICAL WORK

I. THE AIM OF THE POLITICAL WORK OF A GUERRILLA UNIT

This aim lies in strengthening and raising to a higher level the fighting capacity of each member of the unit. The fighting capacity of a guerrilla unit is not determined exclusively by military arts, but depends above all on political consciousness, political influence,

setting in motion the broad popular masses, disintegrating the enemy army, and inducing the broad popular masses to accept our leadership. All the plans of a guerrilla unit, whether they be political, military, or of any other nature, are all directed toward this single end.

2. THE MAIN CONTENT OF POLITICAL WORK

We must carry out political instruction directed toward the resurrection of our people (stimulate the soldiers' national consciousness, their patriotism, and their love for the people and for the masses) and see to it that every officer and soldier in a guerrilla unit understands not only the national tasks for which he is responsible but also the necessity of fighting in defense of our state.

We must also pay attention to supporting the leaders, to maintaining the solidarity of the unit with real sincerity, to carrying out to the end the orders of one's superiors, and to maintaining an iron military discipline. We must see to it that the multitude of the soldiers are of a single mind and endowed with the resolve and the will to save our country together.

Apart from strengthening its own fighting capacity, a guerrilla unit must also carry out propaganda among the masses regarding the plots of the invaders and of the enemy.

3. DISCUSSIONS IN SMALL GROUPS

These are excellent activities to unite our walls, to strengthen confidence, and to proclaim our doctrine.

1. We collect the view of all the comrades, in order to avoid feelings of alienation and to achieve the effect of gathering together ideas and obtaining greater advantage.

2. By training the cadres, we increase their capacity for work and give them more practice in techniques for holding meetings and in methods of speaking. We will also be able to solve problems more quickly, investigate the past, and transform the future.

3. We can thus verify the fellowship existing among the members of the unit, and draw new comrades into the party.

4. This method is convenient for training, and makes it possible

to understand completely each comrade's circumstances, capacity, and knowledge.

5. According to their character, these activities can be divided into discussion meetings, review meetings, and criticism meetings.

4. METHODS

Before the meeting we must prepare for it. These preparations consist in informing the members of the group, establishing the essential subject matter of the discussion, and, at the same time, reporting to the next higher echelon.

1. As regards the number of participants, from three to five represents the optimum.

2. One should not be bound by any rigid pattern. Discussion meetings can be held at all times and in all places.

3. As for the time limit, it is not desirable that the meetings should last too long. One hour is the maximum permissible.

4. It is appropriate to hold one meeting a week. The order of procedure consists in a report by the chairman, discussion of the report by the participants, and a conclusion entrusted to the leader of the group. The record of the meeting should indicate in detail the name of the chairman, the subjects of discussion, the number of those present and absent, and the place where the meeting was held.

5. Not more than two problems at most should be discussed. The discussion should have as its starting point the individual problems of the participants.

6. As for the manner of speaking, it is appropriate that the remarks of the participants should deal with essentials and be simple and clear. They should be systematic and not repetitive. They should be persuasive in content and presented in a friendly and agreeable manner. In answering questions, one should avoid any hint of mockery and pay attention to what the others say. At the same time, one should arrive at a decision concerning the topic discussed.

7. As regards the leader of the group, his report should be simple. He should not give a long and repetitive presentation but seize the occasion to induce the participants to speak.

8. The conclusion should follow the inductive method. It should include a criticism of the whole of the discussions. If there are dissident conclusions, they may also be expressed

5. CARRYING OUT POLITICAL WORK

One should not merely rely on a few political workers. The best thing is to be able to attract and train conscious elements, or interested officers and soldiers, to participate in the work and to train the whole personnel of the unit so that they can all carry on effective political work.

6. TYPES OF POLITICAL WORK

In broad terms, political work can be divided into three categories according to whether it is carried out in ordinary times, during battle, or after a battle. As for propaganda destined to encourage the troops, the various aspects are as indicated below:

(1) Political work in ordinary times. We intensify political training in order to raise the level of political consciousness, create unity in thought, word, and deed, maintain an iron military discipline, and unite closely with the popular masses. The methods are roughly as follows:

(a) We must really put into practice the principles of not disturbing or harming the people (such as “Pay fairly for what you buy,” “Speak politely,” “Return everything you borrow”, and “Pay for anything you damage”).

(b) At all times and in all places, aid the popular masses and help them to solve their difficulties (for example, help the popular masses to gather the harvest or to cultivate their land and send our army doctors to prevent epidemics or treat the people’s ailments, or to enquire after people who have suffered difficulties and devise methods to aid them), maintain the unity of the army and the people, and encourage the spirit of sharing both good fortune and adversity together.

(c) Chat frequently with the popular masses and let them know about our military discipline and our affection for them, and also learn in detail about the hunger and suffering among the people.

(d) Frequently hold joint entertainment sessions for the soldiers and the people, so as to smooth over any feelings of

alienation between the army and the people and increase the affection of the army and the people for one another.

(2) Resolving any feelings of alienation between the lower and higher ranks of officers and soldiers. The methods employed are roughly as follows:

(a) Persons engaged in political training, apart from sharing the good fortune and adversity of the soldiers, should also frequently chat with the soldiers, carefully investigate all their deep grieves and report their problems at all times to their superior officers, and devise methods for improving the situation.

(b) As regards all the opinions of higher and lower ranks, we should take our stand on a position of pure rational knowledge, convince them by an attitude of sincere entreaty, and explain things to them. We must make absolutely certain that higher and lower ranks unite solidly as one man, and we must strengthen their capacity to unite.

(c) With respect to soldiers who violate discipline, we should use educational methods to persuade them. All corporal punishment and insults must absolutely be reduced.

(d) We should frequently hold meetings at which officers and soldiers can enjoy themselves together, in order to heighten the affection between officers and soldiers.

(3) Augmenting the officers' and soldiers' hatred of the enemy, and increasing their resolve to fight to the death to kill the enemy. Increasing the common hatred of the enemy is an important factor in strengthening the soldiers' morale. Consequently, a guerrilla unit should pay particular attention to all the atrocities of the enemy, and to all the instances in which he massacres our army or our people, and carry out propaganda generally among the army regarding these atrocities, so as to heighten the courage of the officers and soldiers to fight to the death and harden their resolve to fight the enemy to the death, since either we or they must perish.

(4) Strengthening confidence in the inevitable victory of our war against the enemy. The methods are more or less as follows:

(a) We must frequently avail ourselves of the tales of the glorious feats of arms in our past, in order to carry out propaganda among our officers and soldiers and inspire them.

(b) We put forward examples of the enemy's defects (such as difficulties, collapses, and other problems that he has recently encountered), in order to demonstrate that in the end the enemy must be defeated.

(c) We must put forward examples of our own strong points (such as the support of the popular masses, transmission of information, familiarity with the terrain) and the present victorious circumstances, in order to demonstrate that we must ultimately triumph.

(d) By exposing the clever tricks habitually used by the enemy, we make known the points to which our army should pay particular attention, in order to prevent the emergence of a mentality of fearing or underestimating the enemy.

After we have suffered an attack, we sink for a time into a situation characterized by difficulties and painful effort, and as a consequence we underestimate ourselves, exaggerate the enemy's strength, and lose our confidence in victory.

7. POLITICAL WORK IN TIME OF BATTLE.

Political work before we set out is carried on as described below.

(1) The commander in chief of the unit first calls a meeting of the cadres. He explains in what respects the existing political situation is favorable to us, as well as the conditions of victory and the significance of the battle. He also explains the methods and points for attention in attaining our goal, but without infringing military secrecy.

(2) On the basis of the meeting of the cadres, the political training section immediately calls meetings of political workers at all levels, at which the essential points and the methods of propaganda are explained and concrete tasks are assigned.

(3) The various groups immediately call meetings of all the

officers and soldiers, at which, in addition to reporting on the current political situation and the guarantees of our victory, conditions for competition are also put forward. ("He who is lightly wounded should not leave the firing line, he who is seriously wounded should not cry out in pain"; "Let us see who can hand in the most weapons"; or "Let us see who can take the most prisoners,") At the same time, tasks are distributed to all political workers and activists (supervision, leadership, or propaganda).

(4) Political workers should be sent to the local population to gather them together, call meetings, and give talks, inspiring them to participate in the battle or to join the ranks of the porters or the transport units. As regards the organizations of the popular masses, we should guide them in methods of calling meetings, of fighting, and of preparing mobilization.

(5) After the battle has begun, the most important political training workers should be sent to inspire the units responsible for the main attack or for particularly important actions. The less important political training workers should be sent to inspire the less important fighting units.

(6) Propaganda units and groups of singers and dancers (all composed of lively and lovable boys in uniform and attractive clothing) should be sent in advance to positions along the side of the roads where the army will advance, to give short talks, sing, dance, or shout slogans, so as to inspire the maximum of courage in the officers and soldiers.

8. POLITICAL WORK AFTER THE BATTLE HAS BEGUN

1. After the battle has begun, we should pay attention to calling out slogans to the soldiers of the other side, so as to dissipate their morale. This is one of the forms taken by our work of sabotage.

2. When the situation on the battlefield enters the stage of an encounter at close range or from positions arrayed opposite one another, we devise a method for holding a joint meeting with the soldiers of the opposite side and take advantage of this opportunity to give them food, in order to gladden their hearts. After this, we carry on more propaganda work, which must be prepared in advance.

3. After the battle has begun, we must assuredly carry out propaganda directed toward those outside our army. It is even more

important to inspire those within our army. The methods for this work are diverse and are determined primarily by what is adapted to the circumstances. For example:

(a) On the attack:

(i) When we suffer a surprise attack by the enemy while advancing to attack, we should give an explanation such as the following “Comrades! Airplanes cannot decide a battle. We must seize this opportunity, advance rapidly, and quickly come to grips with the enemy on the ground. Charge the enemy with your bayonets!”

(ii) When firing begins, we should encourage the soldiers in the following terms: “Comrades! Don’t shoot at random, shoot only when you have taken careful aim. We must try to kill an enemy with every bullet.”

(iii) When we are near the enemy and are about to charge, the method for inspiring the soldiers is as follows:

“Comrades! The time to dispose of the enemy has come. We shall pay no attention to sacrifice, we shall summon up our courage, defeat the enemy and annihilate him. Let our victory inspire the whole army! Forward quickly! Charge!”

(iv) When the first charge is repelled and we charge a second time, we should encourage the soldiers as follows: “Comrades! We are an invincible iron army, we are a mighty unit victorious in every battle, we are absolutely resolved to destroy this enemy and preserve our glorious reputation.”

(v) When officers are wounded or killed in battle, we should exhort the troops as follows: “Comrades! Our officers (So-and-so) and (So-and-so) have already sacrificed themselves gloriously. Let us tread in their bloody footsteps, complete their task, and annihilate the enemy before us. Let us go and avenge them!”

(vi) If the enemy shows signs of wavering, we should exhort the soldiers as follows: “Comrades! The enemy is wavering. Charge quickly and capture his commander in chief alive!”

(vii) When we pursue the enemy, we should exhort the soldiers as follows: "Comrades! The enemy has retreated. Pursue him quickly! Charge and smash the enemy's holding units, finish off his main force, annihilate his whole force. Let us see who can hand in the most arms, and who can take the most prisoners. To win a battle and not to pursue the enemy is a great pity."

(b) On the defence:

(i) When the order has been received, we should carry out propaganda as follows: "Comrades! The enemy has arrived. This is the best opportunity to annihilate the enemy. Make skillful use of natural obstacles, and shoot with sangfroid. The more of the enemy we kill and wound, the easier it will be for our main attack to progress and obtain results."

(ii) When the enemy charges, we should exhort the troops as follows: "Comrades! The enemy is about to charge. Fix your bayonets, and prepare your hand grenades. Let us summon up our awe-inspiring reputation, preserve the glory we have already won, and annihilate the enemy in front of our position."

(iii) When we are surrounded by the enemy, we should exhort the soldiers as follows: "Comrades! We are an ever-victorious unit. We are a courageous and invincible iron army. We will wage a bloody battle to the end for our people and our country, shed our last drop of blood, hold onto our rifles to the death, and die rather than surrender. To hand over one's rifle is suicide, to surrender is the supreme shame. Let us smash their lines at one point and break through."

(iv) At the time of the counterattack or when the order to go over to the offensive is received: "Comrades! We are counterattacking. Let us take away the enemy's rifles, let us capture the enemy officers, let us see who is most courageous!"

(v) Propaganda when we retreat: "Comrades! Let us keep our movements secret and baffle the enemy in his calculations. Let us open wide our arms and lure the enemy to penetrate deep. Do not break ranks, do not fall behind, do not waver, do not succumb to panic, do not fear sacrifice, ex-

ecute resolutely to the end the orders of your superiors. Final victory will be ours!”

(vi) When we cover the withdrawal of our forces, the methods for exhorting them are similar to those indicated above.

9. POLITICAL WORK FOLLOWING A BATTLE

After the battle has been concluded, political work continues.

1. In order to avoid the appearance of attitudes of slighting the enemy or fearing the enemy, we should pay attention to the following points:

(a) We should correctly point out the causes of victory and defeat. We must not become puffed up because of a small victory; still less can we lose our confidence in victory because of a small setback.

(b) We must establish the attitude that should be adopted henceforth, or the points requiring attention.

2. We should collect materials and anecdotes concerning our victory, as well as the names of units, individual officers, and soldiers who have fought courageously. We should then use these materials to compose propaganda outlines, songs, dances, old- and new-style plays, etc.

3. We should print large numbers of victory announcements and slogans and stick them up everywhere. At the same time, we should organize a roving propaganda unit, which spreads out toward areas established in advance, to carry out propaganda and to call the popular masses together and hold meetings to celebrate the victory.

4. When meetings are held to celebrate the victory, one should pay attention to the following points:

(a) Report on the significance of the victory, and the tasks now before us, as well as the concrete methods to be employed to carry out these tasks.

(b) Report on units that have fought courageously, as well as individual officers and soldiers. As for officers and soldiers wounded or killed, one can select the most valuable among them

and report about them.

(c) Put on new versions of classic plays, as well as songs and dances.

While the reports indicated under (a) and (b) above are being delivered, or the play is being put on, the units participating in such a meeting should shout out slogans in accompaniment. We should also bring up the methods for providing pensions to the members of the families of the soldiers killed in battle.

Moreover, we should bring together the prisoners and booty in the sight of the masses, thus further increasing the courage and the spirit of struggle of our soldiers and of the people.

5. At meetings to celebrate the victory, all organizations should also launch a consolation movement. The main points for attention in this respect are:

(a) As regards material consolation, the important thing is not the quantity, but the significance; it is not the elegance and refinement of the items given, but their utility. Such things as straw sandals, face towels, pigs, sheep, chickens, and ducks are all suitable for this purpose.

(b) In case there is a lack of goods for material consolation, consolation in the form of honors should be used. For example, one can make flags for presentation, or compose songs in memory of the fallen, or issue an order of the day in their praise.

(c) Following a small victory, there should be no large-scale consolation. Consolation should be carried out only if we can devise means for doing it in a place near the battlefield.

6. We should praise examples of combined operations, autonomous actions, and the resolute application of orders. Thus:

(a) When there are those who, in the course of a fierce battle, have achieved victory by combined operations, autonomous action, and the resolute execution of orders, the maximum effort should be made to publicize the fact and to praise them. Those who have the misfortune to be defeated in similar circumstances should also be praised.

(b) When there is punishment for those who, in order to pre-

serve their own forces, fail to advance, or fail to carry out their tasks energetically, thus bringing about the defeat of another unit of our army, the case should also be the object of large-scale propaganda within the unit. In this way we give a lesson to the officers and soldiers of the whole unit, or of other units, and make them afraid to commit similar offenses.

10. WORK PERTAINING TO CLUBS AND AMUSEMENT ROOMS

By virtue of the fact that it compensates for a painful and tedious existence in the army, this is also a way of preventing desertion. The essentials regarding the organization and work of clubs are dealt with below.

(1) Rules regarding organization.

(a) In order to promote entertainment in the army, compensate for a tedious existence, increase interest in our work, and inspire a taste for study, each mess unit within a guerrilla unit should organize an amusement room. This should be divided into a military section, a guerrilla section, and a physical culture section. Each officer and soldier in the mess unit should choose one of these sections, in accordance with his own nature; he can, if he wishes, participate in two or three of the sections.

(b) One person from among the company commanders or the particularly energetic and capable platoon commanders should be chosen to be responsible for the amusement room. Each of the three sections should have a section head, chosen at a meeting of the members of the section, for a period of six months with the possibility of being chosen to succeed himself.

(c) Each week there should be one meeting of the section heads and one meeting of the members of each section. A meeting of the leaders should be held once a month. It is called separately by the chairman of the section heads.

(d) In its work, the amusement room should follow the guidance of the club of the next higher echelon. It is also subject to

the supervision and guidance of the commanding officer of the unit. In military affairs, it is absolutely subordinate to the commanding officer of the unit.

(e) In order to guide and unify the work of the various amusement rooms, a guerrilla battalion should establish a club. This club should have a chairman and a secretary who are responsible for all its activities.

(f) The club should be attached to the political training section, because the work of the amusement rooms constitutes a kind of political training. If there is no political training section, the club is directly subordinated to the commanding officer.

(g) The work of the club consists in guiding and promoting the work of the various amusement rooms. Consequently, each week there should be a meeting of the responsible heads of the various amusement rooms, and each month we should call a meeting of all the officers and soldiers or a meeting of the army and the people together. All the work of both the clubs and amusement rooms should have as its principle not to interfere with military administration, military training, or military action.

(2) The essentials of the work of clubs and amusement rooms.

(a) The work of the military section consists in furthering a spirit of independent study among the officers and soldiers, in discussion of military questions, or in the mutual rectification of the actions of the members in order to remedy the lacks and insufficiencies of military training. Its content is as indicated below.

(i) Bayonet section (practice, taking a hypothetical enemy dummy as the object).

(ii) Grenade section (throwing a wooden hand grenade at a target).

(b) Guerrilla section.

(i) Taking aim from a fixed support.

(ii) Checking one's aim.

(iii) Carriage while shooting.

(iv) Investigations when setting out.

(v) Utilization of obstacles.

(vi) Shooting at various types of objectives in the field.

(3) Physical culture section. The work of this section lies in strengthening the bodies of the officers and soldiers. It can also remedy insufficiencies in military training. Its contents is as follows:

(a) Ball playing (basketball, football, volley ball, tennis, baseball, etc.).

(b) Track and field sports (high jump, broad jump, races, obstacle course).

(c) Boxing and swordplay.

(4) Entertainment section. The work of this section consists in providing amusement for the members of the army, in compensating for a tedious existence, and in increasing the soldiers' interest in their work and their taste for study.

(a) Joke section. This section can carry on its activities at any time at all, but attention should be paid to the following points:

(i) When jokes are told, we must make them easy to understand. We can take materials from joke books and such, but they should not be too obscene.

(ii) When telling stories, we should devote much time to stories about the abundant exploits and great enterprises of the ancients, and to their excellent words and admirable conduct, in order to achieve an inspirational effect.

(iii) When reporting on the news, we should devote attention to our own victories and to the atrocities of the enemy.

(b) Theatrical section. This section utilizes rest periods, both in the evenings and during the day, to put on all sorts of new-style plays, traditional operas, comedy teams, story-tellers with drums, etc. — performances that have political content and are at the same time amusing, in order to improve morale.

(c) Song and dance section. In accordance with the circumstances in which the unit finds itself and the nature of its tasks, this section composes all sorts of songs in order to stimulate the

interest of the officers and soldiers in singing songs, or it puts on dances in costume, assuming various comical attitudes, in order to make the onlookers laugh until they hold their sides.

(d) Music section. This is divided into violin, harmonica, guitar and other groups, which can accompany the plays and dances.

(e) The methods of work of all sections should be adapted to the time and circumstances. They should be employed in a lively manner, and on no account in a wooden fashion.

(f) The work of all sections should be subject to strict control and supervision. We should also use methods of competition to induce all the officers and soldiers to make spontaneous efforts.

(g) All kinds of songs and old and new plays, etc.

(h) For the benefit of the work, all groups and sections should have specialized talents.

(i) The officers and soldiers who participate in these performances should be excused from their other duties.

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ON GUERRILLA WARFARE

1937

I. WHAT IS GUERRILLA WARFARE?

In a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla operations are a necessary part. This is particularly true in war waged for the emancipation of a people who inhabit a vast nation. China is such a nation, a nation whose techniques are undeveloped and whose communications are poor. She finds herself confronted with a strong and victorious Japanese imperialism. Under these circumstances, the development of the type of guerrilla warfare characterized by the quality of mass is both necessary and natural. This warfare must be developed to an unprecedented degree and it must co-ordinate with the operations of our regular armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it difficult to defeat the enemy.

These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are but one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. They are the inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their endurance. In our case, these hostilities began at a time when the people were unable to endure any more from the Japanese imperialists. Lenin, in *People and Revolution*,¹ said: "A people's insurrection and a people's revolution are not only natural but inevitable." We consider guerrilla operations as but one aspect of our total or mass war because they, lacking the quality of independence, are of themselves incapable of providing a solution to the struggle.

Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into the heart of the weaker country and occupies her territory in a cruel and oppressive manner, there is no doubt

that conditions of terrain, climate, and society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage by those who oppose him. In guerrilla warfare we turn these advantages to the purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy.

During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into regular forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached that level of development, combine to form the military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.

Both in its development and in its method of application, guerrilla warfare has certain distinctive characteristics. We first will discuss the relationship of guerrilla warfare to national policy. Because ours is the resistance of a semi-colonial country against an imperialism, our hostilities must have a clearly defined political goal and firmly established political responsibilities. Our basic policy is the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front. This policy we pursue in order to gain our political goal, which is the complete emancipation of the Chinese people. There are certain fundamental steps necessary in the realization of this policy, to wit,

- (1) Arousing and organizing the people.
- (2) Achieving internal unification politically.
- (3) Establishing bases.
- (4) Equipping forces.
- (5) Recovering national strength.
- (6) Destroying enemy's national strength.
- (7) Regaining lost territories.

There is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately from national policy. On the contrary, it must be organized and conducted in complete accord with national anti-Japanese policy. It is only who misinterpret guerrilla action who say, as does Jen Chi Shan, "The question of guerrilla hostilities is purely a military matter and not a political one." Those who maintain this simple point of view have lost sight of the political goal and the political effects of guerrilla action. Such a simple point of view will cause the people to lose confidence and will result in our defeat.

What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? With-

out a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must, if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, co-operation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character. On the other hand, in a war of counter-revolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and co-operation. There are those who do not comprehend guerrilla action, and who therefore do not understand the distinguishing qualities of a people's guerrilla war, who say: "Only regular troops can carry on guerrilla operations." There are others who, because they do not believe in the ultimate success of guerrilla action, mistakenly say: "Guerrilla warfare is an insignificant and highly specialized type of operation in which there is no place for the masses of the people" (Jen Chi Shan). Then there are those who ridicule the masses and undermine resistance by wildly asserting that the people have no understanding of the war of resistance (Yeh Ching, for one). The moment that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese.

What is the organization for guerrilla warfare? Though all guerrilla bands that spring from the masses of the people suffer from lack of organization at the time of their formation, they all have in common a basic quality that makes organization possible. All guerrilla units must have political and military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units. Such units may originate locally, in the masses of the people; they may be formed from an admixture of regular troops with groups of the people, or they may consist of regular army units intact. And mere quantity does not affect this matter. Such units may consist of a squad of a few men, a battalion of several hundred men, or a regiment of several thousand men.

All these must have leaders who are unyielding in their policies — resolute, loyal, sincere, and robust. These men must be well-educated in revolutionary technique, self confident, able to establish severe discipline, and able to cope with counter-propaganda. In short, these leaders must be models for the people. As the war progresses, such leaders will gradually overcome the lack of discipline which at first prevails; they will establish discipline in their

forces, strengthening them and increasing their combat efficiency. Thus eventual victory will be attained.

Unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory and those who attack the movement as a combination of banditry and anarchism do not understand the nature of guerrilla action. They say, "This movement is a haven for disappointed militarists, vagabonds, and bandits" (Jen Chi Shan), hoping thus to bring the movement into disrepute. We do not deny that there are corrupt guerrillas, nor that there are people who under the guise of guerrillas indulge in unlawful activities. Neither do we deny that the movement has at the present time symptoms of a lack of organization, symptoms that might indeed be serious were we to judge guerrilla warfare solely by the corrupt and temporary phenomena we have mentioned. We should study the corrupt phenomena and attempt to eradicate them in order to encourage guerrilla warfare, and to increase its military efficiency. "This is hard work, there is no help for it, and the problem cannot be solved immediately. The whole people must try to reform themselves during the course of the war. We must educate them and reform them in the light of past experience. Evil does not exist in guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized and undisciplined activities that are anarchism," said Lenin, in *On Guerrilla Warfare*.²

What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather and the situation of the people.

In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated. Only in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of independent guerrilla action and co-ordination with the effort of the regular armies. But, in spite of the most complete preparation, there can be no victory if mistakes are made in the matter of command. Guerrilla warfare based on the principles we have mentioned

and carried out over a vast extent of territory in which communications are inconvenient will contribute tremendously towards ultimate defeat of the Japanese and consequent emancipation of the Chinese people.

A careful distinction must be made between two types of guerilla warfare. The fact that revolutionary guerrilla warfare is based on the masses of the people does not in itself mean that the organization of guerrilla units is impossible in a war of counter-revolutionary character. As examples of the former type we may cite Red guerilla hostilities during the Russian Revolution; those of the Reds in China; of the Abyssinians against the Italians for the past three years; those of the last seven years in Manchuria; and the vast anti-Japanese guerrilla war that is carried on in China today. All these struggles have been carried on in the interest of the whole people or the greater part of them; all had a broad basis in the national manpower and all have been in accord with the laws of historical development. They have existed and will continue to exist, flourish, and develop as long as they are not contrary to national policy.

The second type of guerrilla warfare directly contradicts the law of historical development. Of this type, we may cite the examples furnished by the White Russian guerrilla units organized by Denikin and Kolchak; those organized by the Japanese; those organized by the Italians in Abyssinia; those supported by the puppet governments in Manchuria and Mongolia; and those that will be organized here by Chinese traitors. All such have oppressed the masses and have been contrary to the true interests of the people. They must be firmly opposed. They are easy to destroy because they lack a broad foundation in the people.

If we fail to differentiate between the two types of guerrilla hostilities mentioned, it is likely that we will exaggerate their effect when applied by an invader. We might arrive at the conclusion that "the invader can organize guerrilla units from among the people". Such a conclusion might well diminish our confidence in guerrilla warfare. As far as this matter is concerned, we have but to remember the historical experience of revolutionary struggles.

Further, we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from those of a purely "class" type. In the former case, the whole people of a nation, without regard to class or party, carry on a guerrilla struggle that is an instrument of the national policy. Its basis is, therefore, much broader than is the basis of a struggle of a class

type. Of a general guerrilla war, it has been said: "When a nation is invaded, the people become sympathetic to one another and all aid in organizing guerrilla units. In civil war, no matter to what extent guerrillas are developed, they do not produce the same results as when they are formed to resist an invasion by foreigners" (*Civil War in Russia*). The one strong feature of guerrilla warfare in a civil struggle is its quality of internal purity. One class may be easily united and perhaps fight with great effect, whereas in a national revolutionary war, guerrilla units are faced with the problem of internal unification of different class groups. This necessitates the use of propaganda. Both types of guerrilla war are, however, similar in that they both employ the same military methods.

National guerrilla warfare, though historically of the same consistency, has employed varying implements as times, peoples, and conditions differ. The guerrilla aspects of the Opium War, those of the fighting in Manchuria since the Mukden incident, and those employed in China today are all slightly different. The guerrilla warfare conducted by the Moroccans against the French and the Spanish was not exactly similar to that which we conduct today in China. These differences express the characteristics of different peoples in different periods. Although there is a general similarity in the quality of all these struggles, there are dissimilarities in form. This fact we must recognize. Clausewitz wrote, in *On War*:

"Wars in every period have independent forms and independent conditions, and, therefore, every period must have its independent theory of war."

Lenin, in *On Guerrilla Warfare*, said:

"As regards the form of fighting, it is unconditionally requisite that history be investigated in order to discover the conditions of environment, the state of economic progress and the political ideas that obtained, the national characteristics, customs, and degree of civilization."

Again:

"It is necessary to be completely unsympathetic to abstract formulas and rules and to study with sympathy the conditions of

the actual fighting, for these will change in accordance with the political and economic situations and the realization of the people's aspirations. These progressive changes in conditions create new methods."

If, in today's struggle, we fail to apply the historical truths of revolutionary guerrilla war, we will fall into the error of believing with Tou Hsi Sheng that under the impact of Japan's mechanized army, "the guerrilla unit has lost its historical function". Jen Chi Shan writes: "In olden days guerrilla warfare was part of regular strategy but there is almost no chance that it can be applied today." These opinions are harmful. If we do not make an estimate of the characteristics peculiar to our anti-Japanese guerrilla war, but insist on applying to it mechanical formulas derived from past history, we are making the mistake of placing our hostilities in the same category as all other national guerrilla struggles. If we hold this view, we will simply be beating our heads against a stone wall and we will be unable to profit from guerrilla hostilities.

To summarize: What is the guerrilla war of resistance against Japan? It is one aspect of the entire war, which, although alone incapable of producing the decision, attacks the enemy in every quarter, diminishes the extent of area under his control, increases our national strength, and assists our regular armies. It is one of the strategic instruments used to inflict defeat on our enemy. It is the one pure expression of anti-Japanese policy, that is to say, it is military strength organized by the active people and inseparable from them. It is a powerful special weapon with which we resist the Japanese and without which we cannot defeat them.

2. THE RELATION OF GUERRILLA HOSTILITIES TO REGULAR OPERATIONS

The general features of conventional hostilities, that is, the war of position and the war of movement, differ fundamentally from guerrilla warfare. There are other readily apparent differences such as those in organization, armament, equipment, supply, tactics, command; in conception of the terms "front" and "rear"; in the matter of military responsibilities.

When considered from the point of view of total numbers, guer-

rilla units are many, as individual combat units, they may vary in size from the smallest, of several score or several hundred men, to the battalion or the regiment, of several thousand. This is not the case in regularly organized units. A primary feature of guerrilla operations is their dependence upon the people themselves to organize battalions and other units. As a result of this, organization depends largely upon local circumstances. In the case of guerrilla groups, the standard of equipment is of a low order and they must depend for their sustenance primarily upon what the locality affords.

The strategy of guerrilla warfare is manifestly unlike that employed in conventional operations, as the basic tactic of the former is constant activity and movement. There is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the fixed, passive defence that characterizes conventional warfare. In guerrilla warfare, the transformation of a moving situation into a positional defensive situation never arises. The general features of reconnaissance, partial deployment, general deployment, and development of the attack that are usual in mobile warfare are not common in guerrilla war.

There are differences also in the matter of leadership and command. In guerrilla warfare, small units acting independently play the principal role and there must be no excessive interference with their activities. In conventional warfare, particularly in a moving situation, a certain degree of initiative is accorded subordinates, but in principle, command is centralized. This is done because all units and all supporting arms in all districts must co-ordinate to the highest degree. In the case of guerrilla warfare, this is not only undesirable but impossible. Only adjacent guerrilla units can co-ordinate their activities to any degree. Strategically, their activities can be roughly correlated with those of the regular forces, and tactically, they must co-operate with adjacent units of the regular army. But there are no strictures on the extent of guerrilla activity nor is it primarily characterized by the quality of co-operation of many units.

When we discuss the terms "front" and "rear" it must be remembered, that while guerrillas do have bases, their primary field of activity is in the enemy's rear areas. They themselves have no rear. Because a conventional army has rear installations (except in some special cases as during the 10,000-mile Long March of the Red Army or as in the case of certain units operating in Shansi Province), it cannot operate as guerrillas can.

As to the matter of military responsibilities, those of the guerrillas are to exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces; to attack enemy lines of communications; to establish bases capable of supporting independent operations in the enemy's rear, to force the enemy to disperse his strength; and to coordinate all these activities with those of the regular armies on distant battle fronts.

From the foregoing summary of differences that exist between guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare, it can be seen that it is improper to compare the two. Further distinction must be made in order to clarify this matter. While the Eighth Route Army is a regular army, its North China Campaign is essentially guerrilla in nature, for it operates in the enemy's rear. On occasion, however, the Eighth Route Army commanders have concentrated powerful forces to strike an enemy in motion, and the characteristics of conventional mobile warfare were evident in the battle at Ping Hsing Kuan and in other engagements.

On the other hand, after the fall of Feng Ling Tu, the operations of Central Shansi, and Suiyuan, the troops were more guerrilla than conventional in nature. In this connection, the precise character of Generalissimo Chiang's instructions to the effect that independent brigades would carry out guerrilla operations should be recalled. In spite of such temporary activities these conventional units retained their identity and after the fall of Feng Line Tu, they were not only able to fight along conventional lines but often found it necessary to do so. This is an example of the fact that conventional armies may, due to changes in the situation, temporarily function as guerrillas.

Likewise, guerrilla units formed from the people may gradually develop into regular units and, when operating as such, employ the tactics of conventional mobile war. While these units function as guerrillas, they may be compared to innumerable gnats, which, by biting a giant both in the front and in the rear, ultimately exhaust him. They make themselves as unendurable as a group of cruel and hateful devils, and as they grow and attain gigantic proportions, they will find that their victim is not only exhausted but practically perishing. It is for this very reason that our guerrilla activities are a source of constant mental worry to Imperial Japan.

While it is improper to confuse conventional with guerrilla operations, it is equally improper to consider that there is a chasm be-

tween the two. While differences do exist, similarities appear under certain conditions and this fact must be appreciated if we wish to establish clearly the relationship between the two. If we consider both types of warfare as a single subject, or if we confuse guerrilla warfare with the mobile operations of conventional warfare, we fall into this error: we exaggerate the function of guerrillas and minimize that of the regular armies. If we agree with Chang Tso Hua, who says, "Guerrilla warfare is the primary war strategy of a people seeking to emancipate itself," or with Kao Kang, who believes that "Guerrilla strategy is the only strategy possible for an oppressed people", we are exaggerating the importance of guerrilla hostilities. What these zealous friends I have just quoted do not realize is this: if we do not fit guerrilla operations into their proper niche, we cannot promote them realistically. Then, not only would those who oppose us take advantage of our varying opinions to turn them to their own uses to undermine us, but guerrillas would be led to assume responsibilities they could not successfully discharge and that should properly be carried out by conventional forces. In the meantime, the important guerrilla function of co-ordinating activities with the regular forces would be neglected.

Furthermore, if the theory that guerrilla warfare is our only strategy were actually applied, the regular forces would be weakened, we would be divided in purpose, and guerrilla hostilities would decline. If we say, "Let us transform the regular forces into guerrillas", and do not place our first reliance on a victory to be gained by the regular armies over the enemy, we may certainly expect to see as a result the failure of the anti-Japanese war of resistance. The concept that guerrilla warfare is an end in itself and that guerrilla activities can be divorced from those of the regular forces is incorrect. If we assume that guerrilla warfare does not progress from beginning to end beyond its elementary forms, we have failed to recognize the fact that guerrilla hostilities can, under specific conditions, develop and assume orthodox characteristics. An opinion that admits the existence of guerrilla war, but isolates it, is one that does not properly estimate the potentialities of such war.

Equally dangerous is the concept that condemns guerrilla war on the ground that war has no other aspects than the purely conventional. This opinion is often expressed by those who have seen the corrupt phenomena of some guerrilla regimes, observed their lack of discipline, and have seen them used as a screen behind which

certain persons have indulged in bribery and other corrupt practices. These people will not admit the fundamental necessity for guerrilla bands that spring from the armed people. They say, "Only the regular forces are capable of conducting guerrilla operations." This theory is a mistaken one and would lead to the abolition of the people's guerrilla war.

A proper conception of the relationship that exists between guerrilla effort and that of the regular forces is essential. We believe it can be stated this way:

"Guerrilla operations during the anti-Japanese war may for certain time and temporarily become its paramount feature, particularly insofar as the enemy's rear is concerned. However, if we view the war as a whole, there can be no doubt that our regular forces are of primary importance, because it is they who are alone capable of producing the decision. Guerrilla warfare assists them in producing this favourable decision. Conventional forces may under certain conditions operate as guerrillas, and the latter may, under certain conditions, develop to the status of the former. However, both guerrilla forces and regular forces have their own respective development and their proper combinations."

To clarify the relationship between the mobile aspect of conventional war and guerrilla war, we may say that general agreement exists that the principal element of our strategy must be mobility. With the war of movement, we may at times combine the war of position. Both of these are assisted by general guerrilla hostilities. It is true that on the battlefield mobile war often becomes positional; it is true that this situation may be reversed; it is equally true that each form may combine with the other. The possibility of such combination will become more evident after the prevailing standards of equipment have been raised. For example, in a general strategic counter-attack to recapture key cities and lines of communication, it would be normal to use both mobile and positional methods. However, the point must again be made that our fundamental strategic form must be the war of movement. If we deny this, we cannot arrive at the victorious solution of the war. In sum, while we must promote guerrilla warfare as a necessary strategic auxiliary to conventional operations, we must neither assign it the primary position

in our war strategy nor substitute it for mobile and positional warfare as conducted by conventional forces.

3. GUERRILLA WARFARE IN HISTORY

Guerrilla warfare is neither a product of China nor peculiar to the present day. From the earliest historical days, it has been a feature of wars fought by every class of men against invaders and oppressors. Under suitable conditions, it has great possibilities. The many guerrilla wars in history have their points of difference, their peculiar characteristics, their varying processes and conclusions, and we must respect and profit by the experience of those whose blood was shed in them. What a pity it is that the priceless experience gained during the several hundred wars waged by the peasants of China cannot be marshaled today to guide us. Our only experience in guerrilla hostilities has been that gained from the several conflicts that have been carried on against us by foreign imperialists. But that experience should help the fighting Chinese recognize the necessity for guerrilla warfare and should confirm them in confidence of ultimate victory.

In September 1812, Napoleon, in the course of swallowing all of Europe, invaded Russia at the head of a great army totaling several hundred thousand infantry, cavalry, and artillery. At that time, Russia was weak and her ill-prepared army was not concentrated. The most important phase of her strategy was the use made of Cossack cavalry and detachments of peasants to carry on guerrilla operations. After giving up Moscow, the Russians formed nine guerrilla divisions of about five hundred men each. These, and vast groups of organized peasants, carried on partisan warfare and continually harassed the French Army. When the French Army was withdrawing, cold and starving, Russian guerrillas blocked the way and, in combination with regular troops, carried out counter-attacks on the French rear, pursuing and defeating them. The army of the heroic Napoleon was almost entirely annihilated, and the guerrillas captured many officers, men, cannon, and rifles. Though the victory was the result of various factors, and depended largely on the activities of the regular army, the function of the partisan groups was extremely important. The corrupt and poorly organized country that was Russia defeated and destroyed an army led by the most famous

soldier of Europe and won the war in spite of the fact that her ability to organize guerrilla regimes was not fully developed. At times, guerrilla groups were hindered in their operations and the supply of equipment and arms was insufficient. If we use the Russian saying, it was a case of a battle between “the fist and the axe” [Ivanov].

From 1918 to 1920, the Russian Soviets, because of the opposition and intervention of foreign imperialists and the internal disturbances of White Russian groups, were forced to organize themselves in occupied territories and fight a real war. In Siberia and Alashan, in the rear of the army of the traitor Denikin and in the rear of the Poles, there were many Red Russian guerrillas. These not only disrupted and destroyed the communications in the enemy's rear but also frequently prevented his advance. On one occasion, the guerrillas completely destroyed a retreating White Army that had previously been defeated by regular Red forces. Kolchak, Denikin, the Japanese, and the Poles, owing to the necessity of staving off the attacks of guerrillas, were forced to withdraw regular troops from the front. “Thus not only was the enemy's manpower impoverished but he found himself unable to cope with the ever-moving guerrilla” [*The Nature of Guerrilla Action*].

The development of guerrillas at that time had only reached the stage where there were detached groups of several thousands in strength, old, middle-aged, and young. The old men organized themselves into propaganda groups known as “silver-haired units”; there was a suitable guerrilla activity for the middle-aged; the young men formed combat units, and there were even groups for the children. Among the leaders were determined Communists who carried on general political work among the people. These, although they opposed the doctrine of extreme guerrilla warfare, were quick to oppose those who condemned it. Experience tells us that “Conventional armies are the fundamental and principal power, guerrilla units are secondary to them and assist in the accomplishment of the mission assigned the regular forces” [Gusev, *Lessons of Civil War*]. Many of the guerrilla regimes in Russia gradually developed until in battle they were able to discharge functions of organized regulars. The army of the famous General Galen was entirely derived from guerrillas.

During seven months in 1935 and 1936, the Abyssinians lost their war against Italy. The cause of defeat — aside from the most important political reasons that there were dissentient political groups,

no strong government party, and unstable policy — was the failure to adopt a positive policy of mobile warfare. There was never a combination of the war of movement with large-scale guerrilla operations. Ultimately, the Abyssinians adopted a purely passive defence, with the result that they were unable to defeat the Italians. In addition to this, the fact that Abyssinia is a relatively small and sparsely populated country was contributory. Even in spite of the fact that the Abyssinian Army and its equipment were not modern, she was able to withstand a mechanized Italian force of 400,000 for seven months. During that period, there were several occasions when a war of movement was combined with large-scale guerrilla operations to strike the Italians heavy blows. Moreover, several cities were retaken and casualties totaling 140,000 were inflicted. Had this policy been steadfastly continued, it would have been difficult to have named the ultimate winner. At the present time, guerrilla activities continue in Abyssinia, and if the internal political questions can be solved, an extension of such activities is probable.

In 1841 and 1842, when brave people from San Yuan Li fought the English, again from 1850 to 1864, during the Taiping War, and for a third time in 1899 in the Boxer Uprising, guerrilla tactics were employed to a remarkable degree. Particularly was this so during the Taiping War, when guerrilla operations were most extensive and the Ching troops were often completely exhausted and forced to flee for their lives.

In these wars, there were no guiding principles of guerrilla action. Perhaps these guerrilla hostilities were not carried out in conjunction with regular operations, or perhaps there was a lack of co-ordination. But the fact that victory was not gained was not because of any lack in guerrilla activity but rather because of the interference of politics in military affairs. Experience shows that if precedence is not given to the question of conquering the enemy in both political and military affairs, and if regular hostilities are not conducted with tenacity, guerrilla operations alone cannot produce final victory.

From 1927 to 1936, the Chinese Red Army fought almost continually and employed guerrilla tactics contently. At the very beginning, a positive policy was adopted. Many bases were established, and from guerrilla bands, the Reds were able to develop into regular armies. As these armies fought, new guerrilla regimes were developed over a wide area. These regimes co-ordinated their ef-

forts with those of the regular forces. This policy accounted for the many victories gained by the guerrilla troops, who were relatively few in number and armed with weapons inferior to those of their opponents. The leaders of that period properly combined guerrilla operations with a war of movement both strategically and tactically. They depended primarily upon alertness. They stressed the correct basis for both political affairs and military operations. They developed their guerrilla bands into trained units. They then determined upon a ten year period of resistance during which time they overcame innumerable difficulties and have only lately reached their goal of direct participation in the anti-Japanese war. There is no doubt that the internal unification of China is now a permanent and definite fact, and that the experience gained during our internal struggles has proved to be both necessary and advantageous to us in the struggle against Japanese imperialism. There are many valuable lessons we can learn from the experience of those years. Principle among them is the fact that guerrilla success largely depends upon powerful political leaders who work unceasingly to bring about internal unification. Such leaders must work with the people; they must have a correct conception of the policy to be adopted as regards both the people and the enemy.

After September 18, 1931, strong anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns were opened in each of the three northeastern provinces. Guerrilla activity persists there in spite of the cruelties and deceptions practiced by the Japanese at the expense of the people, and in spite of the fact that her armies have occupied the land and oppressed the people for the last seven years. The struggle can be divided into two periods. During the first, which extended from September 18, 1931 to January 1933, anti-Japanese guerrilla activity exploded constantly in all three provinces. Ma Chan Shan and Su Ping Wei established an anti-Japanese regime in Heilungkiang. In Chi Lin, the National Salvation Army and the Self-Defence Army were led by Wang Te Lin and Li Tu respectively. In Feng Tien, Chu Lu and others commanded guerrilla units. The influence of these forces was great. They harassed the Japanese unceasingly, but because there was an indefinite political goal, improper leadership, a failure to co-ordinate military command and operations and to work with the people, and, finally, a failure to delegate proper political functions to the Army, the whole organization was feeble, and its strength was not unified. As a direct result of these conditions, the campaigns

failed and the troops were finally defeated by our enemy.

During the second period, which has extended from January 1933 to the present time, the situation has greatly improved. This has come about because great numbers of people who have been oppressed by the enemy have decided to resist, and because of the participation of the Chinese Communists in the anti-Japanese war, and because of the fine work of the volunteer units. The guerrillas have finally educated the people to the meaning of guerrilla warfare, and in the northeast, it has again become an important and powerful influence. Already seven or eight guerrilla regiments and a number of independent platoons have been formed, and their activities make it necessary for the Japanese to send troops after them month after month. These units hamper the Japanese and undermine their control in the northeast, while, at the same time, they inspire a Nationalist revolution in Korea. Such activities are not merely of transient and local importance but directly contribute to our ultimate victory.

However, there are still some weak points. For instance: National defence policy has not been sufficiently developed; participation of the people is not general; internal political organization is still in its primary stages; and the force used to attack the Japanese and the puppet governments is not yet sufficient. But if present policy is continued tenaciously, all these weaknesses will be overcome. Experience proves that guerrilla war will develop to even greater proportions and that, in spite of the cruelty of the Japanese and the many methods they have devised to cheat the people, they cannot extinguish guerrilla activities in the three northeastern provinces.

The guerrilla experiences of China and of other countries that have been outlined prove that in a war of revolutionary nature such hostilities are possible, natural and necessary. They prove that if the present anti-Japanese war for the emancipation of the masses of the Chinese people is to gain ultimate victory, such hostilities must expand tremendously.

Historical experience is written in iron and blood. We must point out that the guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will not be confined solely to China in her present anti-Japanese war but will be world-wide.

4. CAN VICTORY BE ATTAINED BY GUERRILLA OPERATIONS?

Guerrilla hostilities are but one phase of the war of resistance against Japan, and the answer to the question of whether or not they can produce ultimate victory can be given only after investigation and comparison of all elements of our own strength with those of the enemy. The particulars of such a comparison are several. First, the strong Japanese bandit nation is an absolute monarchy. During the course of her invasion of China, she had made comparative progress in the techniques of industrial production and in the development of excellence and skill in her army, navy, and air force. But in spite of this industrial progress, she remains an absolute monarchy of inferior physical endowments. Her manpower, her raw materials, and her financial resources are all inadequate and insufficient to maintain her in protracted warfare or to meet the situation presented by a war prosecuted over a vast area. Added to this is the anti-war feeling now manifested by the Japanese people, a feeling that is shared by the junior officers and, more extensively, by the soldiers of the invading army. Furthermore, China is not Japan's only enemy. Japan is unable to employ her entire strength in the attack on China; she cannot, at most, spare more than a million men for this purpose, as she must hold any in excess of that number for use against other possible opponents. Because of these important primary considerations, the invading Japanese bandits can hope neither to be victorious in a protracted struggle nor to conquer a vast area. Their strategy must be one of lightning war and speedy decision. If we can hold out for three or more years, it will be most difficult for Japan to bear up under the strain.

In the war, the Japanese brigands must depend upon lines of communication linking the principal cities as routes for the transport of war materials. The most important considerations for her are that her rear be stable and peaceful and that her lines of communication be intact. It is not an advantage for her to wage war over a vast area with disrupted lines of communication. She cannot disperse her strength and fight in a number of places, and her greatest fears are these eruptions in her rear and disruption of her lines of communication. If she can maintain communications, she will be able at will to concentrate powerful forces speedily at strategic points to engage our organized units in decisive battle. Another important Japa-

nese objective is to profit from the industries, finances, and manpower in captured areas and with them to augment her own insufficient strength. Certainly, it is not to her advantage to forego these benefits, nor to be forced to dissipate her energies in a type of warfare in which the gains will not compensate for the losses. It is for these reasons that guerrilla warfare conducted in each bit of conquered territory over a wide area will be a heavy blow struck at the Japanese bandits. Experience in the five northern provinces as well as in Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhwei has absolutely established the truth of this assertion.

China is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country; it is a country that is politically, militarily, and economically backward. This is an inescapable conclusion. It is a vast country with great resources and tremendous population, a country in which the terrain is complicated and the facilities for communication are poor. All these factors favour a protracted war, they all favour the application of mobile warfare and guerilla operations. The establishment of innumerable anti-Japanese bases behind the enemy's lines will force him to fight unceasingly in many places at once, both to his front and his rear. He thus endlessly expends his resources.

We must unite the strength of the army with that of the people, we must strike the weak spots in the enemy's flanks, in his front, in his rear. We must make war everywhere and cause dispersal of his forces and dissipation of his strength. Thus the time will come when a gradual change will become evident in the relative position of ourselves and our enemy, and when that day comes, it will be the beginning of our ultimate victory over the Japanese.

Although China's population is great, it is unorganized. This is a weakness which must be taken into account.

The Japanese bandits have invaded our country not merely to conquer territory but to carry out the violent, rapacious, and murderous policy of their government, which is the extinction of the Chinese race. For this compelling reason, we must unite the nation without regard to parties or classes and follow our policy of resistance to the end. China today is not the China of old. It is not like Abyssinia. China today is at the point of her greatest historical progress. The standards of literacy among the masses have been raised; the rapprochement of Communists and Nationalists has laid the foundation for an anti-Japanese war front that is constantly being strengthened and expanded; the government, army and people

are all working with great energy; the raw material resources and the economic strength of the nation are waiting to be used; the unorganized people are becoming an organized nation.

These energies must be directed toward the goal of protracted war so that should the Japanese occupy much of our territory or even most of it, we shall still gain final victory. Not only must those behind our lines organize for resistance but also those who live in Japanese-occupied territory in every part of the country. The traitors who accept the Japanese as fathers are few in number, and those who have taken oath that they would prefer death to abject slavery are many. If we resist with this spirit, what enemy can we not conquer and who can say that ultimate victory will not be ours?

The Japanese are waging a barbaric war along uncivilized lines. For that reason, Japanese of all classes oppose the policies of their government, as do vast international groups. On the other hand, because China's cause is righteous, our countrymen of all classes and parties are united to oppose the invader; we have sympathy in many foreign countries including even Japan itself. This is perhaps the most important reason why Japan will lose and China will win.

The progress of the war for the emancipation of the Chinese people will be in accord with these facts. The guerrilla war of resistance will be in accord with these facts, and that guerrilla operations correlated with those of our regular forces will produce victory is the conviction of the many patriots who devote their entire strength to guerrilla hostilities.

5. ORGANIZATION FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE

Four points must be considered under this subject. These are:

- (1) How are guerrilla bands formed?
- (2) How are guerrilla bands organized?
- (3) What are the methods of arming guerrilla bands?
- (4) What elements constitute a guerrilla band?

These are all questions pertaining to the organization armed guerrilla units; they are questions which those who had no experience in guerrilla hostilities do not understand and without which they can arrive at no sound decisions; indeed, they would not know in what

manner to begin.

HOW GUERRILLA UNITS ARE ORIGINALLY FORMED

The unit may originate in any one of the following ways:

- (a) From the masses of the people.
- (b) From regular army units temporarily detailed for the purpose.
- (c) From regular army units permanently detailed.
- (d) From the combination of a regular army unit and a unit recruited from the people.
- (e) From the local militia.
- (f) From deserters from the ranks of the enemy.
- (g) From former bandits and bandit groups.

In the present hostilities, no doubt, all these sources will be employed.

In the first case above, the guerrilla unit is formed from the people. This is the fundamental type. Upon the arrival of the enemy army to oppress and slaughter the people, their leaders call upon them to resist. They assemble the most valorous elements, arm them with old rifles or whatever firearms they can, and thus a guerrilla unit begins. Orders have already been issued throughout the nation that call upon the people to form guerrilla units both for local defense and for other combat. If the local governments approve and aid such movements, they cannot fail to prosper. In some places, where the local government is not determined or where its officers have all fled, the leaders among the masses (relying on the sympathy of the people and their sincere desire to resist Japan and succor the country) call upon the people to resist, and they respond. Thus, many guerrilla units are organized. In circumstances of this kind, the duties of leadership usually fall upon the shoulders of young students, teachers, professors, other educators, local soldiery, professional men, artisans, and those without a fixed profession, who are willing to exert themselves to the last drop of their blood. Recently, in Shansi, Hopeh, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shantung, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsu, and other provinces, extensive guerrilla hostilities have broken out. All these are organized and led by patriots.

The amount of such activity is the best proof of the foregoing statement. The more such bands there are, the better will the situation be. Each district, each county, should be able to organize a great number of guerrilla squads, which, when assembled, form a guerrilla company.

There are those who say: "I am a farmer", or, "I am a student", "I can discuss literature but not military arts." This is incorrect. There is no profound difference between the farmer and the soldier. You must have courage. You simply leave your farms and become soldiers. That you are farmers is of no difference, and if you have education, that is so much the better. When you take your arms in hand, you become soldiers; when you are organized, you become military units.

Guerrilla hostilities are the university of war, and after you have fought several times valiantly and aggressively, you may become a leader of troops and there will be many well-known regular soldiers who will not be your peers. Without question, the fountainhead of guerrilla warfare is in the masses of the people, who organize guerrilla units directly from themselves.

The second type of guerrilla unit is that which is organized from small units of the regular forces temporarily detached for the purpose. For example, since hostilities commenced, many groups have been temporarily detached from armies, divisions, and brigades and have been assigned guerrilla duties. A regiment of the regular army may, if circumstances warrant, be dispersed into groups for the purpose of carrying on guerrilla operations. As an example of this, there is the Eighth Route Army, in North China. Excluding the periods when it carries on mobile operations as an army, it is divided into its elements and these carry on guerrilla hostilities. This type of guerrilla unit is essential for two reasons. First, in situations of mobile warfare, the co-ordination of guerrilla activities with regular operations is necessary. Second, until guerrilla hostilities can be developed on a grand scale, there is no one to carry out guerrilla missions but regulars. Historical experience shows us that regular army units are not able to undergo the hardships of guerrilla campaigning over long periods. The leaders of regular units engaged in guerrilla operations must be extremely adaptable. They must study the methods of guerrilla war. They must understand that initiative, discipline, and the employment of stratagems are all of the utmost importance. As the guerrilla status of regular units is but tempo-

rary, their leaders must lend all possible support to the organization of guerrilla units from among the people. These units must be so disciplined that they hold together after the departure of the regulars.

The third type of unit consists of a detachment of regulars who are permanently assigned guerrilla duties. This type of small detachment does not have to be prepared to rejoin the regular forces. Its post is somewhere in the rear of the enemy, and there it becomes the backbone of guerrilla organization. As an example of this type of organization we may take the Wu Tat Shan district in the heart of the Hopeh-Chahar-Shansi area. Along the borders of these provinces, units from the Eighth Route Army have established a framework or guerrilla operations. Around these small cores, many detachments have been organized and the area of guerrilla activity greatly expanded. In areas in which there is a possibility of cutting the enemy's lines of supply, this system should be used. Severing enemy supply routes destroys his lifeline; this is one feature that cannot be neglected. If, at the time the regular forces withdraw from a certain area, some units are left behind, these should conduct guerrilla operations in the enemy's rear. As an example of this, we have the guerrilla bands now continuing their independent operations in the Shanghai-Woosung area in spite of the withdrawal of regular forces.

The fourth type of organization is the result of a merger between small regular detachments and local guerrilla units. The regular forces may dispatch a squad, a platoon, or a company, which is placed at the disposal of the local guerrilla commander. If a small group experienced in military and political affairs is sent, it becomes the core of the local guerrilla unit. These several methods are all excellent, and if properly applied, the intensity of guerrilla warfare can be extended. In the Wu Tat Shan area, each of these methods has been used.

The fifth type mentioned above is from the local militia, from police and home guards. In every North China province, there are now many of these groups, and they should be formed in every locality. The government has issued a mandate to the effect that the people are not to depart from war areas. The officer in command of the county, the commander of the peace-preservation unit, the chief of police are all required to obey this mandate. They cannot retreat with their forces but must remain at their stations and resist.

The sixth type of unit is that organized from troops that come over from the enemy — the Chinese “traitor troops” employed by the Japanese. It is always possible to produce disaffection in their ranks, and we must increase our propaganda efforts and foment mutinies among such troops. Immediately after mutinying, they must be received into our ranks and organized. The concord of the leaders and the assent of the men must be gained, and the units rebuilt politically and reorganized militarily. Once this has been accomplished, they become successful guerrilla units. In regard to this type of unit, it may be said that political work among them is of the utmost importance.

The seventh type of guerrilla organization is that formed from bands of bandits and brigands. This, although difficult, must be carried out with utmost vigour lest the enemy use such bands to his own advantages. Many bandit groups pose as anti-Japanese guerrillas, and it is only necessary to correct their political beliefs to convert them.

In spite of inescapable differences in the fundamental types of guerrilla bands, it is possible to unite them to form a vast sea of guerrillas. The ancients said, “Tai Shan is a great mountain because it does not scorn the merest handful of dirt; the rivers and seas are deep because they absorb the waters of small streams.” Attention paid to the enlistment and organization of guerrillas of every type and from every source will increase the potentialities of guerrilla action in the anti-Japanese war. This is something that patriots will not neglect.

THE METHOD OF ORGANIZING GUERRILLA REGIMES

Many of those who decide to participate in guerrilla activities do not know the methods of organization. For such people, as well as for students who have no knowledge of military affairs, the matter of organization is a problem that requires a solution. Even among those who have military knowledge, there are some who know nothing of guerrilla regimes because they are lacking in that particular type of experience. The subject of the organization of such regimes is not confined to the organization of specific units but includes all guerrilla activities within the area where the regime functions.

As an example of such organization, we may take a geographi-

cal area in the enemy's rear. This area may comprise many counties. It must be sub-divided and individual companies or battalions formed to accord with the sub-divisions. To this "military area", a military commander and political commissioners are appointed. Under these, the necessary officers, both military and political, are appointed. In the military headquarters, there will be the staff, the aides, the supply officers, and the medical personnel. These are controlled by the chief of staff, who acts in accordance with orders from the commander. In the political headquarters, there are bureaus of propaganda organization, people's mass movements, and miscellaneous affairs. Control of these is vested in the political chairman.

The military areas are sub-divided into smaller districts in accordance with local geography, the enemy situation locally, and the state of guerrilla development. Each of these smaller divisions within the area is a district, each of which may consist of from two to six counties. To each district, a military commander and several political commissioners are appointed. Under their direction, military and political headquarters are organized. Tasks are assigned in accordance with the number of guerrilla troops available. Although the names of the officers in the "district" correspond to those in the larger "area", the number of the functionaries assigned in the former case should be reduced to the least possible. In order to unify control, to handle guerrilla troops that come from different sources, and to harmonize military operations and local political affairs, a committee of from seven to nine members should be organized in each area and district. This committee, the members of which are selected by the troops and the local political officers, should function as a forum for the discussion of both military and political matters.

All the people in an area should arm themselves and be organized into two groups. One of these groups is a combat group, the other a self-defence unit with but limited military quality. Regular combatant guerrillas are organized into one of three general types of units. The first of these is the small unit, the platoon or company. In each county, three to six units may be organized. The second type is the battalion of from two to four companies. One such unit should be organized in each county. While the unit fundamentally belongs to the county in it was organized, it may operate in other counties. While in areas other than its own, it must operate in conjunction with local units in order to take advantage of their man-

power, their knowledge of local terrain and local customs, and their information of the enemy.

The third type is the guerrilla regiment, which consists of from two to four of the above-mentioned battalion units. If sufficient manpower is available, a guerrilla brigade of from two to four regiments may be formed.

Each of the units has its own peculiarities of organization. A squad, the smallest unit, has a strength of from nine to eleven men, including the leader and the assistant leader. Its arms may be from two to five Western-style rifles, with the remaining men armed with rifles of local manufacture, fowling-pieces, etc., spears, or big swords. Two to four such squads form a platoon. This too has a leader and an assistant leader, and when acting independently, it is assigned a political officer to carry on political propaganda work. The platoon may have about ten rifles, with the remainder of its weapons being fowling-pieces, lances, and big swords. Two to four of such units form a company, which, like the platoon, has a leader, an assistant leader, and a political officer. All these units are under the direct supervision of the military commanders of the areas in which they operate.

The battalion unit must be more thoroughly organized and better equipped than the smaller units. Its discipline and its personnel should be superior. If a battalion is formed from company units, it should not deprive subordinate units entirely of their manpower and their arms. If in a small area, there is a peace-preservation corps, a branch of the militia, or police, regular guerrilla units should not be dispersed over it.

The guerrilla unit next in size to the battalion is the regiment. This must be under more severe discipline than the battalion. In an independent guerrilla regiment, there may be ten men per squad, three squad per platoon, three platoons per company, three companies per battalion, and three battalions to the regiment. Two of such regiments form a brigade. Each of these units has a commander, a vice-commander, and a political officer.

In North China, guerrilla cavalry units should be established. These may be regiments of from two to four companies, or battalions.

All these units from the lowest to the highest are combatant guerrilla units and receive their supplies from the central government. Details of their organizational structure are shown in the tables in

the appendix.

All the people of both sexes from the ages of sixteen to forty-five must be organized into anti-Japanese self-defence units, the basis of which is voluntary service. As a first step, they must procure arms, then they must be given both military and political training. Their responsibilities are: local sentry duties, securing information of the enemy, arresting traitors, and preventing the dissemination of enemy propaganda. When the enemy launches a guerrilla-suppression drive, these units, armed with what weapons they have, are assigned to certain areas to deceive, hinder, and harass him. Thus, the defence units assist the combatant guerrillas. They have other functions, too. They furnish stretcher-bearers to transport the wounded, carriers to take food to the troops, and comfort missions to provide the troops with tea and rice. If a locality can organize such a self-defence unit as we have described, the traitors cannot hide nor can bandits and robbers disturb the peace of the people. Thus, the people will continue to assist the guerrilla and supply manpower to our regular armies. "The organization of self-defence units is a transitional step in the development of universal conscription. Such units are reservoirs of manpower for the conventional forces."

There have been such organizations for some time in Shansi, Shensi, Honan, and Suiyuan. The youth organizations in different provinces were formed for the purpose of educating the young. They have been of some help. However, they were not voluntary, and confidence of the people was thus not gained. These organizations were not widespread, and their effect was almost negligible. This system was, therefore, supplanted by the new type of organizations, which are organized on the principles of voluntary co-operation and non-separation of the members from their native localities. When the members of these organizations are in their native towns, they support themselves. Only in case of military necessity are they ordered to remote places, and when this is done, the government must support them. Each member of these groups must have a weapon even if the weapon is only a knife, a pistol, a lance, or a spear.

In all places where the enemy operates, these self-defence units should organize within themselves a small guerrilla group of perhaps from three to ten men armed with pistols or revolvers. This group is not required to leave its native locality.

The organization of these self-defence units is mentioned in this book because such units are useful for the purposes of inculcating

the people with military and political knowledge, keeping order in the rear, and replenishing the ranks of the regulars. These groups should be organized not only in the active war zones but in every province in China. "The people must be inspired to co-operate voluntarily. We must not force them, for if we do, it will be ineffectual." This is extremely important.

In order to control anti-Japanese military organization as a whole, it is necessary to establish a system of military areas and districts along the lines we have indicated.

FROM MARX EQUIPMENT OF GUERRILLAS

In regard to the problem of guerrilla equipment, it must be understood that guerrillas are lightly-armed attack groups, which require simple equipment. The standard of equipment is based upon the nature of duties assigned; the equipment of low-class guerrilla units is not as good as that of higher-class units. For example, those who are assigned the task of destroying rail communications are better equipped than those who do not have that task. The equipment of guerrillas cannot be based on what the guerrillas want, to even what they need, but must be based on what is available for their use. Equipment cannot be furnished immediately but must be acquired gradually. These are points to be kept in mind.

The question of equipment includes the collection, supply, distribution, and replacement of weapons, ammunition, blankets, communication materials, transport, and facilities for propaganda work. The supply of weapons and ammunition is most difficult, particularly at the time the unit is established, but this problem can always be solved eventually. Guerrilla bands that originate in the people are furnished with revolvers, pistols, rifles, spears, big swords, and land mines and mortars of local manufacture. Other elementary weapons are added and as many new-type rifles as are available are distributed. After a period of resistance, it is possible to increase the supply of equipment by capturing it from the enemy. In this respect, the transport companies are the easiest to equip, for in any successful attack, we will capture the enemy's transport.

An armory should be established in each guerrilla district for the manufacture and repair of rifles and for the production of cartridge, hand grenades and bayonets. Guerrillas must not depend to

much on an armory. The enemy is the principal source of their supply.

For destruction of railway tracks, bridges, and stations in enemy-controlled territory, it is necessary to gather together demolition materials. Troops must be trained in the preparation and use of demolitions, and a demolition unit must be organized in each regiment.

As for minimum clothing requirements, these are that each man shall have at least two summer-weight uniforms, one suit of winter clothing, two hats, a pair of wrap puttees, and a blanket. Each man must have a pack or a bag for food. In the north, each man must have an overcoat. In acquiring this clothing, we cannot depend on captures made by the enemy, for it is forbidden for captors to take clothing from their prisoners. In order to maintain high morale in guerrilla forces, all the clothing and equipment mentioned should be furnished by the representatives of the government stationed in each guerrilla district. These men may confiscate clothing from traitors or ask contributions from those best able to afford them. In subordinate groups, uniforms are unnecessary.

Telephone and radio equipment is not necessary in lower groups, but all units from regiment up are equipped with both. This material can be obtained by contributions from the regular forces and by capture from the enemy.

In the guerrilla army in general, and at bases in particular, there must be a high standard of medical equipment. Besides the services of the doctors, medicines must be procured. Although guerrillas can depend on the enemy for some portion of their medical supplies, they must, in general, depend upon contributions. If Western medicines are not available, local medicines must be made to suffice.

The problem of transport is more vital in North China than in the south, for in the south all that are necessary are mules and horses. Small guerrilla units need no animals, but regiments and brigades will find them necessary. Commanders and staffs of units from companies up should be furnished a riding animal each. At times, two officers will have to share a horse. Officers whose duties are of minor nature do not have to be mounted.

Propaganda materials are very important. Every large guerrilla unit should have a printing press and a mimeograph stone. They must also have paper on which to print propaganda leaflets and notices. They must be supplied with chalk and large brushes. In guer-

rilla areas, there should be a printing press or a lead-type press.

For the purpose of printing training instructions, this material is of the greatest importance.

In addition to the equipment listed above, it is necessary to have field-glasses, compasses, and military maps. An accomplished guerrilla group will acquire these things.

Because of the proved importance of guerrilla hostilities in the anti-Japanese war, the headquarters of the Nationalist Government and the commanding officers of the various war zones should do their best to supply the guerrillas with what they actually need and are unable to get for themselves. However, it must be repeated that equipping guerrilla units will in the main depend on the efforts of the guerrillas themselves. If they depend on higher officers too much, the psychological effect will be to weaken the guerrilla spirit of resistance.

ELEMENTS OF THE GUERRILLA ARMY

The term "element" as used in the title to this section refers to the personnel, both officers and men, of the guerrilla army. Since each guerrilla group fights in a protracted war, its officers must be brave and positive men whose entire loyalty is dedicated to the cause of emancipation of the people. An officer should have the following qualities: great powers of endurance so that in spite of any hardship he sets an example to his men and be a model for them; he must be able to mix easily with the people; his spirit and that of the men must be one in strengthening the policy of resistance to the Japanese. If he wishes to gain victories, he must study tactics. A guerrilla group with officers of this calibre would be unbeatable. I do not mean that every guerrilla group can have, at its inception, officers of such qualities. The officers must be men naturally endowed with good qualities which can be developed during the course of campaigning. The most important natural quality is that of complete loyalty to the idea of people's emancipation. If this is present, the others will develop; if it is not present, nothing can be done. When officers are first selected from a group, it is this quality that should receive particular attention. The officers in a group should be inhabitants of the locality in which the group is organized, as this will facilitate relations between them and the local civilians.

In addition, officers so chosen would be familiar with conditions. If in any locality there are not enough men of sufficiently high qualifications to become officers, an effort must be made to train and educate the people so these qualities may be developed and the potential officer material increased. There can be no disagreements between officers native to one place and those from other localities.

A guerrilla group ought to operate on the principle that only volunteers are acceptable for service. It is a mistake to impress people into service. As long as a person is willing to fight, his social condition or position is no consideration, but only men who are courageous and determined can bear the hardships of guerrilla campaigning in a protracted war.

A soldier who habitually breaks regulations must be dismissed from the army. Vagabonds and vicious people must not be accepted for service. The opium habit must be forbidden, and a soldier who cannot break himself of the habit should be dismissed. Victory in guerrilla war is conditioned upon keeping the membership pure and clean.

It is a fact that during the war the enemy may take advantage of certain people who are lacking in conscience and patriotism and induce them to join the guerrillas for the purpose of betraying them. Officers must, therefore, continually educate the soldiers and inculcate patriotism in them. This will prevent the success of traitors. The traitors who are in the ranks must be discovered and expelled, and punishment and expulsion meted out to those who have been influenced by them. In all such cases, the officers should summon the soldiers and relate the facts to them, thus arousing their hatred and detestation for traitors. This procedure will serve also as a warning to the other soldiers. If an officer is discovered to be a traitor, some prudence must be used in the punishment adjudged. However, the work of eliminating traitors in the army begins with their elimination from among the people.

Chinese soldiers who have served under puppet governments and bandits who have been converted should be welcomed as individuals or as groups. They should be well-treated and repatriated. But care should be used during their reorientation to distinguish those whose idea is to fight the Japanese from those who may be present for other reasons.

6. THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

In Chapter 1, I mentioned the fact that guerrilla troops should have a precise conception of the political goal of the struggle and the political organization to be used in attaining that goal. This means that both organization and discipline of guerrilla troops must be at a high level so that they can carry out the political activities that are the life of both the guerilla armies and revolutionary warfare.

First of all, political activities depend upon the indoctrination of both military and political leaders with the idea of anti-Japanism. Through them, the idea is transmitted to the troops. One must not feel that he is anti-Japanese merely because he is a member of a guerrilla unit. The anti-Japanese idea must be an ever-present conviction, and if it is forgotten, we may succumb to the temptations of the enemy or be overcome with discouragement. In a war of long duration, those whose conviction that the people must be emancipated is not deep rooted are likely to become shaken in their faith or actually revolt. Without the general education that enables everyone to understand our goal of driving out Japanese imperialism and establishing a free and happy China, the soldiers fight without conviction and lose their determination.

The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to inhabitants of guerrilla zones and their national consciousness awakened. Hence, a concrete explanation of the political systems used is important not only to guerrilla troops but to all those who are concerned with the realization of our political goal. The Kuomintang has issued a pamphlet entitled *System of National Organization for War*, which should be widely distributed throughout guerrilla zones. If we lack national organization, we will lack the essential unity that should exist between the soldiers and the people.

A study and comprehension of the political objectives of this war and of the anti-Japanese front is particularly important for officers of guerrilla troops. There are some militarists who say: "We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms." It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to iso-

late one from the other.

It is to be hoped that the world is in the last era of strife. The vast majority of human beings have already prepared or are preparing to fight a war that will bring justice to the oppressed peoples of the world. No matter how long this war may last, there is no doubt that it will be followed by an unprecedented epoch of peace. The war that we are fighting today for the freedom of all human beings, and the independent, happy, and liberal China that we are fighting to establish, will be a part of that new world order. A conception like this is difficult for the simple-minded militarist to grasp and it must therefore be carefully explained to him.

There are three additional matters that must be considered under the broad question of political activities. These are political activities, first, as applied to the troops; second, as applied to the people; and, third, as applied to the enemy. The fundamental problems are: first, spiritual unification of officers and men within the army; second, the spiritual unification of the army and the people; and, last, the destruction of the unity of the enemy. The concrete methods for achieving these unities are discussed in detail in pamphlet Number 4 of this series, entitled *Political Activities in Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare*.

A revolutionary army must have discipline that is established on a limited democratic basis. In all armies, obedience of the subordinates to their superiors must be exacted. This is true in the case of guerrilla discipline, but the basis for guerrilla discipline must be the individual conscience. With guerrillas, a discipline of compulsion is ineffective. In any revolutionary army, there is unity of purpose as far as both officers and men are concerned, and, therefore, within such an army, discipline is self-imposed. Although discipline in guerrilla ranks is not as severe as in the ranks of conventional forces, the necessity for discipline exists. This must be self-imposed, because only when it is, is the soldier able to understand completely, why he fights and why he must obey. This type of discipline becomes a tower of strength within the army, and it is the only type that can truly harmonize the relationship that exists between officers and soldiers.

In any system where discipline is externally imposed, the relationship that exists between officer and man is characterized by indifference of the one to the other. The idea that officers can physically beat or severely tongue-lash their men is a feudal one and is

not in accord with the conception of self-imposed discipline. Discipline of the feudal type will destroy internal unity and fighting strength. A discipline self-imposed is the primary characteristic of a democratic system in the army.

A secondary characteristic is found in the degree of liberties accorded officers and soldiers. In a revolutionary army, all individuals enjoy political liberty and the question, for example, of the emancipation of the people must not only be tolerated but discussed, and propaganda must be encouraged. Further, in such an army, the mode of living of the officers and the soldiers must not differ too much, and this is particularly true in the case of guerilla troops. Officers should live under the same conditions as their men, for that is the only way in which they can gain from their men the admiration and confidence so vital in war. It is incorrect to hold to a theory of equality in all things. But there must be equality of existence in accepting the hardships and dangers of war. Thus we may attain to the unification of the officer and soldier groups, a unity both horizontal within the group itself, and vertical, that is, from lower to higher echelons. It is only when such unity is present that units can be said to be powerful combat factors.

There is also a unity of spirit that should exist between troops and local inhabitants. The Eighth Route Army put into practice a code known as "Three Rules and the Eight Remarks", which we list here:

Rules:

- All actions are subject to command.
- Do not steal from the people.
- Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks:

- Replace the door when you leave the house.
- Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
- Be courteous.
- Be honest in your transactions.
- Return what you borrow.
- Replace what you break.
- Do not bathe in the presence of women.
- Do not without authority search those you arrest.

The Red Army adhered to this code for ten years and the Eighth Route Army and other units have since adopted it.

Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals a lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water; the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element, cannot live.

We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops, by treating his captured soldiers with consideration, and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands. If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of our enemy.

7. THE STRATEGY OF GUERRILLA RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN

It has been definitely decided that in the strategy of our war against Japan, guerrilla strategy must be auxiliary to fundamental conventional methods. If this were a small country, guerrilla activities could be carried out close to the scene of operations of the regular army and directly complementary to them. In such a case, there would be no question of guerrilla strategy as such. Nor would the question arise if our country were as strong as Russia, for example, and able speedily to eject an invader. The question exists because China, a weak country of vast size, has today progressed to the point where it has become possible to adopt the policy of a protracted war characterized by guerrilla operations. Although these may at first glance seem to be abnormal or heterodox, such is actually not the case.

Because Japanese military power is inadequate, much of the territory her armies have overrun is without sufficient garrison troops. Under such circumstances, the primary functions of guerrillas are three: first, to conduct a war on exterior lines, that is, in the rear of the enemy; second, to establish bases; and, last, to extend the war areas. Thus, guerrilla participation in the war is not merely a matter of purely local guerrilla tactics but involves strategic considerations.

Such war, with its vast time and space factors, establishes a new military process, the focal point of which is China today. The Japanese are apparently attempting to recall a past that saw the Yuan extinguish the Sung and the Ching conquer the Ming; that witnessed the extension of the British Empire to North America and India; and saw the Latins overrun Central and South America. As far as China today is concerned, such dreams of conquest are fantastic and without reality. Today's China is better equipped than was the China of yesterday, and a new type of guerrilla hostilities is a part of that equipment. If our enemy fails to take these facts into consideration and makes too optimistic an estimate of the situation, he courts disaster.

Though the strategy of guerrillas is inseparable from war strategy as a whole, the actual conduct of these hostilities differs from the conduct of conventional operations. Each type of warfare has methods peculiar to itself, and methods suitable to regular warfare cannot be applied with success to the special situations that confront guerrillas.

Before we treat the practical aspects of guerrilla war, it might be well to recall the fundamental axiom of combat on which all military action is based. This can be stated: "Conservation of one's own strength; destruction of enemy strength." A military policy based on this axiom is consonant with a national policy directed towards the building of a free and prosperous Chinese state and the destruction of Japanese imperialism. It is in furtherance of this policy that government applies its military strength. Is the sacrifice demanded by war in conflict with the idea of self-preservation? Not at all. The sacrifices demanded are necessary both to destroy the enemy and to preserve ourselves; the sacrifice of a part of the people is necessary to preserve the whole. All the considerations of military action are derived from this axiom. Its application is as apparent in all tactical and strategic conceptions as it is in the simple case of the soldier who shoots at his enemy from a covered position.

All guerrilla units start from nothing and grow. What methods should we select to ensure the conservation and development of our own strength and the destruction of that of the enemy? The essential requirements are the six listed below:

- (1) Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned tactical attacks in a war of strategic defence; tactical speed in a

war strategically protracted, tactical operations on exterior lines in a war conducted strategically on interior lines.

(2) Conduct of operations to complement those of the regular army.

(3) The establishment of bases.

(4) A clear understanding of the relationship that exists between the attack and the defence.

(5) The development of mobile operations.

(6) Correct command.

The enemy, though numerically weak, is strong in the quality of his troops and their equipment; we, on the other hand, are strong numerically but weak as to quality. These considerations have been taken into account in the development of the policy of tactical offence, tactical speed, and tactical operations on exterior lines in a war that, strategically speaking, is defensive in character, protracted in nature, and conducted along interior lines. Our strategy is based on these conceptions. They must be kept in mind in the conduct of all operations.

Although the element of surprise is not absent in conventional warfare, there are fewer opportunities to apply it than there are during guerrilla hostilities. In the latter, speed is essential. The movements of guerrilla troops must be secret and of supernatural rapidity; the enemy must be taken unaware, and the action entered speedily. There can be no procrastination in the execution of plans; no assumption of a negative or passive defence; no great dispersion of forces in many local engagements. The basic method is the attack in a violent and deceptive form.

While there may be cases where the attack will extend over a period of several days (if that length of time is necessary to annihilate an enemy group), it is more profitable to launch and push an attack with maximum speed. The tactics of defence have no place in the realm of guerrilla warfare. If a delaying action is necessary, such places as defiles, river crossings, and villages offer the most suitable conditions, for it is in such places that the enemy's arrangements may be disrupted and he may be annihilated.

The enemy is much stronger than we are, and it is true that we can hinder, distract, disperse, and destroy him only if we disperse our own forces. Although guerrilla warfare is the warfare of such dispersed units, it is sometimes desirable to concentrate in order to

destroy an enemy. Thus, the principle of concentration of force against a relatively weaker enemy is applicable to guerrilla warfare.

We can prolong this struggle and make of it a protracted war only by gaining positive and lightning-like tactical decisions; by employing our manpower in proper concentrations and dispersions; and by operation on exterior lines in order to surround and destroy our enemy. If we cannot surround whole armies, we can at least partially destroy them, if we cannot kill the Japanese, we can capture them. The total effect of many local successes will be to change the relative strengths of the opposing forces. The destruction of Japan's military power, combined with the international sympathy for China's cause and the revolutionary tendencies evident in Japan, will be sufficient to destroy Japanese imperialism.

We will next discuss initiative, alertness, and the matter of careful planning. What is meant by initiative in warfare? In all battles and wars, a struggle to gain and retain the initiative goes on between the opposing sides, for it is the side that holds the initiative that has liberty of action. When an army loses the initiative, it loses its liberty; its role becomes passive; it faces the danger of defeat and destruction.

It is more difficult to obtain the initiative when defending on interior lines than it is while attacking on exterior lines. This is what Japan is doing. There are, however, several weak points as far as Japan is concerned. One of these is lack of sufficient manpower for the task; another is her cruelty to the inhabitants of conquered areas; a third is the underestimation of Chinese strength, which has resulted in the differences between military cliques, which, in turn, have been productive of many mistakes in the direction of her military forces. For instance, she has been gradually compelled to increase her manpower in China while, at the same time, the many arguments over plans of operations and disposition of troops have resulted in the loss of good opportunities for improvement of her strategic position. This explains the fact that although the Japanese are frequently able to surround large bodies of Chinese troops, they have never yet been able to capture more than a few. The Japanese military machine is thus being weakened by insufficiency of manpower, inadequacy of resources, the barbarism of her troops, and the general stupidity that has characterized the conduct of operations. Her offensive continues unabated, but because of the weaknesses pointed out, her attack must be limited in extent. She can

never conquer China. The day will come — indeed already has in some areas — when she will be forced into a passive role. When hostilities commenced, China was passive, but as we enter the second phase of the war we find ourselves pursuing a strategy of mobile warfare, with both guerrillas and regulars operating on exterior lines. Thus, with each passing day, we seize some degree of initiative from the Japanese.

The matter of initiative is especially serious for guerrilla forces, who must face critical situations unknown to regular troops. The superiority of the enemy and the lack of unity and experience within our own ranks may be cited. Guerrillas can, however, gain the initiative if they keep in mind the weak points of the enemy. Because of the enemy's insufficient manpower, guerrillas can operate over vast territories, because he is a foreigner and a barbarian, guerrillas can gain the confidence of millions of their countrymen; because of the stupidity of enemy commanders, guerrillas can make full use of their own cleverness. Both guerrillas and regulars must exploit these enemy weaknesses while, at the same time, our own are remedied. Some of our weaknesses are apparent only and are, in actuality, sources of strength. For example, the very fact that most guerrilla groups are small makes it desirable and advantageous for them to appear and disappear in the enemy's rear. With such activities, the enemy is simply unable to cope. A similar liberty of action can rarely be obtained by regular forces.

When the enemy attacks the guerrillas with more than one column, it is difficult for the latter to retain the initiative. Any error, no matter how slight, in the estimation of the situation is likely to result in forcing the guerrillas into a passive role. They will then find themselves unable to beat off the attacks of the enemy.

It is apparent that we can gain and retain the initiative only by a correct estimation of the situation and a proper arrangement of all military and political factors. A too pessimistic estimate will operate to force us into a passive position, with consequent loss of initiative; an overly optimistic estimate, with its rash ordering of factors, will produce the same result.

No military leader is endowed by heaven with an ability to seize the initiative. It is the intelligent leader who does so after a careful study and estimate of the situation and arrangement of the military and political factors involved. When a guerrilla unit, through either a poor estimate on the part of its leader or pressure from the enemy,

is forced into a passive position, its first duty is to extricate itself. No method can be prescribed for this, as the method to be employed will, in every case, depend on the situation. One can, if necessary, run away. But there are times when the situation seems hopeless and, in reality, is not so at all. It is at such times that the good leader recognizes and seizes the moment when he can regain the lost initiative.

Let us revert to alertness. To conduct one's troops with alertness is an essential of guerrilla command. Leaders must realize that to operate alertly is the most important factor in gaining the initiative and vital in its effect of the relative situation that exists between our forces and those of the enemy. Guerrilla commanders adjust their operations to the enemy situation, to the terrain, and to prevailing local conditions. Leaders must be alert to sense changes in these factors and make necessary modifications in troop dispositions to accord with them. The leader must be like a fisherman, who, with his nets, is able both to cast them and to pull them out in awareness of the depth of the water, the strength of the current or the presence of any obstructions that may foul them. As the fisherman controls his nets through the lead ropes, so the guerrilla leader maintains contact with control over his units. As the fisherman must change his position, so must the guerrilla commander. Dispersion, concentration, constant change of position — it is in these ways that guerrillas employ, their strength.

In general, guerrilla units disperse to operate:

- (1) When the enemy is in over-extended defence, and sufficient force cannot be concentrated against him, guerrillas must disperse, harass him, and demoralize him.
- (2) When encircled by the enemy, guerrillas disperse to withdraw.
- (3) When the nature of the ground limits action, guerrillas disperse.
- (4) When the availability of supplies limits action, they disperse.
- (5) Guerrillas disperse in order to promote mass movements over a wide area.

Regardless of the circumstances that prevail at the time of dispersal, caution must be exercised in certain matters:

(1) A relatively large group should be retained as a central force. The remainder of the troops should not be divided into groups of absolutely equal size. In this way, the leader is in a position to deal with any circumstances that may arise.

(2) Each dispersed unit should have clear and definite responsibilities. Orders should specify a place to which to proceed, the time of proceeding, and the place, time, and method of assembly.

Guerrillas concentrate when the enemy is advancing upon them, and there is opportunity to fall upon him and destroy him. Concentration may be desirable when the enemy is on the defensive and guerrillas wish to destroy isolated detachments in particular localities. By the term "concentrate", we do not mean the assembly of all manpower but rather of only that necessary for the task. The remaining guerrillas are assigned missions of hindering and delaying the enemy, of destroying isolated groups, or of conducting mass propaganda.

In addition to the dispersion and concentration of forces, the leader must understand what is termed "alert shifting". When the enemy feels the danger of guerrillas, he will generally send troops out to attack them. The guerrillas must consider the situation and decide at what time and at what place they wish to fight. If they find that they cannot fight, they must immediately shift. Then the enemy may be destroyed piecemeal. For example, after a guerrilla group has destroyed an enemy detachment at one place, it may be shifted to another area to attack and destroy a second detachment. Sometimes it will not be profitable for a unit to become engaged in a certain area, and in that case, it must move immediately.

When the situation is serious, the guerrilla must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind. Their tactics must deceive, tempt, and confuse the enemy. They must lead the enemy to believe that they will attack him from the east and north, and they must then strike him from the west and the south. They must strike, then rapidly disperse. They must move at night.

Guerrilla initiative is expressed in dispersion, concentration, and the alert shifting of forces. If guerrillas are stupid and obstinate, they will be led to passive positions and severely damaged. Skill in conducting guerrilla operations, however, lies not in merely understanding the things we have discussed but rather in their actual ap-

plication on the field of battle. The quick intelligence that constantly watches the ever-changing situation and is able to seize on the right moment for decisive action is found only in keen and thoughtful observers.

Careful planning is necessary if victory is to be won in guerrilla war, and those who fight without method do not understand the nature of guerrilla action. A plan is necessary regardless of the size of the unit involved; a prudent plan is as necessary in the case of the squad as in the case of the regiment. The situation must be carefully studied, then an assignment of duties made. Plans must include both political and military instruction, the matter of supply and equipment, and the matter of co-operation with local civilians. Without study of these factors, it is impossible either to seize the initiative or to operate alertly. It is true that guerrillas can make only limited plans, but even so, the factors we have mentioned must be considered.

The initiative can be secured and retained only following a positive victory that results from attack. The attack must be made on guerrilla initiative; that is, guerrillas must not permit themselves to be maneuvered into a position where they are robbed of initiative and where the decision to attack is forced upon them. Any victory will result from careful planning and alert control. Even in defence, all our efforts must be directed toward a resumption of the attack, for it is only by attack that we can extinguish our enemies and preserve ourselves. A defence or a withdrawal is entirely useless as far as extinguishing our enemies is concerned and of only temporary value as far as the conservation of our forces is concerned. This principle is valid both for guerrillas and regular troops. The differences are of degree only; that is to say, in the manner of execution.

The relationship that exists between guerrilla and the regular forces is important and must be appreciated. Generally speaking, there are three types of co-operation between guerrillas and regular groups. These are:

1. Strategic co-operation.
2. Tactical co-operation.
3. Battle co-operation.

Guerrillas who harass the enemy's rear installations and hinder his transport are weakening him and encouraging the national spirit

of resistance. They are co-operating strategically. For example, the guerrillas in Manchuria had no functions of strategic co-operation with regular forces until the war in China started. Since that time, their function of strategic co-operation is evident, for if they can kill one enemy, make the enemy expend one round of ammunition, or hinder one enemy group in its advance southward, our powers of resistance here are proportionately increased. Such guerrilla action has a positive action on the enemy nation and on its troops, while, at the same time, it encourages our own countrymen. Another example of strategic co-operation is furnished by the guerrillas who operate along the Ping-Sui, Ping-Han, Chin-Pu, Tung-Pu, and Cheng-Tai railways. This co-operation began when the invader attacked, continued during the period when he held garrisoned cities in the areas, and was intensified when our regular forces counter-attacked, in an effort to restore the lost territories.

As an example of tactical co-operation, we may cite the operations at Hsing-Kou, when guerrillas both north and south of Yeh Men destroyed the Tung-Pu railway and the motor roads near Ping Hosing Pass and Yang Fang Kou. A number of small operating bases were established, and organized guerrilla action in Shansi complemented the activities of the regular forces both there and in the defence of Honan. Similarly, during the south Shantung campaign, guerrillas in the five northern provinces co-operated with the army's operation on the Hsuechow front.

Guerrilla commanders in rear areas and those in command of regiments assigned to operate with regular units must co-operate in accordance with the situation. It is their function to determine weak points in the enemy dispositions, harass them, to disrupt their transport, and to undermine their morale. If guerrilla actions were independent, the results to be obtained from tactical co-operation would be lost and those that result from strategic co-operation greatly diminished. In order to accomplish their mission and improve the degree of co-operation, guerrilla units must be equipped with some means of rapid communication. For this purpose, two way radio sets are recommended.

Guerrilla forces in the immediate battle area are responsible for close co-operation with regular forces. Their principal functions are to hinder enemy transport to gather information, and to act as outposts and sentinels. Even without precise instructions from the commander of the regular forces, these missions, as well as any oth-

ers that contribute to the general success, should be assumed.

The problem of establishment of bases is of particular importance. This is so because this war is a cruel and protracted struggle. The lost territories can be restored only by a strategic counter-attack and this we cannot carry out until the enemy is well into China. Consequently, some part of our country — or, indeed, most of it — may be captured by the enemy and become his rear area. It is our task to develop intensive guerrilla warfare over this vast area and convert the enemy's rear into an additional front. Thus the enemy will never be able to stop fighting. In order to subdue the occupied territory, the enemy will have to become increasingly severe and oppressive.

A guerrilla base may be defined as an area, strategically located, in which the guerrillas can carry out their duties of training, self-preservation and development. Ability to fight a war without a rear area is a fundamental characteristic of guerrilla action, but this does not mean that guerrillas can exist and function over a long period of time without the development of base areas. History shows us many examples of peasant revolts that were unsuccessful, and it is fanciful to believe that such movements, characterized by banditry and brigandage, could succeed in this era of improved communications and military equipment. Some guerrilla leaders seem to think that those qualities are present in today's movement, and before such leaders can comprehend the importance of base areas in the long-term war, their mind must be disabused of this idea.

The subject of bases may be better understood if we consider:

1. The various categories of bases.
2. Guerrilla areas and base areas.
3. The establishment of bases.
4. The development of bases.

Guerrilla bases may be classified according to their location as: first, mountain bases; second, plains bases; and last, river, lake, and bay bases. The advantages of bases in mountainous areas are evident. Those which are now established are at Chang Po Chan, Wu Tai Shan, Taiheng Shan, Tai Shan, Yen Shan, and Mao Shan. These bases are strongly protected. Similar bases should be established in all enemy rear areas.

Plains country is generally not satisfactory for guerrilla operating bases, but this does not mean that guerrilla warfare cannot flourish in such country or that bases cannot be established there. The extent of guerrilla development in Hopeh and west Shantung proves the opposite to be the case. Whether we can count on the use of these bases over long periods of time is questionable. We can, however, establish small bases of a seasonal or temporary nature. This we can do because our barbaric enemy simply does not have the manpower to occupy all the areas he has overrun and because the population of China is so numerous that a base can be established anywhere. Seasonal bases in plains country may be established in the winter when the rivers are frozen over, and in the summer when the crops are growing. Temporary bases may be established when the enemy is otherwise occupied. When the enemy advances, the guerrillas who have established bases in the plains area are the first to engage him. Upon their withdrawal into mountainous country, they should leave behind them guerrilla groups dispersed over the entire area. Guerrillas shift from base to base on the theory that they must be in one place one day and another place the next.

There are many historical examples of the establishment of bases in river, bay, and lake country, and this is one aspect of our activity that has so far received little attention. Red guerrillas held out for many years in the Hungtze Lake region. We should establish bases in the Hungtze and Tai areas and along rivers and watercourses in territory controlled by the enemy so as to deny him access to, and free use of, the water routes.

There is a difference between the terms base area and guerrilla area. An area completely surrounded by territory occupied by the enemy is a "base area". Wu Tai Shan, and Taiheng Shan are examples of base areas. On the other hand, the area east and north of Wu Tai Shan (the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar border zone) is a guerrilla area. Such areas can be controlled by guerrillas only while they actually physically occupy them. Upon their departure, control reverts to a puppet pro-Japanese government. East Hopeh, for example, was at first a guerrilla area rather than a base area. A puppet government functioned there. Eventually, the people, organized and inspired by guerrillas from the Wu Tai mountains, assisted in the transformation of this guerrilla area into a real base area. Such a task is extremely difficult, for it is largely dependent upon the degree to which the people can be inspired. In certain garrisoned ar-

areas, such as the cities and zones contiguous to the railways, the guerrillas see unable to drive the Japanese and puppets out. These areas remain guerrilla areas. At other times, base areas might become guerrilla areas due either to our own mistakes or to the activities of the enemy.

Obviously, in any given area in the war zone, any one or three situations may develop: the area may remain in Chinese hands; it may be lost to the Japanese and puppets; or it may be divided between the combatants. Guerrilla leaders should endeavour to see that either the first or the last of these situations is assured.

Another essential point in the establishment of bases is the cooperation that must exist between the armed guerrilla bands and the people. All our strength must be used to spread the doctrine of armed resistance to Japan, to arm the people, to organize self-defence units, and to train guerrilla bands. This doctrine must be spread among the people, who must be organized into anti-Japanese groups. Their political instincts must be sharpened and their martial ardour increased. If the workers, the farmers, the lovers of liberty, the young men, the women, and the children are not organized, they will never realize their own anti-Japanese power. Only the united strength of the people can eliminate traitors, recover the measure of political power that has been lost, and conserve and improve what we still retain.

We have already touched on geographic factors in our discussion of bases, and we must also mention the economic aspects of the problem. What economic policy should be adopted? Any such policy must offer reasonable protection to commerce and business. We interpret "reasonable protection" to mean the people must contribute money in proportion to the money they have. Farmers will be required to furnish a certain share of their crops to guerrilla troops. Confiscation, except in the case of business run by traitors, is prohibited.

Our activities must be extended over the entire periphery of the base area if we wish to attack the enemy's bases and thus strengthen and develop our own. This will afford us opportunity to organize, equip, and train the people, thus furthering guerrilla policy as well as the national policy of protected war. At times, we must emphasize the development and extension of base areas; at other times, the organization, training, or equipment of the people.

Each guerrilla base will have its own peculiar problems of at-

tack and defence. In general, the enemy, in an endeavour to consolidate his gains, will attempt to extinguish guerrilla bases by dispatching numerous bodies of troops over a number of different routes. This must be anticipated and the encirclement broken by counter-attacks. As such, enemy columns are without reserves, we should plan on using our main forces to attack one of them by surprise and devote our secondary effort to continual hindrance and harassment. At the same time, other forces should isolate enemy garrison troops and operate on their lines of supply and communication. When one column has been disposed of, we may turn our attention to one of the others. In a base area as large as Wu Tat Shan, for example, there are four or five military sub-divisions. Guerrillas in these sub-divisions must co-operate to form a primary force to counter-attack the enemy, or the area from which he came, while a secondary force harasses and hinders him.

After defeating the enemy in any area, we must take advantage of the period he requires for reorganization to press home our attacks. We must not attack an objective we are not certain of winning. We must confine our operations to relatively small areas and destroy the enemy and traitors in those places.

When the inhabitants have been inspired, new volunteers accepted, trained, equipped, and organized, our operations may be extended to include cities and lines of communication not strongly held. We may hold these at least for temporary (if not for permanent) periods. All these are our duties in offensive strategy. Their object is to lengthen the period that the enemy must remain on the defensive. Then our military activities and our organization work among the masses of the people must be zealously expanded; and with equal zeal, the strength of the enemy attacked and diminished. It is of great importance that guerrilla units be rested and instructed. During such times when the enemy is on the defensive, the troops may get some rest and instruction may be carried out.

The development of mobile warfare is not only possible but essential. This is the case because our current war is a desperate and protracted struggle. If China were able to conquer the Japanese bandits speedily and to recover her lost territories, there would be no question of long-term war on a national scale. Hence, there would no question of the relation of guerrilla warfare and the war of movement. Exactly the opposite is actually the case. In order to ensure the development of guerrilla hostilities into mobile warfare of a con-

ventional nature, both the quantity and quality of guerrilla must be improved. Primarily, more men must join the armies; then the quality of equipment and standards of training must be improved. Political training must be emphasized and our organization, the technique of handling our weapons, our tactics — all must be improved. Our internal discipline must be strengthened. The soldiers must be educated politically. There must be a gradual change from guerrilla formations to regular regimental organization. The necessary bureaus and staffs, both political and military, must be provided. At the same time, attention must be paid to the creation of suitable supply, medical, and hygiene units. The standards of equipment must be raised and types of weapons increased. Communication equipment must not be forgotten. Conventional standards of discipline must be established.

Because guerrilla formations act independently and because they are the most elementary of armed formations, command cannot be too highly centralized. If it were, guerilla action would be too limited in scope. At the same time, guerrilla activities, to be most effective, must be co-ordinated, not only in so far as they themselves are concerned, but additionally with regular troops operating in the same areas. This co-ordination is a function of the war zone commander and his staff.

In guerrilla base areas, the command must be centralized for strategic purposes and decentralized for tactical purposes. Centralized strategic command takes care of the general management of all guerrilla units, their co-ordination within war zones, and the general policy regarding guerrilla base areas. Beyond this, centralization of command will result in interference with subordinate units, as, naturally, the tactics to apply to concrete situations can be determined only as these various situations arise. This is true in conventional warfare when communications between lower and higher echelons break down. In a word, proper guerrilla policy will provide for unified strategy and independent activity.

Each guerrilla area is divided into districts and these in turn are divided into sub-districts. Each sub-division has its appointed commander, and while general plans are made by higher commanders, the nature of actions is determined by inferior commanders. The former may suggest the nature of the action to be taken but cannot define it. Thus inferior groups have more or less complete local control.

NOTES

¹ The *Great Learning*, one of the four Confucian classics.

² *Nineteen Old Poems*, a famous collection of poems of the Han Dynasty.

³ *The Doctrine of the Mean*, one of the Confucian classics.

⁴ The Confucian *Analects*.

⁵ From a poem attributed to Hsiang Yu.

⁶ This is a reference to Mencius.

⁷ The mode of dress of the swordsmen of King Wen of Chao, according to a chapter of the Taoist classic *Chuang Tzu*.

⁸ The Confucian *Analects*.

⁹ From *Chuang Tzu*.

¹⁰ From Hsun Tzu, a Confucian “realist”.



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APPENDICIES

Diagram 1: Organization of an Independent Guerrilla Company

Table 1: Allocation of Personnel and Arms, Independent Guerrilla Company

Diagram 2: Organization of an Independent Guerrilla Battalion

Table 2: Allocation of Personnel and Arms, Independent Guerrilla Battalion

Diagram 3: Organization of an Independent Guerrilla Regiment

Table 3: Allocation of Personnel and Arms, Independent Guerrilla Regiment

Diagram 4: Organization of an Independent Guerrilla Brigade (or Division)


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Diagram 1

ORGANIZATION OF AN INDEPENDENT GUERRILLA COMPANY



NOTES

1. Each squad consists of from 9 to 11 men. In case men or arms are not sufficient, the third platoon may be dispensed with, or one squad organized as company headquarters.
2. The mobile propaganda unit consists of members of the company who are not relieved of primary duties except to carry out propaganda when they are not fighting.
3. If there is insufficient personnel, the medical section is not separately organized. If there are only two or three medical personnel, they may be attached to the administrative section.
4. If there is no barber, it is unimportant. If there is an insufficient number of cooks, any member of the company may be designated to prepare food.
5. Each combat soldier should be armed with a rifle. If there are not enough rifles, each squad should have two or three. Shotguns, lances, and big swords can be furnished. The distribution of rifles does not have to be equalized in platoons. As different missions are assigned to platoons, it may be necessary to give one platoon more rifles than the others.
6. The strength of a company should at the most be 180, divided into 12 squads of 11 men each. The minimum strength of a company should be 82 men, divided into 6 squads of 9 men each.


Table 1

ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL AND ARMS,
GUERRILLA COMPANY

RANK	PERSONNEL	ARM
Company Commander	1	Pistol
Political Officer	1	Pistol
Executive Officer	1	Pistol
Company Headquarters		
Message Section Chief	1	
Administrative Section Chief	1	Rifle
Public Relations	3	Rifle
Duty Personnel	2	
Barber	1	
Cooks	10	
Medical Section Chief	1	
Assistant	1	
First Aid and Nursing	4	
Intelligence Section Chief	1	Rifle
Intelligence	9	Rifle
Platoon Leaders	3	Rifle
Squad Leaders	9	Rifle
Nine Squad (8 each)	72	Rifle
TOTAL	122	3 Pistols 98 Rifles

Diagram 2

ORGANIZATION OF AN INDEPENDENT GUERRILLA BATTALION



NOTES

1. Total headquarters of an independent guerrilla battalion may vary from a minimum of 46 to a maximum of 110.
2. When there are 4 companies to a battalion, regimental organization used be used.
3. Machine-gun squads may be heavy or light. A light machine-gun squad has from 5 to 7 men. A heavy machine-gun squad has from 7 to 9 men.
4. The intelligence section is organized in from 2 to 4 squads, at least one of which is made up of plain-clothes men. If horses are available, one squad should be mounted.
5. If no men are available for stretcher-bearers, omit them and use the cooks or ask for aid from the people.
6. Each company must have at least 25 rifles. The remaining weapons may be fowling-pieces, etc., big swords, or locally made shot-guns.


Table 2

ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL AND ARMS,
INDEPENDENT GUERRILLA BATTALION

RANK	PERSONNEL	ARM
Battalion Commander	I	Pistol
Political Officer	I	Pistol
Executive Officer	I	Pistol
Battalion Headquarters		
Signal Section	2	
Administrative Section		
Section Chief	I	Rifle
Runner	I	Rifle
Public Relations	IO	Rifle
Duty Personnel	2	
Barbers	3	
Supply	I	
Cooks	IO	
Medical Section		
Medical Officer	I	
Stretcher-Bearers	6	
Nursing	4	
Intelligence Section		
Section Chief	I	Pistol
Intelligence	30	Pistol
Machine-Gun Section	As Available	As Available
Total, Headquarters	75	34 Pistols 12 Rifles
Three Companies (122 each)	366	9 Pistols 294 Rifles
TOTAL	441	43 Pistols 306 Rifles

Diagram 3

ORGANIZATION OF INDEPENDENT GUERRILLA REGIMENT



NOTES


1. See Diagrams 1 and 2 for company and battalion organization.
2. Battalions and companies have no transport section.
3. The hand weapon should be either revolver or pistol. Of these, each regiment should have more than 100.

Table 3

ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL AND ARMS,
GUERRILLA REGIMENT

RANK	PERSONNEL	ARM
Regimental Commander	1	Pistol
Political Officer	1	Pistol
Chief of Staff	1	Pistol
Operations Section		
Operations Officer	1	Pistol
Clerks	15	
Intelligence Section		
Intelligence Officer	1	Pistol
Personnel	36	Pistol
Public Relations Section		
Public Relations Officer	1	Pistol
Personnel	36	Rifles
Administrative Section		
Administrative Officer	1	Pistol
Clerks	15	Pistol
Runner	1	
Transport Section		
Chief of Section	1	Pistol
Finance	1	
Traffic Manager	1	Pistol
Supply	1	
Drivers	5	
Medical Section		
Chief of Section	1	
Doctors	2	
Nurses	15	
Total, Regimental Headquarters	137	60 Pistols 36 Rifles
Three Battalions (441 each)	1323	129 Pistols 918 Rifles
TOTAL	1460	189 Pistols 954 Rifles

Diagram 4
ORGANIZATION OF INDEPENDENT GUERRILLA BRIGADE
(OR DIVISION)



DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM*

April — June, 1938

FROM MARX

CHAPTER I

TO MAO IDEALISM AND MATERIALISM

I. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN TWO ARMIES IN PHILOSOPHY

The whole history of philosophy is the history of the struggle and the development of two mutually opposed schools of philosophy — idealism and materialism. All philosophical currents and schools are manifestations of these two fundamental schools.

All philosophical theories have been created by men belonging to a definite social class. The ideas of these men have moreover been historically determined by a definite social existence. All philosophical doctrines express the needs of a definite social class and reflect the level of development of the productive forces of society and the historical stage in men's comprehension of nature. . . .

The social origins of idealism and materialism lie in a social structure marked by class contradictions. The earliest appearance of idealism was the product of the ignorance and superstition of savage and primitive man. Then, with the development of the productive forces, and the ensuing development of scientific knowledge, it stands to reason that idealism should decline and be replaced by materialism. And yet, from ancient times to the present, idealism

* This text includes about two thirds of the first chapter, and about one fifth of the first six sections of the second chapter of Mao's "Pien-Cheng-fa wei-wu-lun (chiang-shou ti-kang)" ("Dialectical Materialism — Notes for Lectures"), as published in *Kang-chan ta-hsueh*, Nos. 6, 7 and 8, April — June, 1938.

not only has not declined, but, on the contrary has developed and carried on a struggle for supremacy with materialism from which neither has emerged the victor. The reason lies in the division of society into classes. On the one hand, in its own interest, the oppressing class must develop and reinforce its idealist doctrines. On the other hand, the oppressed classes, likewise in their own interest, must develop and reinforce their materialist doctrines. Both idealism and materialism are weapons in the class struggle, and the struggle between idealism and materialism cannot disappear so long as classes continue to exist. Idealism, in the process of its historical development, represents the ideology of the exploiting classes and serves reactionary purposes. Materialism, on the other hand, is the world view of the revolutionary class; in a class society, it grows and develops in the midst of an incessant struggle against the reactionary philosophy of idealism. Consequently, the history of the struggle between idealism and materialism in philosophy reflects the struggle of interests between the reactionary class and the revolutionary class. . . . A given philosophical tendency is in the last analysis a manifestation in a particular guise of the policy of the social class to which the philosophers belong.

The distinguishing characteristic of Marxist philosophy — *i.e.*, dialectical materialism — is its effort to explain clearly the class nature of all social consciousness (including philosophy). It publicly declares a resolute struggle between its own proletarian nature and the idealist philosophy of the propertied class. Moreover, it subordinates its own special and independent tasks to such general tasks as overthrowing capitalism, organizing and building a proletarian dictatorship, and edifying a socialist society.

2. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IDEALISM AND MATERIALISM

Wherein lies the basic difference between idealism and materialism? It lies in the opposite answers given by the two to the fundamental question in philosophy, that of the relationship between spirit and matter (that of the relationship between consciousness and existence). Idealism considers spirit (consciousness, concepts, the subject) as the source of all that exists on earth, and matter (nature and society, the object) as secondary and subordinate. Materialism

recognizes the independent existence of matter as detached from spirit and considers spirit as secondary and subordinate. . . .

3. THE SOURCE OF THE GROWTH AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEALISM

Idealism sees matter as the product of the spirit. This is turning the real world upside down. Where is the source of the growth and the development of such a philosophy?

As mentioned above, the earliest manifestation of idealism was brought about by the superstition and ignorance of primitive, savage man. But with the development of production, the separation between manual labour and intellectual labour was responsible for ranking idealism first among currents of philosophical thought. With the development of the productive forces of society, the division of labour made its appearance; the further development of the division of labour saw the emergence of persons devoting themselves entirely and exclusively to intellectual labour. But when the productive forces are still weak, the division between the two does not reach the stage of complete separation. Only after classes and private property appear and exploitation becomes the foundation of the existence of the ruling class do great changes occur. Intellectual labour then becomes the exclusive privilege of the ruling class, while manual labour becomes the fate of the oppressed classes. The ruling class begins to examine the relationship between themselves and the oppressed classes in an upside-down fashion: it is not the labourers who furnish them with means for existence, but rather they who supply the labourers with these means. Hence, they despise manual labour and develop idealist conceptions. To eliminate the distinction between manual labour and intellectual labour is one of the preconditions for eliminating idealist philosophy.

The social root that makes possible the development of idealist philosophy lies principally in the fact that this kind of philosophical consciousness is the manifestation of the interests of the exploiting class. . . . The final decline of idealism will come with the elimination of classes, after the establishment of a communist society.

The source that enables idealism to develop and deepen and gives it the strength to struggle with materialism must be sought in the process of human knowing. When men think, they must use con-

cepts. This can easily cause our knowledge to be split into two aspects: reality, which is of an individual and particular character; and concepts, which are of a general character. . . . In the nature of things, the particular and the general are inseparably linked; once separated, they depart from objective truth. . . . To separate the general from the particular, and to view the general as objective reality and the particular merely as the form in which the general exists — this is the method adopted by all idealists. All idealists put consciousness, spirit, or concepts in place of objective reality existing independently from human consciousness. . . . They cannot point out the materialist truth according to which consciousness is limited by matter, but believe that only consciousness is active, whereas matter is only an inert composite entity. Urged on moreover by their own class nature, the idealists then use every method to exaggerate the activity of consciousness, developing this aspect unilaterally. . . . Idealism in economics exaggerates beyond measure a nonessential aspect of exchange, raising the law of supply and demand to the status of the fundamental law of capitalism. . . . Idealist historians regard heroes as the makers of history. Idealist politicians regard politics as omnipotent. Idealist military leaders practice the methods of desperate combat [*ping-ming-chu-i-ti tso-chan*]. Idealist revolutionaries advocate Blanquism. The diehards say that the only way to revive our nation is to restore the old morality. All this results from exaggerating subjective factors beyond measure. . . .

Pre-Marxist materialism (mechanistic materialism) did not stress the thought process in the development of knowledge, but regarded thought merely as the object of action, as the mirror that reflects nature. . . . Only dialectical materialism correctly shows the active role of thought, and at the same time points out the limitation imposed upon thought by matter. It points out that thought arises from social practice and at the same time actively shapes practice. Only this kind of dialectical theory of the unity of knowledge and action can thoroughly vanquish idealism.

4. THE ORIGIN OF THE INCEPTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MATERIALISM

The recognition that matter exists independently and apart from consciousness in the external world is the foundation of material-

ism. Man created this foundation through practice. . . .

Obliged to submit to natural forces, and capable of using only simple tools, primitive man could not explain the surrounding phenomena and hence sought help from spirits. This is the origin of religion and idealism.

But in the long-range process of production, man came into contact with surrounding nature, acted upon nature, changed nature, and created things to eat, to live in, and to use, and adapted nature to the interests of man and caused man to believe that matter has an objective existence.

In the social existence of humanity, reciprocal relationships and influences arise between individuals. In a class society there is moreover a class struggle. The oppressed class considers the circumstances and estimates its strength, and then makes its plans. When they succeed in the struggle, the members of this class are convinced that their views are not the product of fantasy, but the reflection of the objectively existing material world. Because the oppressed class fails when it adopts the wrong plans and succeeds by correcting its plans it learns to understand that it can achieve its purpose only when its subjective plans rest upon the accurate understanding of the material nature of the objective world and the fact that the objective world is governed by laws.

The history of science furnishes man with proof of the material nature of the world and of the fact that it is governed by laws and helps man to see the futility of the illusions of religion and idealism and to arrive at materialist conclusions.

In sum, the history of man's practice comprises the history of his struggle with nature, the history of the class struggle, the history of science. Owing to the necessity to live and struggle, men have thought about the reality of matter and its laws, have proved the correctness of materialism, and have found the necessary intellectual tool for their struggle — materialist philosophy. The higher the level to which social production develops, the greater the development of the class struggle, and the more scientific knowledge reveals the "secrets" of nature, the greater the development and consolidation of materialist philosophy. Thus man can be delivered gradually from the dual and crushing oppression of nature and society. . . .

CHAPTER II

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

I. DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM IS THE
REVOLUTIONARY ARM OF THE PROLETARIAT

The Chinese proletariat, having assumed at the present time the historical task of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, must make use of dialectical materialism as its mental-arm. . . . The study of dialectical materialism is even more indispensable for the cadres who lead the revolutionary movement, because the two erroneous theories and methods of work of subjectivism and mechanism frequently subsist among the cadres, and as a result frequently cause the cadres to go against Marxism, and lead the revolutionary movement on to the wrong path. If we wish to avoid or correct such deficiencies, the only solution lies in conscious study and understanding of dialectical materialism, in order to arm one's brain anew.

2. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE OLD PHILOSOPHICAL
HERITAGE AND DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

After the May 4th Movement of 1919, as a consequence of the conscious appearance of the Chinese proletariat on the political stage, and the rise in the scientific level of the country, a Marxist philosophical movement arose and developed in China. In its first period, however, the level of understanding of materialist dialectics within the materialist current of thought was rather weak, and mechanistic materialism influenced by the bourgeoisie, as well as the subjectivism of Deborin, were its principal components. Following the defeat of the revolution in 1927, the level of understanding of Marxism and Leninism progressed, and the thinking of materialist dialectics gradually developed. Just recently, because of the severity of the national and social crisis, and also because of the influence of the movement for liquidating deviations in Soviet philosophy, a broad movement of materialist dialectics has developed in China's intellectual circles.

Because of the backwardness of China's social development, the

dialectical materialist philosophical currents developing in China today do not result from taking over and reforming our own philosophical heritage, but from the study of Marxism-Leninism. However, if we wish to ensure that dialectical materialist thought shall penetrate profoundly in China, and continue to develop, and shall moreover give firm direction to the Chinese revolution and lead it to final victory in the future, then we must struggle with all the old and rotten philosophical theories existing in China on the ideological front throughout the whole country, raise the flag of criticism and in this way liquidate the philosophical heritage of ancient China. Only thus we can attain our goal.

3. THE UNITY OF WORLD VIEW AND METHODOLOGY IN DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Dialectical materialism is the world view of the proletariat. At the same time it is the method of the proletariat for taking cognizance of the surrounding world, and the method of revolutionary action of the proletariat. It is the unity of world view and methodology. . . .

4. THE QUESTION OF THE OBJECT OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS—WHAT DO MATERIALIST DIALECTICS SERVE TO STUDY?

Marx, Engels and Lenin all explained materialist dialectics as the theory of development. . . .

Under the heading of the object of philosophy, we must still solve another problem, namely the problem of the unity of dialectics, logic and epistemology. . . .

Materialist dialectics is the only scientific epistemology, and it is also the only scientific logic. Materialist dialectics studies the origin and development of our knowledge of the outside world. It studies the transition from not knowing to knowing and from incomplete knowledge to more complete knowledge; it studies how the laws of the development of nature and society are daily reflected more profoundly and more extensively in the mind of humanity. This is precisely the unity of materialist dialectics with epistemology. . . .

The essence of the concept of development consists in regarding laws as the reflection in and transplanting to our minds (moreover further elaborated in our minds) of the manifestations of the movement of matter. . . .

Only by using materialism to arrive at a solution of the problem of the relations between existence and thought, only by taking one's stand on the theory of the reflection, can one arrive at a thorough solution to the problems of dialectics, logic and epistemology. . . .

FROM MARX 5. ON MATTER

The very first condition for belonging to the materialist camp consists in recognizing the independent existence of the material world, separate from human consciousness — the fact that it existed before the appearance of humanity, and continues to exist since the appearance of humanity, independently and outside of human consciousness. To recognize this point is a fundamental premise of all scientific research.

How shall we demonstrate this? The proofs are extremely numerous. Humanity is constantly in contact with the external world and must, moreover, struggle fiercely against the pressure and resistance of the outside world (nature and society). Moreover, we not only must, but can overcome this pressure and resistance. All of these real circumstances of the social practice of humanity, as manifested in the historical development of human society, are the best proof [of the existence of the material world]. China does not doubt the objective existence of Japanese imperialism which has invaded our country, nor of the Chinese people themselves. The students of the Anti-Japanese Military-Political University also do not doubt the objective existence of this university and of the students themselves. . . .

If we consider this thing known as consciousness in the light of thoroughgoing materialism (that is to say, in the light of materialist-dialectics), then what we call consciousness is nothing else but a form of the movement of matter, a particular characteristic of the material brain of humanity; it is that particular characteristic of the material brain which causes the material processes outside consciousness to be reflected in consciousness. From this we see that when we distinguish matter from consciousness and when, moreover,

we oppose them one to another, this is only conditional; that is to say, it has meaning only from the standpoint of epistemology. . . .

In a word, matter is everything in the universe. "All power belongs to Ssu-Ma I." We say, "All power belongs to matter." This is the source of the unity of the world. . . .

6. ON MOVEMENT (ON DEVELOPMENT)

The first fundamental principle of dialectical materialism lies in its view of matter. . . . This principle of the unity of the world has already been explained above in discussing matter.

The second fundamental principle of dialectical materialism lies in its theory of movement (or theory of development). This means the recognition that movement is the form of the existence of matter, an inherent attribute of matter, a manifestation of the multiplicity of matter. This is the principle of the development of the world. The combination of the principle of the development of the world with the principle of the unity of the world, set forth above, constitutes the whole of the world view of dialectical materialism. The world is nothing else but the material world in a process of unlimited development. . . .

Dialectical materialism's theory of movement is in opposition first of all with philosophical idealism and with the theological concepts of religion. The fundamental nature of all philosophical idealism and religious theology derives from their denial of the unity and material nature of the world, and in imagining that the movement and development of the world takes place apart from matter, or took place at least in the beginning apart from matter, and is the result of the action of spirit, God, or divine forces. The German idealist philosopher, Hegel, held that the present world results from the development of the so-called "world Spirit". In China the philosophy of the *Book of Changes*, and the metaphysics of the Sung and Ming, all put forward idealist views of the development of the universe. Christianity says that God created the world, Buddhism and all of China's various fetishist religions attribute the movement and development of all the myriad phenomena (*Wan Wu*) of the universe to spiritual forces. All of these doctrines which think about movement apart from matter are fundamentally incompatible with dialectical materialism. . . .

Dialectical materialism . . . considers that rest or equilibrium are merely one element of movement, that they are merely one particular circumstance of movement. . . . A sentence popular with the metaphysical thinkers of ancient China, "Heaven does not change and the Way also does not change," corresponds to . . . a theory of the immobility of the universe. . . . In their view, the basic nature of the universe and of society was eternally unchanging. The reason why they adopted this attitude is to be found primarily in their class limitations. If the feudal landlord class had recognized that the basic nature of the universe and of society is subject to movement and development, then most certainly they would have been pronouncing in theory a death sentence on their own class. The philosophies of all reactionary forces are theories of immobilism. Revolutionary classes and the popular masses have all perceived the principle of the development of the world, and consequently advocate transforming society and the world; their philosophy is dialectical materialism. . . .

The causes of the transformation of matter is to be found not without, but within. It is not because of the impulsion of external mechanical forces, but because of the existence within the matter in question of two components different in their nature and mutually contradictory which struggle with one another, thus giving an impetus to the movement and development of the matter. As a result of the discovery of the laws of such movement and transformation, dialectical materialism is capable of enlarging the principle of the material unity of the world, extending it to the history of nature and society. Thus, not only it is possible to investigate the world considered as matter in perpetual movement, but the world can also be investigated as matter endlessly in movement from a lower form to a higher form. That is to say, it is possible to investigate the world as development and process.

Dialectical materialism investigate the development of the world as a progressive movement from the inorganic to the organic, and from thence to the highest form of the movement of matter (society).

What we have just discussed is the theory of the movement of the world, or the principle of the development of the world in accordance with dialectical materialism. This doctrine is the essence of Marxist philosophy. If the proletariat and all revolutionaries take up this consistently scientific arm, they will then be able to understand this world, and transform the world.

WE ARE FOR ROOSEVELT AND AGAINST CHAMBERLAIN*

January 20, 1939

FROM MARX

. . . The great war of resistance now being waged by China is not merely the affair of China it is also the affair of the world. In the democratic countries such as England, America, and France, there are broad popular masses including all the progressive people from the various social strata who sympathize with China's war of resistance and oppose the invasion of China of Japanese imperialism. It is only a reactionary faction that opposes China's war of resistance. . . . In this great war of resistance we rely first of all on China's own strength to vanquish the enemy. . . . But at the same time, we need outside aid. Our enemy is a world-wide enemy, and the war of resistance waged by China is a war of resistance of a world-wide character. History has already shown that a viewpoint attempting to isolate this war is erroneous. In all the democratic countries, such as England and America, there still exists an isolationist viewpoint whose adherents do not understand that if China is defeated, England, America, and the other countries will not be able to go on enjoying their own tranquility. This erroneous viewpoint is not attuned to the needs of the times. For the others, to aid China is to aid themselves — this is the only concrete verity at the present time. . . . China is pursuing her war amidst many difficulties, but the flames of a war among the great powers of the world are coming closer every day and no country can remain aloof. We are in agreement with President Roosevelt's proclamation regarding the defence of democracy. We are, on the other hand, resolutely opposed to the policy of concessions to the fascist states in the West, practiced by Chamberlain. Up to this day, Chamberlain has also displayed a cow-

* Extracted from Mao's Preface to the English edition of "On Protracted War", dated January 20, 1939.

ardly attitude towards Japan. I hope that the popular masses of England and America will arise and act positively to admonish their governments and make them adopt a new policy of resistance to wars of aggression — for the good of China and also for the good of England and America themselves.

FROM MARX
TO MAO



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TO BE ATTACKED BY THE ENEMY IS NOT A BAD THING BUT A GOOD THING

On the Third Anniversary of the Founding of the
Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political College

FROM MARX

May 26, 1939

TO MAO

Why is it that the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College has become famous all over the country and even enjoys some reputation abroad? Because, of all the anti-Japanese military institutes, it is the most revolutionary, the most progressive, and the best fighter for national liberation and social emancipation. This, I think, is also the reason why visitors to Yen-an are so keen on seeing it.

The college is revolutionary and progressive because both its staff members and teachers and its courses are revolutionary and progressive. Without this revolutionary and progressive character, it could never have won the praise of revolutionary people at home and abroad.

Some people attack the college; they are the country's capitulationists and die-hards. This only goes to show that the college is a most revolutionary and progressive one, or otherwise they would not attack it. The vigorous attacks by the capitulationists die-hards testify to its revolutionary and progressive nature and add to its lustre. It is a glorious military institute not only because the majority of the people support and praise it, but also because the capitulationists and die-hards strenuously attack and slander it.

I hold that it is bad as far as we are concerned if a person, a political party, an army or a school is not attacked by the enemy, for in that case it would definitely mean that we have sunk to the level of the enemy. It is good if we are attacked by the enemy, since it proves that we have drawn a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves. It is still better if the enemy attacks us wildly

and paints us as utterly black and without a single virtue; it demonstrates that we have not only drawn a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves but achieved a great deal in our work.

In the past three years, the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College has made a great contribution to the country, to the nation and to society by training tens of thousands of promising, progressive and revolutionary young students. It will certainly go on making its contribution to the country, the nation and society, because it will continue to train such young students in large numbers. In speaking of the college, people often compare it to the Whampoa Military Academy¹ before the Northern Expedition. In fact, there are points of both similarity and difference between the two institutes. The similarity is the presence of Communists among the teachers and students in both. The difference is that, while the chief leaders and the majority of the students at the Whampoa Military Academy were members of the Kuomintang, the entire leadership of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College is in the hands of the Communist Party and the vast majority of the students are communist or communist-inclined. For this reason, the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College of today cannot but be more revolutionary and more progressive than was the Whampoa Military Academy of the past, and it will certainly make a greater contribution to national liberation and social emancipation.

The educational policy of the college is to cultivate a firm and correct political orientation, an industrious and simple style of work, and flexible strategy and tactics. These are the three essentials in the making of an anti-Japanese revolutionary soldier. It is in accordance with these essentials that the staff teach and the students study.

The progress and development of the college over the past few years have been accompanied by certain shortcomings. It has grown, but difficulties have arisen too. The main difficulty is the shortage of funds, teachers and teaching materials. But led by the Communist Party, the college does not fear any difficulties and will certainly overcome them. There are no such things as difficulties for Communists, for they can surmount them.

It is my hope and the hope of the people of the whole country that the college will eliminate its shortcomings and become still more progressive after its third anniversary.

Teachers, staff members and students of the college, let us redouble our efforts!

NOTES

¹ The Whampoa Military Academy, located at Whampoa near Canton, was established by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 with the help of the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. At the time, it was run jointly by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. At one time or another Chou En-lai, Yun Tai-ying, Hsio Chu-nu, Hsiung Hsiung and other comrades did political and other works in the academy. They trained large numbers of cadres in a revolutionary spirit for the revolutionary armed forces; these cadres included many members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League. However, the head of the academy was Chiang Kai-shek. Using his position, he pushed aside the Communists, built up his own following and finally, after the Counter-Revolutionary coup d'état of April 12, 1927, turned the academy into a Counter-Revolutionary organization.

THE SECOND IMPERIALIST WAR*

September 14, 1939

... The new world economic crisis, which began in 1937, has in recent years penetrated into so-called "peaceful" states such as England, France, and America; it is also developing in Germany, Japan, and Italy. This economic crisis has also brought a grave political crisis in its wake. The people are discontented with capitalism and with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Whether it be in the states that became fascist a long time ago, or in the states where they are taking advantage of the war to carry out a fascist transformation, this political crisis, this popular discontent are daily becoming more acute. On the other hand, the socialist Soviet Union has been strengthened to the point where it can no longer be invaded. Under these conditions, the bourgeoisie of each of the imperialist states realizes that without a vast war, without transforming the limited war into a total war, without demolishing its imperialist friends, it cannot escape either the economic crisis or the political crisis, nor can it escape its own death.

These are the calculations of the bourgeoisie of all the countries of the world on the eve of its death. The authors of these calculations have no idea that in this way — by making use of a war to divide up the world anew in order to escape from the economic and political crisis and to avoid their own death — they cannot fail to create an even greater economic and political crisis and to hasten the day of their death. They are like a mad dog, they are already mad, the capitalist system has made them altogether mad, they cannot do otherwise than hurl themselves pell-mell against their enemies and against the walls of the world. Such is the reality of life today in all the capitalist countries of the world. A fight between

* Extracted from a lecture to the Party Cadres in Yen-an, September 14, 1939, reported in *Chieh-fang*, No. 85, September 30, 1939.

mad dogs — such is the present imperialist war.

1. THE AIMS OF THE WAR

“War is the continuation of politics.” The nature of imperialism is predatory, and even in periods of “peace” there is no instance when the policy of the imperialist states is not predatory. But when the predatory policy of certain imperialist states encounters the obstacle of certain other imperialist states and cannot break through this obstacle by peaceful means, then these states use warlike means to break through this obstacle so that they may pursue their predatory policies. The aim of the Second Imperialist War is similar to that of the First Imperialist War. It consists in dividing up the world anew, that is to say, in dividing up anew the colonies, semi-colonies, and spheres of influence, in pillaging the peoples of the world, and in establishing their domination over the peoples of the world. . . . Apart from aims of this kind, are there any other aims? Are there any good aims? There are none whatever. Whether it be Germany, Italy, or Japan, whether it be England, America, or France, all the imperialist states participating directly or indirectly in the war have only a counter-revolutionary, an imperialist goal — pillaging the people. The “lasting peace” of Japanese imperialism, the “self-determination of peoples” of Hitler, the “opposition to National Socialism” of Chamberlain, the “aid to Poland” of Daladier — all these come down to a single word: pillage. Merely because it sounds good and to fool the people, they order their secretaries to invent a few synonyms, that is all.

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2. THE NATURE OF THE WAR

The nature of the war is basically determined by the political aims of the war. All wars are divided into two categories. As Comrade Stalin has said, they are divided into: (1) just wars, the aim of which is not pillage but liberation, and (2) unjust wars of pillage. By its nature, the Second Imperialist War like the First Imperialist War, belongs to the second category. The two sides in the present war, in order to fool the people and mobilize public opinion, both proclaim with utter shamelessness that they themselves are just and

those on the other side unjust. In reality all of this is nothing but a farce and sham. Only wars of national liberation and wars of popular liberation, as well as wars undertaken by socialist countries to support these two kinds of liberation movements, are just wars. Many people are confused about the present war. According to them, Germany is certainly unjust, whereas England and France are democratic and anti-fascist states, and Poland, for her part, is waging a national war of self-defence. They therefore believe that on the whole, the Anglo-Franco-Polish side has after all a slightly progressive character. This is an altogether muddled conception, arising from the fact that people have not clearly understood either the aims of the war or the peculiarities that characterize the first and the second stages of the war.

3. THE PECULIARITIES OF THE FIRST STAGE OF THE WAR

A portion of the imperialist states, the fascist states of Germany, Italy, and Japan, were waging wars of aggression like mad dogs, violating the interests of all small and weak peoples, violating the interests of all democratic countries, and unleashing a fascist menace within each democratic country. At this time the people of the whole world demanded that aggression be resisted and that democracy be defended; they demanded that another part of the imperialist states, the so-called democratic states of England, America, and France, intervene against these wars of aggression and that they allow the people to retain a small residue of democracy. The Soviet Union made known many times that she was ready to establish a joint front against aggression with all these so-called democratic states. If these so-called democratic states had intervened at the time against the aggressors, if a war had broken out to prevent aggression, if for example it had been possible together with the Soviet Union to aid the armies of the Spanish Government in their effort to stop the German and Italian aggressors, and to aid China in her effort to stop the Japanese aggressors, then such an action, such a war, would have been just, would have had a progressive character. But these so-called democratic states did not intervene; they adopted a policy of "non-intervention". Their aim was to bring about a situation in which the two sides — the side of the aggressors and

the side of the victims of aggression — would be ravaged by war, after which they would intervene to fish in troubled waters. . . . Nevertheless, at this time, apart from the circumstances that German, Italian, and Japanese imperialism were waging unjust wars of pillage, and that the so-called democratic states were allowing them to continue, there was another circumstance, there were also wars of national liberation.

4. OUR REVOLUTIONARY POLICY DURING THE FIRST STAGE OF THE WAR

There is not the slightest doubt that the revolutionary policy of this stage has as its goal the organization of a united front against aggression of the people of the country that is the victim of aggression. . . . At the same time, this policy does not ignore the organization by the Soviet Union and the governments of all the democratic countries of the struggle to prevent new aggression. . . . Even after Munich, because of the anger aroused among the broad masses of the English and French people, and even among the left wing of the bourgeoisie by the defeat of Spain and the disappearance of Czechoslovakia, there was a possibility of compelling the Chamberlain and Daladier governments to abandon their policy of non-intervention and to organize, with the Soviet Union, a common front against aggression. . . .

5. THE RUPTURE OF THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND STAGE OF THE WAR

The bourgeoisie of the so-called democratic states fear on the one hand that the fascist states may violate their interests; but they fear the development of the revolutionary forces even more. They fear the Soviet Union, they fear the liberation movements of the peoples of their own countries, they fear the liberation movements in the colonies and semi-colonies. Consequently, they rejected a genuine united front against aggression and a genuine war against aggression involving the participation of the Soviet Union, and they organized by themselves a united counter-revolutionary front. They

undertook by themselves a robbers' war of pillage.

The Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations lasted from April 15 to August 23 . . . but from beginning to end, England and France refused to recognize the principle of equality and reciprocity. They wanted the Soviet Union to guarantee their security, but they were absolutely unwilling to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union or of the small countries of the Baltic. . . . In addition, they would not allow the Soviet Army to cross Poland to fight the aggressor. Naturally, the Soviet Union was not willing to conclude a treaty like that proposed by England and France, which would not have been adapted to revolutionary aims but only to counter-revolutionary aims. . . . This is the basic reason for the rupture of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations. At this point, Germany abandoned her anti-Soviet position and in fact was ready to abandon the so-called "anti-Comintern Pact"; she recognized the inviolability of the Soviet frontier, and so the German-Soviet Non-aggression Treaty was concluded. The absolute lack of sincerity of England and France in their negotiations with the Soviet Union, their absolute refusal genuinely to oppose aggression, the way in which they decided to break off the Three Power Negotiations, proves nothing less than that Chamberlain had already decided on war. Consequently, if the great war broke out, it was not only Hitler, but Chamberlain, who wanted to fight, for if he had really wanted to avoid the war, he could have done so only with Soviet participation. . . .

6. THE PECULIARITIES OF THE SECOND STAGE OF THE WAR

At the present time, now that war has broken out, the situation has undergone a fundamental change. The distinction that existed in the past between the fascist states and the democratic states has lost all meaning. At the present time, if one wishes to distinguish between things of different natures, there are only the following two categories: (1) all the countries that are waging an imperialist war of pillage, as well as all the countries that are in reality supporting this war; and (2) those who are waging not wars of pillage, but just wars of national liberation and popular liberation, as well as the countries that support these war. . . . Today England had become the most reactionary country in the world, and the number one anti-

Soviet, anti-communist, anti-democratic, and anti-popular leader, the enemy of all small peoples, is none other than Chamberlain. . . .

7. OUR REVOLUTIONARY POLICY DURING THE SECOND STAGE OF THE WAR

In conformity with the peculiarities of the second stage of the war, what should the revolutionary policy of the proletariat be, and especially of the Communist Party?

In my opinion, it should be the following:

1. In all the imperialist countries participating in the war, we must call on the people to oppose the imperialist war, make clear the imperialist nature of both warring camps, treat them all as the same kind of robbers. In particular, we must oppose English imperialism, this robber chief, incite the people not to allow themselves to be deceived by the imperialist robbers, carry out propaganda among the people, in order that they may transform the imperialist war into a revolutionary civil war, and establish a united popular front against the imperialist war. . . .

2. In all the neutral countries, such as America, the members of the Communist Party should reveal to the people the imperialist policy of the bourgeois government, which calls itself neutral but in reality aids the war and seeks to enrich itself in the war. . . .

3. In all the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the policy to follow is that of the national united front, either to resist the invader (as in China), or to oppose the mother country (as in the case of India), in order to attain national independence. . . . In all the colonies of countries participating in the war, we must oppose the actions of the traitors to the nation who support the war waged by the mother country, oppose the mobilization of the people of the colony to participate in the war on the front of the other country, remind the people of the colony of the misery they suffered during the First Imperialist War. In the colonial and semi-colonial countries, if we do not oppose the traitors to the nation there is no hope for the movement of national liberation.

8. THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE WAR

Wars between imperialisms and mutual weakening of imperialisms . . . constitutes a favourable condition for movements of popular liberation in all countries, for movements of national liberation in all countries, for China's war of resistance, for the building of communism in the Soviet Union. From this standpoint, the darkness that reigns in the world is only provisional and the future of the world is bright. Imperialism will surely perish, and the liberation of the oppressed people and of the oppressed nations will surely be achieved.

FROM MARX

TO MAO



NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

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YOUTH NEEDS EXPERIENCE*

October 5, 1939

FROM MARX
TO MAO

The young people — whether or not they be members of the Communist Party — who join the ranks of the revolutionary movement, bringing new blood and enthusiasm, are all very precious. Without them, the ranks of the revolution could not develop and the revolution could not triumph. But lack of experience is the natural failing of our young comrades. Now revolutionary experience comes from personal participation in revolutionary struggle. If one begins working at the grass roots, if, for several years, one does work that is genuine, not false, then experience will come to those who do not have it.

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* This is the complete text of a message dated October 5, 1939, published as an unnumbered page at the beginning of Chung-kuo chling-vin wel-hsuan, Chung-kuo Ching-nien She, 1940.

Words in red are pin yin spellings that still have to be changed to Wade-Giles system.

What are “running-expenses”? What does “set-to” mean? Are these Indian colloquial expressions? We need better words to convey these ideas.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR*

December 1942

FROM MARX

I. A BASIC SUMMARY OF OUR PAST WORK

TO MAO
NOT FOR
COMMERCIAL
DISTRIBUTION

The general policy guiding our economic and financial work is to develop the economy and ensure supplies. But many of our comrades place one-sided stress on public finance and do not understand the importance of the economy as a whole; engrossed in matters of revenue and expenditure as such, they cannot find solutions to any problem hard as they try. The reason is that an outmoded and conservative notion is doing mischief in their minds. They do not know that while a good or a bad financial policy affects the economy, it is the economy that determines finance. Without a well-based economy it is impossible to solve financial difficulties, and without a growing economy it is impossible to attain financial sufficiency. The financial problem in the Shaan-Kan-Ning Border Region is that of supplying funds for the living and operating expenses of tens of thousands of troops and civilian personnel, in other words, the problem of supplying funds for waging the war. These funds come partly from taxes paid by the people and partly from production carried on by the tens of thousands of troops and civilian personnel themselves. We shall simply be resigning ourselves to extinction unless we develop both the private and the public sectors of the economy. Financial difficulties can be overcome only by down-to-earth and effective economic development. To neglect economic development

* This is a report delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at a conference of senior cadres of the Shensi-Kansu-Niagsia Border Region. The years 1941 and 1942 were the hardest for the Liberated Areas in the war of Resistance Against Japan. The savage attacks by the Japanese invaders and the encirclement and blockade by the Kuomintang created enormous financial difficulties for the Liberated Areas. Comrade Mao Tse-tung

and the opening up of sources of finance, and instead hope for the solution of financial difficulties by curtailing indispensable expenditures, is a conservative notion which cannot solve any problem.

In the last five years we have passed through several stages. Our worst difficulties occurred in 1940 and 1941, when, the Kuomintang created friction by its two anti-Communist drives. For a time we had a very acute scarcity of clothing, cooking oil, paper and vegetables, of footwear for our soldiers and of winter bedding for our civilian personnel. The Kuomintang tried to strangle us by cutting off the funds due to us and imposing an economic blockade; we were indeed in dire straits. But we pulled through. Not only did the people of the Border Region provide us with grain but, in particular, we resolutely built up the public sector of our economy with our own hands. The government established many industries to meet the needs of the Border Region, the troops engaged in an extensive production campaign and expanded agriculture, industry and commerce to supply their own needs, and the tens of thousands of people in the various organizations and schools also developed similar economic activities for their own support. This self-supporting economy, which has been developed by the troops and the various organizations and schools, is a special product of the special conditions of today. It would be unreasonable and incomprehensible in other historical conditions, but it is perfectly reasonable and neces-

sary. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that in order to overcome these difficulties it was necessary for the Party to exert itself in leading the people in developing agriculture and other branches of production, and he called upon the government and other organizations, the schools and the army in the Liberated Areas to produce as much as possible for their own support. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's "Economic and Financial Problems" and his articles "Spread the Campaigns to Reduce Rent, Increase Production and 'Support the Government and Cherish the People' in the Base Areas" and "Get Organized!" formed the Party's basic programme for leading the production campaign in the Liberated Areas. Comrade Mao Tse-tung here severely criticizes the mistaken notion of concentrating on public revenue and expenditure to the neglect of economic development, and the wrong working style of making demands on the people without mobilizing and helping them to develop production and surmount difficulties, and he set forth the Party's correct policy of "developing the economy and ensuring supplies". With this policy great successes were achieved in the production campaign which was unfolded in the Shaan-Kan-Ning Border Region and in the Liberated Areas behind the enemy lines. It not only enabled the armed forces and the people of the Liberated Areas successfully to tide over the most difficult period of the war, but also provided the Party with a rich store of experience for guiding economic construction in later years. The first Chapter of this report was published in the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. III, pp. 111-116.

sary at present. It is by such means that we have been overcoming our difficulties. Do not these indisputable historical facts prove the truth that supplies can be ensured only through economic development? While we still face many difficulties, the foundation of the public sector of our economy has already been laid. In another year, by the end of 1943, this foundation will be even firmer.

Developing the economy is the correct line, but development does not mean reckless or ill-founded expansion. Some comrades who disregard the specific conditions here and now are setting up an empty clamour for development; for example, they are demanding the establishment of heavy industry and putting forward plans for huge salt and armament industries, all of which are unrealistic and unacceptable. The Party's line is the correct line for development; it opposes outmoded and conservative notions on the one hand and grandiose, empty and unrealistic plans on the other. This is the Party's struggle on two fronts in financial and economic work.

While we must develop the public sector of our economy, we should not forget the importance of help from the people. They have given us grain, 90,000 *tan* in 1940, 200,000 in 1941 and 160,000 in 1942,¹ thus ensuring food for our troops and civilian personnel. Up to the end of 1941, the grain output of the public sector of our agriculture was meagre and we relied on the people for grain. We must urge the army to produce more grain, but for a time we shall still have to rely mainly on the people. Although the Shaan-Kan-Ning Border Region is in the rear and has not suffered direct war damage, it has only 1,500,000 inhabitants, a small population for so large an area, and the provision of such large quantities of grain is not easy. Besides, the people transport salt for us or pay a salt transport levy, and in 1941 they purchased five million yuan worth of government bonds; all of which represents no small burden. To meet the needs of the War of Resistance and national reconstruction, the people must shoulder such burdens, the necessity of which they very well realize. When the government is in very great difficulties, it is necessary to ask the people to bear a heavier burden, and they understand that too. But while taking from the people we must at the same time help them to replenish and expand their economy. That is to say, appropriate steps and methods must be adopted to help the people develop their agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, salt industry and commerce, so that they gain at the same time as they give and, moreover, gain more than they give; only thus can we sustain a

long war against Japan.

Disregarding the needs of the war, some comrades insist that the government should adopt a policy of “benevolence”. This is a mistake. For unless we win the war against Japan, such “benevolence” will mean nothing to the people and will benefit only the Japanese imperialists. Conversely, although the people have to carry rather heavy burdens for the time being, things will get better for them as the difficulties confronting the government and the troops are overcome, the War of Resistance is sustained, and the enemy is defeated; and this is where the true benevolence of the revolutionary government lies.

Another mistake is “draining the pond to catch the fish”, that is, making endless demands on the people, disregarding their hardships and considering only the needs of the government and the army. That is a Kuomintang mode of thinking which we must never adopt. Although we have temporarily added to the people’s burden, we have immediately set to work building the public sector of our economy. In the years 1941 and 1942, the army, the government and other organizations and the schools met most of their needs by their own efforts. This is a wonderful achievement without precedent in Chinese history, and it contributes to the material basis of our invincibility. The greater our self-supporting economic activities, the more we shall be able to lighten the people’s tax burdens. In the first stage from 1937 to 1939, we took very little from them; during this stage they were able to build up considerable strength. In the second stage, from 1940 to 1942, the burden on the people was increased. The third stage will begin in 1943. In the next two years, 1943 and 1944, if the public sector of our economy continues to grow, and if all or most of our troops in the Shaan-Kan-Ning Border Region are in a position to engage in farming, then by the end of 1944 the people’s burden will again be lightened, and they will again be able to build up strength. This is a possibility which we should prepare to turn into actuality.

We must refute all one-sided views and advance the correct slogan of our Party, “Develop the economy and ensure supplies.” With regard to the relation between public and private interests, our slogans are “Give consideration to both public and private interests” and “Give consideration to both troops and civilians.” We consider only such slogans to be correct. We can guarantee our financial needs only by expanding both the public and the private sectors of our

economy in a realistic and practical way. Even in difficult times we must take care to set a limit to taxation so that the burdens, though heavy, will not hurt the people. And as soon as we can, we should lighten the burdens so that the people can build up strength.

The Kuomintang die-hards regard construction in the Border Region as a hopeless undertaking and the difficulties here as insurmountable; they are expecting the Border Region to collapse any day. It is not worth arguing with such people; they will never see the day of our "collapse" and we shall unquestionably grow more and more prosperous. They do not understand that under the leadership of the Communist Party and the Border Region Revolutionary Government the masses always give their support to the Party and government. And the Party and the government will always find ways to get over economic and financial difficulties, however serious. In fact we have already pulled through some of our recent difficulties and will soon overcome others. We encountered difficulties many times greater in the past and surmounted them all. With intense fighting going on every day, our base areas in northern and central China are now facing much greater difficulties than the Shaan-Kan-Ning Border Region, but we have already held out for five and a half years in these areas and can certainly continue to do so till victory. For us, there is no ground for pessimism; we can conquer any difficulty.

After the present conference of senior cadres of the Shaan-Kan-Ning Border Region we shall put into effect the policy of "better troops and simpler administrations".² It must be carried out strictly, thoroughly and universally, and not perfunctorily, superficially, or partially. In carrying it out we must attain the five objectives of simplification, unification, efficiency, economy and opposition to bureaucracy. These five objectives have a very important bearing on our economic and financial work. Simplification will reduce non-productive expenditures and increase our income from production, it will not only have a direct and healthy effect on our finances, but will lighten the people's burdens and benefit them economically. In our economic and financial set-up, we must overcome such evils as disunity, assertion of independence, and lack of co-ordination, and must establish a working system which is unified and responsive to direction and which permits the full application of our policies and regulations. With the establishment of such a unified system, working efficiency will rise. All our organizations, and particularly those

engaged in economic and financial work, must pay attention to thrift. By practicing thrift we can cut out a great deal of unnecessary and wasteful expenditure, which amounts possibly to tens of millions of yuan. Finally, people engaged in economic and financial work must overcome surviving bureaucratic practices, some of which, such as corruption and graft, over-elaborate organization, meaningless "standardization" and red tape, are very serious. If we fully attain these five objectives in the Party, the government and the army, our policy of "better troops and simpler administration" will achieve its purpose, our difficulties will surely be overcome, and we shall silence the gibes about our approaching "collapse".

Below, we shall discuss separately various objectives of financial and economic work, concretely summarize experience in past work, and put forward the general policies for work that should be carried out in 1943.

2. ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE

The general strategy for economic and financial work in the Border Region is to develop the economy and ensure supplies. This being the case, the first and most important questions are: "How has our economic work been done in the past?", "What are the successes?", "What are the shortcomings?", and, "What should be our strategy henceforth?"

The economy of the Border Region is divided into the two large sectors, the public and the private. The private sector of our economy consists of all agriculture, industry, and commerce undertaken by private individuals. The public sector of our economy consists of the agriculture, industry, and commerce, undertaken by the government, troops, official organizations and schools. The functions and relationship of these two sectors are such that the private sector provides the livelihood of the 1,400,000 people of the Border Region. At the same time through taxation, it assists the government and troops, and supports the sacred cause of the War of Resistance and the reconstruction of the country. The public sector provides the bulk of the living and operating expenses of several tens of thousands of Party members, government workers and soldiers, thus reducing the amount taken from the people and building up their resources so that these can be obtained in future urgent need. The

principles used here are "Give consideration to both public and private interests" and "Give consideration to both troops and civilians".

If our Party and government do not pay attention to mobilizing the people and helping them to develop agriculture, industry, and commerce, their life cannot be improved, and the needs of the War of Resistance cannot be met. As a result there will be trouble between the troops and the people. And if we cannot settle the minds of the troops and the people, it is pointless to consider anything else. Therefore the most important task is for the Party and the government to concentrate great efforts on building up the people's economy.

However, relying on the taxes handed over by the people alone cannot meet the needs of the War of Resistance and the reconstruction of the country. This is particularly true of the Border Region where the area is large and the population sparse, and where there has long been a large contradiction between the taxes paid by the people and the expenditure of the government. Therefore, we must also concentrate great efforts on managing the public sector of the economy. This is an extremely great responsibility borne by our government, troops, official organizations and schools. In the past few years we have had great successes in this work. In 1943 we must achieve even greater successes so as directly to meet the needs of the War of Resistance and the reconstruction of the country. The more the public sector of the economy grows, the more the burden carried by the people can be reduced. This is another way of building up the resources of the people. And the instrument which unites and reconciles the private and public sectors is the currency.

The private sector comprises agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, co-operative undertakings, the salt industry, and commerce. Here I shall first deal with agriculture.

The agriculture of the Border Region was depressed during the period of the land revolution. At that time there was much uncultivated land in Yanan, Ansai, Baoan, Ganquan, Huachi and the three eastern counties, etc. On the border between Huachi and Baoan, there was an area called Erjiachuan, which was more than 200 *li* long, yet only twenty or thirty households lived there. As early as the Tongzhi period (1862-74) there was no one living in Wuyasi and Zhangjiacha in Baoan county. Fucunchuan in Ganquan county, and Jinpenwan and Machichuan in Yanan county had for the most part ceased to be cultivated. Cotton-planting had ceased throughout the

Border Region. The decline in animal husbandry was very great. Only 400,000-500,000 head of sheep remained and 100,000 oxen and donkeys. Textiles, the transport of salt, and other subsidiary undertakings had all been disrupted in the same way. In particular the textile industry had almost completely disappeared. By 1938, only 70,000 packs of eating salt were exported. All this shows how depressed the agriculture of the Border Region was at that time. Agriculture was only speedily restored and developed after the Central Red Army came to the Border Region and civil war ceased, after the local bandits were cleaned up and the peasants were given security, after the "left" economic policy was corrected and a mild taxation policy was adopted, and after the Party and government's call for the development of agriculture had greatly raised the enthusiasm of the peasants for production.

Table 1.1 gives the statistics for livestock, cotton-planting and opening up of uncultivated lands in the past four years.

Table 1.1

Agricultural Activity, 1939-42*

Year	Area of new land opened (<i>mou</i>)	Area of cot- ton planted (<i>mou</i>)	Oxen	Donkeys	Sheep
1939	1,002,774	3,767	150,892	124,935	1,171,366
1940	698,989	15,177	193,238	135,054	1,723,037
1941	390,087	39,087	202,914	137,001	1,724,203
1942	281,413	94,405	—	—	—
Total	2,373,263	—	—	—	—

* The figure for the area of new land cultivated is for the amount of new land opened each year. The figures for cotton planted and for livestock are the annual totals for the whole of the Border Region.

** The statistics for the livestock of Jiaxian and Mizhi counties have not been included; the 1939 figures for livestock include the 1940 total for seven of the counties.

These statistics show that year by year the cultivated land of the

Border Region has expanded, the acreage of cotton planted has grown, and the amount of livestock has increased. Moreover, the real totals are more than those shown in the statistical table. As a result much of the formerly uncultivated land has become productive. For example, there are now more than a hundred households in Erjiachuan and all the land of the area has been cultivated. Wuyasi and Zhangjiacha are now both fully inhabited. In the past, all eleven districts in Yanan county had unused land. At present only Jinpen and Liulin Districts, half the Central District, and one township in Yaodian District have uncultivated land. In 1939, there were only about 300,000 *mou* of ploughed land in Yanan. In 1942, there were 699,538 *mou*. There used to be a lot of uncultivated land in the counties of Ansai, Anding, Yanchuan, and Yanchang. Now there is very little. Before 1940, the Border Region bought grain from Luochuan County and east of the Yellow River. Now, not only, is it unnecessary to buy grain from outside, there is even some surplus grain which is exported to the region of Yulin. Some people have moved here from other areas, livestock has increased, but we do not feel a shortage of grain. In the light of all these facts there is no longer any doubt that the Border Region can be self-supporting in grain.

Cotton-growing has not only again reached its pre-revolutionary peak, but has also developed. For example, the districts of Yongping, Yongsheng and Yuju in Yanchuan County did not previously grow cotton. Now they have all started growing it. The same is true of Yanan. The profit from cotton is greater than the profit from grain. The return from 1 *mou* of cotton is on average 700 yuan or more, whereas if grain were planted the return would only be 200 yuan. The ratio is thus 3:1. In 1939, the area planted to cotton was only just over 3,700 *mou*. In 1942 it was more than 94,000 *mou*, and the quantity produced reached 1,400,000 *jin*. This was a great achievement. However, the amount needed by the Border Region is 3 million *jin*. This is our future task.

The increase in livestock has also been very rapid. For example, in 1937 there were only about 8,000 sheep in Yanan. Now there are more than 60,000. In 1937, there were only 70,000 sheep in Huachi, now there are more than 120,000. Before the land revolution, there were only five flocks of sheep in Zhangjiahe of Third Township, Dongyang District, Yanchuan County. (There was no grazing land and there could only be thirty to fifty head in each flock.) Now there are thirteen flocks. Oxen and donkeys have increased by al-

most two-thirds since the time of the civil war. As a result, in 1940 and 1941 we were able to export 500,000 packs of salt. If it were not for the increase in oxen and donkeys, this salt would have been very difficult to move out.

However, the development of agriculture has not been even. Those areas with relatively all-round development and rather more successes include the counties under direct administration and the Longdong sub-region, in particular Yanan, Ansai, Ganquan, Huachi, Quzi and the three eastern counties. This is because they have a lot of land, few people, and the climate is quite good. These counties also have the biggest share in the subsidiary work of salt transport and, at the same time, the largest amount of public expenditure. The area that has not developed is the special military area [Jingbei], because it has a large population and the land is limited. There is no possibility of enlarging the ploughed area. They have had some success there in the gradual restoration of household spinning and weaving work. Moreover, there has been some emigration to the Yanan area, which has eased the distribution of population and land.

The speed of development has also varied. Development was faster before 1940, particularly in the years 1939 and 1940. In these two years 1,700,000 *mou* of new land were opened up. In 1940, the number of sheep increased by nearly 600,000, and oxen and donkeys by over 50,000. But in 1941 and 1942, only about 600,000 *mou* of land were opened up. This is only one-third of the previous two years. There were fewer sheep in 1941 over 1940, and the number of oxen and donkeys only increased by 10,000 (in reality there was a reduction). However, in these two years cotton growing and textiles both developed.

The above outlines the development of agriculture in the Border Region. Now I want to say a few words about how this development took place.

Before the civil war ended, agriculture was in decline. Afterwards it developed. How did this development come about? Apart from the arrival of the Central Red Army, the cleaning up of the local bandits, and the realization of peace so that the peasants could live and work securely, there were the following six reasons.

(1) The "left" mistakes in economic policy were corrected and the policies to build up the resources of the people were implemented. Although the peasants had obtained a share of land, they were afraid to develop production because of the "left" economic

policy. In addition, because agriculture was disrupted both before and after the revolution, the base was very weak and hindered growth. The Central Committee corrected the "left" policy and thus put an end to the peasants' tendency to fear developing production. The peasants were then willing to buy more implements, and the rich peasants dared to take on tenants [an huozi] and long-term labourers [gu changgong]. The milder policies restored confidence and helped the extension of production. At the same time the high price for grain and the great profit in subsidiary undertakings stimulated the peasants' zeal to produce, and made agriculture develop rapidly. This laid the basis for the levy of 200,000 *tan* of grain tax and 26 million *jīn* of hay tax in 1941.

(2) Calls were made for the development of production. The Production Mobilization Conference for cadres held by the Central Committee (1939), the Second Party Congress of the Border Region (1939), the first meeting of the Border Region Council (1941) and the First Agricultural Exhibition, all called for the development of production. These calls played a major role in promoting growth. They first aroused the cadres, and then through them penetrated deeply to the masses, mobilizing men, women, old, young, and even loafers [er liuzi] to take part in production. They increased the labour force, and finally destroyed the peasants' fear of developing production. Thus the amount of new land opened up in 1939 was more than 1 million *mou*, and real imports of livestock were also greatest in that year.

(3) The immigration policy. A major reason for the enlargement of cultivated land by 2,350,000 *mou* in the past four years has been that those regions with large amounts of land have absorbed large numbers of immigrants, and increased their population. For example, in 1937 Yanan (including Yanan city) only had a population of 34,000. Now its population is roughly 70,000. Because of this, cultivated land in this county has increased from around 300,000 *mou* to roughly 700,000 *mou*. In 1936 Ansai only had a population of about 20,000. Now it has a population of more than 40,000. Ganquan originally had about 8,000 people. Now it has more than 14,000. In 1939 Yanchang only had a population of 25,000. Now it has more than 32,000. Yanchuan had the least amount of uncultivated land, but between 1938 and the present its population has increased by over 10,000. Huachi only had a population of 35,000 in 1938. Now it has a population of more than 40,000. Other places such as Baoan,

Anding, Jingbian, and the counties of the Longdong and Guanzhong sub-regions have also increased their population. These immigrants came mostly from Hengshan, Yulin, Shenmu, and Fugu, and secondly from the special military area. They all came voluntarily and were not organized by the government. They were willing to come because there was land and they were treated well. The various counties organized the existing householders to give help with grain, tools, and cave houses, etc. At the same time the rich peasants took on tenants, which also helped the immigrants. The increase in immigrants not only enlarged the area cultivated, but also increased livestock, and stimulated commerce. Therefore the immigrants were one of the factors in the development of agriculture.

(4) The policy of incentives. Immigrants do not pay grain tax for three years, and their other obligations are reduced. If some of the peasants' planting cotton do not make as much profit as those planting grain, the government pays compensation. If livestock is purchased from outside the Border Region, there is a reduction in grain tax by a fixed amount in the first year. In addition, there were the rewards to labour heroes given at the two agricultural exhibitions, which also brought about great results. For example, Wu Manyou and Mao Kehu of Yanan and Due Fafu of Ganquan were rewarded at the first agricultural exhibition. Now they have become very good, rich peasants. They all pay more than 5 *tan* of grain tax (in the Border Region 1 *tan* is 300 *jin*). Moreover, they have encouraged other peasant householders in the villages to develop production. All these things have promoted the development of agriculture, in particular of grain and cotton.

(5) The reduction in the wastage of labour power, and the better adjustment in the use of labour power. Because we were busy fighting during the civil-war period, we did not pay attention to production and the land was neglected. After peace was established, there were frequent exercises and guard duties by the self-defence army [ziweijun] and many kinds of meetings. Therefore, each month each able-bodied man missed at least three working-days. Later this kind of wastage was reduced. Furthermore, before 1941 not much grain tax was collected, there was little tax grain transport duty, and the amount of work missed was comparatively limited. In recent years in rural areas, contract-labour teams [zhagong] and exchange-labour teams [biangong] have developed and made better adjustment in the use of labour power. We have mobilized loafers to take part in pro-

duction. The number of women joining-in production has also increased. All these things have helped the development of Border Region agriculture.

(6) The policy of agricultural credit. Formerly there was no agricultural credit but this was offset by the mild taxation policy. Now that the grain tax has increased, and especially since 80 per cent of peasant households must pay it, those households (roughly one-third) lacking oxen, agricultural tools, and food grain must be helped with credit. Moreover, a supply of credit is very necessary for certain kinds of agriculture that must be developed (like cotton-planting), for agricultural subsidiaries (like spinning and weaving), and for certain regions which need more development. Although only 4 million yuan credit was given in 1942, of which merely 1,500,000 yuan was for oxen, over 2,600 oxen and nearly 5,000 agriculture implements were bought, and cotton-planting was also expanded. It cannot be denied that this was a great help. But because finances are limited and we can only lend according to the government's financial strength, we still cannot provide enough credit to match the needs of the peasant households. However, a little is always better than nothing, and it does give some help.

The above are several of the major factors in the development of agriculture; below I shall discuss several major lessons to be drawn from our work.

(1) Act according to the conditions of the area and the season. Agricultural regions and seasons are different and methods of development are also different. For example, there is no uncultivated land in the special military area (apart from a small amount in Qingjian). The cultivated land area cannot be enlarged. Sheep-herding is limited by the pasture lands available. There is also a lack of pack-animals for the transport of salt. The policy of rent reduction has not yet been thoroughly implemented. Because of these things, grain production has not increased in those areas, and with the exception of spinning and weaving, subsidiary undertakings have not developed. Although improved techniques such as more frequent hoeing of weeds, greater use of manure, and more deep ploughing were introduced there long ago, we should still carry out more investigation of the situation, and at the right time do our utmost to increase production. However, if we were to employ these improved techniques in areas where land is plentiful, population sparse, and working methods primitive, they would not be very effective be-

cause they all need an increase in labour power. From the point of view of the peasants of the latter kind of area, deep ploughing is not as good as planting more land. Applying more manure is not as good as opening up more uncultivated land. Planting more land is especially good in areas with low rainfall. Therefore, in these areas the call to improve agricultural methods is in general ineffective at the present time. To really increase production in these regions the most important thing for the moment is to rely on opening up unused land. If in the six years from 1937 to 1942 the increase in ploughed land was roughly 3 million *mou*, then the amount harvested in 1942 was at least 500,000 *tan* more than in 1936, which is equivalent to 250,000 *tan* of hulled grain (each *tan* is 300 *jin*). If we estimate the grain production of the Border Region in 1942 to be 1,500,000 *tan* of hulled grain, then over six years, the increase in grain production through the increase of ploughed land is approximately one-sixth of the total. Some of this increase in cultivated land is new land opened up by immigrants, and some is expansion of land farmed by the original households. All this shows us that in directing agriculture, we must adopt different methods in different regions. In one region we should make deep ploughing the key, and in another enlarging the area ploughed. We must also make distinctions with respect to timing. At a time when there is unused land that can be cultivated, we should mainly encourage the opening up of new land. When the availability of uncultivated land has been exhausted, then we must turn to encouraging deep ploughing. We must not only make these distinctions between large regions, we must also make them within a county, a district and sometimes even within a township. For example, if certain villages in a township have rather a lot of unused land, we should encourage the opening up of unused land there. If in other villages there is little or no unused land, we should encourage deep ploughing. While there is still uncultivated land in a township, we should encourage the opening up of land. When all the lands have been opened up, we should encourage deep ploughing. Although we have had some successes in the past few years in our work, much has been too empty and generalized. Many of our comrades still do not know how to investigate objective circumstances minutely, nor do they know how to put forward concrete proposals to provide the conditions for increasing production in different regions, and, at different times. Slogans put forward in the past for deep ploughing, opening new lands, water conservation, and increasing production

by 400,000 *tan* or 200,000 *tan*, in reality contained much subjectivism. Many peasants were not interested or influenced by them. From this we may conclude that in the future we must carry out deep, factual investigations, and solve problems in terms of concrete times, places, and conditions.

(2) As yet the peasants in a large number of areas still pay heavy rents and heavy interest rates, and the policy of reducing these has not been thoroughly implemented. On the one hand peasants must bear the burden of paying rent and interest to the landlords, and on the other they must pay grain tax and money tax to the government. They get too little for themselves, which dampens their enthusiasm to produce. Thus there is no possibility of increasing production. From this we may conclude that we must conscientiously implement the decrees to reduce rent and interest rates.

(3) As a result of the increase in Braid tax, and the newly levied hay tax, sheep tax, and salt-transport requirement, the peasants' enthusiasm for production has diminished. In the two years 1941 and 1942 the peasants paid a large amount of grain tax, hay tax and salt tax, and during these years they expanded the area of ploughed land by only 600, 000 *mou*, merely 60 per cent of the increase in 1939. Livestock did not increase in 1941, and sheep even declined (of course epidemics had some effect). Immigration also dropped. In 1942 only 4,843 households came. Moreover, 3,527 old households moved out, the reason mainly being that they feared further burdens. Another reason was that the amount of grain tax collected increased progressively according to the amount harvested and not according to the area of land worked. This method, although rational in terms of sharing the burden equally, hindered the growth of investment in agriculture. It lowered the peasants' enthusiasm to invest in the land because for the same land a good harvest meant paying out a lot and a poor harvest meant paying out little or even nothing. If taxation was based on the area of land worked, this point could be corrected. The enthusiasm of the middle and rich peasants could be raised, and there would be no detriment to the poor peasants. From this we may conclude that there must be limits to the grain tax and hay tax, and at the same time we must improve the methods of taxation so as to promote agricultural production.

(4) Policies should be thoroughly implemented. For example, we stipulated that for three years we would not take grain tax from new immigrants or from those planting cotton, but in fact we have

“welcomed” grain tax from immigrants, and we have levied one-half of the grain tax for land planted to cotton. We originally stipulated that when livestock was bought from areas outside the Border Region we would reduce grain tax by a definite amount for the first year, but this has also not yet been implemented. In addition regulations for giving rewards for increased production have not been fully carried out. All these things not only affect the authority of the government but also diminish the enthusiasm of the peasants. From this we may conclude that henceforward everything pertaining to the decrees announced by the government must be resolutely implemented.

(5) More equitable adjustment in the use of labour power and other methods helpful to peasants, such as exchange-labour teams, contract-labour teams and so forth, have a strong influence on agricultural growth. However, with the exception of some counties like Yanan, we have still not done enough to organize and promote them. There are certainly many comrades among the county cadres who are actively striving to put ideas to the people, and who have originated many good methods for mobilizing the masses to develop production. They have created many model examples. However, many other comrades are not like this. They lack the spirit of factual investigation and enthusiastic effort. They lack creativity. They feel that there is no work that they can do for agriculture, or they do not know how to set-to. Therefore they only raise empty slogans like “spring ploughing” or “autumn harvest”. They remain passive, and let the peasants do things as they like. The government simply keeps a record of what is done. But in fact there are many things to be done. Many good methods can be thought up. For example, during spring ploughing in 1942 some of the peasants in Yanan felt very discouraged. Instances of moving out, splitting up the family, and selling livestock in preparation for reducing production occurred. From the point of view of the comrades who lack enthusiasm and creativity, these phenomena would be insoluble and it would be best to accept fate and let such bad things happen. But the comrades from Yanan were not like this. They were neither passive nor bureaucratic. They were able to grasp the key to the problem and adopt active methods. They overcame the difficulties. At that time, the Party and government did much propaganda work, and gave help with grain, cave houses, and agricultural tools. Afterwards not only did production not decline, but cultivated land increase by 80,000

mou. This example proved that there is much work in agriculture that ran and should be done by the local Party committees and the local government. Moreover, so long as they grasp the key points and find a method, then when they act they can be effective. From this we may conclude that cadres must be active to overcome difficulties, they must unite with the masses, and according to the needs of the masses create vigorous methods to solve their problems. They definitely cannot be passive and bureaucratic.

In order to give our comrades a clear-cut standpoint on this extremely important question of uniting closely with the masses and conscientiously solving their difficulties, I here specially reproduce for reference the reports of the comrades of Yanan county on how they handled the problem of opening up unused land, how they handled the problem of refugees, and how they handled the problem of loafers.

What follows is the original report.

HOW WAS YANAN COUNTY'S PLAN TO OPEN UP 80,000 *MOU* OF UNUSED LAND IN 1942 COMPLETED?

(1) We relied on the labour power of immigrant refugees to open up uncultivated land.

There were 25,428 refugees in the period of 1940 to 1942. On the basis of five of them equalling one labour power, there were 5,086 labour powers. Each labour power can open up 10 *mou* of new land in one year, giving a total of 50,860 *mou*. (Ten *mou* is the average figure for the land opened up by refugees in the past three years. In 1942 the land opened up by each labour power was more than this.)

(2) We relied on the labour power of original households and animals to open up unused land, totaling 29,399 *mou*.

The original households had 10,616 labour powers. The work could be done with each labour power opening up less than 3 *mou*.

(3) However, the organization of labour power is a major task. This year we adopted methods of collective labour, such as contract-labour teams and exchange-labour teams. We also organized women and loafers to take part in production.

Altogether we organized 487 contract-labour teams. We also drew 4,939 good labour powers into collective labour (exchange-labour teams). This was almost one-third of the total number of

labour powers (according to statistics for this spring, there were 15,702 labour powers in the whole county), which meant that out of every three people one took part in collective labour. The method of Contract labour was to form a group of eight to ten good workers from a village and establish a foreman [gongtou]. Then they opened up new land and hoed weeds either for themselves or for others. Sometimes the foreman took part in physical labour, in which case he received pay valued at two labour days per day worked. If he did not take part, he only received pay valued at one labour day per day. Those forming contract-labour teams were either entirely from the local village, or came from outside, or were organized with people from outside the village together with peasant from the village.

The peasants were very pleased that we organized loafers to take part in production. It increased their enthusiasm for work.

More and more women joined in production each year. In particular refugee women took part in opening up uncultivated land, and even more of them in hoeing. There were thirty-nine in Liulin district this year. The refugee women of Third township in Chuankou district did not have any hoes. They went to the mountains and waited until others were tired and resting, then they took up the hoes and began opening-up land. When the others had finished their rest they handed back the hoes and waited again.

(4) We relied on production plans for each peasant household. In 1942, this county laid emphasis on determining production plans for each peasant household based on discussions with that household and with its agreement. The government printed a standard form to record plans including such things as opening up new lands, hoeing weeds, and so forth. When a plan was determined, it was posted up in the home of each family so that afterwards the government could examine the production plan of each household according to the form. When determining peasant household plans we had to pay attention to the following points:

- (i) The production circumstances of the previous year.
 - (ii) The conditions for the increase of production in the current year.
 - (iii) The amount of labour power (human and animal).
 - (iv) Obtaining the agreement of the man concerned.
 - (v) The need for constant examination and supervision of work.
- (5) The effect of agricultural credit was important, in particular

the 100,000 yuan credit given to refugees for agricultural tools. When the refugees arrived they did not have a thing. To open up unused land, first a mattock was needed to clear away the scrub and then a hoe to break the land. After agricultural credit was issued and the problem of tools was solved, the refugees' desire to open up new land was very strong. In six days they were able to open up 3 *mou*. In 1942 agricultural credit was given rather late. The earlier credit is given the sooner more land can be opened up. (Note: do not violate the agricultural season.)

(6) During spring ploughing, mobilization work had to be reduced as much as possible. The peasants were allowed the time to open up new land and to take part in production.

(7) The government had a tight grasp on the work of opening up unused land. Only three months were available for this. With a hundred-day plan, each day opening up 800 *mou*, it was necessary to have a labour force of 1,600. This was one-tenth of the laborer force of the whole county. By April 19 we had only opened up 15,000 *mou*. This was still far short of completing the task, and already two-thirds of the time had gone. Therefore beginning on April 20, after a rainfall, there was a twenty-day assault. In the twenty days more than 50 per cent of the whole task was completed. Between March 10 and April 19, 15,000 *mou* of land was opened up. This was 18.7 per cent of the work. In the twenty day assault, 46,442 *mou* of land was opened up, which was 58 per cent of the work.

In the assault the best districts were the following: Luilin District: the ratio of new land opened up during the period of assault to that opened up before was 1,294.4:100. Yaodian District: the ratio was 1,184.4:100. Chuankou District: the ratio was 432.1:100.

Altogether the county government held two meetings of district heads to inspect the work, and issued three directives. The cadres of the county government went down to the districts and townships more than three times.

The districts checked up on the work of the townships up to seven or eight times in some cases, and three times at the very least. The townships also checked up many times on the work of the villages.

The tight grasp of the leadership and the strict check-ups played a decisive role in the completion of the task.

HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF

REFUGEES TAKING PART IN PRODUCTION

(1) [Table 1.2 refers to] Statistics on the flow of refugees into Yanan county in recent years.

Putting it simply, the number of households more than doubled, and the number of people just about doubled.

The refugees who came settled mainly in Chuankou, Liulin, Jinpen. and Yaodian Districts. In these districts there was a lot of unused land.

FROM MARX

Table 1.2

The flow of refugees into Yanan County
(Yanan City excluded), 1938-42

Year	Households	Number of people
1938	249	1,200
1939	533	1,976
1940	1,137	6,090
1941	5,040	14,207
1942	1,050	6,231
Total	8,009	29,704

Comparison with 1937

DISTRIBUTION

Year	Households	Number of people
1937	7,703	32,705
Increase during 5 years	8,009	29,704
Percentage increase	103.9%	90.8%

(2) Statistics on how the government helped the refugees solve

problems in production after they had come (Table 1.3).

Table 1.3

Allocation of State aid to refugees, 1940-42

	1940	1941	1942*	Total
Allocation of land (in <i>mou</i>)	10,220	3,451	6,335	20,006
Grain (in <i>tan</i>)	669.9	495	458.48	1,623.38
Seeds (in <i>tan</i>)	40.18	8.2	47.37	95.75
Agricultural tools (items)**	424	2,133	427	2,984
Oxen	979	82	212	1,273

* In 1942, 13,555 *jin* of sweet potatoes [*yangyu*] were given to the refugees in addition, and on 273 occasions they were helped with oxen.

** Agricultural tools were ploughshares, rakes and hoes.

(3) The methods for solving refugees' difficulties in production were:

(i) There was a lot of land. We proposed that the ownership of publicly-owned uncultivated land should go to those who opened it up. If the owner of privately-owned unused land did not open it up, we let refugees do so. The three-year exemption from tax was an incentive.

(ii) The problem of a place to live. In the beginning they lived in old cave houses or broken-down cave houses. Many of the others who came afterwards were joining friends, relatives, or people of other social relationships. They lived in the cave houses of those friends or relatives. Having settled down, they dug out their own cave house. In other cases one person came in the first year and dug out the cave house. In second year the family came and moved into the house.

(iii) We made arrangements among the peasants for grain to eat. We proposed that if 1 *tou* of grain was borrowed before spring, after autumn 1 *tou* and 3 *sheng* should be repaid. This was a

profit of 30 per cent. It encouraged the original households to lend grain and the government guaranteed repayment. Another method was to urge the original households to hire help [*diao fenzi*], to take on share-cropping tenants [*an zhuangjia*] and to contract short-term labour [*lan gong*] from among the refugees. Conditions were decided voluntarily by both sides. Allowing the original households to exploit a little was not a problem because when the refugees first came they did not have a thing. Although they were exploited, we could not let them starve.

Statistics for this year (1942) [are shown in Table 1.4].

Table 1.4

Households reliant upon employers
for food grain in 1942

Hired help [<i>diao fenzi</i>]	359 households
Share-cropping tenants [<i>an zhuangjia</i>]	466 households
Short-term contract labour [<i>lan gong</i>]	184 households
Total	1,009 households

These households relied on their employers for food grain. However, the hired helpers [*diao fenzi*] could only get supplies for themselves. Hired farmhands and short-term contract labourers were able to get food grain for their family members as well. There were 650 households of the latter kind. At a rate of three people per household, this was altogether 1,950 persons. If we add on the 359 hired helpers, the full total was 2,309 people relying on their employers for grain. If they had asked for aid from the government, at a rate of 5 *tou* per man per year the amount of grain needed would have been 1,154.5 *tou*. What a large amount this would have been! Therefore on the basis of mutual agreement between employer and employee, the hiring of farmhands, helpers, and short-term contract labourers solved many great problems. It not only solved the problem of food grains. It also enlarged production and increased the supply of

grain. Taking each household as one labour power, there were 1,009 labour powers altogether. One labour power could produce 2 *tan* of grain, so in total they could increase grain production by 2,018 *tan*. After consumption this still left a surplus of 863.5 *tan*. By the following year these people were in a position to carry out production by themselves.

(iv) The peasants were urged to help the refugees with seed and land to work. Seed was repaid after autumn, and a rent paid for land with the government as guarantor.

(v) The institution of credit for agricultural implements for refugees was very effective in solving the problem of supplying tools to open up new lands. If arrangements for any problem (food grain, supply of agricultural implements, etc.) were not good, the opening up of unused lands could have been impeded. Therefore it was necessary to solve each problem rapidly and at the correct time. A delay of one day reduces the amount of land opened up.

(vi) As for the problem of burdens on the refugees, we resolutely carried out the decisions of the government of the Border Region on treating them well. For three years we made no demands on them, and instead the government helped them solve all kinds of difficulties. This year the government cadres of the county, districts, and townships saved 10 *tan* of grain for issue to the refugees. While solving the problem of grain for refugees to eat, Third township in Central district made great efforts to reduce their burdens.

(4) Why did the refugees want to come to Yanan?

(i) We have really solved the difficulties of refugees. The solution of the refugee food-grain problem in 1940 had a particularly wide influence. In Chuankou District alone 300 *tan* of grain was supplied. Therefore many more refugees came in the year 1941.

(ii) Although government calls had a great impact, the effect of the refugees themselves telling their own friends, relations and other social acquaintances of the good treatment they received was even greater. We found that very few refugees who came to us had refugee certificates issued by Suide sub-region. This was because they feared that after having accepted settling-

in funds or registration cards from there, they would not be free or they would become public property. They preferred to get money through their own personal relationships.

(5) Opinions concerning future immigrant refugees:

(i) Get more to come by encouraging refugees to use their social connections.

(ii) The government at county and district levels should conscientiously solve problems for them.

(iii) The government of the Border Region should issue some grain and funds to help them, with repayment after autumn.

(iv) Persist in carrying out the decisions to treat refugees favourably.

HOW TO MOBILIZE LOAFERS TO TAKE PART IN PRODUCTION

(1) Statistical summary [given in Table 1.5].

Table 1.5

Mobilization of loafers, 1937-42

Year	Original number of loafers	Number joining in production	Number not yet taking part in production
1937	1,629	299	1,330
1938	1,246	578	668
1939	543	120	423
1940	359	175	184
1941	184	126	58
1942	145	40	105

Note: The chief reason for the increase in loafers in 1942 was that in 1941 Jinpenwan was taken from Gulin County and placed under the administration of this county. According to statistics, that

district had forty-three idlers.

Explanation:

(i) In Panlong District, a certain spirit medium beat his “three mountains’ knife”³ into a hoe. He told the masses he would not swindle people again and would work hard in future.

(ii) At Lijiaqu in Third Township of Chuankou District, Hui San and Gao Wu were each given the task of opening up 6 *mou* of uncultivated land this spring. They completed this and even exceeded it by 2 *mou*. At Tianujiagelao in Fourth Township, Yang Yingcheng was given the job of opening up 6 *mou*. He opened up 9 *mou*.

(iii) In Liulin District this year, seven men were reformed and joined in production. In Wuyang District twelve men were investigated. After a struggle, nine of them took part in production. In Fengfu District there were eight men. At Ganguyi in Yaodian District eight men were organized in two groups to go to Zhangjiakou to open up new land.

(iv) At Nanyigou of Third Township in Fengfu District, Bai Fenyu was a shaman before 1936. By 1941 he had an ox and hired a man. He had 200 sheep and had become the village head. He paid 10.2 *tan* grain tax, 200 *jin* salt tax, and 500 *jin* hay tax. This year he has got another ox and hired a helper. He has expanded production and his prospects are very good.

(v) Because the government mobilized them to take part in production, the loafers of Panlong district said: “If things go wrong this year government men will be even more strict with us”. For example, Li Dejin from Lijabian in Fourth Township used to smoke opium. This year he has opened up 6 *mou* of new land and also stopped smoking. In the whole district there were twenty-seven loafers. They have written guarantees that they will do well in production, and as a result twenty of them are very good.

(vi) At Liujiaping in Mudan District there is a man (name unknown) with extremely bright prospects now that the government has mobilized him to join-in production. Later he sought out one of the government personnel and treated him very well saying: “The government was right to get us to take part in production”. Gao Yucheng from the same district used to be a It at

en He did not farm and he did not cut firewood. Winter and summer, wearing a ragged old cotton-padded jacket he would curl up on the cold Rang. Each day he would smoke one-fifth of an ounce [er qian] of opium. His wife and children cried from cold and hunger. After the revolution and educated by the government, he has become the production director of Fourth township. Everybody praises his method of work. He is a labour hero. Moreover he keeps a close watch on loafers. He forces them to make production plans. Every five days he goes up into the hills to supervise them. Under his direction Liu Guai and Yan Fenghe have each planted 24 *mou* of land this year.

(2) Our methods of mobilization are:

(i) Doing propaganda, educational, and persuasive work to get them to take part in production. Having got some grain in their prospects improve.

(ii) The government gives them definite production tasks, such as opening up uncultivated land (see examples above). They are inspected at regular intervals. Moreover special people in the villages are designated to supervise their production.

(iii) Urging the masses to struggle against them, and to force them to join production. This year in the two villages, Jinpenhe and Yunshansi in Third Township, Panlong District, production competitions were organized. In this situation, Chang Degong, a loafer in Jinpenhe, was forced by the villagers to go up into the hills to open up new land. He has opened up 3 *mou*. At the moment he is preparing to plant 15 *mou*.

(iv) Organizing the loafers in collective labour. The loafers are concentrated in the district town and organized into teams to open up new land. After they get rid of the opium-smoking habit, they can go home. The land opened up and farmed is given to whoever does the work.

(v) The government solved some of the loafers' production difficulties.

(3) Results.

The masses were very pleased that the government made the loafers take part in production. The masses opposed them very much

because they did no work at all, paid no grain tax, and caused trouble every time there was mobilization work. As for the loafers themselves, after they obtained some real results from production, they realized that the government was acting for their betterment. The above examples clarify this point. As for those who were extremely stubborn and refused to change, some even running away when the government tried to mobilize them, on their return they joined in a little light productive labour. In this county no loafers have become bandits. We have not referred to this report of the leading comrades of the Party and government of Yanan county without purpose. The spirit of the comrades of Yanan county is entirely the spirit of Bolsheviks. Their attitude is enthusiastic, and there is not the slightest passivity in their thoughts and in their actions. They are not at all afraid of difficulties, and are able vigorously and firmly to overcome them all. Look how responsible they are towards their work: "In 1942 agricultural credit was given rather late. The earlier credit is given the sooner more land can be opened up!" "It was a necessary to solve each problem rapidly and at the correct time: A delay of one day reduces the amount of land opened up!" "Determine the production plans of each peasant household." "The tight grasp of the leadership and the strict check-ups played a decisive role in the completion of the task." How vastly different and hoar much better is this spirit than that of those timid people who draw back, full of sighs when they meet difficulties, and of those who are not conscientious in their work and try to get by and neglect things! Imbued with such spirit, there is not one thing that the comrades of Yanan did not handle realistically and practically. They have a full understanding of the feelings, needs, and concrete circumstances of all the people of Yanan county. They are completely united with the masses. They carry out extremely good investigation and research, and thus they have learned the Marxist art of leading the masses. They are entirely without subjectivism, sectarianism, and the Party "eight-legged essay". How does this compare with those subjectivists who do not solve problems according to the demands of the masses but according to their own subjective imagination? And with those bureaucrats who do no investigation and research work at all end, though they work for many years, have no idea of what is going on beneath them? In there not a world of difference between them? We hope all the comrades of the Border Region will have this spirit of the comrades of Yanan, this attitude towards their work,

this one-ness with the masses, this willingness to carry out investigation work, and thus also learn the Marxist art of leading the masses to overcome difficulties so as to make our work successful whatever is undertaken. Quite a few of the comrades of the various counties of the Border Region are like or more or less like the comrades of Yanan. We hope that the model experience of these comrades can quickly spread to all counties, districts, and townships.

The above is a summary of agricultural work in the Border Region in the past. What follows are the tasks for the year 1943.

The major demand on agriculture is to increase the production of grain and cotton (subsidiary undertakings will be discussed elsewhere). In the light of the present need for grain and cotton, and also in order to strive for some grain and cotton for export, it is still necessary for us to mobilize the peasant masses to increase the production of hulled grain by 200,000 *tan* and to increase the production of cotton by 1,600,000 *jin*. Is there any hope that this can be achieved? In the six years between 1937 and 1942, it is estimated that roughly 3 million *mou* of uncultivated land was opened up and the production of grain increased by 500,000 *tan*. Well then, is it possible in the next few years once again on the basis of opening up new land and other methods to increase the production of grain by 400,000 *tan* equivalent to 200,000 *tan* of hulled grain? In the years between 1939 and 1942 the land planted to cotton exceeded 90,000 *mou* and the raw cotton produced reached 1,100,000 *jin*. Well then in the next few years is it possible to increase the land planted to cotton by more than 100,000 *mou*, and the cotton produced by more than 1,600,000 *jin*?

We consider that all this is entirely possible.

If the peasants are able to increase the production of hulled grain by 20,000 *tan* then even if they hand over 200,000 *tan* of grain tax as in 1941, they will still only have to give the government the amount of increase. They themselves will be able to keep an amount equal to the entire previous harvest. As for cotton, even if in future we levy some in tax, the peasants will still be able to keep the largest part of the harvest, and the problem of cotton cloth supply for the Border Region can be solved.

What are the policies which will effectively attain the above targets and not remain just empty words? According to our past expe-

rience the following eight policies must be implemented: (1) the reduction of rent and the reduction of interest rates; (2) an increase in the opening up of uncultivated land, (3) an increase in the planting of cotton; (4) not violating the agricultural seasons; (5) better adjustment in the use of labour power; (6) an increase in agricultural credit; (7) improvement in technical skill; (8) implementing progressive taxation. In what follows I shall deal with each of these eight points separately.

Our first agricultural policy is the reduction of rent and the reduction of interest rates. Approximately one-half of the 1,400,000 people of the Border Region have received a share of land. The remainder have not yet done so, such as those in the Suide-Mizhi special military area, Longdong sub-region, Fuxian County and many places in Sanbian sub-region and so forth. In these regions we should carry out the reduction of rent and interest rates in accordance with government decrees. This is an extremely important policy for increasing the peasants' enthusiasm for production. After rent and interest rates have been reduced, the peasants' burdens from the landlords are less and the amount they can keep themselves is increased. Thus their enthusiasm for production is greatly raised and they can produce more. The Northwest Bureau [Xibei Ju] has already made concrete arrangements with the Border Region Government over this policy and I will not speak more of it here.

Our second agricultural policy is to increase the amount of uncultivated land opened up. Peasants in areas where there is a lot of uncultivated land consider that deep ploughing is not as good as opening up new land. We should therefore organize the peasants in the counties, districts, and townships where such land exists to develop it as a means of increasing the production of grain. Besides land freshly cultivated by the original households, we must mainly rely on encouraging immigrants to come and develop unused land. At present the conditions are right for getting immigrants. The various counties should do a large amount of organizational work. According to circumstances they should determine specific tasks for the new and old households separately. Like Yanan County they should make specific sowing and planting plans for each household. Such plans should include both the opening up of new land and the planting of cultivated land. For 1943 the planned increase in production of grain for the entire Border Region has been fixed as 80,000 *tan* of hulled grain. This should be achieved through the

people and the troops opening new lands and improving agricultural methods.

Our third agricultural policy is to increase the planting of cotton. The entire Border Region needs 3 million *jin* of cotton. If on average each *mou* of land can yield a net total of 20 *jin* of raw cotton, we only need 150,000 *mou* of land for cotton. If each *mou* can only yield a net total of 15 *jin* or even less, we shall need 200,000 *mou*. We should prepare our cotton land according to the latter estimates. But because households planting cotton for the first time lack experience and faith, even if we expand the area planted to cotton, the harvest will not live up to expectations. Therefore it is not possible to attain the full target for cotton production in a single year and we should increase cotton land by 56,000 *mou* in 1943. Together with the previous 94,000 *mou*, the total will be 150,000 *mou* making it possible to increase production to 2,250,000 *jin*. There is no problem over land and seed for planting this area of cotton, but there is a great shortage of cotton-ginning equipment. If each ginning machine can gin 60 *jin* of cotton per day on average, we need 300 machines in order to be able to gin 3 million *jin* of cotton in half a year. In 1943 there will be 2,250,000 *jin* of cotton to be ginned. For this we need more than 200 machines. However, at present there are only a hundred or so broken and old machines of which only fifty can be used every day. If we attempt to gin 2 million *jin* of cotton on fifty machines we will need two whole years. Therefore solving the problem of ginning the cotton is a vitally necessary part of the policy of expanding the planting of cotton. A further point is that up to the present the peasants of the Border Region have still not learned to press cotton-seed oil. With 2 million *jin* cotton we will also get 4 million of cotton seed. Each 100 *jin* can produce 12 *jin* of cotton-seed oil. If we can solve the problem of pressing the oil, then the returns to the peasants growing cotton will increase. Their enthusiasm for growing cotton will also rise. In relation to the above needs, in 1943 the government should do the following work to expand the planting of cotton. (1) Allocate the planting of cotton to peasant households with suitable land so as to make a total of 150,000 *mou*. Help the households planting cotton with seed, manure and techniques. Those who have difficulties with draught animals and implements should be given credit. (2) Construct cotton-ginning machines and spare parts, and supply them to the peasants planting cotton. Help them to repair old machines. At

the same time organize them to buy cotton-ginning machines from outside areas, helping with credit. In these ways solve the problem of ginning the cotton. (3) Do research into methods of pressing cotton-seed oil so that the peasants planting cotton will be able to extract 480,000 *jin* of oil from the 4 million *jin* of seed (each *jin* is worth 15 yuan, a total value of 7,200,000 yuan). (4) Organize joint public and private cotton co-operatives to undertake work such as cotton-ginning, making up into bundles, selling, pressing oil and so forth. (5) Give rewards to peasants good at growing cotton and introduce good methods of planting cotton and ginning so as to increase the enthusiasm of the peasants growing cotton and to raise the amount and quality of the cotton.

Our fourth agricultural policy is not to violate the agricultural seasons. That is, in busy agricultural seasons we should allow the peasants to cease all meetings and mobilization work which is not related to agriculture. Under the present circumstances in the Shaan-Kan-Ning Border Region, in busy agricultural seasons we should stop all meetings and mobilization of the peasant masses outside of their agricultural work, so as to economize on labour and animal power, and let it all be used for agricultural production. Essential meetings and mobilization should be carried out during gaps in the work. The previous mistake of holding too many meetings and too much mobilization must be corrected.

Our fifth agricultural policy is better adjustment in the use of labour power. To this end there are the following methods: incentives to immigrants, mutual-aid labour, mobilization of women, mobilization of loafers, emphasizing support for families with kin serving as soldiers in the War of Resistance, granting leave of absence to take part in the War of Resistance, granting leave of absence to take part in production, obtaining help from the troops, and so forth. All of these assist in adjusting the use of labour power.

As regards incentives to immigrants, we must rely on co-operation between the government and the people. The methods to be employed are as follows. (1) The Party and government of the Suide-Mizhi special military area should be responsible for organizing immigrants with a total of 5,000 labour powers to go to the directly administered counties to open up unused land. However, the basic principle must be voluntary participation, and all kinds of propaganda and organizational work should be done. (2) The government should set aside some grain for lending to immigrants who need help.

It should also provide credit for agricultural implements and fully carry out preferential treatment by waiving grain tax for three years. (3) The old households should be encouraged to help the new households by lending grain, giving up some cultivated land, lending out cave houses, and so forth. In these loans the peasant doing the lending should be permitted to charge some interest, with the rate freely decided by the two parties. (4) Peasant households with a good basis should be organized to take on the poorest immigrants as tenants [huozhong]. The amount of rent should not be excessively low, so that the old households will be happy to take them on. (5) Immigrants from outside should be encouraged to come by old households who have contact with outside areas. Each county in the frontier areas should have a special person responsible for their reception. He should tell them about regions where there is land to be opened up so that they can go there and settle down. For example recently 600 refugees from Henan[?] came to Longdong sub-region; they should be welcomed in this way.

Mutual-aid labour means that within one village or among several villages the peasant households not only plough and plant their land independently but in busy seasons also carry out mutual aid. For example, on a voluntary basis five, six seven or eight households can become one group. Those that have labour power can supply labour power. Those that have animal power can supply animal power. Those that have a lot can supply a lot, those that have little can supply a little. In rotation and collectively they can plough hoe, and harvest for each household in the group, and they can settle accounts in autumn. Work can be repaid by equal amounts of work. Those who supply more can receive supplementary wages from those who supply less, according to the wage rate of the village. This method is called mutual-aid labour. The mutual-aid co-operatives and ploughing teams previously set up throughout the Kiangsi Soviet were all organized according to this method. In villages with a large population, several small teams can join together into a mutual-aid co-operative. The teams have a team head and a deputy head. Co-operatives have a co-operative head and a deputy co-operative head. Adjustment in the use of labour can also take place between co-operatives. These, then, are the labour co-operatives of the peasant masses. They are extremely effective. Not only do they mean that peasant households which lack labour power can plant, hoe and harvest at the correct time, but also those households which

do not lack labour power can, through collective labour, get even more profit from their planting, hoeing and harvesting. This method is entirely beneficial and has no drawbacks. We should promote it widely. The system of exchange-labour teams which some areas in the Border Region have already implemented is the same method. Each county should strive to organize mutual-aid co-operatives and greatly expand collective labour by the peasants. Apart from this, there are contract-labour teams. These are also welcomed by the peasants of the Border Region. The method is not one of mutual aid but a kind of hired-labour organization for the busy agricultural seasons. Several people or even more form a group and collectively work for the people who hire them. When they have finished working for one household they go to another. It is another method of adjusting the use of labour power. All areas should help those who come from outside to do contract labour by helping them to find work to do and so forth.

As for mobilizing women to take part in production, although many of the women of the Border Region have bound feet, they are still a large labour force second only to the men. They can take part in various kinds of supplementary agricultural work such as planting vegetables, sowing seeds, hoeing weeds, feeding livestock, taking food to the fields, drawing water, and gathering the harvest, etc. There are also some who can take part in basic labour. They have generally done these things in the past. In future we should spread propaganda and encouragement widely, stimulating their enthusiasm for labour so as to raise agricultural production. Comrades in the leading organs of Party and mass organizations for women have as yet not found the orientation for their work. They feel there is nothing that they can do. In fact their first task should be that of looking into and helping the women of the Border Region to play a wider role in productive labour, so that all those women who can take part in labour go to the production front and together with the men solve the great problem of how to increase production. There are still a large number of women in the Border Region who have not untied their bound feet. This is a great hindrance to labour and production. We should use the two methods propaganda and compulsion so that within a few years we make them untie their bound feet. Henceforth no one is permitted to bind the feet of young girls, no matter who they are.

As for mobilizing loafers to take part in productive labors, we

have already had some remarkable successes over the past few years. After the various counties did this work, the number of loafers greatly decreased. However, in those regions where they still exist we should use both persuasion and compulsion to mobilize all of them to go to the production front during 1943. The experience of Yanan County in this work is good, Bolshevik experience. Mobilizing loafers to take part in production not only increases the labour force but also reduces the number of bad people doing bad things. It is supported by the people and strengthens social peace.

When emphasizing support for families with members working in the War of Resistance, we have in the past put support for families with civilian personnel in first place and support for families with kin serving as soldiers in the War of Resistance second. This is entirely wrong. Now we should reverse this and put support for families with kin serving as soldiers in the War of Resistance first. The system of substitute cultivation [daigengzhi] should first be applied conscientiously for those family dependents of soldiers in the army resisting Japan who lack labour power (making no distinction between our own army and friendly armies). Secondly it should be applied to those dependants of workers in the Party and government who truly lack labour power. In those areas where labour co-operatives [exchange-labour teams] have been successfully organized, the solution of this problem can be entrusted to the co-operative.

Granting leave of absence to take part in production means that in the busy agricultural seasons Party and government officials in the Border Region whose families have difficulties are each year permitted to return home on two occasions, each time for several days, so that they can take part in family based agricultural production. The primary and secondary school of the Border Region should also stop classes in the busy agricultural seasons, letting the students and local teachers return home to help production. This is another method of adjusting the use of labour.

The armed forces assisting in production means that each busy agricultural season the troops of the Border Region spend several days helping the peasants in the areas around where they are stationed with the ploughing, hoeing and harvesting. Moreover they do not receive any payment (they eat their own food). On the one hand this can help adjust the use of labour power, and on the other hand it can strengthen the relationship between the army and the

people. The political work departments of the army should plan this work.

If all the above seven ways of adjusting the use of labour power are well implemented, they will be of great help to agricultural production in the Border Region. Among them the most important is the mutual-aid co-operative, which should be realized generally throughout the whole Border Region.

Our sixth agricultural policy is to increase agricultural credit. In 1942 the government issued credit for draught animals, cotton-planting, water conservancy work and so forth. This was greatly appreciated by the peasants and helped some of them to overcome their difficulties. One-third of the peasants of the Border Region lack draught animals and agricultural implements. This is an extremely important problem. If we want agriculture to develop, helping this huge number of peasant masses to solve their difficulties is a very important policy. One way of doing this is to increase agricultural credit. In 1942 under the sponsorship of the Border Region Bank, 1,580,000 yuan of credit for draught animals and agricultural implements was issued to 8,025 peasant households in the seven counties, **Yanan, Ganquan, Fuxian, Ansai, Zichang, Gulin and Zhidan**. Together with capital of more than 1,030,000 yuan amassed by the peasants themselves, this bought 2,672 draught animals, and 4,980 pieces of agricultural equipment. Over 100,000 *mou* of new land was opened up and grain production increased by an estimated 26,000 odd *tan*. In addition, the three counties Yanchang, Yanchuan and Gulin issued 1,530 yuan of credit for planting cotton and for cotton-seedlings. The area planted to cotton grew by over 51,000 *mou* and could produce an estimated increase of 870,000 Jin of cotton. In view of the achievements through agricultural credit in 1942, a further 17 million yuan should be lent in 1943 in addition to re-lending the 3,110,000 yuan. Of this, 14 million yuan should be credit for agricultural implements and draught animals and 3 million yuan should be for planting cotton. Based on the experience in issuing credit in 1942, methods for credit in 1943 should pay attention to the following points:

(1) Credit should be given in those regions which have a lot of unused land to new and old immigrants and old households of poor peasants who have labour-power but lack implements, draught animals and grain, and to peasant households which have planted a lot of land but have no money with which to hire la-

bour for hoeing.

(2) After trials by the Commodities Bureau [Wuzi Ju], we should introduce loans in kind, buying draught animals and suitable implants from outside or assisting peasant households themselves to purchase them. Only in this way can we truly increase the draught animals and agricultural implements in the Border Region. Otherwise the peasants can only buy implements and animals from the rich peasants and landlords of the Border Region with their Border Region currency. This merely has the function of adjusting the ownership of animals and tools within the Border Region and does not increase the total stock of animals and implements.

(3) Agricultural credit for next year has already been increased. We should also alter the policy used this year of concentrating issue of credit in the counties around Yanan. We should issue a suitable amount to the Sui-Mi, Longdong, Sanbian, and Guanzhong sub-regions. But this should not be done on an egalitarian basis. Instead it should be issued in a planned way to those counties, districts and peasant households where there is a lot of unused land, where the need for funds is greatest, and where there can be profitable production.

(4) The organization for issuing credit must be improved. That is to say, credit must be issued through district and township governments, and co-operatives which have the trust of the masses. Therefore the cadres of the districts and townships must be made to recognize the great significance of agricultural credit in the development of agriculture. They must not look upon it as a disaster-relief system. They may not adopt a policy of egalitarian distribution nor an irresponsible attitude.

(5) The formalities for issuing credit must be simple. Use the local methods for giving credit with which the peasants are already familiar. There is no need for formalities such as the "letter of request for credit", etc.

(6) Of the total agricultural credit of 20,110,000 yuan set aside 8 million yuan specially as credit for cotton and wheat seedlings. The households which borrow this can repay in kind after the cotton and wheat harvest. Although these funds are specified as funds for cotton and wheat seedlings, the peasants should be able to use them freely. Such credit is of mutual benefit to public and private interests. The government gets repayment in

kind and the peasants can reduce exploitation through paying high interest rates on loans.

(7) The issue of credit should not violate the agricultural seasons. The Finance Department [*Caiting*] and the Border-Region Bank should make rapid plans so as to issue half of the entire total of credit before the end of the lunar year this year, that is about 10 million yuan.

Our seventh agricultural policy is to improve agricultural techniques. Improving techniques means carrying out research into things that are feasible, starting from the existing agricultural techniques and the peasants' production skills in the Border Region. The aim is to help the peasants improve the major processes in the production of grain and cotton and to increase production. Some improvements are very possible. We have already had quite a lot of experience. It is wrong to lack faith and enthusiasm on this point. However, there is no basis for boasting of the possibility of great improvement, or for considering that we can realize modernized, large-scale agricultural techniques in the Border Region.

How should we implement this policy? We consider that the following things should be done:

(1) We should build effective water conservancy projects. Jingbian provides an example. In *Yangquiaopan, Changcheng* District, *Jingbian* County there are 25,000 *mou* of land that can be irrigated. They have already irrigated 5,000 *mou*. In 1943 they want to carry out further construction. According to the Jingbian comrades, 1 *mou* of dry land only yields 1 *tou* of hulled grain. However 1 *mou* of irrigated land can be planted three times per year. The first planting is spring wheat which yields 8 *tou*, equal to 4 *tou* of hulled grain. The second planting is black beans, yielding 4 *tou* equal to 2 *tou* of hulled grain. The final planting is turnips, yielding 2,000 *jin*. Each is worth 0.3 yuan and the total value is 600 yuan. On the basis of each *tou* of hulled grain being worthy of 150 yuan, this is the equivalent of 4 *tou* of hulled grain. These three things give a total equivalent of 1 *tan* of hulled grain. This is ten times the yield of dry land. Therefore the peasants of Jingbian often proudly say, "Plant wheat first and then black beans. The black bean forest contains turnips too." The major problems in constructing irrigated land are those of the distribution of land rights, of mobilizing manpower, of organizational leadership, and of building ditches

and dykes. If one of these four is not right then nothing can be achieved. In 1942 the comrades of Jingbian led the peasants to construct six dykes in **Tuwan** and Yangquiaopan. etc. After the dykes they built ditches, channeling in the water to irrigate the land. First of all they solved the question of land rights by dividing the new irrigated land between landlords and peasants at ratios of 70 per cent to 30 per cent, 60 per cent to 40 per cent, or half and half. This aroused the enthusiasm of the peasant masses. According to the comrades from Jingbian: "So long as the problem of land rights is solved, it is easy to call on the peasants. For example, we constructed ten irrigated areas. Over a hundred new households came in addition to the existing 200 peasant households and of these more than thirty came from other districts." They also say: "Government funds are very important in the construction of irrigated land. However we must mainly rely on the organization of manpower and on unutilized capital. In Jingbian we built 5,000 *mou* of irrigated land in 1942. Altogether we used 28,560 labour days, which is an average of 5.7 per *mou*. The total funds were 858,000 yuan. Of this 210,000 yuan came from public funds and 648,000 yuan from unutilized capital absorbed. Of course a large proportion of these resources was made up by the ordinary folk giving their labour instead of cash."

As regards organization and leadership, the Jingbian comrades say:

"We adopted the following two methods of leadership when building irrigated land. First we organized water conservancy committees of three to five men from good peasants in the locality. These were responsible for balancing equitably the use of labour, tools, and so forth. However, it was often difficult for them to solve problems of property rights and water-use rights, hindering the implementation of water-conservation work. Therefore it was necessary to have a second method whereby the government delegated cadres to assist in leadership and to solve difficult disputes among the masses. Cadres from the Water Conservancy Bureau [*Shuili Ju*] and a further three delegated by the county government took partial control of construction at the ten sites."

The comrades of Jingbian have also decided that in 1943 they

will continue by constructing 4,000 *mou* of irrigated land in Yangquiaopan. However since there were originally only sixty households there and in 1942 only about forty new households came in, the total of a hundred or sixty households still leaves a problem of labour power. They have therefore decided to appeal for a hundred households to come in 1943. At present they have already begun to dig out cave houses and to prepare dwellings. "Settling a hundred immigrant households is a heavy task. Since most of them came from Hengshan and many will be refugees, they will need a lot of credit if we are to succeed. If the immigrants arrive, together with the labour power already in the area there will be no difficulty in constructing, 4,000 *mou* in 1943." As well as this the comrades of Jingbian have also built a kind of "water-logged land" [*Shuimandi*]. Water-logged lands are "large pieces of flat land surrounded on three sides by high mountains and on the fourth side by a deep gully [*tian gou*]. Some are 2,000 to 3,000 *mou* and some are 200 to 300 *mou*. The soil of such land is very good but on top of it is piled sand and gravel which obstructs the seedlings and spoils the quality of the soil". The method of constructing water-logged land is "to build a solid dyke along the side of the gully on top of which sand willows [*shaliu*] and pea-trees [*ningtiozi*] (in winter this supplies food for the sheep) are planted. This dyke prevents the water that runs off the mountains during the course of the year from flowing away through the gully. It all lies on the land. The mud is very thick. It is extremely fertile and has a high water-content. It is very good for planting crops. Furthermore, each year the area expands and the mountain gullies become flat land. Thus the productive area is increased". The yield of this water-logged land is more than double that of dry land. "Five *mou* of dry land yields 1 *tan* of grain but 5 *mou* of water-logged land can yield 2 or 3 *tan*." The comrades of Jingbian only discovered how to build this water-logged land during the mobilization for the spring ploughing in 1942. Therefore it has as yet only been tried out in two places totaling 1,000 *mou*. They are preparing to construct such lands in a good many places in 1943 and the total area will be over 13,000 *mou*. They say: "In the entire county from 50,000 to 60,000 *mou* of water-logged land can be built". I have given the example of Jingbian in detail to prove that the case for building water conservancy works is far from hopeless. Conditions for doing so exist in several places. In particular the consci-

entious and practical spirit of the comrades of Jingbian provides an effective model for the various counties. Although the water-conservancy conditions in other counties cannot be the same as those in Jingbian, by relying on the leadership of the Party and government and the efforts of the people some water conservancy can be started in those places where conditions are really right. In 1943 the government should set aside 2 million yuan as funds for carrying out water conservancy works in the Yangquiaopan area of Jingbian, the **Huluhe** area of Fuxian and so forth.

(2) We should popularize the use of superior-quality seeds. If we have good seeds we can get a bigger harvest even without increasing labour and manure. For example, the **Guanghua** Agricultural Station has already successfully tried out the "Wolf's tail" seed. It has a high yield, is resistant to insects and birds, and can be planted anywhere. Their sweet-potato yield is also higher than average. We should encourage the peasants to plant them. First each county should select one or two districts and order some peasants to carry out tests. If they find the soil and climate suitable, then such seeds can be popularized so as to increase production.

(3) We should encourage the opening up of new land and the turning over of the earth during autumn, as this can reduce insect pests and promote the aeration of the soil. It can also conserve the water content and increase the harvest of the following year.

(4) After popularizing the organization of mutual-aid co-operatives we should encourage the peasants to increase the number of times they hoe weeds. The purpose of hoeing weeds is not only to get rid of weeds and to help the seedling, but also to conserve water and resist drought. If we increase the number of times we undertake hoeing, we can increase the amount of harvest even if we do not use much manure.

(5) In the summer and winter of 1943 the five sub-regions should separately hold exhibitions organized by the Reconstruction Department [**Jianting**] and five special offices [**zhuan-shu**]. In the light of the experience of the two previous agricultural exhibitions in the Border Region, we should improve the layout, introduce and promote the achievements of model-peasants, and popularize an agricultural production movement in the labour style and skills of Wu Manyou. In 1943 the agricultural exhibition of the sub-regions should include the achievements of the troops, the official organizations and schools in agricultural production. This will encourage

their agricultural production and will also promote unity between the troops and the people.

(6) In 1943 the Liberian Daily and Border Region Masses Daily should widely promote the Wu Manyou production movement so that many more Wu Manyous will be created within the five sub-regions.

(7) The primary and secondary schools of the Border Region should run general agricultural knowledge classes and edit textbooks for winter-study containing practical information on Border Region agriculture with the aim of improving agriculture and increasing production.

(8) the Reconstruction Department should call a meeting of experts to get down to research on the "willow-root" water which flows from the hilltops, so as to deal with it in a scientific manner and to prevent people from contracting "limping sickness" after drinking it. If this problem can be salved then much fertile land in the neighborhood of the hills can be put under the plough and become good arable land.

Our eighth agricultural policy is to implement progressive agricultural taxation.

In the past agricultural taxation was in the form of national salvation grain tax. Although it was levied on progressive principles, the amount levied each year was not standard. The amount levied per family varied from year to year. In 1941 there were cases of taxes being apportioned out [*tanpai*]. Although an assessment method [*pinquizhi*] was instituted in 1942 as being more equitable, there were still inequalities. The most important failing was that the amount of tax was not fixed. This dampened the enthusiasm of the peasants for production. We propose that in 1943 the government should examine and register the land held by the people, and thereby construct a simple progressive agricultural tax. The amount of tax should be decided according to the amount of land, its quality, and so forth. In this way the peasant will be able to calculate the amount of tax themselves according to the amount and quality of the land they farm. Once the peasants can do this, they can work out the ratio between income and expenditure for the family for the entire year. They can then set-to and produce with greater enthusiasm for production. This will guarantee an increase in the production of grain. Moreover, inequalities will not arise when the government levies the tax. After carrying out the preparatory work in 1943, we can implement progressive taxation in 1944. Counties

where preparation is completed early, can carry it out on a trial basis in 1943.

Reduction of rent and of interest rates, an increase in opening up new lands, popularizing the planting of cotton, not violating agricultural seasons, better adjustment in the use of labour power, an increase in agricultural credit, improvements of agricultural techniques, and preparation for implementing a progressive tax — these eight items are the effective agricultural policies which we can and must carry out in 1943. With the exception of the progressive tax for which we can make preparations and which can be tried out in a few counties, the other seven items should be implemented immediately. Many of them should commence during the winter of 1942. Otherwise the time will be lost and they will become empty words.

The above is a summary of our work as regards agriculture in the private sector and our strategy for 1943. What follows is a discussion of closely related agricultural subsidiary undertakings such as animal husbandry and handicrafts.

3. ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

The three major subsidiary undertakings of the peasants of the Border Region are animal husbandry, salt transport, and textiles. It is well known that the breeding of cows and donkeys plays a decisive role in agriculture and salt transport. The breeding of sheep is closely related to the supply of bedding and clothing. Last year the peasants of the Border Region harvested more than 1 million *jin* of wool. Including sheep exported the estimated value was more than 20 million yuan which is proof of the importance of sheep. The greatest enemies of livestock are the many diseases and the lack of fodder. If we do not solve these two problems, there can be no development. In the first place the destructive power of disease is very great. For example, in the Spring of 1941, more than 20,000 sheep died in an epidemic in Jingbian. In 1942, more than 16,000 died at the same cause in **Dingbian**. In the summer of 1941, more than 500 cows died of cattle plague in Yanan. In the summer and autumn of 1942, 574 cows died in **Zhidan**. This shows how disease is the great enemy of the livestock of the Border Region. Secondly, the lack of fodder also greatly hinders the raising of livestock. In the spring of 1941, when 20,000 sheep died in Jingbian, most of the

30,000 lambs also died. Besides the epidemic, an important factor was the lack of fodder. At the same time, over 2,000 cows and horses died of hunger there. Another keenly-felt difficulty in recent years is the lack of fodder supplies on salt-transport routes, which greatly hinders the transport of salt.

Our task is to protect livestock and increase breeding. In order to attain these goals we should implement the following policies.

Prevention of disease. The important thing here is for the county and district governments to call meetings of local veterinarians and old experienced peasants to do research into simple methods of preventing and curing animal diseases, and to encourage the use of these methods among peasant families with livestock. This is a very simple thing to effect. Secondly, the Reconstruction Department should order its agricultural station to increase veterinary equipment, to do research into animal diseases in the Border Region, to produce large amounts of serum and vaccine, and to propagate and implement effective methods of prevention and cure.

Popularize the planting of grass for animal pasture. Most of the animals of the Border Region are put out to pasture. Where the pasture is not good, disease easily arises. Therefore we should widely promote the planting of alfalfa [*musu*], particularly on and near the salt-transport routes. This will benefit both the transport of salt and the development of animal husbandry. In 1942 the government originally planned to plant 30,000 *mou* of alfalfa, but ultimately only 23,000 *mou* were planted because there were not enough seeds. In 1943 the county governments should transport more seeds from Guanzhong and issue them to the peasants in areas where planting is planned. They should also encourage the peasants to buy some themselves. In addition they should mobilize the peasants to cut large quantities of grass in the autumn and to store it up for winter use. This will not only avoid illness induced by animals eating cold grass but also stop the peasants from selling animals because of lack of winter fodder. We should look to the experience of Jingbian in this respect. Warned by the great loss of livestock in the spring of 1941, the comrades in Jingbian have done much work in the past two years. They have appealed to the peasants to plant alfalfa, create fields for pasture, cut autumn grass, plant willow trees, and dig up grass roots as means of providing fodder. First of all they called upon the peasants to plant over 2,000 *mou* of alfalfa in 1942. Most of the seed was issued by the government, and the peasants were

very enthusiastic. They are once again preparing to issue some credit for seeds to the peasants in 1943, and they are specially calling upon the peasants themselves to prepare seeds. As a way of encouraging them to plant large amounts of alfalfa, they are giving rewards to those who do very well. Secondly, they prepared more than 4,000 *mou* of pasture fields in 1942. The grass on this pasture land is mainly reed grass [*luwei*]. This flourishes in the ponds and large marshes in the desert land bordering an Mongolia. Each *mou* yields more than 500 *jin*. The pasture fields that existed before the revolution were later destroyed and the cows and sheep wandered around at will. Now they are mobilizing the masses to restore them. It does not take a lot of labour, and cutting the grasses after autumn prepares for winter use. Thirdly, in the mountainous areas of Jingbian there is a lot of reed grass, white grass [*baicao*], bing grass [bingcao], desert bushes, and so forth. These are of great help for the livestock, if they are harvested in autumn. In 1941 the masses were organized to gather 5 million *jin*. In 1942 they again mobilized each man to cut 100 *jin*. As yet they have not worked out the latter total. Fourthly, they encouraged the masses to plant willow-trees, sand-willows, and pea-trees. The leaves and twigs can be fed to camels and sheep which is another way of providing fodder. At the same time this supplies fuel which pleases the masses. The duty of the government is to supply seeds and encourage planting. Fifthly, in Jingbian the animals eat both the leaves and the roots of the white grass and bing grass. During spring ploughing the strongest men in Jingbian plough the land in the morning, dig-up roots in the afternoons, and feed the livestock in the evening. The woman and children spend the whole day digging-up roots. Each person can clean-up more than 100 *jin*, and this plays an important part in this supply of fodder. However, the government must make good arrangements since, as there are many people digging, there are arguments over land rights. The landless refugees make it even more difficult. According to the Jingbian comrades:

“With these methods we solved many problems for the people. Of course the grass grew well in 1942 because there was a good rainfall. However, animal husbandry also developed because of the above five methods for providing fodder. In 1942 over 60,000 lambs survived throughout the county and there were very few deaths. With the exception of a few areas, there was a great

reduction in the loss through disease of fully-grown sheep, and cows, donkeys, horses and so forth. Excluding sheep, the livestock of Jingbian requires 30 million *jin* of fodder per year. We can get at least 10 million *jin* with the above five methods."

Fodder is a life-and-death question for livestock. We hope that the comrades in the various counties will make a plan for fodder in 1943.

Ban the slaughter and export of female animals. The slaughter of all cattle is forbidden and old cattle can only be killed after inspection.

Improve animal breeds. We should investigate experience in cross-breeding, select good breeds of donkeys and sheep, and popularize them among the people. This should be done first of all in **Ganquan** and Yanan and then spread to other counties. Besides this the government should purchase tanyang sheep from Yanchi. These should be issued for breeding to peasant families with many sheep. Each tanyang ram can be mated with twenty ewes. The wool of this sheep is extremely fine and soft, and each sheep yields 2 *jin* per year.

If we can conscientiously implement the above methods, there can be even greater expansion of livestock in the Border Region. I hope the Reconstruction Department and the comrades in the various counties will pay attention to this.

4. ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF HANDICRAFTS

Handicrafts in the Border Region exist in two forms. The majority are subsidiary family undertakings and a proportion are independent handicrafts. The largest is the spinning and weaving undertaken by women. However, for many years past a large proportion of local yarn and local cloth has been displaced by foreign yarn and foreign cloth. Only recently, because of our encouragement, has there been some resurgence. Even so, the peasants of the Border Region still want to take their surplus products, skins, and salt-transport trade to outside regions in exchange for large amounts of foreign yarn and foreign cloth. Their own spinning and weaving industry is still far from sufficient to supply their own needs. I shall therefore take textiles as the key popular handicraft for discussion

here. In addition, I shall deal with silk and oil-pressing, ignoring others for the moment.

SPINNING AND WEAVING

The people, the troops, and official personnel need 250,000 bolts of coarse cloth per year (each bolt is 2 feet 4 inches wide and 100 feet long [Chinese measurement].) Of this, the amount required by the troops and official personnel is roughly 50,000 bolts, and that by the people 200,000 bolts. What is the present supply? The seven publicly owned textile mills produce approximately 11,000 bolts per year. The seven large and small textile co-operatives run by the people produce roughly 18,000 bolts per year. There are no statistics for the amount of local cloth produced by the women at home, but it is estimated to be around 30,000 bolts per year. Public and private annual production totals 100,000 bolts, 150,000 bolts less than the amount needed. That is easy to say, we can already supply 40 per cent of our needs, which is a great achievement. But we are still 60 per cent short, and meeting this is our future task. This task is very great, and we shall need several years to complete it. But it can be done if we rely on, improve and expand the existing textile enterprises run by the government and by the people. If we have the raw cotton, we can, in a planned way, encourage the women to spin yarn and to weave cloth made half of local yarn and half of foreign yarn. Gradually we can reduce the import of foreign yarn, until eventually we reach the position where we use only our own yarn to weave cloth. In this way we can solve the problem.

As regards weaving, the responsibility rests first with the publicly owned mills. In 1942 publicly owned textile mills were capable of producing 11,000 bolts of cloth. This could supply almost half of the needs of the troops and official personnel. In a few more years we can be completely self-sufficient. Second, we must encourage women to weave cloth as a popular industry. In the Suide sub-region, the women can already produce more than 30,000 bolts per year. However, the widths and lengths are not uniform. The people do not like to buy it. They still prefer imported cloth. If improvements can be made, there are good prospects for increasing the production of cloth. Third, the people's co-operatives can already produce 18,000 bolts per year. This can be further developed.

We must rely on the combination of these three forms to provide the cloth required by the Border Region. However, in the first place, the greatest problem is the supply of yarn. At 12 *jin* of yarn per bolt, we need 3 million *jin* to weave 250,000 bolts of coarse cloth entirely from local yarn. If we use a mixture of half local yarn and half foreign yarn, we will need 1,500,000 *jin* of local yarn and 150,000 bundles of foreign yarn. At present the cloth woven by publicly owned mills and the people's co-operatives is made from this mixture of half local and half foreign yarn. However, there is still not enough local yarn. We must greatly expand the amount of spinning done by the people and improve the quality of the yarn. Therefore, it is extremely important for the Border Region to gradually expand handicraft spinning and weaving among the people, to increase the quantity, and to improve the quality.

How should we gradually solve these problems? In the light of past experience, we propose the following methods.

(1) First we should reorganize and expand spinning and weaving among the people in the counties of the Suide special military area. The way to do this is, under the direction of the special office of the military area, to unite the efforts of the commodities Bureau and the Daguang Yarn Factory of the 359 Brigade, issuing raw cotton to women and ordering them to produce more local yarn to supply the yarn needs of the publicly owned cloth factories. This method was effectively implemented in 1942. It should be continued and expanded in 1943. Apart from supplying yarn to the publicly owned cloth factories, the people of the special military area may weave cloth themselves. The Commodities Bureau can determine measurements and quality, and guarantee a market. That is, the cloth can be purchased by the Commodities Bureau either for its own use or for selling among the people. Next, the government should invest 1 million yuan in order to increase the quantity of local yarn. Based on the experience of the Southern District Co-operative of Yanan County which organized spinning by women in 800 households, lending funds to 3,000 households in Yanan and Ansai will increase the number of spinning-machines in the two counties by 3,000 in 1943. Organizing spinning by women in 1,000 households in **Qingyang** and **Quzi** Counties will increase the number of spinning-machines by 1,000. These credit funds can be handled by the Commodities Bureau, which can issue raw cotton and spinning-machines. It can purchase the local yarn produced to supply the needs of the publicly

owned factories. Next, in order to increase cloth production the government should invest a further 1 million yuan either as loans or as share capital in the existing cloth-weaving co-operatives run by the people as a means of expanding their undertakings.

Here we should consider the plan for Yanan county. In their *Plan for Production and Construction* in 1943, the comrades in Yanan say:

In 1943 we shall increase the number of women able to spin and weave by 40,000. Estimating that they will be able to spin 18 *jin* of yarn each in a year ($1\frac{1}{2}$ *jin* per month), this gives a total of 72,000 *jin*. In addition, there were already 1,000 women able to spin in 1942. Each year one of these can spin 20 *jin*, giving a total of 20,000 *jin*. The two groups can together spin 92,000 *jin*, which can be woven into 8,363.6 bolts of cloth. However, this is still 4,886.4 bolts short of our needs. He plan to solve this problem within two or three years, and to achieve complete self-sufficiency. The population of this county is 64,000 (excluding the city of Yanan). Of these, 42,000 are adults. Each adult needs one-quarter of a bolt of coarse cloth per year (a suit of plain clothes requires 11 feet of cloth and half a suit of padded clothes requires 14 feet of cloth, a total of 25 feet; each bolt of coarse cloth is 100 feet long). Their total requirement is therefore 10,500 bolts. The 22,000 young people each need half the quantity of cloth required by an adult. A bolt of cloth is enough for eight and their total requirement is 2,750 bolts. The annual requirement for the whole county is thus 13,250 bolts.

The 92,000 *jin* of yarn spun in 1943 will be woven into 8,366.6 bolts of coarse cloth. This requires 56 looms (each loom can weave 150 bolts of coarse cloth per year). In 1942 there were twelve looms in the villages and factories of this county. Thus we must expand the number in the village by forty-four during 1943 using the co-operative structure. There are three methods for doing this. The first is investment (i) in incentive awards to encourage women to spin, 50,000 yuan, (ii) in producing 5,000 *jin* of raw cotton at 100 yuan per *jin*, 500,000 yuan, and (iii) in expenses for spinning and weaving equipment, 1,000 spinning-wheels at 100 yuan each, 100,000 yuan, and 44 looms at 1,000 yuan each, 44,000 yuan. The total required for the above items is 694,000 yuan. Second, looms in the villages should be set up by the peasants organizing themselves into partnerships.

The government can help them overcome their difficulties by training skilled workers, or by investing capital for looms and so forth. Third, for every 2 *jin* of raw cotton issued, 1 *jin* of yarn should be collected. The cotton cloth woven in the villages may be used by the peasants themselves. The Gaodan Yarn Spinning Factory should play the leading role in encouraging women to spin, and in training workers.

This plan by the comrades in Yanan is really worth looking at. If the people of Yanan, who lack experience of spinning and weaving, are able with the encouragement of the Party and government to become fully self-sufficient in yarn and cloth within two or three years, other counties without experience should also be able to solve the problem within a similar or slightly longer period. We hope that the comrades in the various counties will all make such a plan. As for the various counties where the peasants have experience, such as the special military area, the problem should be solved even more easily. According to the calculations of the comrades in Yanan, adults make up two-thirds of the population and children one-third. One bolt of cloth is enough for four adults or eight children. Therefore, the yearly cloth requirement for the 1,400,000 population of the Border Region is not 200,000 bolts but 337,500. According to the opinions of the comrades in Yanan, a large quantity like this can be provided within two or three years. In sum, by relying on the masses setting-to and on the leadership of the Party and the government, any difficulty can be overcome.

(2) The Reconstruction Department should do research into the people's experiences in spinning in order to improve the quality of local yarn so as to prepare to produce Border Region cloth entirely from local yarn, gradually reducing and ultimately stopping the import of foreign yarn. If the quality of yarn cannot be improved, then we cannot suspend dealings in foreign yarn.

(3) Improve the woollen goods made by the publicly owned factories. Using woollen goods in place of some of the cotton clothing and bedding used by the army is a way of reducing the consumption of cotton cloth.

(4) In 1943 the official personnel should set a personal example and wear local cloth without exception. At the same time they should encourage the people to use more local cloth and less foreign cloth. According to the situation in the development of local cloth, the

Commodities Bureau can gradually limit the import of foreign cloth.

The above methods will help us gradually to solve the great problem of self-sufficiency in cotton cloth. Although it can only be done gradually, it is nevertheless entirely possible. We must resolutely implement all methods for doing so.

COTTON-SEED OIL

In 1942 the peasants of the counties planting cotton harvested around 3 million *jin* of cotton seeds capable of giving 360,000 *jin* of oil, and, with the expansion in cotton-planting, from 5 to 6 million *jin* of seed can be obtained next year, which can further increase the quantity of oil. We should prevent all this being wasted. Cotton-seed oil is edible, but the peasants of the Border Region are still not accustomed to it. If the government does not promote it, they will not extract the oil. Therefore, the government of the Border Region should invest 300,000 yuan and, through the governments of the counties where cotton is planted, encourage the peasants to experiment with pressing cotton-seed oil. After the experiments succeed, it can be widely promoted. The oil can be bought by the government. This will not only provide edible oil but also, at present oil prices of 30 yuan per *jin*, give the peasants an income of 10,800,000 yuan from 360,000 *jin* of oil.

COMMERCIAL SILK

In the counties of Suide, Qingjian, Anding, Yanchuan, Gulin and so forth, many peasants rear silkworms. It is a relatively large subsidiary undertaking. For example, in Anding alone there were 3,585 peasant households rearing silkworms during 1942. They harvested 23,662 *jin* of silkworm cocoons, at a value of 600,000 yuan.

Our sewing and repair industry needs silk thread and our woollen-blanket industry needs silk edging. We can also use silk thread for the woof when weaving cotton cloth as a means of reducing the import of foreign yarn. Therefore, we should develop the silk production of the Border Region. The way to do this is for the government to issue 300,000 yuan in credit to the peasant families to expand the rearing of silkworms. Credit should be given especially to

those peasant households which have a good record in rearing silk-worms. Moreover, the commodities Bureau should buy the peasants' silk through the local co-operatives and order woven-silk articles from the peasants in order to promote the expansion of the silk industry.

The total investment in the above three undertakings, spinning and weaving, oil-pressing, and silk, is 2,600,000 yuan (yarn spinning 1 million, cloth-weaving 1 million, oil-pressing 300,000 and silk 300,000). Although these funds are not great, they can stimulate the people to progress a little in solving the urgent needs of the moment. In 1943, when we have even more experience, we should consider increasing the amount of capital. Spinning and weaving are particularly important. Unless the people set-to and the public sector helps, the problem cannot be solved as a whole.

Here I have only taken up spinning and weaving, oil-pressing, and silk. Other items have not been mentioned. The counties can according to actual circumstances, do research into handicrafts which are related to the people's economy and which need stimulus from the Party and the government, and they can make their own plans.

5. ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CO-OPERATIVES

There were already co-operatives in the Border Region during the Civil War period. Since the War of Resistance began, the Border Region government has continued to promote them, and after five and a-half years of hard effort they have gradually expanded.

In the four years from 1937 to 1941 the number of consumer co-operatives increased from 130 to 135 and the number of co-operative members from 57,847 to 140,218. The share capital grew from 55,525 yuan to 693,071 yuan. The value of sales increased from 261,189 yuan to more than 6,008,000 yuan. Profits rose from 4,800 yuan to over 1,020,000 yuan, and the public accumulation fund [*gongjijin*] increased from 3,500 yuan to over 173,000 yuan.

If we compare the October 1942 statistics for the nineteen county capitals with those of 1941, the number of co-operative members has increased from 97,297 to 115,899. The share capital has risen abruptly from over 712,900 yuan to more than 6 million yuan, and the profit has also grown from 858,000 yuan to more than 3,398,000 yuan.

The largest amount of share capital owned by individual members of consumer co-operatives is around 10,000 yuan and the lowest is around 4 or 5 yuan.

The distribution of consumer co-operatives at the end of 1941 was as follows: Yanan, twenty-eight; Ansai, twelve; Yanchang, eight; Gulin, eight; Dingbian, eight; Qingyang, Huachi, Quzi and Yanchuan, seven each; Anding, Fuxian and Wuqi, six each; Ganquan, Jingbian and Heshui, five each; Yanan city and Mizhi, four each; and Suide, two. There are still no statistics for the other counties.

Turning to producer co-operatives, ten were established in 1939 with the support of the government and the assistance of the north-west office of the Chinese Industrial Co-operative [*Gonghe*]. Thereafter some consumer co-operatives with large amounts of capital also ran producer co-operatives. By October 1942 the number of producer co-operatives had increased from ten to fifty. The number of employees engaged in production had increased from 199 to 563. Share capital had grown from 11,130 yuan to 2,491,600 yuan and the total value of monthly production from 60,000 yuan to over 2,300,000 yuan.

According to this year's statistics the distribution of producer co-operatives is as follows: Suide, sixteen; Yanan, seven; Gulin, five; Yanchang, five; Yanchuan, five; Ganquan, three; Ansai, three; Jingbian, two; Qingyang, one; Jiaxian, one; Mizhi, one; Anding, one.

Among the fifty producer co-operatives there are twenty-seven large and small textile co-operatives, thirteen in Suide, four in Yanan, two in *Gulin*, and one each in *Ganquan*, *Fuxian*, *Yanchang*, *Yanchuan*, *Ansai*, *Anding*, *Jiaxian* and *Mizhi*. Altogether they employ 497 people and their share capital is 1,700,000 yuan. Six have twenty-five or more employees, the rest ranging from three to over ten. If these twenty-seven co-operatives were working at full capacity, they could produce 30,000 bolts of cloth annually. At the moment they are only producing around 22,000 bolts, 6,000 woven blankets, 4,152 dozen woolen towels, and 8,400 dozen pairs of woven socks.

There are five dyeing co-operatives, two in Yanchuan, two in Suide and one in Yanchang. They employ a total of thirteen people, their share capital is 128,000 yuan and each year they can dye over 7,000 bolts of cloth. There are five producer co-operatives pressing cottonseed oil. Of these, two are in Gulin, two in Jingbian, and one in Yanchang. They employ a total of nineteen people, their share capital 245,000 yuan, and each year they can press 10,000 *jin* of

cottonseed oil. There are nine flour mills, two each in Ansai, Ganquan, Yanchang, Yanchuan and one in Gulin. They employ a total of twenty-four people and their share capital is 262,000 yuan. There are four blanket-making co-operatives, two in Yanan, one in Qingyang, and one in Suide. They employ a total of forty-two people and their share capital is 152,000 yuan. Each year they can produce 7,600 blankets. There is one pottery co-operative in Yanan county. It employs seven men, its share capital is 3,000 yuan and each year it produces six kilnloads of pottery.

The above statistics show us that both consumer and producer co-operatives have expanded greatly in terms of membership, share capital, profit, and undertakings. However, this development has been uneven. In the past five years it has gone through three stages. Moreover, qualitative development only began to advance rapidly during 1942. Before 1939, co-operatives everywhere were based upon share capital from the government with the addition of some share capital assessed from the masses. At this time their nature was basically that of publicly owned enterprises and for the most part they became shops publicly owned by the county and district governments. Co-operative enterprise was not facing the masses, but was chiefly facing the government. It was providing funds for the government and all decisions were taken by the government. This was the first stage. After 1939, the slogan "Popularize the Co-operatives" was put forward. However, most places still used the old method of assessing share capital from the masses to carry out this so-called "popularization". Thus, the masses still regarded the co-operatives as a burden, assessed upon them and not as something of their own. Co-operative personnel were still the same official personnel. They ordered the masses to do substitute farm work on their land and on their behalf. The masses could not see the great benefits to the co-operatives for themselves and, on the contrary, considered that the co-operatives increased the labour burden they had to bear. After 1940, the duty of all the local governments to achieve self-sufficiency in production was increased. Thereafter the large shareholders in many co-operatives were not the people but government organs. It was thus even more difficult for the co-operatives to give due consideration to the interests of the masses. This was the second stage. It was only in January 1942 that the Reconstruction Department put forward the strategy of "overcome the desire to monopolize everything, implement the policy of the people in control

and officials as helpers", based on the experience of the Southern District Co-operative of Yanan County. It was only by implementing this strategy that co-operatives everywhere did away with the method of levying shares by assessment, and gradually built up close relations with the masses and experience in being concerned for the interests of the masses. Thus, in merely ten months the share capital has risen sharply by more than 5 million yuan and undertakings have also expanded. This has played a great role in organizing the economic strength of the people, reducing exploitation by middlemen, and developing the people's economy. This is the third stage. It is only in this stage that the co-operatives of the Border Region have in general begun to follow the right path.

The above sketch outlines the path of development of most co-operatives. However, there have been exceptions. For example, the Southern District Co-operative of Yanan County got on to the right path some what earlier. Through several years of hard experience, this co-operative has become a model co-operative truly supported by the people. During 1942, co-operatives from the counties of Suide, Anding, Ansai, Ganquan, Yanchang, **Wuqi**, etc. have advanced by studying this model co-operative.

What, then, are the special features of the Southern District Co-operative? It has the following good points:

(1) It has smashed dogmatism and formalism in co-operatives, and it does not cling to old ways and regulations. The Southern District Co-operative began as a consumer co-operative. However, its undertakings have extended into every aspect of the economic life of all the people of the Southern District. It does not just manage consumer undertakings but handles supply and distribution, transport, production and credit. It has organized six producer co-operatives for textiles, oil-pressing, blanket manufacture and so forth, and one transport team with more than a hundred animals. It has become a comprehensive co-operative. It does not concentrate on the percentage of income that should be devoted to the co-operative's own public accumulation fund and public welfare fund [*gongjijin*], but strives to share out its profits to the members. It does not place a limit on the share dividend, and each member receives a return on his shares regardless of the number held. It does not limit the right of members to dispose of their shares, and each member has the freedom to withdraw his shareholding at any time. Nor does it limit the nature of the membership. People from all

social strata can join. (Since Yanan is an area that has gone through land revolution, allowing people from all classes to join is no hindrance to the leadership of the co-operative by the Communist Party.) They can also belong to the organs of the co-operative. Moreover, it is not necessary to have ready cash to become a shareholder. Before the co-operative won complete confidence among the masses, it permitted them to become shareholders by using government bonds [*gongzhaiquan*] and savings bonds [*chuxupiao*] to take out shares. In this way the share capital was increased. When the co-operative came to have the confidence of the masses and the masses wanted to take out shares but had no money, it allowed them to use any articles of value such as grain, livestock, eggs and firewood to buy shares. Therefore, all the people praised it.

(2) It has smashed formalism in co-operatives, and conscientiously carried out the policy of facing the masses and working for the benefit of the people. It has, therefore, gradually came to be loved and respected by the masses. For example, every year during spring ploughing, it makes early arrangements to transport shovels from Hancheng and other places, selling them to the peasants at a price lower than the market price. It organizes various productive enterprises, which not only absorb unemployed workers, take on apprentices, and employ the family dependents of working personnel, but also expand profits, guarantee the supply of daily necessities to the people of the area and increase the income of the people. The Southern District Co-operative has organized more than 800 women to spin yarn. Each month they can spin 1,400 *jin*. This has increased the monthly income by 70,000 yuan. The managerial policy of the consumer co-operative is to fully ensure the supply of necessary commodities for the people, not only letting them make fewer trips for their purchases but also charging prices cheaper than those found in shops of large towns.

(3) It uses the policy of benefiting both the public and the private sectors as the bridge between the economic activity of the government and the economic activity of the people. On the one hand, it carries out the financial and economic policies of the government, and on the other, it adjusts the burdens of the people so as to make those burdens more acceptable, raises their income, and increases their enthusiasm. For example, in 1941 when the government was mobilizing for the salt-transport levy, the Southern District Co-operative got the people of the district to hand over a money substi-

tute, and its transport team transported salt for the government on behalf of the people. Before the government collects the grain tax, the co-operative mobilizes the people to pay it to the co-operative itself in accordance with the amount of tax collected in the previous year. The co-operative guarantees to pay the grain tax for the current year on behalf of the co-operative members and also accepts the grain handed over as share capital paid in by people to join the co-operative. Thus, on the one hand, the co-operative acts on behalf of the government, ensuring the payment of the grain tax, using it to make a profit before it is finally paid over. On the other hand, the people not only pay their grain tax but also get some share capital. As a result, some households with surplus grain have even wished to pay two years' worth of their grain tax to the co-operative. No matter what the increase in the grain tax the following year, the co-operative undertakes to pay the difference. More than forty households in the district have done this. In this way, the burdens of the peasants have been fixed, their income has increased, and their enthusiasm for production has also been raised. Another example was when the government of the county and district wanted the people to pay educational expenses and expenses for the guard posts of the self-defense army. The co-operative again paid these for the people from its profits. In this way, the government was saved the trouble of collecting the expenses and the people were not burdened with the payment. The government policies of encouraging immigration and assisting refugees can also be carried out by the co-operative (it can give credit to the refugees and immigrants and so forth). In these ways the interests of the government, the co-operatives, and the people, the interests of the individual and the collective are closely united.

(4) It changes the organizational structure of the co-operative according to the wishes of the people. It does not hold congresses of all file co-operative members, but allows the members to elect delegates from each village. It does not use the method of assessment for raising share capital, but rallies groups of activist co-operative members to go and encourage the people to take out shares. It does not limit the share capital of the co-operative members, and it divides the profit according to shares held. However, in solving the co-operative's problems it does not consider the number of shares owned. Each shareholder has equal rights.

The above are the features of the Southern District Co-operative.

As a consumer co-operative, its characteristics conform to the basic spirit of consumer co-operatives and grow from the life, culture, economy, and politics of the people of the Border Region. As a producer co-operative, while not a co-operative of the producers themselves but an enterprise where shareholders hire labour, its present structure is a means of absorbing unused rural capital to develop handicrafts, and it corresponds to existing conditions in the Border Region where handicrafts are not developed and handicraft workers are few.

Since 1936 the Southern District Co-operative has gone through six to seven years of trial and hard struggle. Now, it has grown from 160 members to include more than 90 per cent of the households of the Southern District. The number of voluntary members is 1,112. The amount of share capital has risen from 159 yuan to 2 million yuan. It has grown from one co-operative to sixteen co-operatives. The net profit has risen from several tens of yuan to 1,620,000 yuan for the first ten months of 1942. It has developed the agricultural, industrial and commercial enterprises of the people of the district and looked after their economic welfare, becoming the economic heart of the people of Southern District.

In the large but under-populated Border Region where the economy is almost entirely a small-scale peasant economy, it is necessary to rely upon truly popularized co-operatives to play a pivotal role in implementing the economic policies of the government and in organizing and encouraging the people to develop the economy. Thus, the road of the Southern District Co-operative is the road for all the co-operatives of the Border Region. A movement to develop co-operatives in the style of the Southern District Co-operative is a major item of work for expanding the economy of the people of the Border Region.

For this reason, the Party and government should carry out the following work in co-operatives throughout the Border Region:

(1) The Reconstruction Department should be responsible for studying the experience of the Southern District Co-operative and for compiling a small handbook as educational material for the fourth section [*ke*] of all county governments and for the personnel of all co-operatives. Furthermore, we should use the opportunity presented by holding meetings in Yanan to take working cadres from all parts of the Border Region on a tour of the Southern District Co-operative.

(2) All the enterprises run by the Commodities Bureau should help successful consumer and producer co-operatives with supplies and distribution. They should sell commodities to the consumer co-operatives, and supply raw material to, and guarantee the purchase of products from, the producer co-operatives. The government should issue 3 million yuan to the Commodities Bureau in 1943 to help in adjusting the co-operatives' supplies and distribution.

(3) In order to stimulate co-operatives the government must clearly stipulate and conscientiously carry out a reduction in the co-operatives' tax burden.

(4) The Border Region Government and the governments of all the counties should seek out students educated to the upper primary school or higher level for training as accountants or managers so as to ease the difficulties of all co-operatives over these.

(5) The personnel of the co-operatives must implement the policy of "popularization" and adopt the wages system, doing away with the system of substitute cultivation for co-operative personnel. They must improve co-operative organization and simplify administration. They must make them into proper enterprises and not official organs. They must reduce the working personnel and reduce expenditure.

In order to ensure that everyone fully understands the history of the development of the Southern District Co-operative, we have specially invited its director, Comrades Liu Jianzhang, to write a report which now follows.

THE HISTORY OF THE YANAN SOUTHERN DISTRICT CO-OPERATIVE

First Period

On 2 December 1936, we began to propagandize the people to buy shares. At that time each share was worth 0.30 yuan in soviet currency. After twenty days there were 160 members with 533 shares giving a total value of 159.90 Yuan.

Wang Tianjin was elected director, Liu Jianzhang accountant, and Li Shengzhang buyer.

Dividends were paid quarterly and the gross profit for the

first quarter was 199.44 yuan.

Expenditures were made up of payments to the three personnel 9 yuan, food 45 yuan, stationery 3.50 yuan, woolen socks and gloves to support the front 13 yuan, help for the dependable of troops of the War of Resistance 15 yuan, support for the small school 8 yuan and public welfare fund 10 yuan. After expenses, the dividend per share was 0.18 yuan, and the total dividend 95.94 yuan.

On the occasion of this dividend, we held a co-operative members' congress attended by all. At this meeting we reported on the work done by the co-operative, shared out the dividend, and gave the members dinner. The meeting produced great results. The members themselves proposed that since the co-operative was helping the dependents of soldiers in the War of Resistance, assisting the small school, and supporting the front with woolen socks and gloves and so forth on their behalf, everyone should buy more shares. This was the first period.

Second Period

Wang Shengming became treasurer. I planned a large increase in the share capital. Director Wang was not satisfied. He argued that an increase in share capital should be carried out when the situation demanded it. I wanted to take the matter to county government for discussion and later we went to see Liu Shichang, head of the National Economy Department [*guomin jingjibi*] of the county government. Department head Liu permitted an increase in share capital. Since Wang Tianjin disagreed with everyone, the county government moved him to another post.

In March 1937, Liu Jianzhang was elected director, Wang Shengming accountant, and Li Shengzhang remained as buyer. Once again there were three people. On one hand we managed the business and on the other we increased the share capital. The date for the second payment of dividend was 2 June, 1937. The total of new shares issued was 2,697, which together with the previous issue made a total of 3,230 with a value of 969 yuan at the maintained rate of 0.30 yuan per share. The sum of 3,657 yuan was handled in turnover [*guoliushui*] during the three months and the gross profit was 276 yuan. Expenditures included

support for the small school 6 yuan, support for the dependents of soldiers in the War of Resistance 12 yuan, donation to the appeal for support for the front 20 yuan, public welfare fund 10 yuan, three months' food 53 yuan, staff payments 13.50 yuan, and office expenses 3.50 yuan. After expenses the dividend per share was 0.05 yuan, a combined total of 161.50 yuan. As before, a congress of co-operative members was held when the dividend was paid. Two-thirds of the members attended. We reported on the activities of the Co-operative. At that time we had bought 3 *tan* of grain on behalf of the troops and had also acted as an agent in the purchase of all the charcoal and firewood used by the reception centre of the Northwest Military Committee [*Xibei Jun-wei*]. All income from this business was in Soviet notes, but the ordinary people did not agree. They asked the co-operative to request goods as a pledge when acting as a purchasing agent. On the one hand they should give some goods and on the other we could accept some Soviet notes. At this time the cadres of the co-operative worked hard and patiently to bring about agreement between the people and the troops. After this we built up relations between the army and the people. If the Soviet notes held by the people could not be used to buy things in other places, the co-operative could buy them. When this was announced, the members gained a greater understanding of the co-operative and stated that "the co-operative was able to act on their behalf".

COMMERCIAL

Third Period

Beginning in June 1937 we again planned to increase the number of cadres. Sun *Shenghua* was promoted to be a buyer. He worked for one month, every day acting as buying agent for the troops which he found very troublesome. He said he wanted to stop working. Despite repeated attempts at persuasion and education, he was determined not to work for the co-operative and so he left. Li Shenghai became buyer. We planned to open a fire wood shop at *Goumenshang*. The co-operative put up 200 yuan capital and it became an independent unit. Li Shengzhang was director of the shop with his wife as cook and Li Shenghai as assistant. In three months the gross profit was 400 yuan.

The current account for the running of the co-operative and

the shop was 7,175. 60 yuan and the gross profit 538. 70 yuan. Three yuan in soviet currency was equivalent to one yuan in national currency [*baipiao*], giving a converted value of 175 yuan [*yang yuan*]. When co-operative members took out shares, 1 yuan in Soviet currency was taken as equivalent to 1 yuan in national currency. We donated 25 yuan for the front and 10 yuan to help the small school. The Director for Women's Affairs of the district was robbed by local bandits and new bedding for her cost 4.50 yuan. The public welfare fund was 12 yuan. Losses on forged notes came to 8.50 yuan, payments to staff 45 yuan, food 90 yuan, and office expenses 7.50 yuan. New shares issued numbered 2,130, making a total of 5,360 with value of 1,596 yuan. Dividend per share was 0.02 yuan.

During this period, the porters in Ansai County, **Baoan** County, and our own district organized a salt-transport co-operative. They pooled their capital and formed a partnership setting up a salt-transport team with a total of twelve donkeys, horses and mules. Together with more than one hundred privately-owned animals, they regularly went to Yanchi to transport salt which was sold through the co-operative. This also encouraged porters from other counties to invest 320 yuan in the shop. During this period the Soviet currency used to buy shares was converted entirely into national currency.

We reported to the September co-operative members' meeting. Everyone expressed the opinion that making the Soviet notes worth 1 yuan in national currency instead of 0.30 yuan had increased the trust of the members. We proposed an increase in the share capital, made a census of the population and surveyed the conditions of the people's economy. The three townships of the district had 432 households with a population of 1,733. There were 222 ox-drawn implements and 323 oxen, 125 donkeys and 270 sheep. The total value of the people's economy for the whole district was 220,000 yuan, including livestock, land, houses and all assets. Excluding grains, the average annual expenditure per head on clothing, agricultural implements, salt, matches, etc. was 40 yuan, making a total of 69,320 yuan. We proposed to the meeting that each person should increase his share capital to 20 yuan so that we could provide daily necessities for the people. The members agreed to increase the share capital and to lengthen the accounting periods from quarterly to half-yearly.

Fourth Period

The fourth period ran from September 1937 to February 1938. The original value of 0.30 yuan per share was raised to 0.50 yuan. The total number of shares was 5,360 valued at 2,680 yuan. The current account was 22,875 yuan and the gross profit 1,732.30 yuan. Outgoing were the public accumulation fund 110 yuan, the public welfare fund 68 yuan, woollen socks and gloves to support the front 245 yuan, support for the dependents of troops in the War of Resistance 18 yuan, support for the small school 12 yuan, payments to co-operative personnel and hired labour 310.50 yuan, food 90 yuan, entertainment expenses 38.50 yuan, office expenses 61.50 yuan, incentives for personnel 60 yuan and repairs 285 yuan. After expenses the dividend per share was 0.08 yuan and the total dividend was 428.80 yuan. Although the co-operative members' meeting for the previous period had proposed raising the share capital per person to 20 yuan, this had only been partly realized because of difficulties in the people's economy. This time the meeting planned to establish a credit co-operative with share capital of 1,000 yuan. People could come to this co-operative for short-term loans for marriages and funerals without paying interest. As soon as this slogan was put forward, the members said they would guarantee the raising of all share capital. The aim was to provide assistance. We also planned to open a restaurant in **Liulin**.

DISTRIBUTION

Fifth Period

This ran from March to August 1938. First of all we increased the number of cadres, recruiting Wang **Yaoming**, Mao **Keye**, Li Shenghai, Huang **Baozhong**, etc. Within three months we raised 1,060 yuan share capital for the credit co-operative and in addition increased other share capital by 110 yuan. Including previous share capital the total was 3,890 yuan. The current account for the six months was 42,500 yuan and the gross profit was 3,633 yuan. Expenses were woollen socks for troops at the front 185 yuan, relief appeal donations 22 yuan, incentives 80 yuan, re-

pairs 230 yuan, meetings and entertainment 85.60 yuan, office expenses 189 yuan, payments and salaries (twenty-four people) 864 yuan, and food 900 yuan. After expenses the dividend per share was 0.10 yuan and the total dividend 778 yuan. When the dividend was distributed we held a meeting of co-operative members' group leaders. We planned to accumulate 500 yuan to buy ploughshares. Each plowshare cost 0.25 yuan so we could buy 2,000. We also planned to expand with an oil-pressing shop [*youfang*], a flour-mill [*fengfang*], and a public welfare centre [*gongyixin*] so as to establish commercial relations in Yanan city. On this occasion none of the group leaders disagreed.

TO MAO

Sixth Period

This ran from September 1938 to February 1939. We changed the share value from 0.50 yuan to 1 yuan, and we increased share capital by 4,510 yuan making a new total of 8,200 yuan. The current account for the six months was 49,860 yuan and the gross profit 4,118 yuan. Expenses included support for dependents of troops in the War of Resistance 34 yuan, the public accumulation fund 654 yuan, the public welfare fund 10 yuan, incentives 131 yuan, entertainment 180 yuan, miscellaneous expenses 116 yuan, salaries and payments to personnel (thirty people) 867 yuan and food 1,116 yuan. During this period all plans were realized. We bought 2,000 shovels in Hancheng. Each shovel was worth 0.50 yuan and the market-price was 0.90 yuan. We sold them to co-operative members at 0.60 yuan each, a saving of 0.30 yuan and a total saving of 600 yuan. The oil-pressing shop and flour-mill were established. In this period we still paid a dividend on a half-yearly basis. There was a total of 850 co-operative members.

Seventh Period

This ran from March to August 1939. We started planning to do business in partnership with private individuals. In the area there were some people who wanted to go into business but feared that the government would increase taxation on them. So they invested their money together with the co-operative as individual

shareholders in a joint venture. First we set up business in partnership with private individuals in Sanshilipu including a noodle shop and a restaurant. The co-operative put up 200 yuan and the individuals 800 yuan. Through this partnership business we solved many problems for the people. We made rule allowing the freedom to invest or withdraw share capital from the co-operative. This lasted until the end of the year when the government, reaffirming the principles of co-operatives pointed out that the co-operative had developed the private economy and this was not allowed. So this business was broken off.

In the same year we expanded share capital by 860 yuan, making a new total of 9,016 yuan. Co-operative members numbered 960.

The current account was 57,600 yuan and the gross profit was 4,778.60 yuan.

After deducting the public accumulation fund, welfare fund and other expenses, the net dividend was 0.10 yuan per share and the total dividend 901.60 yuan.

In the course of paying out this dividend, many difficulties arose. On one hand the expansion of share capital was slow and the rise in commodity prices high, making it difficult for the co-operative to operate. On the other hand, the people reckoned there was no increased profit for the individual, and were unwilling to invest in more shares. We tried again and again to propagandize and persuade them but they remained unwilling to invest more. I myself reckoned that unless we formed partnerships with private individuals, the co-operative could not develop, and that we should do business in such partnerships without government approval. I put this forward for discussion at a management meeting and it was agreed that it should be done.

Eighth Period

In September 1939 we again went into partnership with individuals to set up the **Xinghua** Branch Co-operative at Sanshilipu, the Limin Co-operative at **Goumenshang**, the Minsheng Herbalist at **Liulin**, and the **Lihe** Co-operative at **Nanzhuanghe**. Using the cover of being joint public and private ventures; they attracted over 100,000 yuan of capital from private investors. The

people working in the branches got personal shares. We drew up contracts. There was still complete freedom in making investments and withdrawals and the co-operative did not lay down any restrictions. Subsequently when the county government learned about this, it wanted to see the contracts. After seeing them, it approved the formation of partnerships. The original co-operative was changed into the head co-operative of the district, and the various townships set up branch co-operatives. Excluding the branch co-operatives, the head co-operative again increased share capital by 2,629 yuan, making a new total of 11,645 yuan. The current account for the head and branch co-operatives together was 158,350 yuan and the gross profit 18,250 yuan. Expenses were 8,895.13 yuan and the net profit was 9,354.07 yuan. The dividend per share was 0.10 yuan, including the branch co-operatives. Having set up branch co-operatives, the head co-operative was strong enough to establish productive undertakings. In 1940, in partnership with the **Guanghua** Store, we bought mules and set up a transport team, benefiting from co-operation with private individuals. The original capital of the transport team was 5,000 yuan. By the end of the year, it had expanded to have 160 mules and was regularly transporting salt goods. We also set up a textile mill and a leather-workshop. The West District Co-operative and the **Xinmin** Co-operative at **Dufuchuan** collectively set up a transshipment warehouse and two felt workshops at **Qilipu**. At first shares were taken out on an individual basis so that there could be several co-operative members within one family. Later this became troublesome, so they were combined, taking the household as the unit. Each family became one co-operative member, and there was a total of 853 members.

After the membership had been combined in this way households had 300-500 yuan to 1,000 yuan invested. At the same time, small merchants and porters from other counties had also joined the branch co-operatives with share capital of 10,000 yuan. In particular the porters who came frequently from the counties of **Luochuan**, **Fuxian**, **Ansai**, **Baoan** and **Sanbian** invested in the co-operative. When the dividend was paid in the ninth month we held a meeting of members' representatives and reported on the reasons for the expansion of the co-operative. After examination we put forward the general aims for future work.

First, we wanted to increase shares by 30,000 yuan, and we asked the representatives to guarantee that this would be done. Secondly, we planned to accept local products and to sell them on behalf of the people, to supply the people with all daily necessities, and to take responsibility for buying goods from other areas. Thirdly, the salt, matches, and ploughshares needed by the people of the district would not be bought from outside but would be supplied by the co-operative. We reckoned that the 7,135 people of the district consumed 2 *qian* of a salt per head per day and 4.5 *jin* per head per year, making an annual total of 32,107.5 *jin*. At a price per *jin* set 1 yuan below the market-price, we could save over 32,100 yuan. Each family used five packs of matches per year, a total of 8,675 packs for the whole district. At a price per pack 5 yuan below the market-price, we could save 43,375 yuan. The district used 1,500 ploughshares per year. At 15 yuan below the market-price we could save 22,500 yuan. The total saving for these three items could be 98,050 yuan. The district population's annual consumption of cotton cloth for making clothes was 7,000 bolts. Each bolt required 25 *jin* of raw cotton, a total requirement of 17,515 *jin*. The total value was 3,500,000 yuan. If the yarn was spun by the people, they could earn half of it, that is, 1,750,000 yuan. We reported on our plans to the members at this meeting. After approval by the members, we increased the number of machines for spinning and weaving by peasant women.

Ninth Period

In August 1941 we increased share capital in the form of shares taken out as government bonds for national salvation [*jiuguo gongzhai*]. The government mobilized the people to buy government bonds for national salvation. The amount of bonds to be taken out by the people was added on to their share capital. The dividend on this share capital was paid towards the government bonds of 33,000 yuan. In this difficult situation for the people, we helped them ease their burdens and raised their faith in our ability to do so.

The now share capital was 33,070 yuan. Combined with the old, this gave a total of 44,715 yuan for the head co-operative.

The share capital for the various branch co-operatives was 120,000 yuan and for the transport team it was 80,000 yuan. The combined total was thus 244.715 yuan and the membership was 1,018. The current account for the head and branch co-operatives together was 1,161,840.70 yuan and the gross profit was 284,317.40 yuan. Expenses were 138,849.30 yuan and the net profit was 145,469 yuan. The dividend per share of 1 yuan was 0.70 yuan. When issuing the dividend we proposed that each dividend of 0.70 yuan could be valued at 1 yuan if invested as share capital. This increased members' trust and a lot of the dividend was added on to the share capital. People taking out additional share could use local products, firewood and grain as money, calculating the value higher than market price. For example, each *jin* of grass was valued 0.20 yuan higher than the market-price. This was true of all investment in kind and it also increased the people's trust.



Tenth Period

In 1942 we set up a sock-weaving factory. When we began propagandizing for share capital, we made each share worth 20 yuan and presented the members with a pair of socks. Afterwards, with the increase in the cost of raw cotton, we raised the value of each share to 40 yuan. The total share capital was 30,000 yuan. We set up the sock-weaving factory and it now has six machines. In Yanan city we set up the Yunhe transshipment warehouse with 420,000 yuan share capital. At **Songshulin** we set up a branch co-operative with share capital of 340,000 yuan. The surplus accumulated by the transport team increased its capital to 750,000 yuan. The head and branch co-operatives expanded their share capital by 1,232,000 yuan, making a new total 2,520,000 yuan. The membership was 1,112 (each member represented one household). The largest investor had shares to the value of 5,000 yuan. There were nineteen units of the co-operative within the boundaries of the district (including production, transport, and consumption). Apart from the co-operatives, there was no other private commerce. Southern district is 60 *li* long and 40 *li* broad. It has 1,544 households with 7,128 people. Altogether there are 1,469 oxen, 635 donkeys, 60 horses,

22 mules, and 4,445 sheep. Arable land covers 54,408 *mou*. The wheat harvest was 872.5 *tan*. The harvest of coarse grains was 9,084.16 *tan*, equivalent to 5,662.43 *tan* of hulled grain. The output from subsidiary undertakings was equivalent to 334.25 *tan* of hulled grain. The full total was 6,869.18 *tan*. In 1942 we paid 2,480 *tan* of grain tax leaving 4,389.18 *tan*. The average amount of grain per head was 0.6 *tan*. Animal fodder totalled 1,500 *tan*.

This spring the government mobilized to get 34,000 yuan for educational expenses and for sentry fees for the self-defence army, 8,000 yuan for share capital for production at **Gaomaowan**, and 20,000 yuan for bank savings bonds. The total was 62,000 yuan to be raised in three parts. Each time each household would have to attend a meeting for collection and lose the work of one of its members. This would happen three times and each time the work of 1,500 would be lost. The work of each person was valued at 30 yuan so the total loss of earnings would be 135,000 yuan. Added to the 62,000 yuan the full burden on the people would have been 197,000 yuan. Therefore the co-operative paid the 62,000 yuan, on behalf of the people, saving the 135,000 yuan which would have been lost. We helped the people's production at a particularly busy agricultural time. We also handed over 1,050 packs of salt each worth 240 yuan as salt tax on behalf of the people. The total value of this was 252,000 yuan. Reducing the amount of work-time lost by the people influenced their attitude towards the co-operative, and we increased share capital by 420,000 yuan. We plan to pay next year's salt tax on their behalf.

We organized 600 peasant women to do spinning. Each day each person spun 2 *liang* of yarn. The total of raw cotton spun each day was 75 *jin* and the people should get half of it. Each *jin* of yarn was reckoned as worth 150 yuan. The profit per day was 5,250 yuan and the profit for the year was 1,890,000 yuan. This year they spun 5,000 *jin* of raw cotton. In the first half of the year cotton was low-priced. Combining both halves each *jin* cost 70 yuan. The people earned 2,500 *jin* of raw cotton, equal to 175,000 yuan. The co-operative arranged advances of 20,000 yuan for spinning-wheels. After deducting this 20,000 yuan, the people earned 155,000 yuan. Now we are expanding the amount of spinning done by women. In the past there was no spinning

people earned 155,000 yuan. Now we are expanding the amount of spinning done by women. In the past there was no spinning done in Southern district. Now large numbers of women are taking part, but there are problems of raw materials. Finally, this year we sold 20,000 *jin* of charcoal for the people at 2 yuan per *jin*. The people got 400,000 yuan.

The above facts relate what the co-operative has done. We have not divided out the dividend so far this year on account of the floods. The co-operative has lost 58 buildings with a value of 400,000 yuan, equipment worth 300,000 yuan, goods worth 400,000 yuan, and the Fuchang Storehouse at a value of 200,000 yuan. Total losses were 1,300,000 yuan. The Government later helped us borrow 500,000 yuan and we went to **Dingbian** County three times to sell goods making a gross profit of 300,000 yuan. At present we again have repair expenses of 240,000 yuan and we are expanding share capital.

As regards the organization of the co-operative, each village elects one or two representatives. Co-operative affairs are handled by the twelve-man management committee held on the sixth day of each month. All questions concerning management and cadres are determined at the management committee meetings.

Supplementary notes:

(1) At present the co-operative has 135 buildings and fifty-five stone-built cave houses worth 2,890,000 yuan at current values, liquid capital of 1,500,000 yuan, and equipment and live-stock worth 1,020,000 yuan.

(2) The experience and lessons of the co-operative are explained in the page on the Southern District Co-operative in the volume *Materials on Yanan's Economic Construction*.

December 13, 1942

The above document leaves a gap of two years between the eighth and ninth periods, and there seem to be some omissions. Inquiries were made and the following report came back:

CONCERNING THE PROBLEM OF PERIODIZATION OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT CO-OPERATIVE

Operations began in December 1936 and the first meeting of all co-operative members was held after three months. Altogether three such meetings were held at three-monthly intervals. Then they were changed to once every six months and a further three meetings were held. After the sixth meeting, there was a gap of eight months and then the first meeting of representatives was held (at the end of 1939). Afterwards the second meeting of representatives was held in July 1940, and the third in August 1941. We planned to hold the fourth meeting in July this year but because of floods it was difficult to draw up the accounts so we extended the period. Before 1939, the period between meetings was short and all the members attended. This was because our scope and membership were both small. Later, meetings of representatives were held once a year because our membership was too large, our undertakings had expanded, and drawing up accounts was not easy.

In our previous report we omitted to refer to the second representative meeting of July 1940 and so the eighth period was lengthened into two years.

The previous report was made without proper drafting. If there are still questions on this material please instruct for further reports.

Wang Pinian
Liu Jianzhang
15 December

Below is the report of the comrades of the Yanan County Party Committee on the Southern District Co-operative. It is reproduced here for study.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LIULIN DISTRICT (THE YANAN SOUTHERN DISTRICT) CO-OPERATIVE

Looking at the process of development of the Liulin District Co-operative we can see:

(1) Co-operative operations are not limited to consumption, but are also related to production, credit and transport, making them a coherent whole. The head co-operative and its branches make a total of sixteen.

On the production side, there is the textile-mill, the leather-workshop, the felt-workshop, the oil-pressing shop, and the flour-mill.

On the transport side, there is the transport team with over a hundred animals. The co-operative's capital investment is 500,000 yuan.

Because the Liulin District Co-operative operates by uniting several economic functions together, its scope is wide, its capital is large, its activities are big, its development is fast, and it has solved many problems in the supply of daily commodities for the people. Other co-operatives in this county are limited to consumption. Compared to a co-operative which also carries out production and transport, their capital and scope are small and their development retarded.

(2) The policy for management of co-operatives by the people was put forward by adopting the experience of Liulin. This co-operative's share capital expanded, absorbed the capital of small merchants and drew them in to take part in the work. All the work of the co-operative was discussed and decided by the co-operative members. The people were deeply involved with the co-operative. They did not consider it to be run by officials, but by themselves.

(3) The co-operative solves problems in the supply of daily necessities for the masses, such as bolts of cloth, salt, matches, ploughshares, etc., at lower than market-price. Taking matches and salt alone, the annual savings for the people was more than 80,000 yuan. Naturally the people wish to buy things at the co-operative. The co-operative can supply the entire needs of the people of Liulin District in these four daily necessities.

(4) The co-operative helps the masses out of urgent difficulties, such as those created by marriages or funerals, by allowing them to borrow funds temporarily, either giving credit against bolts of cloth or taking something as a pledge. It sets a time limit for repayment. This fills the role of a credit co-operative, solving major difficulties for the people. Because the co-operative does this at a time of urgent need when no help can be found elsewhere, it creates trust among the people, who consider the co-operative to be something that really helps them.

(5) The co-operative has a variety of ways of expanding share capital:

(i) Buying shares with ready cash.

(ii) Taking out shares in return for goods: a chicken, a pair of shoes, some sheepskins, some hemp ropes, all of which can be exchanged for shares at equivalent value.

(iii) Absorbing the capital of small merchants.

(iv) Helping the masses pay burdens from the government and making this a way of taking out shares. After the government issues its demand, the co-operative turns them into a call for buying shares (to the same amount) and itself pays the taxes. For example, in 1942 the people of the district had to pay 250,000 yuan to the government as a cash substitute for tax salt. This was treated as share capital and paid to the co-operative. The co-operative paid the salt tax to the government, making a profit from the handling of the cash. The people also got a dividend. Government bonds, education costs, sentry costs, and so forth were collected in this way and paid by the co-operative. The government was paid, the co-operative's share capital increased and its operations expanded. The people profited and they had less troubles. They also received dividends as shareholders.

(v) Increasing share capital through making timely responses to the needs of the moment of the people. For example, when they wanted to expand spinning and weaving, they put forward the slogan of raising share capital to do so. In 1941 the co-operative experimented with paying tax grain for the people. For each *tan* of the previous year's grain tax, the people bought shares for cash. The co-operative used the cash to expand its operations. In the following year, when the grain tax was allocated among the people, it was paid by the co-operative from the profits it had obtained. This was done for forty or so households, for whom paying grain tax was almost like not paying. They became shareholders in the co-operative and were able to get a dividend every year. They were very happy, their enthusiasm for production increased, and they got even more grain.

(vi) Paying a dividend on taking out shares. People taking out shares for 40 yuan were issued a pair of socks valued at 20 yuan. In this way the people were encouraged to buy shares.

(6) The co-operative is in a very good geographical position since it is in Liulin District, which is close to the large commercial market in Yanan. Liulin has much forest land. Many people sell

timber and charcoal, which raises their income and thus there is a lot of liquid capital in the villages which can be absorbed in the purchase of shares. At the same time, being near a market, the turnover of capital is very quick. These are objective factors.

(7) The scope of the co-operative's activities is very wide. It has established relations with the Border Region Bank, the Guanghua Store and the various official organizations in Yanan. Sometimes it can borrow capital or do a lot of work for the official organizations, and the co-operative has been able to develop through this mutual help.

(8) The cadres have not been transferred much, and they pay attention to investigation and research. Director Liu has not been transferred to other work since he was appointed. He has been able to concentrate exclusively on his work, research and on thinking of ways of doing things. At the same time, he also pays great attention in investigating objective conditions. For example, he often investigates such things as the annual consumption per individual of bolts of cotton, salt, matches and so forth, so as to solve the people's problems.

Here is an example to show the relationship between the co-operative and the people. In 1941, the peasant **Bai Da of Lufengpo**, in Liulin District, had to hand over 60 yuan for the nation's salvation grain tax. Beforehand he paid it to the co-operative as share capital. At the appointed time the co-operative paid the government on his behalf. Later the dividend was added to the original capital of 60 yuan bringing it up to 200 yuan. He bought four ploughshares from the co-operative and saved 15 yuan on each (that is, they were sold at 15 yuan less than the market price), making a total saving of 60 yuan. He bought five packs of matches saving 5 yuan on each, a total of 25 yuan. At the end the twelfth lunar month in 1941, he bought goods worth 1000 yuan at the co-operative but only paid 500 yuan saving 500 yuan. Subsequently, the market prices of these goods rose by 550 yuan. Including the previous purchases of ploughshares and matches, he saved a total of 635 yuan. Originally he had to pay 60 yuan in grain tax, now it has become share capital of 200 yuan and he saved 635 yuan on the purchase of goods. This has really made the co-operative belong to the people, facilitating their dealings and looking after their interests. There are many examples like this.

The Co-operative Situation throughout the County

Table 5.1

Number of co-operatives in Yen-an County,
1941 and July 1942

	1941	1942
Branch co-operatives	18	30
District co-operatives	8	8
Total	26	38

Table 5.2

Capital (in yuan) invested in co-operatives
in Yen-an County, 1941 and 1942 (half year)

	1941	1942 (for half year)
District co-operatives	264,207.56	312,207.56
Branch co-operatives	193,340.00	978,507.14
Total	457,547.56	1,290,714.70

Within six months capital increased by 833,167.14 yuan. The fastest increase in capital was in the branch co-operatives, which are directly organized by the people with the support of the district co-operatives. Therefore, the people are very enthusiastic about taking shares.

The average taken from 1,290,000 yuan works out to 20 yuan per head of the population of the county. This is not much, so the role of the co-operatives in the entire county is still a minor one.

Important experience

(1) Persist in the policy of management by the people and non-interference by the government. We inspected the co-operatives in

July this year and called for an increase in share capital. Substantial capital should be held by the co-operatives.

(2) Co-operative cadres should not be lightly transferred to other posts. Let them be settled in their posts, concentrating on their work. Guarantee their livelihood. Co-operatives should adopt the method of assigning personal shares [*da Shenfen*]. That is, each member of the co-operative's personnel should be equivalent to a number of shares depending on his ability and work. For example, if someone is made equivalent to shares of 5,000 yuan, he is paid the interest due on shares of 5,000 yuan at the time of settling accounts. This becomes his salary and he does not receive any other income.

(3) Enlarging the scope of co-operative undertakings should not be limited to consumption alone but should include production, transport, credit and so forth. This is an inevitable trend in co-operative development henceforth. That is to say, we must run comprehensive co-operatives.

(4) Concentrate on making a good job of one or two co-operatives and gaining experience. Gradually expand to other areas. For example, we are preparing to turn the Songshulin Co-operative of *Jinpen* District into a second Liulin Co-operative.

These are opinions on our future work.

6. ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SALT INDUSTRY

Salt is the great resource of the Border Region. It is the mainstay which balances imports and exports, stabilizes the currency, and regulates commodity prices. A large proportion the people rely on salt [as a form of] exchange for goods from outside. A relatively large proportion of the troops and working personnel rely on salt for their livelihood or to supplement their livelihood. Salt is also a major source of government financial revenue. Therefore, salt plays an extremely important role in the Border Region. Since the War of Resistance began the supply of salt from the sea has been cut off and the supply from the Huai area and from Shanxi has been reduced. The southwest relies on salt from Sichuan and the northwest and the eastern areas on salt from Ningsia and Qinghai. Salt from a Border Region has thus come to occupy an important position, and the transport and sale of salt increases annually. In 1938 our salt exports were only 70,000 packs (each pack is 150 *jin* and each *jin* is

24 *liang*.). In 1939 there was a sudden increase to 190,000 packs. In 1940, the figure was 230,000 packs, and in 1941 there was another abrupt increase to 299,068 packs. By September 1942 the total was 155,790 packs, and it is estimated that another 70,000-80,000 packs can be sold in the last three months, making a total of 230,000-240,000 packs. These statistics reflect two important facts: the first is the external demand, and the second is our hard work. Some comrades cannot see that external demand is determined by the War of Resistance and that within certain limits salt can be sold. Therefore, they propose that things should follow their own course and that there is no need for the Party and government to interfere. Other comrades merely ascribe the yearly increase in the sale of salt to external demand and do not recognize that the leadership of the Party and government is a great factor in that increase. We began to pay attention to the salt industry in autumn 1940. As well as the objective factor of the external salt famine and depletion of salt stocks, which made 1941 salt sales particularly good, the abrupt increase from 230,000 packs in 1940 to 299,000 packs in 1941 was also due to the subjective factor that we implemented through the policy of supervising transport in that year. Apart from the fact that external demand was not as urgent as in 1941, the sudden drop to 230,000-240,000 packs in 1942 from the previous year's 299,000 was due to our abandonment of the policy of supervising transport (putting an end to the many plans made by the people for transporting salt). If we do not learn a lesson from this, we shall repeat past mistakes in future work. Certainly there were defects in the salt-industry work for 1941. The original plan to transport 600,000 packs was too big. The Border Region still does not have such a great transport capacity. The achievement in producing 700,000 packs of salt was good, but the quality [of the salt] was too poor. Supervision of transport was correct but it was unnecessary to mobilize everyone everywhere. There were also many abuses in the organization and method of mobilization which did not accord with the actual situation. All these things were shortcomings and mistakes in our work in 1941. Nevertheless, adopting a policy of active development of the salt industry was entirely correct. Belittling, misunderstanding and even opposing this policy is entirely wrong.

What should be done in 1943? First we must determine a policy for active development. In the current situation in the Border Region, we certainly cannot adopt a negative approach towards salt

because it is a major factor in solving financial problems (the publicly owned salt industry and the salt tax), in balancing imports and exports, and in stabilizing the currency and commodity prices. Therefore, we must enlarge the already established Salt Company into the main force for allying public and private salt industry and for expanding public and private production, transport and sales. And we must improve the quality of salt produced so as to promote sales. We must restore transport supervision and organize all possible transport capacity among the people to expand salt transport. We must draw in porters from outside areas to transport and sell more. We must build roads, and arrange for inns, warehouses and fodder to help transport. The Salt Company should gradually gain control of outside sales in order to avoid the anarchic situation produced by lack of public and private co-ordination. These are our general policies for the active development of the salt industry in 1943. Concrete arrangements should be as follows:

(1) Expand the Salt Company and increase its capital. Under the direction of the Commodities Bureau raise share capital from the various official organizations, the troops and private individuals. Develop salt transport, expand salt sales. Regulate salt prices. Guarantee that the Company transports 40,000 pack in 1943, and with this salt as a basis, buy as much salt from the people as possible to carry out partial unification of salt sales to outside areas. Afterwards, depending on the situation, gradually achieve complete unification so as to prevent outside manipulation and guarantee the interests of the government and the people.

(2) In 1943 plan to produce 400,000 packs of salt and to transport 300,000-360,000 packs. Moreover, strive to exceed this. As regards production, continue the policy of supervision by officials and production by the people. Ensure that the salt is mostly or entirely top-quality and do not allow inferior quality to be produced again. As regards transport, plan for the Salt Company system to transport 400,000 packs, draw in porters from outside to move 50,000 packs, and organize the manpower and animal power of the Border Region to move 210,000-260,000 packs, making a total of 300,000-360,000 packs.

(3) The organization of the manpower and animal power of the Border Region to transport 210,000-260,000 packs is im-

mense, arduous and meticulous piece of organizational and mass work. It should be directed by the Reconstruction Department and supervised by the government at various levels, the Party committees at each level having the responsibility for checking up and helping. Mobilization to transport salt must have a degree of coercion, but it certainly must avoid commandism which causes damage. We must chiefly adopt the policy of unit propaganda and persuasion. The organization to transport salt must take the forms of transport co-operatives and transport teams. Propagandize the masses to buy shares voluntarily. Some can provide manpower, and some can provide draught animals. Some can provide both. Some can provide running costs and some, in special circumstances, can be exempted from providing anything. We can organize transport teams among people who have rich experience in portering, together with the necessary animals. The Party and government at county, district and township levels should actively direct the rational, fair and health, organization of these transport teams. They should set off smoothly, do the necessary work along the way and ensure the safety of the personnel and animals. On return, pay attention to the distribution of the co-operative's profits and guarantee the interests of the people involved and of all the co-operative members. Salt transport must not violate the agricultural season. We must strengthen the organization of labour mutual-aid co-operatives (exchange labour) so that after the transport team has set off, the co-operative members do not lose agricultural production through lack of manpower and animal power. As regards the salt-transport organizations (co-operatives and teams) of the Sui-Mi Special Military Area and the three eastern counties, we should allow the masses greater freedom and reduce coercion. The transport co-operatives and teams of all places must be built up on a basis of benefiting the co-operative members. The duties of the Party and government lie in making these benefits increase daily, otherwise we will certainly be defeated. The Reconstruction Department, the sub-regions and counties should teach the people through the most successful examples of salt transport by the masses. They should propagandize them widely for imitation so as to be certain that the plan for salt-transport in 1943 will be completed and will also bring large direct benefits for the people.

(4) The enterprises of the Commodities Bureau and the

people's co-operatives in all places must closely co-ordinate with the people's transport co-operatives and teams, and strive to ensure that the animals used by the people to transport salt are able to transport other goods on their return journey. Only then can the people's salt-transport undertaking expand and the whole of salt transport develop, and only then will the whole salt-transport plan be completed.

(5) The key sector in developing the salt industry is transport, and the major condition for transport is communications. In 1943 the government should allocate 2 million yuan under the direction of the Reconstruction Department for the building of two cart-roads between Yanan and Dingbian, and Dingbian and Qingyang, and for repairing the road from Yanan to Fuxian. Furthermore, the Commodities Bureau should set up inns with stables and trans-shipment warehouses along the main salt transport routes, and dig water-storage holes in places lacking water. The Reconstruction Department and Commodities Bureau together should plant alfalfa widely along the routes and also provide fodder in other ways. So long as there are roads, inns, grass and water, transport costs can be greatly cut, the volume of transport can be greatly increased, and the three forms of transport — porters from outside, people from the area and the Salt Company — can all develop. Plans to improve the means of transport should also be directed by the Reconstruction Department. Carts and handcarts should be built according to road conditions in order to increase salt transport. Provided the roads are well built, it is much better for the government to use more carts and the people to use more handcarts than to use pack-animals.

(6) In 1943 the salt tax is fixed as 100,000 packs. Those who live near will provide transport, those who live far away will provide a substitute, and some will provide a mixture of both. However, the salt tax and the development of the salt industry are two different matters. So long as we can definitely export 300,000-360,000 packs, it does not matter whether we accept actual salt or substitute payments for the salt tax.

If we can complete our plans for planting cotton and spinning and weaving in 1943, we can reduce our imports of raw cotton, cotton yarn and cotton cloth. If we can export 300,000-360,000 packs of salt in 1943 at an average value of 10 yuan Border Region cur-

rency per *jin* (each donkey pack is 150 *jin*) our income will be between 450 million yuan and 540 million yuan. Thus, by reducing one and increasing the other, the Border Region's problem of balancing imports and exports will be entirely solved. The following material reflects the people's experience in the transport of salt during 1941.

A RECORD OF LU ZHONGCAI'S LONG MARCH

Report on the first experiences in salt transport of **Chengguan** District, **Fuxian** County, as told by the deputy leader of Chengguan District, Lu **Zhongcai**. Supplemented by Wang **Yuxian** and Kong **Zhaoping**. Recorded by **Gao** Kelin, August 13, 1941.

(1) For the first salt transport, Chengguan District should have provided fifty pack animals. In fact, it provided twenty-eight. The reason the plan was not fulfilled was the lack of animals (at the very most we could mobilize forty). Some animals were hidden away and not kept at home. The District Government did not handle things firmly as it was busy with grain loans and government bonds.

(2) We set off on July 18 and returned home on August 11, a total of twenty-five days. It took twelve days to get from **Fuxian** to **Dingbian**, one day to get to Yanchi and load up, and twelve days to return. The longest stage was 90 *li*. The route, stage names and conditions during each stage was as follows:

(i) From Fuxian to **Zhangcunyi**, 50 *li*. Five gullies and the road was difficult. Good water and grass.

(ii) Zhangcunyi to Lannipo, altogether five stages, each 70 *li*. Road good. Cut grass to feed the animals.

(iii) Lannipo to **Lijiabian**. 20 *li* of mountains and 40 *li* of gullies. Road difficult. Fodder no good.

(iv) Lijiabian to Lujiajiao. 30 *li* of gullies and 5 *li* of mountains. Most difficult to travel. Fodder no good.

(v) Lujiajiao to Luanshitouchuan. Travelling in gullies. There were military stations. Fodder was sold (each 100 *jin* of mountain grass 30 yuan of valley grass 50 yuan, and wheat hay 40 yuan.).

(vi) Luanshitouchuan to Sanlimiao, 80 *li*. There were military stations. Dry grass cost 50 yuan for 100 *jin*. Forty *li* of mountains, very precipitous. Difficult to travel. Water difficult (Salt water not drinkable.). Saw a salt-porter whose donkey had fallen to its death.

(vii) Sanlimiao to Liangzhuang, 80 *li*.

(viii) Liangzhuang to Dingbian 90 *li*. There were military stations. Fodder 50 to 100 yuan per 100 *jin*. No water.

(ix) Dingbian to Yanchi, 40 *li*. One day there and back. Sandy road difficult to travel.

(3) Difficulties along the route were:

(i) During three of the five stages from Zhangcunyi to Lannipo, locusts [*zhame**ng*] were biting. It was best for men and animals to travel in the evening.

(ii) During the two stages from Sanlimiao to Liangzhuang and thence to Dingbian there was no water. Men and animals were thirsty.

(iii) There were a lot of thieves at Dingbian. Animals, money, clothing and tools often taken.

(iv) Beyond Luanshitouchuan since salt-transport animals from various counties converge there are often several thousands or hundreds of animals travelling together. Thus there are problems of inn-space, fodder, water, and especially of room to rest animals. Things can easily go wrong and cause trouble.

(4) Life on the road:

Chengguan District sent twenty-eight animals and fourteen men. Along the way we cooked for ourselves. Each meal required 7 *sheng* of millet, roughly 25 *jin*. Everyone felt that "We eat more when we have set out". Inn charges ranged from 3 yuan at the lowest to 8 yuan at the most. It depended entirely on whether you had a good or bad relationship with the manager of the inn. When travelling we sang and told stories, many of them about Duke Xiang seeking a wife. Everyone was very happy and no one felt burdened. Animal fodder was cut in rotation. It was plentiful and could not all be eaten up. The masses along the route were very good, and there was no problem in getting grain

and fodder, though we chiefly relied on ourselves. Sometimes there were quarrels, mainly because the animals had eaten someone's crops. Only in one place did the manager of an inn give us bad grain.

(5) Points that arose during the journey:

Good:

(i) None of the animals had any illness. Those from the First and Third Townships were thin when we set off but returned fat. This was because of the care of the porters, and careful feeding.

(ii) None of the porters had any illness. Everyone was very fit and in good spirits. No one grew thinner. They just got a little sunburned.

(iii) Nothing was left behind along the way and the animals did not eat people's crops. This was mainly because deputy district head Lu Zhongcai's was an old porter. He was experienced, responsible, and meticulous. Everyone else was very active and thus we were successful.

Bad:

(i) Du Hai, head of the village council of the First Administrative Village of the Third Township, sold good donkey and bought a bad one to go. As a result the donkey was exhausted, did not carry pack and we wasted 165 yuan in travel expenses. The township also sent another bad animal (it had bad loins) and Jianjuntaicun of Fourth Township sent donkey with a bad leg. Neither carried salt and each wasted 165 yuan in travel expenses. Furthermore, the same village sent a donkey with a rotten saddle with the result that its back was hurt through the pressure of its load. The head of Second Township had two donkeys. He sent a bad one with a pod saddle and frame. This caused a lot of bother along the way. The district-level government did not make a careful inspection of these matters before we set out. Some were known about but not corrected. As a result only twenty-five of the twenty-eight donkeys carried salt. The other three travelled without loads, not contributing one bit to the value of salt carried and wasting from 500 to 600 yuan in travel costs.

All in, the total loss was over 1,500 yuan. This is a valuable warning for district and township cadres.

(ii) The head of the village council of Jianjuntaicun in Fourth Township did not obey Deputy District Head Lu Zhongcai's instructions. He did not bring good fodder for the animals (oats [*yumai*] and broad beans [*candou*]) and instead used *kaoliang* and other poor substitutes. As a result, the animals from that township sometimes lay down when travelling because of their poor fodder. We are preparing to struggle against that village head and punish him.

(iii) The porter Yang *Wanbao* from Fourth Township was a real troublemaker on the way. He pretended to be ill and skulked off home. He created wild rumours, "two people had died, Deputy District Head Lu and a man called Wang. . . . There was nothing to eat along the way. . . . The donkeys' backs had all been ruined under their loads. . . . The inns could not sell grain . . ." so that many people back in the town felt unhappy. The district head did not pay sufficient attention to this. In future he should be alert.

(iv) Some families sent bad donkeys which carried less, only about 110 *jin*. One family from Jianjuntaicun in the Fourth District changed their donkey's halter for a bad one when they sent it off. They anticipated the donkey would die and had made up their minds to write everything off. The donkey from the head of Second Township was only 10 *li* from home on the way back when it lay down. He was unwilling to send a good donkey to take over. He defaulted on his responsibility as he thought the donkey would surely die and could not return. So he did not come and take over.

(v) Twelve donkeys carried too much and 40 to 50 *jin* were given to a donkey without a load. When we got to the tax inspection office at *Sunkeyaoxian* they confiscated 50 *jin* of salt and one sack (value 20 yuan) because we had no certificate.

(6) Costs, losses and gains:

(i) Average expenses per donkey were: 2 *tou* of beans, value 60 yuan; each man had 1.5 *tou* of grain, and as each man looked after two donkeys this equaled 0.75 *tou* per don-

key with a value of 35 yuan; travelling costs were 70 yuan. The total 165 yuan. In addition there was salt capital [*yanben*] of 20 yuan. The average cost per donkey was thus 185 yuan.

(ii) On average each donkey from First Township carried 130 *jin*, and from Second, Third and Fourth Townships 110 *jin*. At present market prices of 200 yuan per 100 *jin* salt, each load was worth from 220 to 260 yuan.

(iii) At current prices, after expenses are deducted, earnings per donkey load ranged from 35 to 75 yuan.

Notes:

(a) If each donkey were able to carry 150 *jin*, the guaranteed income per donkey at current prices would be above 100 yuan.

(b) Reports on amounts carried were given by the porters who were certainly holding something in reserve — most donkeys here can carry 150 *jin*.

(c) At the same time the principle is clear that so long as you have good donkeys you can earn more. The worse the donkeys the less you earn, and you can even make a loss.

(7) Experience and lessons:

(i) The victorious return of this salt-transport team from Chengguan District, Fuxian, proves that the Party and Government's plans, estimates and methods for salt transport are entirely correct. The doubts, lack of trust and considerations that it would be a burden by various comrades are all erroneous and shallow outlooks.

(ii) We smashed the fears of some cadres and masses about going to Sanbian for salt ("men and animals will die . . . they will go and not return"). On the contrary the animals carrying salt returned fatter, and the men were healthier and merely a little sunburned.

(iii) We proved that salt transport can earn money, and smashed the inaccurate reckless talk that we "certainly would lose capital", "each donkey would lose 100 yuan", and "it is the greatest burden ever imposed it the Border Region".

(iv) We showed that certain cadres at district and township levels, particularly at township level, did not do their

work responsibly (they did not inspect carefully), were prepared to cover-up things that were wrong (village and township heads could send poor animals and were not investigated), were corrupt (used poor kaoliang instead of beans), and had become tails following behind the masses.

(v) The cadres played a decisive role. Deputy District Head Lu Zhongcai was experienced, lively and responsible. Each time we reached a place or something happened, he held a discussion meeting of the porters — he even discussed how much salt each donkey should carry. As a result, neither men nor animals came to any harm and on the contrary ended up stronger and in better spirits than when they set out.

Lessons:

(i) The district and township cadres did not pay attention to and investigate at the right time the troublemaker from Fourth Township, Yang Wanbao who skulked off home and created rumours. They did not talk to him and did not report to higher levels. As a result a rumour spread among the people of the district that two people had died — deputy district head Lu and somebody Wang — and that three donkeys had died. This made people very uneasy.

(ii) There were problems along the way (some stages were hard going, one or two had many locusts, and two had little water) but they could be overcome. On bad roads we had to be more careful. Where there were locusts we travelled in the evening. Where there was little water we drank more on getting up in the morning and carried water with us. With patience all difficulties could be overcome.

(iii) The better the donkeys, the more we can earn. If we could earn 75 yuan for each donkey that carried 130 *jin* this time, we can earn 115 yuan for donkeys carrying 150 *jin*. The worse the donkeys the less we can earn, and we can even make a loss. For example, Chengguan District sent three poor donkeys (one with bad loins, one with bad legs, and one was exhausted). As a result they did not carry salt. Each donkey wasted 165 yuan in travelling expenses and the total loss including porters was over 1,000 yuan. At the same time this showed that work must be done carefully and you cannot muddle through. If the district and township had carefully

inspected the donkeys sent this time, worked conscientiously, and not given any favours, we, would not have made these losses since everyone would have known about the poor donkeys.

(iv) If we had not stayed at inns along the way and let the animals out to pasture not buying hay, we could have saved over 50 yuan per donkey. What we save becomes earnings.

(v) We must pay more attention to the national laws. Because we were not careful we had 50 *jin* of salt and one sack confiscated. This was an unnecessary loss.

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7. ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-SUPPORTING INDUSTRY

The agriculture, animal husbandry, handicraft industry, co-operatives and salt industry discussed above are all economic undertakings by the people. The Party and government give guidance and help within the bounds of possibility and need so that these things can develop and the requirements of the people can be met. At the same time, the portion handed over to the government by the people in the form of taxes ensures a part of the government's needs (for example, grain tax, salt tax and other taxes) and the portion handed over in the form of trade ensures another part of the government's needs (for example, raw cotton, cotton yarn, cotton cloth, wool, etc.). Their basic nature is that of undertakings run by the people. Only in the case of the salt industry, where 40,000 packs of salt are transported and sold under the control of the government's Salt Company and the 5,000 or so packs are consumed directly by government personnel, does a part (about one-seventh of the whole) belong to the public sector of the economy.

As a whole, the undertakings of the public sector of the economy consist of the following three kinds: (1) the salt industry, industry and commerce run by the government; (2) the agriculture, industry and commerce run by the army; and (3) the agriculture, industry and commerce of the official organization of the Party and government.

These all directly ensure the supply of the living and other expenses of the Party, government and army personnel. According to accounts for 1942 and the budget for 1943, the amount supplied in this way exceeds the amount handed over by the people in the form of taxes (including the grain tax). Therefore publicly run economic undertakings have become the greater of the two large sources ensuring financial supplies. Their importance cannot be overstated.

The reasons we pay attention to publicly run economic construction are both historical and contemporary. During the civil war, the Party Central established some publicly run industry and commerce in the Jiangxi Soviet in order to meet the need of the war. At that time, we initiated the growing of vegetables and raising of pigs by the various official organizations and schools so as to make up for the lack of provisions. Only the army did not have experience in production. Also, since the peasants of Jiangxi were comparatively rich and numerous, it was not yet necessary for us ourselves to set to provide grain. These are historical reasons. Since the War of Resistance began, we have found ourselves in a very special situation. At first, the Kuomintang provided a very small amount of ratio for our arms. Subsequently, it cut them off entirely. The Border Region was blockaded, leaving us no alternative but to become self-supporting in supplying the needs of the War of Resistance. These are contemporary reasons.

After the War of Resistance began, attention was turned to publicly run economic construction in 1938. Since we could not cover the costs of our army we began a production movement. However, at that time we only ordered some of the troops to take part in production, growing vegetables, raising pigs, cutting wood, making shoes and so forth on a trial basis. The aim was simply to rely on this as a way of improving the livelihood of the soldiers. We still did not plan to rely on it as a way of providing general finance and supplies. Later we saw how successful the soldiers were in this experiment. They could do a lot of productive work during their rests from training, and their living standards really improved. After this happened there was a reduction in the instances of desertion. On seeing this success, we applied the experience widely among the troops garrisoned in the Border Region. An order was issued from the Garrison Office [*liushouchu*] calling on the troops to learn from this example. But we still aimed at improving livelihood and not at meeting general needs. At that time the government started to pay

attention to setting up several small factories but the official organizations and schools were not even called on to grow vegetables and raise pigs. In 1939 the Kuomintang issued the *Methods to Restrict the Activities of Alien Parties* and relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party worsened. The number of official organizations and schools in the Border Region also increased. Although there was a small amount of subsidy for expenses from outside, it was already far from sufficient. We were facing a serious situation in finance and supplies. For these reasons we were forced to devise a movement for all-round mobilization to become economically self-supporting. We then raised the following questions at the congress for cadre mobilization. Do you want to starve to death? Shall we disband? Or shall we set-to ourselves? No one approved of starving to death, and no one approved of disbanding. Let us set-to ourselves — this was our answer. We pointed out this simple principle: in the final analysis, how did ancient man survive if not by getting down to it himself? Why is it that we, the sons and grandsons of these ancient men, do not even have this spark of intelligence? We also pointed out: it is very common for an exploited peasant household in a feudal society with three or four or even seven or eight mouths to feed to rely on the production from the labour power of only one individual. Such a family must not only support itself, but must also pay 50 to 80 per cent of its income in rent and taxes to others. Why are we not as good as such a family? Our army is made up entirely of labour power; there are no women, and no old and young. Nor is there the burden of rent and taxes. How could hunger arise? We have these powerful organs of government. Why cannot they provide their own clothing, food, housing and equipment? We reflected for a while on the reasons why ancient man and today's poor peasant were able to survive, and moreover to live better than wild animals. Without doubt, it was because each had a pair of hands, and extended their hands using tools. We again considered ourselves. In fact each of us has a pair of hands, and we can extend them with tools. This period of reflection was very important. Thereafter our problems were immediately solved. In sum, we affirmed that we were able to overcome economic difficulties. Our response to all problems in this respect were the three words "set-to ourselves". This time the tasks we set were no longer the same as those of 1938. We no longer wanted merely to improve our livelihood, but also wanted to meet some of our general needs. The

scope of mobilization was not limited to the army and we called on all forces, official organizations and schools to carry out production. We implemented a call for a large-scale production movement. *The Song of Opening up New Land* was a new song from that period, and so was *The Production Chorus*. This call not only mobilized the several tens of thousands of personnel in the Party, government, army and schools, but also mobilized the common folk of the Border Region. In that year the common folk opened up over 1 million *mou* of new land. This call also reached all over North China. Many units of the Eighth Route Army at the battlefield also carried out production during breaks in the fighting. This was the first stage of our movement for self-sufficiency in production. This stage included the three whole years of 1938, 1939 and 1940. During this stage the government's industrial construction advanced and the army, official organizations and schools developed agricultural production.

From 1941 until this Senior Cadres' Conference (December 1942) has been the second stage. The foundation for self-supporting production had already been firmly laid. During these two years personnel increased and many people unable to find enough to eat outside came to the Border Region seeking food. The 359 Brigade also came to strengthen defences along the Yellow River. The troops have grown in number and support from outside has completely ceased. There are only two sources for the government's living and operating expenses, the people and the government itself. As a result of two years' hard work the proportion of the total amount coming from the government itself is greater than that coming from the people. Experience during this stage makes us feel grateful to those people who blockaded us. For the blockade as well as having its negative drawbacks also brought about a positive side, which was to encourage us to be determined to set to ourselves. As a result we achieved our goal of overcoming difficulties and trained experience in running economic enterprises. The old saying "hardship and distress help you to success" is something we have come to understand entirely and consciously.

During the first of the two stages we have gone through, the troops, official organizations and schools placed emphasis on agriculture and the government developed industry. During the second stage we stressed commerce in order to provide for the critical needs of the moment. With the exception of those troops, official organizations and schools which persisted in the policy of putting agricul-

ture in a prime position, the rest developed business skills and did not place such heavy emphasis on agriculture as in the first stage. However, the government, troops, official organizations and schools all developed industry and handicrafts. After this Senior Cadres' Conference we will enter a new stage of development. In the new stage our economic base will already be rather firm and our experience fairly wide. He should put agriculture in first place, industry, handicrafts, transport and animal husbandry in second place, and commerce in third place. Since commerce can only help in an emergency, we cannot and should not attempt to lay a long-lasting foundation upon it.

Distinctions between the government, the army, and the official organizations and schools in the public sector of the economy can only be made in terms of management and not in terms of an economic nature. Therefore, in the following discussion on self-supporting industry we shall treat the industry run by all three as a whole, and when discussing the self-supporting economy of the army and the official organizations and schools, we shall again look at their industrial production separately. However, since industry run by the government is the largest part of all publicly run industry (government textile mills produce 56 per cent of the 22,000 bolts of cloth produced annually by all publicly run textile mills; the output of government paper factories is 70 per cent of all publicly run paper production; the output of government soap factories is 70 per cent of all Border Region soap production), it is rational to deal with all self-supporting industry alongside that run by the government.

Why should unified, self-supporting industry be run in such a dispersed way? The main reason is that the labour force is divided among the various branches of the Party, government and army. If it were centralized, we would destroy their activism. For example, we encouraged the 359 Brigade to set up the **Daguan** Textile Mill and did not order it to combine with a government mill because most of the several hundred employees at the mill were selected from the officers and men of the 359 Brigade. They work to produce the bedding and clothing requirements of the Brigade and their enthusiasm is high. If we centralized, we would destroy this enthusiasm. Another important reason for dispersed operation is that raw materials are in many different locations and this causes transport problems. For example, in order to meet the needs of the Party, government

and army personnel of **Guanzhong, Longdong, Sanbian**, and Suide the bedding and clothing industry finds it best to produce cloth (or buy it) on the spot, and to make it up on the spot. It certainly should not concentrate its making up in Yanan alone. Thus we use the activism of the various branches to undertake production to meet their own needs. Adopting the policy of "dispersed operation" is correct and ideas aimed at centralizing everything are wrong. However, enterprises of the same kind carried out within the same area should be centralized as much as possible. Unlimited dispersal is not profitable. At present we are already carrying out or about to carry out centralization of this kind. One example is the handing over to government control of the **Tuanjie** Textile Mill of the Central Committee's Central Administration Bureau [**Zhongguang Guanliju**] and the Jiao-tong Textile Mill of the Rear Services Department [**honquinbu**]. Perhaps this process of dispersal at first and centralization later cannot be avoided. Dispersal makes it possible to use the activism of various branches when setting something up, and centralization enables the various branches to get better supplies. But it is very important that dispersed management does not lead to forgetting centralized leadership. This facilitates unified planning, balanced supplies, and essential arrangements in rational management and distribution. Up to now we have had great shortcomings in this respect and they must be corrected in future. To sum up, our policy is "centralized leadership and dispersed operation". Not only is industry like this, agriculture and commerce are too.

At this point we must distinguish between two forms of publicly owned agriculture, industry and commerce, the large and the small. The large ones should be centralized and the small ones should be dispersed. Examples of things for which we should encourage dispersed operation include agricultural work, such as growing vegetables, raising pigs, cutting wood and making charcoal, and such handicrafts as shoemaking, knitting, or small mills, when both are run by one or more provision units [**huoshi danwei**] to provide for their own daily food, bedding and clothing needs and to make up deficiencies in running expenses; or co-operatives and small-scale commerce operated to provide from consumption costs or to earn a small profit to cover office expenses. These things must be dispersed, being carried out and developed everywhere. They cannot be centralized and should not be. This is one kind. However, there is another kind. Examples of this are such things as large agricul-

tural plans to provide a definite amount of grain for a whole brigade or regiment of troops — that is the military farming [*tun tian*] plan; large agricultural stations run to meet the grain and vegetable requirements of many official organizations; large workshops and factories run to provide for the bedding, clothing and daily requirements of a Whole brigade, a regiment, or a large number of official organizations; and large-scale commerce run to meet the operating costs of such large units. All these things must have a unified plan, centralized control, and strict regulation of expenditure. We cannot allow them to lack co-ordination and operate without restraint. However, agriculture, industry and commerce which should be under centralized leadership must not be put entirely in the hands of one single official organization for the whole Border Region. Instead the unified plan drawn up by such an official organization (at present the Border Region Finance and Economy Committee and its office) according to the needs of the whole and the parts and the possibilities for operation, is handed over to the Party, government and army systems for separate implementation. Within the Party, government and army systems, there is also a unified plan with division in operation. These are the features of the policy of “centralized leadership and dispersed operation” in the publicly owned sector of the economy of the Border Region.

In the five years since 1938, the public sector of the economy has made some very great achievements. These achievements are worth treasuring for ourselves and for our nation. That is, we have established a new model for the national economy. The reason that this is a new model is that it is neither the old Bismarkian model of the national economy, nor the new Soviet model of the national economy; but it is the national economy of the New Democracy or the Three People’s Principles.

Our publicly owned, self-supporting industry has not yet reached the stage of supplying fully all our needs. We still cannot talk of using surplus capacity to meet the needs of the people. As yet those needs can only be met by the Party and government providing organizational stimulus and the people setting-to[?] themselves. At present all our efforts are aimed at meeting the needs of self-sufficiency within two or three years, particularly the need for cotton cloth. We must not indulge in the fantasy that in present circumstances we can have tremendous development. That will only do harm.

Below I shall discuss our publicly owned economic undertakings over the past five years item-by-item beginning with self-supporting industry.

We first began to pay attention to the construction of publicly owned industry in 1938. In that year the Border Region successively established the Refugee Textile Mills, the paper factory, the bedding and clothing factory, the agricultural implements factory, and the Eighth Route Army medicine factory. Later on most of these factories each provided an important stimulus. At this time the industrialist Mr. Shen Hong voluntarily moved his ten privately-owned machines to the Border Region to serve the Eighth Route Army, and Mr. Shen himself came to the Border Region to work. Thereafter many scientific and technical personnel also came to the Border Region to work, enabling the Border Region to gather a pool of scientific and technical talent as the guiding force in the establishment of industry.

In 1939 the blockade of the Border Region economy began. Imports of industrial products were limited. The Party Central issued the calls to “set-to ourselves” and to be “self-reliant”. After the Border Region Government held the agricultural exhibition in January, it held an industrial exhibition on Labour Day, which stimulated enthusiasm to develop industry. The government and the Rear Services Department sent people to Sian to select and buy machines and materials. They also organized spinning and weaving co-operatives and oil-pressing and tile-making producer co-operatives in Yanan and Ansai. Although the machines and materials bought from Sian were insufficient, they became one of the major material strengths in the development of Border Region industry over the past few years. In that year we also set up the Xinghua Chemical Factory and the Guanghua Medicine Factory, and began to explore the thick coal-seams at **Shilipu** in Yanan County.

The development of industry in 1940 was carried out under the policy of becoming “semi-self-sufficient” in production. It was decided to make the development of light industry the key feature. In January we held the second industrial exhibition and reviewed the strength of our factories. The Border Region Bank lent 1 million yuan to expand factory capital, to set up proper factory sites and to continue buying materials. In February the Central Committee put forward the policy of “centralized leadership and dispersed operation”. In September Commander **Zhu** promoted the wool-spinning

movement and developed some wool-spinning and weaving undertakings. Very many large official organizations and schools and troop units planned actively to set up factories. They sent people to existing factories to study techniques. They studied methods of control and fixed plans for the rapid development of industry in 1941.

In 1941 the Central Committee put forward the policy of “moving from semi-self-sufficiency to complete self-sufficiency”. Under this policy the bank increased its loan by 3 million yuan and the government also invested 500,000 yuan in the publicly owned factories. Many official organizations and troop units also set aside funds to establish factories. On the Eight of March Festival (International Woman’s Day) we held a production exhibition. In December the large bank building was completed and we held another industrial exhibition presided over by the bank. The following list gives the factories set up by the official organizations and schools directly under the Central Committee in 1942 so as to show the efforts made by the various units to develop industry at this time. These industries are all handicraft factories, none large and some very small.

(1) The **Xin Zhongguo** Textile Mill, the Shiyan Factory, the wooden implements factory, the carpentry factory, the first and second charcoal factories, the tile factory, and the bedding and clothing factory run by the Finance and Economy Office directly under the Central Committee. Total capital over 200,000 yuan. More than 220 employees.

(2) The Shengli Wool Factory and Shengli Carpentry Factory set up by the Central Organization Department [**Zhonguang Zuzhibu**].

(3) The Qiyi Mill set up by the Central Propaganda Department [**Zhonguang Xuanchuanbu**].

(4) The Tuanjie Textile Mill set up by the Marxism-Leninism Institute.

(5) The Sun Yat-sen Textile Mill set up by the Central Party School.

(6) The blanket factory, mill, alcohol factory, glass factory and machine factory set up by the National Sciences Institute.

(7) The factories run by the Lu Hsun Academy, the North Shaanxi Public School [*shaangong*], the Youth League cadres and the Women’s University.

(8) The **Xinhua** Carpentry Factory and the bedding and clothing factory run by the Central Printing and Publishing Department.

(9) The **Yanyuan** Paper Factory run by the instruction brigade [*jiaodao dadui*].

The above lists twenty-seven factories run by the systems directly controlled by the Central Committee with a total of 447 employees and more than 400,000 yuan capital. Most were set up with the aim of achieving economic self-sufficiency.

These apart, there are several small factories run by the Economic Construction Department [*Jingjianbu*], the Garrison Office, the Public Security headquarters, the Border Region Finance and Economy Office, the 359 Brigade and various special offices. The Daguang Textile Mill of the 359 Brigade has a fairly large output. The various regiments of the 359 Brigade also have their own small-scale cotton or wool-spinning and weaving workshops.

The industry constructed from 1938 to 1941 is now expanding. Development during 1941 was particularly vigorous and provided a foundation for the work of 1942. However, throughout the period construction was carried out rather blindly. Many personnel lacked conscious awareness. They only thought of the present and not of the future. They only thought of dispersed operation and not of unified leadership. They had an entirely anarchic outlook. As a result, some factories closed down as soon as they were built, some announced they were closing down after a short period of operation, and some merged with other factories. Only a portion of them have continued to exist. To take textile enterprises near Yanan, by 1942 only three large factories, the Refugee, the **Jiaotong** and the **Tuanjie**, and two small factories, the Xinghua and the **Gongyi**, remained. This winding path could not be avoided at the time, since one can only gain experience from paths that one has already travelled. But having gained experience from this stage, it would be better to avoid following a similar winding path in new industrial construction.

In 1942 the Reconstruction Department laid down the policy of consolidating existing publicly owned factories and developing rural handicrafts. Government investment in industry was 1,700,000 yuan. Rural handicrafts run by the people had already greatly expanded before this year. In Suide, for example, there were 600-700 cotton cloth hand-loom. Blanket-making, leather-tanning and iron-work had also developed in other places. The public and private textile industry has developed particularly quickly, and it has a lot of problems. In order to ensure the development of the textile industry, we have reduced the import tax on raw cotton and foreign

yarn to 1 per cent and increased the import tax on bolts of cloth to 15 per cent. In Suide the bank organized the “the **Yongchang** Native Cloth Producing and Selling Company” with a total capital of 2 million yuan. It issues raw cotton and collects yarn and cloth, encouraging the peasant women to spin yarn and weave cloth. Since cloth-weaving by peasant households has expanded, much of the cloth produced by privately owned, small-scale, capitalist textile production co-operatives can no longer be sold. They also have difficulties with the supply of native yarn. They have no choice but to reduce their scope of operation, or to become fragmented, distributing their equipment among the people and transforming themselves into family subsidiaries. Since publicly owned textile mills chiefly supply for public use, they can maintain themselves. But they also have problems with the supply of raw cotton and yarn. This year the **Zhenhua** main factory and branch factory of the publicly owned paper industry completed the task of supplying the Publications Office with 3,000 rolls of paper made from malan grass. The **Lihua** first and second factories originally planned to produce 2,500 rolls but did not succeed. This year’s output will not exceed 500 rolls. Other publicly owned paper factories experience great difficulty since there is no market for their paper. The products of the publicly owned woollen industry, such as blankets, are aimed at solving problems of finance. The government does not use them itself. Some are exported and others are sold to the troops. The fine-spun woollen thread produced is particularly well received and brings a good profit. Beginning in September, the Jiaotong, Xinghua and Tuanjie textile mills, and the first and second Lihua paper factories were all handed over to the control of the Border Region Government from the Central Committee and the Rear Services Department systems. In order to ensure raw materials for spinning and weaving in 1943, we have begun to buy cotton from the three eastern counties this year. We plan to buy 750,000 *jin*. To ensure the supply of raw materials for paper manufacture, we have raised a levy of 730,000 *jin* of malan grass from the counties of **Ganquan**, **Yanan**, **Ansai**, **Anding**, and so forth. The factories should wait until they have carried out the policy of better workers and simpler administration before dealing with the recruitment of personnel.

The year 1942, and particularly this Senior Cadres’ Conference, is an important landmark in beginning to get rid of blindness and anarchy, and for introducing consciousness and unified and planned

operation into the whole of the public sector of the Border Region economy, and especially into publicly owned industry. Although the Central Committee put forward the principle of "centralized leadership and dispersed operation" long ago in February 1940, only in 1942 has it attracted comrades' attention. It has only obtained unanimous acceptance at this Senior Cadres' Conference. Five years of practical experience has made us progress a lot. After this conference, the whole public sector, industry included, must be reorganized so that it develops in a healthy manner.

Above I have given a simple outline of the history of industry in the Border Region over the past five years. By December 1942 we have seven kinds of industry: textiles, bedding and clothing, paper, printing, chemical, tools and coal and charcoal. There are seven textile mills with a total capital of 26,900,000 yuan and 1,427 employees; eight bedding, clothing and shoe factories with a capital of 1,001,100 yuan and 405 employees; twelve paper factories with a capital of 4,100,000 yuan and 437 employees; three printing factories with a capital of 5,200,000 yuan and 379 employees; twelve chemical factories (medicine, soap, leather, pottery, petrol, etc.) with a capital totalling 17,030,000 yuan and 674 employees; nine tool factories with 3,662,792 yuan capital and 237 employees; and twelve coal and charcoal factories with a total capital of 1,777,070 yuan and 432 employees. The total figures are sixty-two factories with a cumulative capital of 59,670,962 yuan and 3,991 employees. Although our industry is still very small and mainly takes the form of handicrafts, with not much machine industry, nevertheless it has taken five years of effort, laid down an initial foundation and played a part in ensuring supplies and regulating commodity prices. Developing from this foundation, it can certainly plan an even greater role.

Our most important self-supporting industries are the textile industry and the bedding and clothing industry. These are what the several tens of thousands of troops and personnel in the official organizations and schools rely upon each year for their cloth, bedding and clothing. Without them we would be frozen. In 1942 our textile industry was already capable of producing over 22,000 bolts of cloth. However, we needed 40,000-50,000 bolts and we can only reach our goal of self-sufficiency through great efforts. If we want to develop textiles, we must carry out the following policies.

- (1) We must raise cotton-cloth import duty and protect na-

tive cloth. At the same time, the troops and official organizations and schools must use only native cloth produced in the Border Region.

(2) We must generally encourage peasant women to spin cotton yarn and woollen thread to guarantee supplies of yarn and thread to the factories. At the same time, we can raise the income of the masses.

(3) We must solve problems of supply and distribution. No matter whether publicly owned, privately owned or a family subsidiary, the ability to develop is chiefly related to whether problems of supply and distribution can be solved. As regards raw materials, we are still not self-sufficient in raw cotton and cotton yarn, and the sources are not dependable. Since communications are not very good either, there are problems in distribution. We must arrange things so that yarn-spinners can buy raw cotton whenever they want it, and cloth-wavers can buy yarn whenever they want it. As regards finished products, the markets for cotton cloth and woollen products are not stable. We must arrange things so that producers can sell their products at any time; of suitable market-prices. These problems must be solved by the combined strength of the financial organs, commercial organs and the people's co-operatives.

(4) As for problems in the supply of clothing and bedding, we must act according to the methods implemented by the Finance Department in 1942 so as to economize on costs and get clothing at the right time.

Our papermaking industry can already produce over 5,000 rolls of malan paper per year. In 1943 we can increase this to 7,000 rolls, which is entirely sufficient for our printing needs. However, we must (i) unify the production and supply of paper. Malan paper is not suitable for general use apart from printing. It cannot be sold if the printing departments do not want it. At present we have the following situation: if the printing factories do not use enough, the paper factories cannot sell and have to stockpile, capital turnover is sluggish and this influences production. In order to solve this contradiction between supply and demand in 1943, we should unify purchase and supply, and make precise economic relationships between particular official organizations and paper factories. (ii) We must improve the quality of the paper. With existing equipment and tech-

nical conditions the quality of the paper can be improved at a greater cost in work and raw materials. From the point of view of function and significance, a slightly greater cost is worthwhile. On the other hand, we must study improvements in papermaking implements so as to raise production efficiency.

Our printing industry is a modernized cultural tool, and a large quantity of books and papers depend on it. In 1942 printing shops of the Central Committee, the Eighth Route Army and the Northwest Bureau printed 51,600,000 characters. In 1943 this can be increased to 53,600,000. However, we must increase equipment and ensure the supply of paper.

Our chemical industry includes medicine, soap, leather, pottery, glass, alcohol, matches, petrol and so forth. The Eighth Route Army and **Guanghua** medicine factories can produce some of the Western and Chinese medicines needed for military and public use, but we are still not entirely self-sufficient. In 1943 we should study the medicinal materials produced in the Border Region, and set up the means for buying raw materials so as to increase the production of necessary medicines. The Xinhua and Daguang factories make soap. Their production increases daily and their quality is good. As well as meeting our own needs, they can sell outside. In 1943 the Xinhua factory can produce 420,000 pieces of soap valued at 7 million yuan. And it has prospects for development. The scale of leather-tanning is small and the cost of materials high. It cannot develop much. If we could use plant materials produced in the Border Region to manufacture leather for military use then there would be some prospect for development. There are three small pottery kilns making pottery for daily and industrial uses. Glass has already been successfully produced on a trial basis, and we have decided to set up a factory. We can also make our own alcohol for industrial and medical use. We have still not been able to solve the problem of supply of phosphorous for making matches. We are now investigating the possibility of getting it from animal bones. Apart from these, there is petrol from Yanchang which supplies a little each year for military use. The white wax it contains can be supplied for daily use. In sum, the chemical industry must choose to expand and introduce the supply of things which are urgently needed or are profitable and possible. It should not bother with the rest.

Our tool-manufacturing industry supplies spinning-machinery, weaving-machinery, cotton-bowing and crushing machinery, paper-

making equipment, horse-carts, carpenters' tools, agricultural implements and so forth. They are mainly handicraft tools, but they are extremely important. We must do research into improvements, and provide for expansion.

Our coal industry is concentrated in Yanan and Guanzhong. Its output is for daily use. Although it is small-scale, it is very important.

The Border Region lacks iron, which impedes the manufacture and improvement of industrial and agricultural tools. At present we are holding trials in Guanzhong and there are hopes of success. If we can make iron, we can solve a major problem of the Border Region.

The above discussion has roughly covered the whole of publicly owned, self-sufficient industry. Textiles, papermaking, bedding and clothing, printing, chemical, tool-making and coal, all have reasonable prospects for development. Their first target is to meet the needs of the army and government, and their second is to supply some of the people's needs. We should make the following improvements in 1943 in order to meet these targets.

(1) Increase capital (the amount to be decided). Each official organization concerned should draw up concrete plans for consideration by the Finance and Economy Office [of the Border Region Government — *Caijing Banshichu*] with the aim of investing in each of the various industries and in certain investigation and research undertakings, in order to promote the development of self-sufficient industry in a planned way.

(2) Establish a unified leadership for the whole of self-supporting industry, overcome the serious anarchy which exists now. The principle of "centralized leadership and dispersed operation" put forward earlier is correct but it has not been thoroughly implemented. As a result, there is lack of planning, excessive dispersal in production, lack of work inspection and waste of manpower and materials among the industries run by the Reconstruction Department, the Finance Department, the troops and the official organizations. In 1943 we should set up unified leadership under the Finance and Economy Office and first make all self-supporting industry have a unified plan, no matter which branch it controls. In the unified plan we should calculate as a whole the supplies of raw materials, grain and straw, the totals for production and the co-ordination of sales. In supplying raw materials we must deal with the problem of many factories

facing regular raw material shortages because the region is spread out and these materials are not concentrated, or because supply comes from outside. In supplying grain and hay, we should provide the factories with the grain and hay they need as calculated by the Finance Department so as to save distracting the responsible people at each factory from their concentration on looking after production. In respect of the problems of production and sales, the Finance Department and the official organization concerned should, under the unified plan of the Finance and Economy Office, give each factory responsibility to produce a definite amount so that whatever is needed is produced in the quantity required and the finished products are accepted by a definite organ at the right time solving the contradiction between production and supply. In the unified plan we must realize mutual aid between enterprises and get rid of departmentalism, which gives rise to independence from each other or even hindrance of each other. We must also realize unified inspection, giving encouragement and criticism so that the poor catch up with the good. In sum, the problem of unified leadership is the central problem in advancing self-supporting industry during 1943. We must make thorough efforts to solve it.

(3) Establish the system of economic accounting [*jingji hesuanzhi*] overcome the muddled situation within the enterprises. To achieve this we must do the following. First, each factory unit should have independent capital (liquid and fixed) so that it can handle the capital itself and its production is not frequently hindered through capital problems. Second, income and expenditure in each factory unit should be handled according to fixed regulations and procedures, putting an end to the confused situation where income and expenditure are not clear and procedures are not settled. Third, according to the actual situation in the factories some should adopt the cost-accounting system [*chengben kuaijizhi*] and some need not for the time being. However, all factories must calculate costs. Fourth, each factory should have regulations for inspecting the rate of progress in completing the annual and monthly plans. They should not let things slide by doing without inspections for long periods. Fifth, each factory should have regulations for economizing on raw materials and looking after tools, and for fostering the practice of doing these things. All these points are the chief elements of the system of economic accounting. Once we have a strict accounting system, we can examine fully whether an enterprise is profitably

operated or not.

(4) Improve factory organization and administration, overcome the tendency to build organizations like those of government organs [*jiguanhua*] and relaxation of discipline. The first thing we must reform is the irrational phenomenon of excessive staffing in factories. At present many of our factories are extremely irrationally organized. There are too many personnel, the organization is too large, the ratio between administrative personnel and those directly involved in production is not right, and systems for administering large factories are being used in our small factories. These phenomena must be quickly corrected so that all factories carry out "enterprization" [*qiyehua*]. All factories should shrink or grow according to their economic prosperity. All salaries should be paid from the factories' own profit and not from tax grant, government clothing and government grants. Second, we should implement the ten-hour work system and the progressive piecework wages system [*jijian leijin gongzizhi*] so as to raise work enthusiasm and increase production. The eight-hour system is something to be implemented in future with the development of large-scale industry. At present we should universally implement the ten-hour system and make employees understand that this is a requirement of the War of Resistance. An egalitarian system of wages destroys the distinction between skilled labour and unskilled labour and the distinction between industriousness and laziness, thus lowering work enthusiasm. We can only stimulate labour enthusiasm and increase the quantity and quality of production by replacing it with a progressive piecework wages system. For the moment, industrial production in the army cannot adopt the piecework wages system and should have the piecework incentive system [*jijian jiangli zhidu*]. Next, we should improve the work of the workers' congress [*zhigonghui*] and launch a Zhao Zhankui (A Model Worker) Movement in every factory. Work done by the workers' congress which is not suitable for raising labour discipline and activism must be changed. Within a factory the work of the administration, Party branch and workers' congress must be united towards common ends. These common ends are to save as much as possible on costs (raw materials, tools and other expenses), to make as many and as good products as possible, and to sell them as quickly and as profitably as possible. These tasks of lower costs, better products and faster sales are the tasks shared by the administration, Party branch and workers' congress, all three of which should

unite as one. Working methods which divide their work into three separate areas are entirely wrong. The three sides must organize a unified committee, in the first place to put administrative personnel, administrative work, and production plans on the right track. The task of the Party and the workers' congress is to ensure completion of the production plans. Finally the factory should reward the workers and employees with the greatest achievements, and criticize or punish workers and employees who commit errors. Without a suitable system of rewards and punishments, we cannot ensure the improvement of labour discipline and labour enthusiasm.

(5) Strengthen and enlarge textile mills, increase output of bolts of cotton cloth, struggle to achieve complete self-sufficiency in cotton cloth used by the government in 1944. Improve woollen goods and, after supplying the army's needs, increase the amount exported. In the bedding and clothing industry fix standards for the cotton cloth used and the methods of making up. Ensure that cotton garments and bedding can be used for two years.

(6) Put papermaking factories in order, improve the quality of paper. Ensure it is fully satisfactory for printing and office use. Make us entirely self-sufficient in paper for printing and office use in 1944.

(7) Increase production of coal and oil, ensure self-sufficiency and also some exports. Set up ways of making or buying phosphorous so that match-factories can be established. As for other industries, continue with or enlarge those which are urgently needed or profitable. All those which do not match the principle of ensuring supplies or are unprofitable should be merged or closed down.

8. ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRODUCTIVE UNDERTAKINGS OF THE TROOPS

Which of the three branches of the public sector of our economy — the government, the army and the official organizations — is ultimately the most important in terms of directly meeting requirements most quickly and in greatest quantity? Our experience of the past few years shows that it is the army. The army's productive undertakings have become the most important part of the public sector of our economy because the army is the body which is relatively most organized and has most labour power. So long as it has no

direct fighting duties, it can use all its time outside training, doing work. And under our present backward technical conditions, labour is the decisive factor in economic undertakings.

The production movement in the garrison forces of the **Shaan-Kan-Ning** Border Region began in 1938, and one year before that in the official organizations and schools. A joint production movement of the army and official organizations and schools together began in 1939. In 1940, the 359 Brigade took on the duty of defence on the Yellow River and joined in the production movement. In 1941 and 1942, the army increased its responsibility for self-supporting production just like the official organizations and schools. However, the tasks taken on by the army were greater and occupied the most important position in the total volume of self-supporting production. It would have been impossible if during these years the army had not for the most part provided its own means of livelihood and running costs and instead had relied on the government. Responding to the Party Central and Northwest Bureau's call for "production self-sufficiency", the army has fulfilled its production tasks in the midst of the urgent work of fighting, guarding and training. The objective circumstances of some troop units are better than those of others; some have more duties than others, some have worked harder than others. As a result their respective level of achievement has varied. Nevertheless, in general they have all fulfilled their tasks. With very little capital and backward techniques, they have all developed agriculture, handicrafts, transport and commerce. Some have even set up relatively large-scale textile and papermaking factories. During these two years, the capital invested by the government in the army's productive undertakings has not exceeded 6-7 million yuan in total. However, in that time they have both ensured supplies worth over 300 million yuan and they have accumulated roughly 80 million yuan capital from their agriculture, industry and commerce. They have opened up several tens of thousands of *mou* of land, and supplied rich experience for the whole of production construction. They have not only played a political and military role in the protection of the Border Region but have also played a role in directly providing a large amount of financial supplies and in helping to develop the Border Region economy.

Let us take a look at the self-supporting production of a certain company in a certain regiment. The income and expenditure of this company during 1941 are shown in Table 8.1.

With the exception of 75 Table 8 production capital from upper

Income and expenditure of
a regimental company in 1941

1941 Income (yuan)	1941 Expenditure (yuan)
Transport of coal and charcoal (<i>shitan</i>)	Miscellaneous Expenses
Transport of salt	2 mules
Sawn planks	1 donkey
Wooden beams	600 sweat shirts
Pig sales	Shoes (2 pairs per man)
Stables	87 towels
Corn sales	Tobacco
Export business	Basins
Miscellaneous business	Production tools
Oil (840 <i>jin</i>)	Oil
Meat (1,610 <i>jin</i>)	Meat
Vegetables (4,690 <i>jin</i>)	Vegetables
Charcoal (5,000 <i>jin</i>)	Charcoal
Firewood (2,555 <i>jin</i>)	Firewood
Received production capital	Supplementary provisions
Miscellaneous office payments	5 months' pay
Supplementary production payments	Rifle-cleaning
Supplementary provisions payments	Summer clothing
	New Year costs
	Office
	Horse feed [<i>? magan</i>]
Total	Total

Net income = 6,537.12 yuan

levels, miscellaneous payments of 360 yuan from the office, supplementary production payments of 2,855 yuan and supplementary provisions payments of 3,771 yuan given by the regimental supplies of-

face, a total of 7,736 yuan, the expenditure of 52,530 yuan shown [in Table 8.1] was met by the company's own production of 44,794 yuan. This excludes the capital accumulated for use in production the following year.

According to these figures, each regiment of ten companies can be self-supporting up to 440,440 yuan.

Furthermore, there is still the self-supporting production run by the regimental headquarters [shown in Table 8.2]. The total value of production of the companies, battalions and regiments is 703,828 yuan. The regiment's total annual expenditure (including grain and a proportion of clothing and bedding) is 896,638 yuan, which leaves a shortfall of 185,510 yuan to be supplemented from upper levels. As a result the regiment's own self-supporting production accounts for 79 per cent of consumption and supplements from above account for 21 per cent. If we add the large amount of self-supporting production carried out by the brigade headquarters, the proportion for the whole brigade far exceeds 80 per cent.

Table 8.2

The values (in yuan) of self-supporting production by Regimental headquarters

Regimental headquarters	197,426
Directly controlled forces	27,149
1st Battalion headquarters	18,629
2nd Battalion headquarters	12,777
3rd Battalion headquarters	7,408
Total	263,389

The following material is a summary by the Garrison Office of five years' production by the garrison army. We can see the general situation in self-supporting production by the army.

A SUMMARY OF FIVE YEARS PRODUCTION BY THE GARRISON ARMY

(a) *Outline*

In the new and difficult environment since the War of Resistance and following Chairman Mao's call for production, the garrison army began the Production Movement in the autumn of 1938. At the time, production was not yet aimed at self-sufficiency and was merely making up for deficiencies in the necessities of life. We could only give each member of the force 0.05 yuan for vegetables and 1.5 *jin* of grain per day. At the market-prices of the time each yuan could buy 30-40 *jin* of vegetables, 2 *jin* of edible oil, or 100 *jin* of fire wood. With a hundred men in a company, each day they had 5 yuan for vegetables. If they bought vegetables, they could not buy oil, salt and firewood. If they bought oil, salt and firewood, they could not buy vegetables. Pork was even further beyond their reach. As for their clothing and bedding, you could rarely see a soldier whose clothing was not darned and patched. Bullet bags were so tattered they could not longer carry bullets, which had to be put in pouches. Some wore padded clothes in summer and some wore shorts in winter. Some went on parade barefoot in the snow and some could not even find a broken old leather bag for leg wrappings. These were the material conditions of the troops then.

The methods used in the Production Movement at that time were: (i) to set up co-operatives; (ii) to plant lots of vegetables; (iii) to set up grinding-mills, to raise pigs and sheep, to make bean curd and to grow bean sprouts; (iv) to mobilize every soldier to learn to make shoes; (v) to knit woollen clothes, socks, shoes and gloves; (vi) to promote economy and prevent waste. The result of half a year's production in 1938 exceeded the plan, and the soldiers' life was greatly improved. For example, they ensured self-sufficiency in vegetables, each week they had two pork meals, they partly met requirements for woollen clothes, socks, gloves and shoes, and they supplemented the supply of bullet bags, pouches, leather bags and leg wrappings.

The significant achievements in production during the latter half of 1938 raised the troops' enthusiasm for, and trust in, production. So in 1939 even greater tasks for self-supporting production could

be put forward, reducing the burden on the people of the Border Region. In 1939 it was stipulated that the troops in their agricultural work should plant grain as well as vegetables so as to fulfil the task of producing 4,700 *tan* of grain. Most production in 1939 was agricultural and 25,136 *mou* of new land was opened up over the whole year. At first it was estimated that 2 *tou* of hulled grain could be harvested per *mou* giving a total of 4,986 *tan*. But because the new land was just being broken in, there were not enough agricultural tools, leadership experience was uneven, and some of the land suffered natural disasters, only 2,590 *tan* of hulled grain was harvested. At this time the troops still had little capital and commerce had not yet developed.

In 1940 the production tasks for the troops stipulated that each section should provide grain for one and one-half months, a total of 3,400 *tan*. In that year the troops opened up 20,679.7 *mou* of land which should have given 4,136 *tan* of hulled grain. Because the harvest was poor, they only got 2,400 *tan*. In order to fulfil its duties, each section also took on salt transport, digging liquorice root and felling trees (in Guanzhong they also did some commercial work). The garrison army earned a total profit of 2,236,516.16 yuan from this supplementary production. This, together with the agricultural harvest, provided grain for one and one-half months and also met part of the supplements for equipment.

In 1941 the operating budget for all troops was 4,479,536.40 yuan and the task for production was to provide 400,000 yuan. However, the result was entirely different. The requirement for operating expenses was much greater and the task for self-supporting production was much greater than originally estimated. Chiefly as a result of the call by Commander Zhu to select six battalions to get salt, we got a total of 56,966 packs of salt valued at 236,408.90 yuan. In agriculture 14,794.6 *mou* were opened up and 1,170 *tan* of miscellaneous grains harvested. In commerce the total profit was 12,019,592.72 yuan. Because of price inflation, the value of paper money fell. Regular expenses and clothing and bedding expenses for the whole year were 7,881,757.17 yuan. (All these excludes the income and expenditure of one regiment and the forces in Guanzhong.) The average daily expenses for provisions per man over the whole year was 0.50 yuan. Apart from the 0.10 yuan issued by the State, we provided 0.40 yuan ourselves, a total of 2,592,000 yuan. The total for the above regular expenses, bedding and cloth-

ing expenses and provisions expenses was 10,473,757.17 yuan, 5,673,804.53 yuan above the original budget. There was still a surplus after payments were made from production income.

In 1942 the budget for expenses (excluding grain, clothing and bedding) was 5,833,636 yuan and we took on the task of helping central expenses with 2,500,000 yuan. The year's production plan was for 12,400,000 yuan. By August (statistics for the later period are not yet available), commerce had earned a profit of 38,969,230.20 yuan and industry had a profit of 431,773.40 yuan, giving a total of 39,401,004.60 yuan.

By June we had received 1,440,058.60 yuan running expenses, and supplementary expenses for the first issue of summer clothing of 206,825 yuan. Actual expenditure was running expenses 7,750,598.85 yuan, supplements for bedding and clothing 3,067,730.60 yuan, and supplements for provisions (the State issued 0.70 yuan per man per day and the actual cost was 3.00 yuan) over the half-year, 9,180,000 yuan. Most of the winter clothing and bedding for the latter half of the year was provided by the brigades and regiments themselves. The second issue of summer clothing, half of the padded cloth, 40 per cent of the bedding, and bindings, bullet bags, grenade pouches, padded cotton shoes, and light shoes, these eight items had a total value of 12,641,200 yuan. Other things like charcoal for heating in winter were provided by each unit itself. As for animal fodder, in 1941 we provided two months' horse-feed ourselves. In 1942 the Finance Department issued eight months' hay for horses, leaving two months' unaccounted for. In general we cut two months' supply of grass ourselves, saving roughly 1,200,000 yuan. Furthermore, in 1942 the budget for horse fodder was 11,000 *tan*. According to the regulations of the Finance Department 1 *tou* of hulled grain is equivalent to 2 *tou* of horse fodder. But this is insufficient and it is necessary to increase the annual amount by 2,750 *tan* which comes to 1,375,000 yuan at 500 yuan per *tan*.

The outcome of five years' production has been that, besides meeting annual running expenses, clothing and bedding expenses and provisions expenses, current financial assets include 24 million yuan commercial capital, 556 transport animals (excluding plough oxen, and excluding the First and Fifth Regiments) with a value of 11,232,000 yuan, and factory capital of 712,000 yuan. The combined total is 35,944,00 yuan.

(Note: The above summary does not include the 359 Brigade and

the peace preservation corps, [*baoran budui*].)

(b) *Lessons*

(1) The reason why the forces of the Border Region have been able to carry out self-supporting production and solve great problems over the past few years is their immense labour power and better organizational strength, and the fact that the Border Region also has rich resources to develop. This experience proves that the troops can be entirely self-sufficient. Because the troops have solved the problem of self-sufficiency over the past few years and increased their faith in production, they have realized that self-sufficiency is one of the major tasks in building up the army, and is one of the best methods overcoming hardships and coming through a difficult period.

(2) The production construction of the troops is part of the economic construction of the whole Border Region. Although in the past the troops did well in working hard to fulfill production tasks, ideologically they did not emphasize the relationship with the construction of the Border Region. Therefore, they still had a shallow understanding of the development of the agricultural and industrial base. They were not good enough at working hard to establish a secure foundation. Their thinking on unified construction was also muddled. There was even a lack of co-ordination between units and incidences of serious breaches of command discipline. These shortcomings must be resolutely and ruthlessly corrected.

(3) Under conditions of backward production methods, the production base must chiefly be built up depending on the labour power and economic base of each unit. Therefore, the government's financial and economic policy should look after the productive undertakings of these units. Within the confines of the government's unified policy, they should be allowed full development and profitability. Only this way can the development of productive undertakings have greater organization, greater strength, greater unity, greater rationality, and greater ability to fight the blockade in a unified way. The greatest shortcoming of the troops in production is to pay most attention to commerce and to neglect agriculture. In the future they must improve and encourage agricultural production.

(4) In their productive work the troops should grasp ideological

leadership tightly and set up and strengthen the regulations and the organs of leadership in production. They should correct and guard against cadres doing things without co-ordination, becoming decadent, eating and living well, spending recklessly, not economizing, not stressing effective results and adopting other corrupt practices.

The above sums up our opinions.

The self-supporting production of the 359 Brigade is the best among the various units in the garrison forces. In the first place, the leading comrades of the 359 Brigade have grasped the strategy of agriculture first, industry and transport second, and commerce third. They have taken advantage of their lack of active duties, the suitable environment of Nanniwan for agriculture and of the Suide Special Military Area for light industry. They have mobilized the large amount of labour power and within three years have completed large assignments for economic self-sufficiency. In particular they have grasped the policy of taking agriculture as the core so that the economic base rests on a secure foundation. Second, the troops of 359 Brigade have carried out the following concrete economic construction. (i) Their grain production in 1940 was a failure, but they were not disheartened. They persevered in 1941 and got tremendous results. In 1942 they strengthened this foundation. They opened up 25,000 *mou* of land and planted grain, vegetables, hemp and tobacco, meeting the troops requirements of vegetables, lamp-oil, hemp for shoes and tobacco, and supplementing supplies of grain, vegetable-oil, horse beans and fodder. Thus, after only two years' work they laid the foundation of the agricultural economy of all the companies in the brigade. Furthermore, the period of labour for all the officers and men was no more than two months per year. Ten months were left for troop exercises, and training was not impeded. According to the new method thought out by the brigade, each company sets up a specialist agricultural labour group of six or seven men and the masses of soldiers only provide extensive assistance during the busy agricultural seasons. In this way training time is even greater. (ii) They have used the farms to develop animal husbandry. In 1942 the whole brigade maintained 2,000 pigs which met the troops' requirements for meat and oil. Since the troops ate more meat, they saved grain. In addition, they organized groups of men to gather firewood, make charcoal and saw planks, which not only provided for their own fuel and building needs, but also provided a surplus for sale. (iii) They also built up industry and handicrafts. In 1941 they as-

signed some soldiers and rear-service personnel to establish the Daguang Textile Mill and the Daguang Soap Factory. Now, there are "Daguang" products on the market in addition to those they consume themselves. They set up ten salt-wells in Suide and Nanniwan, one charcoal-pit, two carpentry factories, three iron-factories, six mills, eight flour-mills and one oil-press. They also mobilized the soldiers during their spare time after training to spin woollen thread, to make various kinds of utensils from willow and elm wands, to make writing-boards from birch bark, to make vegetable-boxes and to make lamplighters. This work done by the soldiers not only benefited the whole, but also profited the individuals. The brigade stipulated that four-fifths of all the products of handicraft labour done using publicly-owned tools should come under public ownership and one-fifth should belong to private individuals, and the two-thirds of that produced not using publicly-owned tools should come under public ownership and one-third should belong to private individuals. This method provided commodities for public use and was also equivalent to raising the soldiers' pay. (iv) They established a strong transport undertaking. Now they have a transport team which owns 600 pack mules and is fully engaged in the transport of salt and goods. Along the road between Suide, Sanbian and Yanan, they have set up ten stables and settled a group of older and weaker personnel. (v) Their commercial organ is the Daguang Store, which has ten branches besides the main shop. The profit in the first nine months of 1942 was over 6 million yuan. However, this commerce only makes up 10 per cent of the brigade's total production of 60 million yuan (at Yanan market-prices). (vi) The brigade has implemented a unified production plan, and regulations for production and supply. The production plan for the whole brigade is fixed by the brigade headquarters. Some undertakings are directly run by the brigade headquarters, such as large-scale industry, transport and commerce. Others are run by the regiments and companies, such as agriculture, animal husbandry, small industry and commerce. Inspections are carried out at each level from brigade down to individual companies. The regulations for production are also fixed by the brigade headquarters. The arrangements for soldiers spinning woollen thread described above is an example of this. The regulations for supply also preserve unity. Although the agricultural, industrial transport and commercial undertakings are each run separately, all expenditure above a certain level must be approved from above. Lower lev-

els cannot spend freely. This prevents instance where free spending of the fruits of production bring unequal blessings or waste. It ensures the utility of the whole brigade. (vii) They have not only developed large amounts of production but have also rigorously carried out the policy of strict economy. For example, they laid down that they would issue three suits of summer clothing every two years and two suits of padded clothing every three years, and that new bedding and clothing would only be issued in exchange for old. They also issued needles and thread to the soldiers so that they could repair clothes themselves. Thereafter, bedding and clothing lasted longer, and the soldiers took greater care of them, greatly reducing these expenses. As mentioned above, they ordered the soldiers to make writing-boards from birch bark, vegetable-boxes and lamplighters, and issued wool to the soldiers to knit socks, gloves and so forth. This not only increased the supply of daily necessities, but also economized on purchases of these things. All building construction and tool repairs for the whole brigade is done by the troops and none is contracted out. All these things have not only economized on expenditure, but have also developed care for public property among the officers and men, and increased attention to results, opposition to waste and a simple style of work that rejects ostentation.

The following material is a summary of three years' production by the 359 Brigade, drawn-up by its leading comrade. It shows us the actual situation in the Brigade's agriculture, industry and commerce.

A SUMMARY OF PRODUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION IN 359 BRIGADE OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS

In the three years since this brigade has returned to take up the defence of the Border Region, the implementation of the economic policy of self-reliance and self-sufficiency has been a new creation in building up the army. With the exception of grain received from the government, we have achieved 82 per cent self-sufficiency in all other expenses through carrying out this policy. In this way we overcame difficulties with material resources, improved our troops' provisions, consolidated our forces, promoted the physical strength of the soldiers, consolidated army discipline and strengthened the

ties between the army and the people. The following outlines our experience over the past three years in agricultural, industrial and commercial operations.

(A) Agriculture

In response to the call for a production movement, we began agricultural production in 1940. We planned to plough and plant enough land to be self-sufficient for two months' grain, to be entirely self-sufficient in vegetables from the summer onwards, and to raise enough pigs to cover our meat requirement for the New Year festivities. However, since the areas where we were stationed in Suide, Mizhi and Wuqi Counties were heavily populated with little spare land, we had to travel to places over 100 *li* away (Jiulishan and Qingjian) to open up new land and wasted a lot of time in travel. Although enthusiastic and taking trouble, we did not investigate carefully nor plan suitably. As a result, the harvest did not match the capital spent on tools and seeds. However, the vegetables planted near where we were stationed enabled us to be self-sufficient for these after the summer. Each provisions unit was issued 0.10 yuan provisions expenses per man per day, barely enough to buy oil and salt. The troops had to go up to 100 *li* away carrying charcoal for sale. They earned enough to make more charcoal and a surplus to buy pigs for raising. These productive activities laid the foundations for the companies to improve provisions. Apart from opening up all the public unused land (public cemeteries, the neighbourhood of temples, odd pieces of land near cities, stretches of old unused road, old military defence works, etc.) around the towns of **Suide, Mizhi, Jiaxian, Wuqi and Qingjian** where we were stationed and along the river defences, we also rented land from the local inhabitants to plant vegetables. The spirit of bitter struggle and hard work of the commanders and troops gained great sympathy and understanding from people of all walks of life. Some of the landlords from whom we rented land (like the landlords and rich peasants of Yihezhen) would not accept our rent payments. Other poor peasants voluntarily granted temporary tenant rights. This came from the deep sympathy and concern of the people for the army. For those stationed in poor agricultural regions, particularly those where the climate only suited summer and autumn crops, agricultural produc-

tion was not only necessary to solve difficulties in running expenses, but was also essential to maintain the correct relationship with the people. From the end of 1939 to the spring of 1940, the troops did not have enough expenses for provisions and were short of vegetables. Personnel sent out to buy provisions sometimes resorted to the serious actions of forced purchase or purchase at unfair prices. In carrying out agricultural production, we ensured good political influence among the people, with the exception of the small number of people in the county towns who relied on market gardening for their livelihood and spoke angrily of the poor defence forces who offered no profit.

We solved the following problems with our production in 1940. (i) We became self-sufficient in vegetables after May. (ii) We added pig-raising to self-sufficiency in vegetables and improved provisions in the latter half of the year so that each man could eat 1 *jin* of meat per month. (iii) Each provisions unit made their own agricultural implements and raised over ten pigs. (iv) We proved the old saying: "If you have vegetables you have half a year's grain, if you have no vegetables you have half a year's famine." The troops' grain was sufficient. (v) Planting grain meant opening up new land. In the first year we got no profit from grain since it was too far from the places we were stationed. We could not weed at the right time and we wasted too much effort in travel. For these reasons, the planned grain harvest was not realized.

In 1941 the troops found land they could farm and implemented the policy of farming which the commander-in-chief himself ordered. Each man on average farmed 6 *mou* of land. Each *mou* needed seven days' work, including opening up the land, planting seed, weeding and harvesting. Six *mou* required forty-two days' work, from which was obtained roughly 3 *tou* (lower-middle harvest) of hulled millet, and from hay, also worth 3 *tou* hulled grain. The grain and hay together could be exchanged for one suit of padded clothing. If an upper-middle harvest could be obtained, the return would increase by one-quarter. Various secondary crops such as corn, hemp and sesame also yielded a harvest equal to that of millet. Around the edges of the 6 *mou* we could plant many subsidiary crops such as castor, pumpkins, beans and so forth giving good harvest. In addition, each man planted half a *mou* to provide vegetables for a whole year. Also among the products were hot peppers, garlic, onions, lamp-oil, tobacco, grass rope for sandals,

and so forth. Since we had field crops, it was easy to raise domestic animals such as pigs, cows, sheep, chickens, ducks, rabbits etc. Since pig-raising was most profitable, it was the major subsidiary. Reckoning at one pig for every five men, a hundred men could raise twenty pigs. As well as this, they could raise three sows. Every year each sow can have two litters of at the very least four piglets. With no swine fever and no untoward events, they could produce twenty-four pigs per year. Killing pigs at a rate of two a month, we would have to kill twenty-four a year. The pig-breeding rate would counterbalance the slaughter rate and there would still be surplus piglets. From birth to slaughter, piglets can grow 5 *liang* per day on average. In actual practice the annual average was indeed one pig per five men.

As a result of agricultural production, there was a lot of vegetable refuse. Since we were grinding flour, we got the chaff remains from the husking, and since we were making beancurd we got the bean residues, etc. We could raise the pigs using waste and gain great benefits. Now the entire brigade has achieved all of the above. The wealth obtained from agriculture and animal husbandry by each provisions unit is increasing. And this wealth is controlled by the party branch, supervised by all the soldiers and used rationally according to the regulations laid down at high levels. As yet there is no summary for 1942, but harvests will definitely be no less than last year.

Reviewing the agricultural production movement, we can make the following summary of its merits and shortcomings.

Merits

(1) The troops carried out political mobilization concerning the performance of the tasks so that all personnel realized that the slogan of self-sufficiency in production put forward by Chairman Mao was of great significance in maintaining unity in the War of Resistance and in passing through an economic crisis. The commander-in-chief himself led the way after his return to the Border Region and strengthened the soldiers' enthusiasm and endurance.

(2) Improvements in real livelihood made us feel the advantages of the production movement.

(3) The brigade and regiments fixed the whole of the annual

production plan, stipulated the production tasks for the companies, and conscientiously supervised the regiments' guidance and supervision of the companies' production.

(4) The companies organized production committees to discuss and arrange the implementation of production tasks, to inspect and examine the economy (the companies' economies are entirely public) and to ensure the implementation of the supply regulations.

(5) Now every company is enjoying a self-sufficient, rich peasant family standard of living because of its agricultural production.

Shortcomings

(1) We have not paid full attention to production tools, we have not organized and employed plough oxen and we have not selected some soldiers (from among the cooks) to specialize in farming throughout the year. We have generally adopted the method of all-round mobilization, wasting time and impeding troop-training.

(2) Some cadres have taken a negative attitude towards farming and do not strive to get a larger harvest by extending the land farmed.

(3) We have not been conscientious in gathering manure.

(4) We have no cadres specially directing production.

According to experience, we must use oxen for ploughing, carting manure and harvesting (using ox-carts), prepare sufficient tools, assign cadres with special responsibility for directing production (a deputy battalion leader for production and company leaders with special duties), assign soldiers (from among the cooks) to carry out agricultural production throughout the year, mobilize all the officers and men to take part at planting, weeding and harvesting times, and stipulate the number of workdays so as to use a fixed amount of time. In this way the total work per man to farm 6 *mou* and cut a year's fire wood will not exceed two months, and we shall not only get grain but will also become entirely self-sufficient for all daily vegetables, meat, straw shoes, firewood, shoes and socks. The last few items alone make up one-third of all running expenses so they cannot be considered a small problem. The grain harvest can sus-

tain 2,000 men.

The above is a brief summary of the brigade's agricultural production.

The following list shows how much work and time it would cost a provisions unit for a hundred men to travel over 60 *li* to make its purchases if it did not plant vegetables itself.

Monthly vegetable consumption (1 <i>jin</i> per man per day)	3,000 <i>jin</i>
Number of purchases (each time buying 100 <i>jin</i>)	30 times
Labour days per purchase (each time using 2 men)	4 days
Actual days per purchase (there and back 2 days)	2 days
Labour days per month	120 days
Actual days per month	60 days
Labour days per year	1,440 days
Actual days per year	720 days

Using this table alone we can explode the lie that "agricultural production is profitless and hinders training".

(B) Industry

There follows a summary of our experience in establishing and developing the Daguang Textile Mill and of other handicrafts.

(1) Motivation and intentions.

The troops need clothing and bedding every year. The raw materials for bedding and clothing are the chief problems in supply work. In the winter of 1939 after the troops returned to the defence of the Border Region, we had difficulties in buying these raw materials and also had no money. In response to the call by Chairman Mao for self-reliance, self-sufficiency and overcoming difficulties to build up the Border Region, we made a long-term plan to run a textile mill.

(2) Trial beginnings.

We began to think of running a textile mill in September 1940. At the time there was a man from Hebei in the short-term training class set up by the supply department who could weave cloth. We set up a small wooden loom, bought some foreign yarn and tried it out. Within ten days all the yarn was woven and the cloth was quite

good. We could weave 100 feet per day [Chinese measurement] and costs worked out one-third cheaper than buying cloth.

Since there were weavers among the troops we decided to set up a factory and undertook the following: (i) we bought wood and built nineteen small looms in our own machine-repair shop, and we bought four metal looms from **Shanxi**; (ii) we bought yarn from local merchants on credit; (iii) we selected twenty skilled men from places like **Gaoyang** in **Hebei** who were among the troops.

In this way the factory got going. It was not only profitable and convenient, but also solved problems in buying cloth.

In December 1940 we decided to enlarge the factory in order to achieve self-sufficiency in cloth for the whole brigade.

Early in 1941 we abolished service personnel at all levels throughout the brigade, and collected together over a hundred youths as apprentices to study weaving.

We again bought two iron looms from the northwest of Shanxi and made a further eleven large wooden ones ourselves. In February and March we made another sixteen large wooden looms, and fourteen more towards the end of March. We thus had sixty-six looms of all kinds. At the same time we made spinning-wheels and other essential small implements.

As regards raw materials, in 1941 the government issued the brigade with 400,000 yuan capital for production. Of this, 250,000 yuan was divided among the regiments. Of the remaining 150,000 yuan, 100,000 was spent buying 300 bales of yarn (each bale was 7 *jin* 14 *liang* and cost 280-90 yuan) and some things that had to be bought (such as the wire for the looms which we could not make ourselves and had to purchase outside).

Administered by the supply department accountants, the workers divided into yarn-starchers, weavers, thread-joiners [*luoxian*], and threaders [*daxian*]. Each group had twenty to thirty men. About ten skilled men became master workmen and took charge of the technical work in starching and reeling the yarn. Intelligent youths studied weaving, and the less bright and the younger did threading and thread-pining.

As soon as the looms started working, we became aware of a need for more labour power. So taking the name, the Daguang Textile Mills, we employed fifty young boys and girls from the Suide areas as apprentices. We also took captured bandits and people who had committed mistakes from the military courts. In this way we

assembled our labour force. There were then over 200 workers administered by the military training unit and the supply department. They were divided into four platoons and twelve squads (including one women's platoon; each platoon had three squads of ten or more people).

The factory was roughly taking shape. But there were still two difficult problems to be solved, first the supply of capital and raw materials, and second the control, education and training of the workers.

(a) The problem of the supply of capital and raw materials

In May 1941 we borrowed 200,000 yuan from the Border Region Bank but it still did not provide support for long. After that we had to make friends, built up relationships, liaison with rich merchants and buy raw materials on credit, making repayments at fixed periods.

Before May 1941 most foreign yarn was bought from Shanxi. Afterwards, because supplies were cut off, we could only buy from Sian and Yanan (Shenxin and Guanghe brands). We also bought raw cotton from Sian and Yanan.

The supply of local yarn came as a result of the government's encouragement of local women to spin. At first the wage for spinning 1 *jin* of yarn was from 3 to 7 yuan (raw cotton cost 4 yuan per *jin*), and it was divided into three grades. In July and August this was changed to issuing 1 1/2 *jin* of prepared cotton in return for 1 *jin* of yarn. In February and March of 1942 this was again changed into 2 *jin* or 2 *jin* 2 *liang* for 1 *jin* of yarn.

Because the supply of yarn from the people was insufficient and of poor quality, we set up our own yarn-spinning factory with four cotton-bowing machines and forty spearing machines in October 1941. By July 1942 we still lacked skilled workers and the cotton bowed by the machines could not all be used on the machines (the raw cotton was poor). Now only the four bowing machines are still going and spinning has stopped.

(b) The problem of controlling, educating and training the workers.

The number of workers has increased but there are many different elements and they are not easy to control. They young service personify in particular were used to a free life and had not taken part in labour before they left home. At first they would fight, curse and carry on every day. They would say "We've seen all the gro-

cers, big and small” and would not accept any controls.

Most of the women from the villages had come because of marriage problems. They had been sent to the factory by the women’s aid committee of the government. Whenever they talked of marriage, some cried and some laughed. They often asked for help in solving their marriage problems.

Persuading captured bandits to work was difficult.

Many of the people being punished for mistakes were company and platoon cadres who maintained their old character, were unwilling to work and were troublemakers.

From January to March 1941 the head of the supply department tried hard to correct them and achieved some success.

During this time, approximately twenty skilled workers acted as master-workers and taught the youths in the weaving group. First they used the small looms (needed little strength and easy to manage). The master-worker did all the preliminaries and told them how to start the loom, how to connect broken threads, how to handle the shuttle, and how to co-ordinate hand and foot. At the beginning they only wove for two or three hours a day. After one or two months, this group had mastered these looms and moved onto the large wooden ones, and another group came to learn. Thus group-by-group the teaching went on until March 1941.

The work of joining the threads and threading was easy to learn and only needed patience. Once you had learned to join the threads properly, you were all right. But it needed practice. When unpracticed, the results were not good enough for weaving.

When the work began and the young apprentices sat at the looms or did their joining and threading, their backsides ached after a short time, yarn easily broke, tempers rose, there was little patience and they wasted a lot of thread and broke some looms. So, before March 1941 products were no good.

Apart from strengthening technical training and raising technical skills, the chief way of dealing with this was political encouragement and education in revolutionary labour discipline. This made the workers consciously realize the important significance of production, made them patient in their work and improved their enthusiasm for production and their labour discipline.

Various methods of education were used to implement military discipline. The head of the supply department, He Weizhong, the head of the military training unit and the branch Party Secretary per-

sonally came to give guidance every day, explaining that production at the rear was equal to fighting at the front, that they should accept organization, that work was glorious and that they were the working class. We proposed a competition with emulation between apprentices and emulation between male and female workers. We implemented a system of rewards and punishments and a system for getting time off. At the same time each person was given some writing materials every month, and we bought some entertainment equipment.

Thereafter the workers felt that to work was glorious. After work they wanted to study culture and politics and to live a military life. As a result life became organized on military lines. In this way we gradually set up the soldier-worker system, and the factory got going in the right way. Before breakfast there were early-morning exercises and running. After breakfast they went to work. In winter and spring there was a ten-hour day.

We then encountered new difficulties.

The factory site was a hired house. As it was not convenient for work, we built ten or so cave houses ourselves for the workers to live in. Unexpectedly the cave houses were moist and damp, the workers developed sores and many of them could not work. So we changed the new caves into storerooms and the workers moved into the hired house. In June we began to build five stone cave houses for the looms and these were not completed until October. During this period there was nowhere to put the looms. The only thing we could do was to put them in the courtyards and work under tents. In May and June there was early morning dew and it rained often. Wet thread is no good for weaving. In July the weather was hot and the sun strong. The threads became very dry which was also no good for weaving. The only thing we could do then was cover the looms in wet army blankets and pour water on the ground. But this only worked for two or three hours and, as can be imagined, gave a lot of trouble.

The months from June to September passed in this way. The new caves were completed in October and we also built one-story houses with a total of twenty-seven rooms for the workers to live in. Only then were all these problems overcome.

As for raising the workers' technical level, after June the youths gradually became skilled, and some even exceeded the master-workers.

In the first week when they were apprentices they generally only

worked for two or three hours a day and made four or five feet of cloth. After two or three weeks they worked for seven or eight hours a day and could weave 10 to 40 feet. After April they could do 40 to 50 feet, and by May, 60 to 70. After June they had all become skilled workers and the best could weave 120 to 130 feet a day. During this time the quality of cloth continuously improved.

We can say that after June 1941 the factory was consolidated and began to develop, having overcome all kinds of difficulties.

(3) Establishing the soldier-worker system

The factory expanded and needed to be regularized. It was very inconvenient for the administrators from the military training unit. And so under the supply department we set up a factory head and a commissar to provide leadership, and drew-up a draft outline for the administration of the factory.

Under the leadership of the head and commissar, the administration was divided into four sections: labour, operations, accounts and general work. These sections divided the tasks and worked together, each with its own responsibility. We stipulated a variety of regulations for meetings, minutes, reports, inspection, livelihood, pay (according to technical skill with the top rate of 10 yuan) and for rewards and punishment. We settled the times for work, study, rest and relaxation. We fixed the scope for democratic life and all kinds of principles for the workshops, dormitories, canteen, days off, leaving the premises and so forth.

By October 1941 everything was properly set up.

After October we felt that the wooden looms were not as good as the iron ones. The cloth the latter produced was of good quality and needed less work. We planned gradually to replace the wooden looms with iron ones. Between January and October 1942 we built iron looms ourselves. However, as one had to be strong and skilful to weave with these looms and there were not enough workers like that, we could not convert entirely to iron looms and we did not build any more. The total was forty-five iron looms and sixty-two wooden looms. Apart from this, we bought thirteen wooden looms for weaving woollen blankets and woollen goods from the **Longwan Factory** (in spring 1942) and built thirteen wooden looms ourselves. This gave a total of 133 looms. On average we produced about 1,000 bolts of wide cloth, 500 woollen towels and 100 blankets per month.

After May 1942 the pay system was changed into a piecework system giving .70-.80 yuan per month at the most (roughly one-tenth

of wages in a privately owned factory), and 20-30 yuan at the least. This increased the workers' enthusiasm to produce. Some workers did not take their noon rest and did not stop work at the end of the working day but kept an working. After some persuasion and education, we overcame this excessive enthusiasm.

We persisted in the soldier-worker system. The factory workers also grew vegetables and raised pigs for their food.

In the winter of 1942 we stopped work for one month to make padded clothing.

In 1941 after all expenses, the factory made a profit of 3,900,000 yuan. In the first ten months of 1942, the profit was 8 million yuan. The value of the factory site, looms, yarn and raw cotton is 5 million yuan (yarn and cotton 1 million yuan). We intend to invest several million more to maintain reproduction.

In sum the lessons of experience in running industry are as follows:

(i) The profit earned by the soldier-workers working in textiles, that is the Daguang Hill led by the brigade supply department, is the largest of all the profits earned by the various industrial enterprises. In 1941 the total number of employees was 250 and in 1942 it were 225. After all expenses its profit in 1941 was 3,900,000 yuan, equivalent to the price of 4,000 *tan* of millet at the year-end price (300 *jin* per *tan*).

Profit by October 1942 was 8 million yuan, again equivalent to 4,000 *tan* of millet at current prices in Suide. The average net profit per worker was roughly 18 *tan*.

In the light of two years' experience and the present circumstances, we shall invest 25,000 yuan per head for the 225 employees of the factory during 1943, not counting buildings and tools, making a total of 5,625,000 yuan. The cloth required for uniforms will be bought from the factory. In this way production for 1943 will earn a net profit per man of 20 *tan* of millet (because of inflation, it is best to take millet as the standard).

Each regiment has a cloth-weaving factory which can produce enough cloth for a hundred men.

In addition, apart from undertakings purely for producing equipment and clothing for the troops such as shoemaking, cloths-making and leather-tanning, the brigade also has roughly 200 blacksmiths and carpenters. In the light of the past two to three years' experience and the prospects for the continued development of the Border Region economy, these craftsmen could make an annual profit

roughly equivalent to 6 *tan* of millet in return for an investment of 1,000 yuan per man.

There is also a papermaking factory and an oil-pressing shop which use as raw materials the sesame seeds and straw coming from the troops' agriculture and malan grass cut by the soldier-workers, for which the factories pay a cheap price. These enterprises employ sixty people with an average net profit per head of 6 *tan* of millet.

(ii) Besides agriculture, effective operation of the system of soldier-workers is a way of realizing self-sufficiency and solve both commodity and financial problems. Commerce is definitely not as reliable as agriculture and industry. Commerce relies on others, not on oneself, so it is not suitable to do too much of it.

(iii) Shortcomings are: in running a large factory there is a lot of expenses and waste, and there is no fixed amount of capital. This influences reproduction. Therefore in future we must strive to set up a fixed amount of capital.

(iv) In the past we did not take the whole Border Region economy into consideration. Nor did we make a unified plan for the troops' agricultural and industrial production. We could not interlock agriculture, industry, transport and commerce. This was a great failing. Henceforth, we should have unified plans and interrelated management.

The above is a summary of our opinions.

COMMERCIAL

(C) Commerce

Our commerce began with a co-operative and it took six years to develop into large-scale commerce.

In 1937, the brigade was sent across the Yellow River to the area around **Guoxian** to fight the enemy. After the loss on **Taiyuan**, commerce was disrupted and city goods could not be moved into the countryside. The common folk did not dare to travel to buy goods. As a result there were great shortages of daily necessities. Oil and salt were out of supply for a while. Both the army and the people had to eat plain food. In these circumstances we set up a co-operative at the request of the people. We allocated animals to go to **Ningwu** and elsewhere for salt. The supply department put up 300 yuan to buy goods belonging to merchants which were stored in the countryside. We contracted the merchant, Li Maolin[??], from

Yangwu as manager and set up business at Yangwu. It was called "359 Brigade Army-People Co-operative". The aim was simply to solve difficulties in the supply of salt, oil and so forth, and to handle other necessary goods. At the time the currency had not yet lost value, so, although the capital was small, business was successful. In the short period of six months from October 1937 to April 1938 when the troops moved east, we gained great sympathy among the people of the county. Thousands of people praised us, saying that if it were not for the co-operative, they would have died without being killed by the enemy. Making a profit was not the aim at the time, so although business was good we did not earn any money. At the end in April, the capital and profit of 490 yuan was handed over to the troops and used.

In May, 1938, the co-operative personnel went to the **Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei** Border Region with the troops. When they got to **Lingqiu** there was another shortage of daily necessities. Both the people and the army suffered. They wanted to continue with the co-operative but had no capital and could think of no way. In August the co-operative personnel went to the county town of **Laiyu** County to build up relations with merchants. Through friendly connections they bought goods worth 3,042 yuan on credit. Most of it consisted of bolts of cloth, writing materials, paper, soap and so forth totaling eleven packs. They returned to **Donghenanzhen** east of **Lingqiu** and set up a shop. The suppliers of the goods also came along. Within five days the goods were entirely sold and they got a net profit of 800 yuan. They paid the suppliers 2,042 yuan and presented 1,000 yuan to the frontline troops for buying provisions. With the 800 yuan left over, they returned with the suppliers to **Laiyuan** to get more goods. This process was repeated several times up until December when the bill for goods was fully repaid. From August to December the operations of the co-operative provided supplies of oil, salt and cloth needed by the people of the Lingqiu region and earner 2,800 yuan to supplement the troops' expenses. In addition there remained goods worth 1,500 yuan.

In January 1939 we moved the 1,500 yuan worth of goods to **Xiaguanzhen**. We mainly dealt in oil and salt, on the one hand supplying the troops and on the other helping the ordinary folk. since the troops were continuously engaging the enemy at this time, we had over 1,000 wounded. It was not easy to get Western medicines and nutritious foods so the co-operative set up good relations with

various merchants and through them got Western medicine, milk, arrowroot and so forth from **Tianjin, Beijing, Baoding** and other places. This ensured the supply of necessities for the wounded. In September 1939 the brigade received the order to take on the defence of the Yellow River between **Shanxi** and **Shaanxi**. The co-operative was closed down. The nine months' business brought in 9,400 yuan. When the troops set off they had no money so 5,400 yuan was paid out in expenses. The remaining goods worth 4,000 yuan were brought west with the troops in five donkey packs. In October we got to **Wuliwan** in Suide in the Border Region, we sold them for 20,000 yuan and we sent people to **Loufan, Wenshui** and **Jiaocheng** to buy writing-materials and cloth. By the end of the year we had 31,000 yuan in goods and cash.

In January 1940 the co-operative moved to Nanguan in Suide. At that time the troops' economy was in great difficulties. We could only rely on the earnings of the co-operative to help pay expenses, so we felt the name "Army-People Co-operative" was not suitable and changed it into the "Daguang Store" showing that its goal had changed into making a profit. During that year we built up friendships with some merchants and bought goods either for cash or on credit. We bought writing-materials, cloth, paper, shoes, socks, towels and so forth, and made a profit in the market. We worked hard and by the year-end earned 191,700 yuan. We apportioned 101,700 yuan to the troops to help with the expenses, and kept 90,000 yuan as capital for 1941.

In 1941 the brigade decided to expand its commercial activities as a supplement to the major undertakings in agriculture, industry and transport in order to meet the urgent requirements of the troops. Besides the existing 90,000 yuan capital, a further 250,000 yuan was given from the 400,000 yuan issued to the brigade by the Finance Department for production capital. In addition all the small shops run by the regiments were closed, and their capital of 60,000 yuan collected together. The town capital was 400,000 yuan. Beginning in January 1941 we set up ten branch shops. After a year's operation we got a profit of 2,982,377 yuan of which 982,377 yuan was used to supplement the troops' expenses and 2 million was kept as the store's capital.

In 1942 the store and ten branch shops got a profit of 6,720,080 yuan from operations during spring, summer and autumn. Two million yuan were used to supplement expenditure for the troops and

the remaining sum of 4,720,080 yuan in use.

The lessons of experience are:

(i) We helped the ordinary folk to buy cloth, paper, oil, salt and other necessities, and we strengthened relations between the army and the people.

(ii) We helped the troops to buy daily necessities by making it possible for the soldiers' income of 1 yuan to purchase soap, towels, toothbrushes, toothpaste etc., at a time when the Eighth Route Army was in difficult economic circumstances. On the other hand, the troops rightfully bought daily necessities with their money which reduced improper and wasteful behaviour among the troops.

(iii) Building friendships is very important. If we had not had good relations with the merchants of Laiyuan, we could not have bought goods.

(iv) Surplus income supplemented expenditure for our forces.

(v) We sold local products and put limits on goods from outside. However, since we did not inspect strictly and provide firm leadership, some shops could not carry out this work in a pleasant and integrated manner. They only looked after narrow departmental interests and neglected all-round economic construction.

(vi) Before 1940 we did not know much about setting up a Commercial information network, and only knew how to work hard. As a result we suffered quite a few losses from rises and falls in prices. In 1941 we set up such a network to report on the situation in various places and built up liaison with some big merchants. We learned of rises and falls in prices at the right time. Therefore we did not make losses of this kind in 1941 and 1942.

(vii) We liaised and worked together with local experienced merchants able to operate outside the Border Region. When we encountered difficulties in the supply of raw materials for spinning and weaving, we obtained great help. However, we also encountered some rogue merchants who used us to carry out their own business, damaging our operations.

(viii) There were too many people working in the store not earning their keep and adding to expenses.

(ix) Frequent contact with merchants from outside enabled us to understand each other's policies and attitudes, reducing misunderstandings and building friendships.

(x) We tested the cadres' Party spirit, thought and ability.

(xi) Only with strict administration and a correlate system of

regulations could the store reduce waste.

(xii) To help stabilize the currency, in 1940 the store changed Guanghua banknotes.

(xiii) Comprehensive preparations, correct and lively application of trading policies, staying within the scope of non-prohibited goods, selling local products and selling necessities solved difficulties in the supply of goods for the army and provided a profit.

(xiv) With the aim of earning money, after January 1941 all the brigade and regimental co-operatives became part of the Daguang Store. The organization took Suide as its centre and set up branches in **Suide, Mizhi, Jiaxian, Wuqi, Anding, Yanchuan and Yanchang**. The brigade had the **Daguang** Store, and the regiments had the branches.

(xv) Most personnel in the shops were soldiers given payments according to their jobs. Employees were paid a wage according to their ability, strengths and weaknesses.

(xvi) Most of the goods were bought from northwestern Shanxi during 1941. Afterwards because of the enemy's mopping-up campaigns and the economic blockade (the decline of the nationalist currency and the use of the puppet currency), commodity prices rose. In addition because of our problems with capital, we could not get much money to buy goods. Therefore using the slogan "resist the enemy's goods and sell local products", we sold the cloth we wove ourselves, and the leather shoes, woollen towels and cloth shoes we produced ourselves. We also sold **Daguang** soap in even greater quantities. To prevent unprincipled merchants from raising market-prices and to promote the Border Region currency we changed **Guanghua** banknotes, and lowered the rising market-prices. For example, the salt we extracted ourselves we sold at 2 *jin* 4 *liang* per yuan compared to the market-price of 1 *jin* 4 *liang* per yuan. Thus we enabled the ordinary folk to buy at cheaper prices. So we can say that in a certain period our aim was not to earn money but to stabilize prices and secure the people's livelihood.

(xvii) "If you knew what would happen in three days' time, you would be rich for thousands of years." It seems as if trading is a question of finding the right way by accident. If you find a good opportunity, then you can earn money. In fact it is not so. Trading relies entirely on correct estimation, understanding of the situation locally and elsewhere, and understanding the difference between imports and exports. Then you can forecast the rise and fall in com-

modity prices, and fix the policies for attention in a certain period.

(xviii) A stable currency and secured finances are the: primary conditions for developing business. During the past three years the sudden rise and fall in the value of the Border Region currency and the disruption of finances has influenced trading in commodities and made everything difficult. Another aspect is that this situation has enabled speculative merchants to deal in currency notes. They have earned a lot of money and influenced the economy of the Border Region.

(xix) The various regimental shops have in practice not thoroughly implemented centralized leadership and have competed with each other. They have lacked co-ordination which is an unhealthy tendency.

(xx) The various regiments have set up an accounting system run by specialists who keep the accounts. However since too many of them were merchants in the past, they did not use new methods of recording and still used the old.

A concrete plan for agricultural production In 1943 has been prepared by 359 Brigade. It is really clear and definite and may be supplied to all units for consideration. The text follows.

359 BRIGADE'S 1943 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PLAN

The military farming system of the troops stationed in the Border Region is one of the basic duties of our army in carrying out the policy of the anti-Japanese national united front and in establishing new democratic politics. Persisting in carrying out this duty enables us to lighten the people's burden, improve the quality of the army and achieve close unity with the people from a position of self-reliance and self-sufficiency. Therefore, in the light of the experience and achievements in carrying out the call from upper levels for production during the past three years, the brigade has drawn up the following plan to strengthen the implementation of this call and to increase the quantity of production in 1943.

(A) How should we organize the troops' agricultural production?

(1) All the defence areas where the regiments and troops are sta-

tioned have arable land, so we stipulate that each provisions unit should carry out agricultural production according to its manpower and the land situation.

(2) In circumstances where the army is stationed in one place, each provisions unit only needs three cooks for every hundred men. Therefore each provisions unit can select six or seven strong comrades with agricultural experience from among the cooks to specialize in farming.

(3) The deputy battalion head with responsibility for production in each battalion, the head of the special duties in each company, and the deputy officers with responsibility for production in the brigade and regiments have the task of planning and inspection. During spring ploughing, summer weeding and autumn harvesting, they should organize and lead all personnel to take part.

(4) We stipulate that the provisions unit of each combat company, apart from supplying all their own vegetables, should plant 600 *mou* of grain. Table 8.3 (see page 420) lays down the tasks each unit can shoulder.

(B) The year's plan relies on the spring. This winter we must prepare for the work of the coming spring.

(1) Each provisions unit must make a clear register of the land to be planted, how much mountain land, how much river land, how much land that has been farmed, and how much uncultivated land. It must also work out what is going to be planted and how much work, seed and so forth will be required for planting, hoeing and harvesting.

(2) Farming requires oxen, ploughs, and other agricultural tools such as hoes, rakes, baskets and sickles. These should be fully prepared in winter. Actual requirements per provisions unit are three plough-oxen, three ploughs and sixty other implements.

(3) If you do not use manure, the crops do not grow well. Every unit must collect manure. All nightsoil, animal manure, and wood and straw ashes must be gathered. Pay attention to control of lavatories, pig-sties, sheep-pens, and oxen and horse-stables. We must put at least 4 *tan* of manure on each *mou* of land. In many places there are grass roots from flooded land and tree leaves. These can be moved to the farmed land for burning.

Table 8.4 (see page 420) lists the amount of preparatory work to

Table 8.3
Agricultural Tasks Assigned to Units

Troop units	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	Total
Number of production units	5	2	1	17	16	13	6	5	65
Area to be planted (mu)	3,000	1,200	600	10,200	9,600	7,800	3,600	3000	39,000
Number of men to be selected from among the cooks	30	12	6	11	96	78	36	30	390

Table 8.4
Preparatory Work Necessary by Spring, 1944

Troop units	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	Total
Number of production units	5	2	1	17	16	13	6	5	65
Number of plough oxen	15	6	3	51	48	39	18	15	195
Number of ploughs	15	6	3	51	48	39	18	15	195
Number of other implements	300	120	60	1,020	960	780	360	300	3,900
Amount of Manure in "tan"	12,000	4,800	2,400	40,800	38,400	31,200	14,400	12,00	156,000

be undertaken by all units and by the brigade as a whole.

(C) How much money is needed and how many workdays?

(1) Oxen, ploughs and other implements all cost money to buy or make. This is capital. In addition there is manure and seeds which come to at least 800 yuan for 600 *mou*. Total capital for 600 *mou*, and for the land formed by the units and for the brigade as a whole, is shown [in Table 8.5 and in Table 8.6 (see page 422)].

FROM MARX

Table 8.5

TO MAO
Capital Needed to Farm 600 *mou*

Item	cost (yuan)
Oxen	12,000
Ploughs	600
Other implements	6,000
Manure and seed	800
Ox fodder	2,700
Total	22,100

NB: (i) Each ox is reckoned at 4,000 yuan.

(ii) Each plough at 200 yuan.

(iii) Each implement at 100 yuan.

(iv) Ox fodder at 900 yuan per animal.

(2) How many workdays are required on 600 *mou*, from opening up the land and sowing seed to harvesting? It is estimated that opening land and sowing seed requires 500 days; preparation and spreading of manure, 800 days; three weddings, 1,800 days; and harvesting, 450 days. This makes 3,550 days in all.

Note: six cooks farming 600 *mou* throughout the year can do at least 1,000 workdays; 3,550 work days minus 1,000 leaves 2,550. Each provisions unit has a hundred men so each man has to do twenty-five days' agricultural labour during the year.

Table 8.6

Agricultural Tasks Assigned to Units

Troop units	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	Total
Oxen	60,000	24,000	1,200	204,000	192,000	156,000	72,000	60,000	780,000
Ploughs	3,000	1,200	600	10,200	9,600	7,800	3,600	3000	39,000
Other implements	30,000	1,000	6,000	102,000	96,000	78,000	36,000	30,000	379,000
Seed, manure	4,000	1,600	800	13,600	12,800	10,400	4,800	4,000	52,000
Ox fodder	1,350	5,400	2,700	45,900	43,200	35,100	16,200	13,500	175,500
Total	110,500	33,200	22,100	375,700	353,600	287,300	132,600	110,500	1,425,500

(D) The type of crops and the harvest

(1) Find out what is the most suitable grain to be planted according to the land. In general, plant spiked millet [*gu (zi)*], millet [*su*], goaliang, maize [*baogu*], beans, rice and so forth. In addition, also consider the needs of the troops and plant hemp for sandals, lamp-oil and cooking-oil. Some units can plant cotton.

The seventh regiment can plant 200 *mou* of cotton. Estimating a harvest of 30 *jin* of cotton per *mou*, the total will be 6,000 *jin*. At a value of 50 yuan per *jin* this will be equal to 300,000 yuan.

Each company in the special duties battalion [*tewuying*] should plant 80 *mou* of cotton in addition to its 600 *mou* of grain. This can give an estimated harvest of 2,400 *jin* worth 120,000 yuan. The battalion headquarters can plant 20 *mou* giving 600 *jin* worth 30,000 yuan.

(2) Reckoning at 4 *tou* of hulled grain for every 3 *mou*, 600 *mou* can produce 80 *tan* of hulled grain, and the 39,000 *mou* of the whole brigade can produce 5,200 *tan*. At a value of 1,250 yuan per *tan*, the crop from 600 *mou* will be worth 100,000 yuan, and that of the brigade's 39,000 *mou*, 6.5 million yuan.

(3) In each 600 *mou*, it is estimated that 300 will be planted to spiked millet. Each *mou* will produce 300 *jin* of hay giving a total of 90,000 *jin*. At a value of 1 yuan per *jin*, 600 *mou* will produce hay worth 90,000 yuan, and the whole brigade will produce hay worth 5,850,000 yuan.

The harvest totals are given [in Table 8.7 and 8.8 (see page 424)].

Table 8.7
Harvest total on 600 *mu*

Hulled grain	80 <i>tan</i>
Value of grain per <i>tan</i>	1,250 yuan
Total grain value	100,000 yuan
Hay	90,000 <i>jin</i>
Value of hay per 100 <i>jin</i>	100 yuan
Total value of hay	90,000 yuan
Total value grain and hay	190,000 yuan

Table 8.8
Harvest for 359 Brigade

Units	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	Total
Area planted in <i>mou</i>	3,000	1,200	600	10,200	9,600	7,800	3,600	3,000	39,000
Grain which could be harvested in <i>tan</i>	400	160	80	1,360	1,280	1,040	480	400	5,200
Hay (10,000 <i>jin</i>)	45	18	9	153	144	177	54	45	585
Value of grain crops (10,000 yuan)	50	20	10	170	160	130	60	50	650
Value of hay crops (10,000 yuan)	45	18	9	153	144	177	54	45	585
Total value of crops (10,000 yuan)	95	38	19	323	304	247	114	95	1,235

After each regiment and unit has received this plan, it should at once call a meeting of production cadres to discuss implementation. The general plan for the regiment or unit and the plan for each provisions unit (including their own plans for vegetables, edible oil, lamp-oil, hemp for making sandals and so forth for which they have been self-sufficient for three years) should be reported upwards by the end of November. It is important that this should be obeyed.

The above materials show us that the army's self-supporting production has undoubtedly achieved a great deal. What have these achievements depended on? These have depended on the active leadership of the cadres and the labour enthusiasm of the troops. The cadres have given active leadership to the production movement consciously in order to overcome difficulties in the course of the revolution. The troops have taken part in productive labour consciously in order to overcome difficulties in the course of the revolution. If these two groups had not had this conscious awareness, if they had not felt that their work was not for others but for themselves, not for some worthless cause but for the sacred cause of the revolution, there would have been no ways for them to fulfil these difficult production tasks. If they had felt they were hired labourers, if they had felt that the production they carried out had no relationship to their own interests and no relationship to the common revolutionary cause, there would have been no way to fulfil these production tasks.

Above we have discussed the fine experience and great achievements of our army in self-supporting production. Below we shall again discuss the shortcomings in our work.

Our work has shortcomings, and these shortcomings are not only found in the army but also in the official organizations and schools. Some of these shortcomings were unavoidable in the past. However, after five years' experience we should be able to correct them. Some have already become serious abuses. If we do not correct them, they will hinder the interests of the Party and the revolution.

What are these shortcomings?

First, in order to solve urgent problems of self-sufficiency quickly some army units and some official organizations and schools have relatively or specially stressed commerce and neglected agriculture and industry. They do not realize that only agriculture and industry produce value. Commerce is merely a medium of circulation. It cannot produce any value itself. Warned by experience, the

production task for all forces and official organizations and schools in 1943 is gradually to transfer the again emphasis to agriculture, industry and transport. In our present circumstances, agriculture is particularly important since the majority of the things we need are agriculture products (staple grain, miscellaneous grain, vegetables, hemp, meat, vegetable-oil, animal-oil, cotton, horse-fodder, timber, firewood, etc.). Agricultural products can also be exported in exchange for industrial products. If we also undertake some possible and necessary handicrafts (spinning yarn, spinning wool, making shoes, weaving woollen thread and garments, digging coal, sawing wood, pressing oil, etc.) and large light industry (textiles, paper-making), we can meet the majority of our daily requirements and produce enough for trading.

The second shortcoming is that we lack unified planning and unified inspection. Lower levels act without co-ordination and upper levels either do not have or lack sufficient unified direction, planning and inspection of policy principles and work content. As a result the various branches do not know what they should not do, or do know but still do it. Thus instances of lack of co-ordination or struggling for independence often occur. Incidents have arisen where policy principles and government orders have been broken, where the people's interests have been damaged, where various economic units have not only not co-operated but have competed and hindered each other, where the upper levels have been deceived and not the lower levels, or where both have been deceived, where things have been kept back or where lies have been told. There has been great waste, reckless spending, concentration on show and not on results. Particularly serious are cases of the evils of bribery and corruption among cadres. Some cadres have been enticed by material things and are not loyal to the sacred cause of communism, having become completely corrupt. Other cadres, have been poisoned, and can only get back to health by drying out in the sun. All these bad things and all this corruption have occurred to a lesser or greater extent among some parts of the army and in some official organizations and schools. Henceforth, all upper-level leadership organs in the army and the official organizations and schools must place emphasis on looking after the whole situation and on grasping policy. They must provide unified planning and inspection for the productive activities of all subordinate units. They certainly must not permit the abuses described above to occur again. If they do occur again, they

must be strictly disciplined. Less important cases should be criticized and serious ones punished. We certainly cannot condone them or, to use a flattering term, “have a liberal policy”. These are the three work styles for rectification in economic work. We must carry them out without the slightest delay.

The third shortcoming is that in the production activities of many army units, official organizations and schools, the cadres responsible for administration and control do not take many pains. A minority even pay no attention at all and merely entrust every thing to the supply organ or to the general office. This is because they still do not understand the importance of economic work. And the reason they still do not understand it is because they have been poisoned by the deceitful corrupting words of metaphysicists like **Dong Zhongshu**, “Conform to the requirements and do not seek gain, be concerned with the way and do not plan for merit”, and have not yet cast them fully aside. It is also because they consider politics, Party and army affairs come first and are most important, while economic work, although also important, is not important to the same degree. They feel that they themselves do not have to divide their attention or to give much attention by being concerned. However, these attitudes are entirely wrong. In the present situation in the **Shaan-Kan-Ning** Border Region, the great majority of people have work to do. If you talk of revolution, then in the final analysis apart from economic work and educational work (including theoretical education, political education, military education, cultural education, technical education, professional education and national education) what other work is worthy of the names central or primary work? Is there any other work that is more revolutionary? True, there is other work and a lot of it, but the central or primary work for the majority of comrades in the present situation in the Border Region is certainly economic work and educational work. All other work is only significant in the context of these two. If we conscientiously carry out these two items of work, we can consider that we have done well in supporting the war at the front and in helping the people of the great rear areas. Of the two, education (or study) cannot be carried out alone. We are not in a time when “official rank lies in study”. We cannot go and “conform to the requirements and illuminate the way” with hungry stomachs. We must get food to eat. We must pay attention to economic work. Talking of education or study separately from economic work is merely using superfluous and empty words.

Talking of "revolution" separately from economic work is like making revolution against the Finance Department and against yourselves. The enemy will not be in the least hurt by you. Because we have many comrades with leadership responsibilities who still take the attitude of neglecting or not paying much attention to economic work, many other comrades copy them, being willing to do Party, government, army and educational work, or to work in literature and art but unwilling to do economic work. Some female comrades are unwilling to marry economic workers, implying that they consider them dishonourable. They consider that marrying the head of a mule-and-horse-team would be an insult and they would rather marry a political-worker. In fact all these viewpoints are very wrong and do not match the situation in this time and place. We must make a new division of labour. We need some revolutionary specialists who are separate from production affairs. We also require some doctors, literature and art workers, and so forth. But we do not want many people like this. If there are too many, then danger arises. If those who eat are many and those who produce are few, if those who are employed suffer and those who benefit are comfortable, we shall collapse. Therefore, many cadres must be transferred from their present work or study to economic posts. Chief responsible cadres at all levels in the Party, government and army must at the same time pay full attention to leading economic work. They must investigate and study the content of economic work, be responsible for making plans for economic work, allocate cadres for economic work, inspect the results of economic work, and never again entrust this extremely important work to the supply departments or general offices alone and wash their hands of it.

The fourth shortcoming is that in the past some army units and official organizations have not had a division of labour between levels when allocating production tasks. All levels from brigade to company and from upper level to lower level have been permitted to run commerce without any limits. Thus many defects have arisen. Henceforth most commerce, industry and transport should be concentrated in brigades, in regiments working in independent areas and in upper-level organs. Furthermore these must work according to correct principles. Trade with the outside must be united under the direction of the Commodities Bureau. Units under regiments working in an independent area, units at battalion level or below, and most lower level organs should be instructed to carry out agricul-

ture, handicrafts that can be done by troops or miscellaneous personnel and business or trading of the consumer co-operative type. They are not allowed to do other work.

In the light of achievements and shortcomings over the past five years, the concrete tasks for the various units of the army in 1943 are as follows:

(1) With the exception of most of the grain and some of the bedding and clothing which are supplied by the government, the great majority of army units should provide 80 per cent of their own supplies. Some units (such as 359 Brigade) should provide 100 per cent. Only those in special circumstances (such as the cavalry) can be allowed to bear a lighter production burden, and they too should think of ways to provide more in 1944. All forces should prepare to increase self-sufficiency in grain and clothing and bedding in 1944 so as to reduce the burden on the people and to let them build up their strength.

(2) With the exception of 359 Brigade, which is already fully carrying out the military farming system, or the cavalry, which would find it difficult because of special circumstances to implement that system at once, and of those with garrison duties, all other forces should carry out the policy of military farming in individual units or several units together so as to increase agricultural production.

(3) All units from top to bottom should carry out production in an organized, led and planned way. Set up production committees at all levels from brigade to company, and carry out collective planning and inspection at each level. Study in production techniques so as to increase production and improve supplies. Correct all irregular phenomena.

(4) Select cadres strong in politics and ability to administer production and supply work in each department. Existing economic cadres should be examined. Incompetents and those who have committed corrupt and decadent errors must be transferred. Particularly serious cases must be punished. Every unit must set up a deputy battalion head with responsibility for production and personnel to administer production in companies. These people should specially control production and the distribution of tasks for whole battalions and whole companies. Brigade units and regimental units should establish deputy officers with responsibility for production to administer the production work of the units themselves. The commanding officer of each level must personally plan and inspect economic

work.

(5) All economic and financial work of the Party, government and army in each sub-region should carry out co-ordinated cost-accounting under the leadership of the finance sub-committee of the sub-region. In order to stimulate the activism of the production and working personnel of all units, it should permit them to spend a suitable amount of the results of their production on improving their livelihood. Everything apart from this should be distributed in a co-ordinated way so as to avoid the problem of unequal benefits. Some co-ordinated distribution should be applied throughout the Border Region as a whole, some within the sub-regions, some within the various systems, and some within units. It can be decided according to the nature of production and the economic situation.

(6) Implement the policy of "giving consideration to both the army and the people". The economic activities of the army, Party and government should harmonize with the economic activities of the people. Anything which damages the people's interests or causes them dissatisfaction is not allowed.

(7) Production and education cannot be out of balance. All units must carefully plan both kinds of work and their mutual relationships. Correctly share out the time for each so that production and education in 1943 can be greater and better than in 1942. We have had five years' experience and it is entirely possible to achieve this aim.

(8) The core of the army's political work is to ensure the fulfilment of its production and education plans, to ensure that while it is carrying out these plans there are correct relationships with the Party, government, and people, to ensure the correct relationship between upper and lower levels within the army itself, and to ensure the purity of economic cadres. If political work does not fulfil its own task in these areas then it will be defeated.

9. ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRODUCTIVE UNDERTAKINGS OF OFFICIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SCHOOLS

Within the three branches of the public sector of the economy, production by the troops and by the official organizations and schools is directly intended to meet their own living and running-costs. Pro-

duction by government organs is also included in this. For example, the personnel working in the various departments and offices of the Border Region Government run agricultural, handicraft and commercial undertakings. These directly supplement deficiencies in the running-expenses of the organs and in clothing, bedding and food for the personnel. By contrast the salt industry, industry and agriculture established as government enterprises are not intended to provide running-expenses but to meet the needs of the whole Party, government and army.

In Yanan and the Border Region, the official organizations of the Party and government, leading organs of the mass organizations and many schools have pursued agriculture industry and commerce under the slogans "set-to-ourselves" and "self-reliance". This is a broad mass-movement, and it has solved many big problems of finance and supply. It is only just second to the army's production and it is worth our while to sum up its experience carefully, to point out its achievements and shortcomings and to determine the work-plan for 1943.

The army's production movement began in 1938 and gained some experience. In 1939 we spread this experience into all official organizations and schools. In February 1939 we held a Production Mobilization Conference. We organized production committees to be leading organs for the production movement and we stipulated different production tasks according to the different circumstances of the work and study of each official organization and school and the strength of their labour force. For example, we laid down that working personnel in districts and townships should be fully self-sufficient in grain, and other organizations from the centre down to the county should be either one-half or one-third self-sufficient according to the strength and size of their labour force. In total we asked them to open up 100,200 *mou* of land and to harvest 13,000 *tan* of hulled grain. Besides this we decided that all official organizations and schools should be entirely self-sufficient in vegetables, should raise pigs for meat and should use the straw from their crops to provide part of the fodder for horses. At the time there were roughly 200,000 people in the official organizations and schools of the whole Border Region. We issued average production expenses of 2.60 yuan per head, a total of over 49,000 yuan. This provided capital to buy plough-oxen and agricultural tools. After they had found land and bought oxen and tools everyone was mobilized for the spring plough-

ing. Most of these people were intellectuals and youths who had never previously taken part in production. Together with cadres from worker and peasant backgrounds and service personnel, cooks and grooms, they were organized into production groups to open up the land. All hilltops near Yanan with unused land became covered with men and women opening them up. They automatically showed labour discipline and declared competitions in clearing land. The strong took up hoes and the weak grew vegetables and raised pigs, or took food and water to the workers.

The gains from this production movement were: (i) the official organizations and schools of the whole Border Region opened up 113,414 *mou* of land, harvested 11,325.63 *tan* of grain (equivalent to 5,830.17 *tan* of hulled grain) and harvested roughly 1,200,00 *jin* of vegetables. At prevailing market prices the two harvests were worth over 368,000 yuan (over 10,179,000 yuan at 1942 prices). This provided one-quarter of the grain requirements of 20,000 people, one-half of the horse fodder and some of the vegetables and meat. (ii) It enabled over 10,000 intellectuals and young people to understand from their own experience what physical labors is. This tempered them. (iii) When the common folk of the Border Region saw or heard that all working personnel and young students in all the Party and government official organizations — from Party Central Committee members to young service personnel — were all going up into the mountains to farm, they were moved. Everyone was keen to open up land and it became an exceptional year for doing so.

On the other hand, the stipulated task for grain productions was not fulfilled in this year because of lack of labour experience and because the application of manure, seed planting and weeding was not done at the right time. Also, in some areas there was drought and so forth. As a result, although a lot of land was opened up, the harvest was not large and only 45 per cent of the original grain target of 13,000 *tan* of hulled grain was achieved. Secondly the error of egalitarianism was committed in leadership and organization. The different nature of each organization and school was not considered. Some were given tasks that were too great such as the call for district and township cadres to be self-sufficient in grain. In fact they only achieved one-quarter. Some put off and spoilt their work or study in order to carry out production with the result that it was uneconomic. In some cases male and female comrades, physically too weak to do hard work, were forced to labour and their health

suffered. Some units could in fact have undertaken industry and commerce but this was not pointed out at the time, and they purely and simply concentrated on agriculture.

In 1940 we corrected these shortcomings. First, we reduced the agricultural production tasks. Apart from self-sufficiency in vegetables and meat, we stipulated that the official organizations and schools should be only from one-seventh to one-sixth or one-quarter self-sufficient in grain according to their different circumstances. We did not ask weak males nor any females to do physical labour. No person over fifty or under fifteen took part in production. We permitted the hiring of experienced peasants to join in or to direct production. In addition, the Finance Department issued 50,000 yuan to the official organizations and schools as capital to allow them to undertake industry and commerce and to develop animal husbandry, raising pigs and sheep. Therefore, in agricultural production during 1940 we did not increase cultivated land beyond the existing amount. Some units lacked labour power and adopted the meshed of taking ordinary folk on as tenants. Some gave part of their grain-producing land to others and concentrated on planting vegetables and raising pigs. In addition, some schools moved to other places in north China. Therefore the 1940 harvest only amounted to 3,000 *tan* of hulled grain and 900,000 *jin* of vegetables, worth 3 million yuan at the market prices of the time.

The commerce we ran began with co-operatives. In 1939 each official organization and school had a consumers' co-operative and some had opened restaurants. By the first half of 1940 there were thirty co-operatives and restaurants with more than 60,000 guest capital. The largest had 10,000 yuan and the smallest not more than a few hundred yuan. Their aim was to supply daily necessities for the organization or school itself. At the same time they sold to outsiders for a slight profit as a means of improving their livelihood. They had still not become commercial undertakings to meet general needs. However, they gave initial tempering to cadres ruling commerce, and accumulated some commercial experience and a small amount of capital.

In the two years of 1939 and 1940 the organizations and schools generally did not undertake industry. They only set up some flour mills for their own needs and the rear services. **Jiaotong** set up a smithy for horseshoes. These can be considered the beginnings of their handicraft production.

The above was the first period in self-sufficient production for the organizations and schools. Below we turn to the second period.

In the winter of 1940 the production tasks of the organizations and schools rapidly changed as a result of the economic blockade of the Border Region, the cutting-off of outside aid, the extreme financial difficulties, and the unavoidable need to move quickly from semi-self-sufficiency to full self-sufficiency in finance and supplies.

At the time (with the exception of the troops) the various organs of the Party, government, army and mass organizations and the personnel of the schools could not all take up agriculture and the task of achieving self-sufficiency was extremely difficult. On the one hand we wanted to rely on developing production to ensure daily and monthly supplies. At the same time we wanted to accumulate capital to establish a foundation for future self-sufficiency.

In order to get through this difficult situation, the Party and government adopted necessary steps. First we improved the organizations for leading production. In succession we established the Finance and Economy Office directly under the Central Committee, the Rear Services Economic Construction Office, the Finance and Economy Office at top level in the Border Region Government, and ordered each sub-region and county to set up production committees. Second, between the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 the government paid out 700,000 yuan and the Border Region Bank lent 3 million yuan to increase the production capital of the various branches. This was handed to the various bodies leading self-sufficient production for issuing downwards, to be added to the capital accumulated by the organizations themselves in the first period. Thereupon everyone made new arrangements, selected personnel, chose undertakings put industry and commerce to the fore.

Agriculture was then placed in a subordinate position.

Below we shall discuss the experience of the various organizations and schools in industry, commerce and agriculture during this period.

The starting point for the industry of the organizations and schools was textiles. Since the Border Region had wool, the personnel of the organizations and schools spun wool by hand after work and study during the winter of 1940. For a while it became a movement and everybody began to spin. But since there was not enough raw material and spinning skills were poor, the woolly threads were uneven, and too much labour was wasted. After March 1941 this

was gradually stopped and we applied ourselves to setting up handicraft textile mills. In the first half of 1941 each large organization and school selected service personnel and messengers to go to the Refugee Textile Mill run by the government to study spinning and weaving. Like bamboo shoots after spring rain, more than ten textile mills grew up within a short time. The shortcoming was that there was no planning. By the latter half of the year because they had no ensured supply of raw materials or market for yarn, or because they lacked sufficient liquid capital or were poorly administered, some had closed, some had merged and some had temporarily closed. For example, the *Xin Zhongguo* Textile Mill of the Finance and Economy Office directly under the Central Committee first merged with the *Shengli* Mill of the Central Organization Department and then merged with the *Tuanjie* Mill run by the Marxism-Leninism Institute. Then using the name of *Tuanjie* Textile Mill, it was run in a centralized way and got more profit. The wool-spinning factory run by the Lu *Xun* Academy and the Women's University was closed down and its capital used elsewhere. The *Tuanjie* Textile Mill of the Financial and Economy Office under the Central Committee and the *Jiaotong* Mill run by the Rear Services could not fully employ their production capacity because of all kinds of difficulties. They alternately worked and closed down for a while until they eventually got on the right track. Thus the process of moving from a hand-spinning movement of several thousands of people to the setting up of handicraft factories, from the setting up of over ten small textile mills and wool-spinning factories to the final merger into two factories, the *Jiaotong* and the *Tuanjie*, was a process of moving from blindness to consciousness in which there was continuous groping forward through research, improvement in techniques and improvement in administration. This process on the one hand illustrated the hard-working spirit of the various organizations and schools and on the other illustrated our complete lack of experience in running industry at that time. By 1942 the *Jiaotong* produced 3,336 bolts of cloth and the *Tuanjie* produced 2,736, becoming major factories in the Border Region. They are the valuable creation of the process of hard work and groping the way forward.

Besides textile mills, the organizations and schools directly under the Central Committee have successively set up many handicraft factories for such things as bedding and clothing, shoes, coal and charcoal, carpentry, papermaking, pottery, flour-milling and oil-

pressing, silk weaving and making iron implements. Their aim has been self-sufficiency. The capital for these factories came either from commercial capital, or from bank loans, or from the closure of the wool-spinning factories. Warned by the experience with textiles, these factories were not run in such an entirely disorganized way. They were rather more orderly. With several organizations and schools co-operating, or with co-operation with the common folk or with the Bank. But it was not all plain sailing. Most only laid a firm foundation after following a winding path from initial loss of capital through continued support to final profit.

In the years 1941 and 1942 the system, under the Central Committee's Finance and Economy Office [*Zhong-cai xitong*], set up a total of twenty-seven large and small handicraft factories with total capital of over 400,000 yuan and with 477 employees. Among them there were eight textile mills with 217,000 yuan capital and 161 employees, three coal and charcoal factories with 70,000 yuan capital and sixty-eight employees, three mills with 15,000 yuan capital and twenty-one employees, two bedding and clothing factories with forty-eight employees (capital details not available), three carpentry factories with 35,000 yuan capital and seven employees, one shoe factory with 10,000 yuan capital and thirty-eight employees, and one papermaking workshop with 20,000 yuan capital and twenty-nine employees. In addition, there were six small factories individually producing machinery, glass, alcohol, pottery, oil-lamps and blankets. (There are no statistics on capital and employees for these factories. The first three were experimental undertakings by the Natural Sciences Institute.) All the above factories were reorganized in September 1941 when the official organizations and schools directly under the Central Committee carried out their first drive for better troops and simpler administration. They were transferred to the direct control of Central Administration Bureau. (The Finance and Economy Office directly under the Central Committee was dissolved and we set up the Central Administration Bureau attached to the Central Work Department [*Zhongyang Bangongting*].) Their number was reduced from twenty-seven by closure or merger to nineteen. In particular the merging of the eight textile mills into two, the Tuanjie and the Shiyan, enabled concentration of management and improvement in operation. Thus we were able to move from a situation where eight mills either lost capital or just maintained themselves to one of a profit of 1,600,000 yuan in October 1942.

Self-sufficient industry run by the Rear Services system was started in the winter of 1940 just like that run by the central financial system. After two years' operation, 1941 and 1942, there was one textile mill, two papermaking factories, three charcoal factories, two carpentry factories, two silk-weaving factories, and one factory each for coal [*shitán*], refined salt, pottery, bedding and clothing, writing-brushes, ironwork, flour-milling, shoes and hemp-weaving, a total of nineteen altogether. There are no statistics yet for the amount of capital, number of employees and amount of production of these factories. Although the profit earned by these undertakings is not great (in the first ten months of 1942 it was 200,000 yuan), their great merits are:

- i. they are run in a centralized way by the Rear Services and are not run freely in a dispersed way as by the various official organizations and schools. Thus leadership and inspection are thorough, and mistakes are quickly corrected.
- ii. They constitute a wide range of operation. Unlike the Central Committee's Finance and Economy Office system's initial concentration on textiles through the establishment of eight factories, the Rear Services has at all times only run one factory, the Jiaotong Textile Mill, and thus had spare capacity to do other things.
- iii. They are entirely aimed at ensuring supplies. Although they do not earn money, they have provided a supply of many necessary goods.

In October 1942 we carried out a thorough drive for better troops and simpler administration. The Central Administration Bureau and Rear Services systems were combined, and their industries administered in a unified way. We also carried out further reorganization. The Tuanjie and Jiaotong textile mills and the bedding and clothing factories were transferred to the Finance Department. The medicine, alcohol, iron, and glassmaking factories were transferred to the Garrison Office. The Natural Sciences Institute and all the things that went with it were handed over to the government. All remaining factories were closed, or merged and handed over to the control of the Central Administration Bureau. By December 1942 there were three carpentry factories, two papermaking factories, five charcoal-factories, one shoe-factory, one oil-pressing factory, one flour-mill,

three grinding-mills, one cart-factory, one wine-factory and three blanket-workshops, a total of twenty-one large and small handicraft factories and workshops. These can ensure all supplies of coal, shoes and flour, the manufacture and repair of all wooden and galvanized-iron implements, and some of the paper and edible-oil requirements for the whole of the Central Administration Bureau system. Bedding and clothing are supplied by the government. This is the outcome of the activism in industrial production over the past two years of the Central Administration Bureau (prior to September 1941 the Central Committee's Finance and Economy Office) and the Rear Services.

The above experience shows that under present circumstances it is essential for the official organizations and schools to run handicrafts. The aim is not to earn money but to ensure supplies of necessities. However, organizations and schools cannot set up any kind of factory they want to. They should choose in a planned way which ones to run, according to the nature of the industry and the situation in the official organization or school. They should reduce the number of errors created by blindly groping around. Existing factories should be organized into systems according to area and official organization. Cutbacks, mergers and transfers can reduce waste and enable them to play an even greater role in providing supplies.

As mentioned above, our comrades lacked experience of running commerce in the same way as they did of running industry. They had previously only managed a few co-operatives. We wished to turn to relying on a profit from commerce in order to provide a large proportion of supplies. What had to be done? Once again it was a process of moving from blindness to consciousness in order to find an answer to this question.

During 1941 and 1942 commerce started off with the aim of rapidly overcoming difficulties. Therefore we had no choice but to use the bulk of the capital of each official organization and school to trade for a quick profit.

In the year from autumn 1940 to autumn 1941 we mainly operated large stores. Some official organizations and schools enlarged their existing low-capital, small-profit co-operatives, small shops and stalls, increasing capital and staff, joining chambers of commerce and running proper commercial undertakings. For example, the Jiaotong Store of the military base was at first a small cigarette-shop set up at the entrance to the base at Qilipu in Yanan. In August

1939 it moved to the new market in Yanan and as well as selling general goods set up a Chinese Medicine shop and a horseshoe-shop. Its capital increased from a few hundred yuan to 20,000 yuan. Another example is the Hezuo Store which grew from the co-operative of the Anti-Japanese University. In June 1940 it moved to the new market and set up branch stores at the three branch schools of the Anti-Japanese University. Its capital increased from 80 yuan to 19,000 yuan. The Rear Services Store was at first a small stall with 30 yuan capital. By September 1940 it had expanded and its capital had grown to 20,000 yuan. As well as selling goods it also set up a dyeing shop. Originally many official organizations and schools did not have shops. Around this time they also collected capital and people together and set up business either independently or in partnerships. At the time the business done by all the publicly owned stores depended on trading goods mainly from Suide, Dingbian and Fuxian counties, in particular the cloth, paper, writing-materials required by the official organizations, schools and troops themselves, and the matches, raw cotton and so forth required by the common folk. During this period the official organizations and schools set up over sixty large and small stores in Yanan, Suide and Dingbian, not including those run by the army. In addition, there were many that did not set up premises but depended on one or two people and a few animals to trade goods along the roads, calling it "floating trade". According to statistics for October 1941 the stores under the control of the Rear Services' committee for store administration were the Xibei Store, the Xibei Vegetable Co-operative, and fourteen large and small stores including the Hsinghua, the Hezuo, the Jiaotong, the Xinxin, the Xingmin, the Minxing, the **Biahuo**, the **Junmin**, and so forth. The Central Administration Bureau had twenty stores.

We really relied on commerce to pass through a serious crisis during that year. It solved great problems of supply. For example, during the first half of 1941 the Central Committee's Finance and Economy Office and the official organizations and schools relied on the twenty large and small stores run by 113 staff with 296,800 yuan capital to earn a profit of 256,000 yuan which supplied 48 per cent of their daily running-expenses. The Rear Services system with capital of 706,000 yuan made 810,000 yuan profit in the same period, which supplied 45 per cent of their daily running-costs.

However, commerce during this period had one great fault: excessive dispersal and no centralized leadership. Furthermore, al-

most all of it was trade in general goods. These faults came from the urgent need to solve difficulties in running-costs for each official organization and school. Each acted without co-ordination, competed with others and even disobeyed Party policy, influencing prices and currency. Simultaneously, there was price inflation, the Border Region banknotes lost value and the external blockade intensified. Suddenly dealing in export and import of general goods had a gloomy future and the various official organizations and schools which relied on this for their running-expenses also found themselves with problems. In this situation, it was urgently necessary to transform the commerce run by the official organizations and schools and by the army. This transformation began in the latter half of 1941. In the spring of 1942 the Border Region carried out an initial drive for better troops and simpler administration. It was then decided to organize all commerce into proper enterprises [*qiyehua*]. On the one hand, each system put its existing stores in order, organized a joint committee for publicly controlled commerce, unified the leadership of publicly owned stores, and strictly carried out laws, commands and policies. On the other hand, they expanded the scope of commercial activity, carrying out many kinds of business such as salt-shops, mule and horse supplies, trans-shipment agencies, merchant warehousing, slaughtering and so forth. The method of operation also changed. In some cases stores were merged, in others capital was invested in private stores or in co-operatives, and the official organization or school did not run its own trade. In other cases capital was invested in the government's Salt Company or in the Guanghua Store. Thereafter the fault of having too many shops competing with each other was avoided, and the function of providing the running-costs of the official organizations and schools could be restored. For example, as a result of reorganization according to this policy the Central Administration Bureau and Rear Services systems reduced the number of their shops from thirty-eight with a staff of 196 to twenty-five with a staff of 105 by October 1942. In the first ten months of 1942 the two systems earned a profit of 16,440,000 yuan with capital of 8 million yuan. This accounted for 68 per cent of all production income. Also during 1942 the production committees of the various departments and offices of the Border Region Government earned 600,000 yuan from agriculture and commerce, of this commerce accounted for 350,000 yuan or 58 per cent. Official organizations at sub-region and county levels origi-

nally put agriculture first, but by 1942 commerce was the most important.

In 1943 financial and economic leadership will be united [*yi yuan hua*]. External trade will be unified under the Commodities Bureau. Every official organization and school must carry out a thorough drive for better troops and simpler administration. As a result, the commerce run by the official organizations and schools must be regulated by the Commodities Bureau, must share in running transport for local products and salt, and must allocate some capital for co-operation with the Commodities Bureau. In this way publicly controlled commerce will be more rational.

The agricultural production of the official organizations and schools also made progress in 1941 and 1942. In these two years there were great achievements in the areas of grain, vegetables, charcoal and labour after work.

Some official organizations and schools were still growing grain entirely independently in 1941, some had already changed to forming partnerships with the common folk, and some ran agricultural stations (including both independent operation and partnerships). Independent operation had changed somewhat. The entire personnel no longer went up the mountains to farm. Instead, those who went were chiefly those doing miscellaneous duties organized into production teams accompanied by some of the physically stronger personnel. For example, the production teams of the various official organizations in the Rear Services system planted 5,200 *mou* of grain in 1941, and the Central Party School planted 800 *mou*. Those in partnership with the common folk included the Central organization Department which planted 840 *mou* and divided the grain at a ratio of 2:8, 2 to the government and 8 to the private individuals, and the hay at a ratio of 7:3, 7 to the government and 3 to the individuals. The agricultural stations included the two stations run by the Secretariat of the Border Region Government on a partnership basis. There were also the independent stations run at *Nanniwan* by teams selected from the miscellaneous duties personnel of the official organizations and schools equipped with oxen and tools. These included two from the Rear Services and one each from the Central Committee's Finance and Economy Office, the Central Organization Department and the Youth League cadres. Official organizations of the sub-regions and counties also adopted both independent operation and partnerships.

In 1942 the drive for better troops and simpler administration was carried out. Many official organizations and schools in Yanan were merged. As a result, self-supporting vegetable production continued but all grain production was only carried out either at agricultural stations or in partnerships.

Although partnerships have some of the character of exploitation, the common folk, in particular the immigrants and refugees, appreciate it very much since the government supplies seed, plough oxen and agricultural implements, and the taxes are not high. This method has a role to play in encouraging immigration and in adjusting the use of labour power. The Party School provides an example:

The general office of the Party School planted 300 *mou* in partnership with four immigrants. These four were all very strong. The Party School sent one man responsible for leadership and inspection. The arrangements were for the Party School to supply the agricultural tools, a hoe, a pick and a sickle per man, to lend two oxen and to give the seed. They also lent grain at rate of 4 *sheng* of hauled grain per 3 *mou* making 4 *tan* for 300 *mou*. It was agreed to repay in the autumn of the following year. The division of the grain and hay harvest was laid down as 20 per cent of the spiked millet [*gu (zi)*] for the government and 80 per cent for the private individuals, 30 per cent of coarse millet [*meiji*] for the government and 70 per cent for the private individuals, and 40 per cent of the miscellaneous grains for the government and 60 per cent for the private individuals. All the hay went to the Party School. This year the Party School received 10,500 *jin* of hay, 8.37 *tan* of spiked millet, 10.17 *tan* of coarse millet, 6.9 *tou* of black beans [*heidou*] 4.2 *tou* of hemp-seed [*xiao mazi*], 1 *tou* of sesame [*lao mazi*] and 2 *tou* of adzuki beans [*xiaodou*], valued at a total of 31,925 yuan in Border Region money. The four partners received 33.48 *tan* of spiked millet, 22.4 *tan* of coarse millet, 7.5 *tou* of black beans, 6.3 *tou* of hemp-seed, 1.5 *tou* of sesame, and 3 *tou* of adzuki beans, valued at a total of 46,805 yuan. This is a good example of giving consideration to both public and private interests.

There is also new experience in building up agriculture stations. Since the personnel selected from the official organizations and schools are not strong labour powers, have limits on their working-time and are not skilled in agricultural techniques, they will waste their capital if they only concentrate on farming. In 1942 we adopted the following two methods. One was independent operation which

includes subsidiary undertakings such as animal husbandry, wood-plank sawing and so forth as well as planting grain. This was like the method adopted by 359 Brigade. The other was to form partnerships and involved going into partnership with the common folk on stations that already had some foundation, and setting up another new station oneself. In the first year the new station brings no profit but in the second year it has some foundation and can also be changed into a partnership. The Secretariat of the Border Region Government provides an example. According to the comrades there:

We have two stations, one to the east, the other to the south. Their size, method of operation and harvest are much the same. In 1942 the southern station planted 288 *mou* of river land, 324 *mou* of previously farmed hill land and 408 *mou* of newly opened land. Altogether the harvest was 244 *tan* of grain. Since beans and corn formed the bulk, this was equivalent to 146.6 *tan* of hulled grain. Taking each *tan* at 1,300 yuan this was worth 190,230 yuan. We also harvested 14,000 *jin* of hay worth 14,000 yuan and 20,000 *jin* of vegetables worth 20,000 yuan. The total value for these three items was 224,320 yuan. Originally we had 128 sheep. In 1942 eighty-one lambs were raised, worth 10,000 yuan. We bought pigs for 3,482 yuan, and we also had thirteen worth 400 yuan each. The total of all the above items is 243,002 yuan.

As we have adopted the method of partnership operation all our expenditures were taken from the amount harvested including all expenses for the five men we assigned. We went into partnership with twelve households, totaling forty-five people. They had nineteen whole-labour powers, thirteen half-labour powers and thirteen children not able to work. Altogether their share was 68 *tan* of grain, equivalent to 40.8 *tan* of hulled grain, with a total value of 53,040 yuan at 1,300 yuan per *tan*. They also received 7,000 *jin* of hay worth 7,000 yuan. The two items came to 60,040 yuan. Our own five men (one was crippled and looked after general running, two cooked, planted vegetables and crops, and two looked after sheep and did general work) four oxen, one mule and five dogs received 30 *tan* of grain for eating equivalent to 18 *tan* of hulled grain worth 23,400 yuan and 50 *jin* of edible oil worth 1,300 yuan at 26 yuan per *jin*. In addition, repairs to implements, ploughs, clothing and supplementary payments came to 20,000 yuan. The total of all the above expenditures was 104,740 yuan, giving a surplus of 138,262 yuan. Adding on the roughly 110,000 yuan from the eastern station, the

return on the two stations was roughly 250,000 yuan.

The two stations are nominally run by the Secretariat and the Civil Affairs, Finance, Education and Reconstruction Departments. In practice they only send out ten people, of whom two are hired labourers, one is a cripple and seven are surplus personnel. The government has a production committee to control the two stations. In practice usually only one person runs things. This year, due to floods and strong winds, we were 150 *tan* short on our harvest, worth 117,000 yuan. We were also swindled on the seeds we bought for turnips and cabbage, which were the wrong kind. This lost 30,000 yuan. These two items came to 147,000 yuan and total losses for the two stations were roughly 200,000 yuan. This means that without natural disasters and the wrong seeds we could have gotten 200,000 yuan more. The working personnel in the Civil Affairs, Finance, Education, Reconstruction Departments and the Secretariat number around 400. The income of 250,000 yuan is thus an average of 625 yuan per head. Although the harvest this year is below norm, the foundations for next year have been laid and a livelihood for twelve immigrant households has been provided. Furthermore, relying on this foundation, next year we are preparing to expand the ploughed land at the southern station by 900 *mou* in order to settle surplus personnel. The two original stations will still be run as partnerships.

The method adopted by the county-level official organizations also include both individual operation and partnerships. For example, the top-rank official organizations in Yanan county have planted a total of 630 *mou*. Of these over 270 *mou* are farmed in partnership with two households. These have five labour powers and the county committee has only assigned two people to work on the station. The remaining 360 *mou* are farmed by criminals. In 1942, excluding the amount distributed to the partners, they received a total of 75 *tan* of grain, equivalent to 45 *tan* of hulled grain, with a value of 58,500 yuan. With the addition of hay worth 3,000 yuan, the total was 61,500 yuan.

As the above examples show, independent operation, partnerships and a combination of both are correct. We should pay attention to this experience when determining the grain production tasks for 1943.

A very great task in agricultural work is the growing of vegetables since grain is also provided by the grain tax. If vegetables are not grown, then over 20,000 people will be semi-starved. The

saying “no vegetables is like half a year’s famine” is completely true.

The method for producing vegetables in the past two years has been to assign personnel specially for growing them and to assign some supplementary labour from the official organizations and schools. Each year we have on average been self-sufficient for three to six months. According to the Rear Services statistics in 1941, their various official organizations and schools planted 1,801 *mou* of vegetables consisting of 1,030 *mou* of potatoes and 771 *mou* of cabbage, beans, turnips and miscellaneous vegetables. In autumn, autumn cabbage and autumn turnips were planted on the 771 *mou*. Over the year 879,000 *jin* of vegetables were harvested, equal to one-third of annual consumption on average. According to the Central Administration Bureau statistics, in 1942 the various official organizations and schools directly under central control assigned forty personnel for growing vegetables and planted 388 *mou* of river land and 1,941 *mou* of hill land. They harvested 745,000 *jin* of vegetables, being self-sufficient for five months on average. The Central Administration Bureau itself supplied nine months of its needs. Yanan University and the Natural Sciences Institute both supplied eight months of their needs, and the Central Research Institute and the Chinese Writers Anti-Aggression Association [*wen-Kang*] both supplied seven months of their needs. The circumstances for vegetable production by the personnel in the various official organizations are very varied. For example, in the Guanzhong sub-region they can only plant a little on account of the climate, and can only achieve three months’ self-sufficiency on average. In the special military area they can only reach two or three months’ self-sufficiency because of the scarcity of land. In some areas such as Huachi, Mudan and other counties they can achieve six months’ or more because they have land and can farm in partnerships. Production of vegetables for their own use by official organizations and schools throughout the Border Region is estimated to be worth around 6 million yuan.

The problem here is to discern whether the method whereby the official organizations and schools assign production personnel to grow vegetables outside their permanent organizational structure is ultimately worthwhile or not. The experience of the various offices under central control shows that it is. The best land for growing vegetables is river land, where all kinds of green vegetables can be

grown. On hilly land only potatoes and beans can be grown. One *mou* of river land growing vegetables can supply five people for a whole year, that is 0.2 *mou* per person. However, 1.5 *mou* of hill land is required to supply one person for one year. Furthermore, so long as a man specializing in growing vegetables has additional help when spreading manure, he can farm 6 *mou* of river land. This means that one man specializing in growing vegetables together with some supplementary labour can supply a year's vegetables for thirty people. The daily vegetable requirement per head is 12 *liang* and the annual requirement is 300 *jin*. For thirty people the annual requirement is 9,000 *jin*. At December 1942 Yanan market prices of 3 yuan per *jin*, the total value of this is 27,000 yuan. Allowing 6,000 yuan for the man specializing in growing vegetables there is a surplus of 21,000 yuan. Taking the necessary incentive payments into account, the least return is 20,000 yuan. Therefore, in the future after each official organization and school has carried out a thorough drive for better troops and simplified administration, it should pay attention to arranging river land for growing vegetables, to assigning personnel for the work, to providing supplementary labour and to ensuring self-sufficiency in vegetables for more than half a year and even for a whole year.

Apart from grain and vegetables, raising pigs and sheep for meat is also an important part of agriculture.

Some people consider that raising pigs wastes grain. However, our experience proves that raising pigs does not waste grain and, instead, not raising them does. First of all, without pigs leftovers have to be thrown away, and there are quite a lot of leftovers in large official organizations and companies. Secondly, if little meat is eaten, then greater quantities of other food is consumed; and if a lot of meat is eaten, then less other food is consumed. Thus, raising pigs to increase meat supplies is not only necessary to maintain health but is also economically rational. The various official organizations and schools have developed many ways of raising pigs. For example, the Central Party School directed the pig slaughterhouse to send someone to the kitchen daily to collect the water in which the grain was washed and the vegetable waste to feed the pigs. The Central General Affairs Section [*Zhongyang Zongwuchu*] directed someone to collect as pig-food the waste left after husking the grain and also the leaves and roots left over in the vegetable plots when the vegetables were harvested. According to the Rear

Services Department statistics, in the first half of 1941 its various official organizations got 56,814 *jin* of pork worth 170,440 yuan at the market prices of that time. This was enough for each person to have 1 *jin* of pork a month. If we add the following six months, the value for the whole year was roughly 350,000 yuan. According to the statistics of the Central Administration Bureau, the various official organizations and schools directly under central control raised an average of 2 65 pigs a month up to October 1942. Over the ten months this gave an estimated 23,330 *jin* of pork worth 700,000 yuan in Border Region currency. Another example is the top-level official organizations in Yanan county, which in the first ten months of 1942 earned 10,000 yuan from raising pigs. According to these figures the total value of animal husbandry by the official organizations and schools of the whole Border Region is more than 4 million yuan.

As well as raising pigs, raising sheep is also profitable where there is pastureland.

After a thorough drive for better troops and simpler administration in 1943, we can adopt the method used by 359 Brigade whereby they assign one cook for every forty people and reduce the service personnel. The remaining cooks and service personnel are sent to work on the production front where they can do many things such as growing grain and vegetables, and raising pigs and sheep. Running large-scale animal husbandry on large livestock farms should be given greater prominence in 1943.

Apart from the grain, vegetables and animals, there is also charcoal-burning and labour done outside working hours, both of which have provided examples worth looking at. All the charcoal used in the winter of 1942 by the various official organizations and schools in Yanan was provided by teams of people from those institutions sent up into the hills. If it had been bought a substantial sum of money would have been involved. In September the Central General Affairs Section organized a charcoal-burning team of forty-two people made up of service personnel, cooks and grooms to spend three months up in the hills making charcoal. Altogether they prepared 145 pits of charcoal completing their task of making 140,000 *jin*. At 1.20 yuan a *jin* this was worth 168,000 yuan. If during the four winter months the 30,000 people in the official organizations and schools of the Border Region on average made 1 *jin* of charcoal per head per day, this would provide 3,600,000 *jin* of charcoal worth

3,600,000 yuan. If we do not make the charcoal ourselves, where shall we find such a large amount of money?

There is also the labour done outside working-hours by the miscellaneous duties personnel of the official organizations and offices of the Border Region. For example, the Central General Affairs Section this year mobilized them to repair buildings, to build surrounding walls, to make bridges, to build roads and to cut horse-fodder. This saved the government over 110,000 yuan. Similar labour done by miscellaneous personnel of the Central Party School saved the government over 139,000 yuan; and 359 Brigade did not employ outside workers for any of its repairs or new construction. All official organizations and schools should strive to do the same. Mobilize all the people in an official organization or school to do all the work they can do. If we only consider the labour done after working hours by miscellaneous duties personnel, the amount from all the official organizations and schools of the Border Region could be surprising. We should give rewards to all people who make achievements in production, and this should also apply to labour outside working-hours.

The above is a summary of the experience of the various official organizations and schools of the Border Region in self-sufficient production during the period 1939-42.

According to the comrades doing economic work, in the two years 1941 and 1942 the agricultural, industrial and commercial capital of the Central Administration Bureau and the Rear Services Department rose from 1,281,917 yuan to 11,690,000 yuan (much of this increase was due to the fall in the value of the currency and it was not all due to increased production). The production surplus of the year 1942 was 23,810,000 yuan. Except for the 2,330,000 yuan retained to increase production capital in 1943 the remaining 21,480,000 yuan was all used to supplement food clothing, bedding and office expenses for the various official organizations and schools. In terms of the type of enterprise, agriculture accounted for 17 per cent, industry 8 per cent, salt 7 per cent and commerce 68 per cent. In terms of the official organizations, the enterprises directly under the control of the Rear Services Department got 8,400,000 yuan, those directly under the Central Administration Bureau, 3,500,000 yuan, those jointly run by the above two, 800,000 yuan, and those run by the various official organizations and schools individually, 11,100,000 yuan. If we compare the amount of self-supporting pro-

duction and the amount supplied by the people, the former is 57.5 per cent and the latter 42.5 per cent. The comrades at the county level estimate that the monthly running-expenses for Party and government at the county level is roughly 10,000 yuan. Their own production is around 9,000 yuan and the upper levels only issue around 1,000 yuan. The proportion is thus 90 per cent to 10 per cent and marks an even greater achievement.

In sum, the self-supporting production work of the official organizations and schools of Yanan and of the whole Border Region has had some success. It has not only supplied the greater part of daily running-expenses and solved urgent financial problems but has also laid a secure foundation for the public sector of the economy. Relying on this base, we can continue to develop production and solve future problems.

What is particularly important and worth raising is that we have gained experience in running economic enterprises. This is a priceless treasure that cannot be reckoned in figures. We should not only be able to manage political, military, Party and cultural affairs, but should also be able to manage economic affairs. If we could do all the others but not economic work, we would be a useless bunch of people. We would be overthrown by our enemies and decline until we collapsed.

In the light of our experience of the past five years, and particularly the past two, production by official organizations and schools must henceforth improve, expanding its achievements, overcoming its weak points, developing towards greater consolidation and completing even greater production tasks. In 1943 we should adopt the following policies:

1. Implement the policy of taking agriculture as the chief sector.

- A. According to the actual circumstances in the official organizations and schools, each should adopt the following methods of running agriculture. (i) Those with no foundations in agricultural stations should at once set-to to prepare ploughs and tools, and separately or in partnership with the people grow grain and vegetables. (ii) Those with agricultural stations, as well as continuing production, should expand the scope of operations and arrange for surplus personnel to do more subsidiary work such as raising pigs, sheep, chickens and ducks, sawing planks and so forth. They should also form partnerships with the ordi-

nary people and open new farms. With these methods grain production in 1943 will be greater and better than in 1942. Agriculture must not be considered backward and must not be neglected.

B. All official organizations and schools, large and small, must allocate the necessary personnel to specialize in growing vegetables, supplemented by light work done by working personnel and students. According to the area and climate, they should become self-sufficient in vegetables for six or more months of the year, and strive to become entirely self-sufficient. This is one of the most important steps in improving their livelihood.

2. Co-ordinate and develop the various kinds of handicrafts. According to the area, system and the principle of better troops and simpler administration, join the existing handicrafts of a similar nature run by each section into partnerships. At the same time, according to the needs of each area and each system, set up new handicraft workshops, such as oil-pressing workshops, places to make soya sauce and condiments, charcoal pits and so forth. The principles for running these handicrafts should be first that the workshop itself must be self-supporting, and second that it can make a profit.

3. Develop animal husbandry. All official organizations and schools both large and small should raise pigs and strive to equal 359 Brigade's rate of one pig for every five people, in order to increase the supply of meat. Treat increasing the supply of meat, improving living-standards and raising health-standards as extremely important matters. In addition, each large official organization and school, and particularly the army, should set aside capital, and without harming the interests of the people select areas in Sanbian, Longdong, Jinpenwan and so forth, to run livestock farms. They should raise large numbers of cows, sheep, donkeys and horses, preparing for the time after victory in the War of Resistance when the Border Region's salt trade declines and it has to be replaced by animal exports.

4. Develop transport undertakings. After a thorough drive for better troops and simpler administration, keep only a small number of animals to ensure the transport of grain and straw needed by each official organization and school itself. All surplus animals together with animals specially purchased should be organized into transport teams to transport salt or goods. These transport undertakings can

be run by area and system as the best way of reducing costs.

5. Regulate commerce. Following the policy of commerce playing a supplementary role and the principles of not going against trading policies nor doing speculative business, run shops in partnerships or individually according to the circumstances in the various systems and units after the drive for better troops and simpler administration. Eradicate commerce which goes against policy and close unprofitable shops. The various systems should transfer the proportion needed from commercial capital to agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts and transport. Do not hesitate to lay secure foundations in the work of becoming self-supporting through agriculture, industry, animal husbandry and transport.

6. Treat improving the livelihood of the working personnel, miscellaneous duties personnel and students in the official organizations and schools as an important matter. Responsible people in these institutions should think of all kinds of ways of doing so. Under the principle of voluntary participation, they should encourage and direct miscellaneous duties personnel, working personnel and mothers with children to carry out some handicraft or agricultural production in ways which do not hinder their work, study or health. However, they should not run commerce. This work can be carried out in large production co-operatives, in small production groups or individually as the people involved wish. The government should provide loans for capital and the earnings should belong to the people who take part in the labour. All responsible people who run this very well and have the best successes should get rewards. All those who are not good at running their official organizations and schools hence make the life of the working personnel, miscellaneous duties personnel, students, mothers, children, the sick and the convalescent too harsh, or those who improve livelihood through ways which are wrong, hinder work and study, or sabotage policies and orders should be criticized and taken to task.

7. Implement unified leadership. Firmly carry out the principle of unified leadership and dispersed operation. The top-levels of the Central Committee, the Border Region, the special regions [*zhuangqu*] and the counties should all set up strong leadership organizations concerned with unifying all production undertakings. According to the system and level, unify the policies for running enterprises, unify the co-ordination between the enterprises, and unify the ways of inspecting the running of each enterprise. Fur-

thermore, under the condition of permitting each production unit to retain a suitable profit for itself, within a suitable area to the nature of production and operation, unify the distribution of the profits from production. This is necessary to avoid the great evils of lack of co-ordination, of inequalities in profits and losses, and of disparities in hardship and comforts.

8. All agriculture, industry, animal husbandry, transport and commerce must be run as proper enterprises [*qiye*hua], using the system of economic accounting. The food, bedding, clothing and payments for the working personnel and employees in each enterprise should be supplied by the enterprise itself. They must not be provided at public expense.

9. All production organs (factories, shops, etc.) should be “popularized” no matter whether they belong to the government, the troops or the official organizations and schools. With the exception of the allocation of production tasks, the administration and supervision of production and the disposal of the results of production, everything else is under the leadership of the local Party and government, even including branch life. All personnel in production organizations must carry out policies, be law-abiding and pay taxes, take off their uniforms and put on ordinary clothing, join in the activities of the local masses and be model citizens of the Border Region.

10. In accordance with the concrete circumstances, the Finance and Economy Office and the financial and economic committees of the sub-regions should issue specific production tasks for 1943 to the official organizations and schools in each county system. They should investigate and examine the production plans, and enter all the results of production completed within the plan by these production units into the financial accounts. Surplus production beyond the plan should be retained by the unit for itself as a means of improving livelihood. Upper levels should issue supplements to units whose production is not enough. Those that made a loss in 1942 should be quickly examined to find ways of making up the deficiency.

11. The four shortcomings pointed out in Chapter 8, “On the Development of the Productive Undertakings of the Troops”, also apply to the official organizations and schools. All official organizations and schools committing similar abuses should pay attention to correcting them.

12. It must be clearly explained to all personnel engaged in agri-

culture, industry, animal husbandry, transport, commerce and labour outside working-hours (including the ordinary people working as hired labour or in partnerships) that their work is for the revolution and they are part of a very glorious cause. Setting aside a portion of the income from their labour to hand over to the government helps our own, glorious and sacred revolutionary cause. It does not increase the assets of any individual. If publicly employed personnel working in the public sector of the economy plot to make special profits for themselves, they are guilty of immoral conduct within our ranks and crimes of corruption before the law. Those who are entirely free of corruption and waste, and work loyally for the Party and the country, are considered noble and moral, and should receive praise and rewards from the Party and the government. This point should be explained to the troops.

13. All people doing economic, financial, supply and general service work, so long as they are not corrupt, do not waste, are loyal and work for the Party and the country, should be honoured. All people who treat their work lightly or with disdain should be criticized and rebuked.

10. ON GRAIN WORK

We have now completed our discussion of economic work. Our economy is divided into the two large private and public sectors. The private sector of the economy includes agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, co-operatives and salt undertakings. The public sector consists of the undertakings run by the government, the army, and the official organizations and schools. We have looked at all these things. We have not discussed commerce in the private sector since we still lack the necessary information. For the moment we have to ignore it. Now we must discuss the problems of finance. However, we shall not look at all of its aspects but just look at three questions: (i) the question of grain, (ii) the question of taxation, and (iii) the question of economizing.

Our finances depend on two sources, the people and ourselves. Financial work for the portion supplied by ourselves is basically distribution and supply work when the process of production by the three elements of the public sector of the economy is completed and becomes a process of distribution. The public sector of the economy

is the primary foundation for our finances and supplies. It provided three-fifths of all finances and supplies during 1942. Thus our primary financial work consists of properly carrying out the distribution of the fruits of production in the public sector. We have already discussed this question at length as a supplementary factor when dealing with the public sector of the economy and there is no space to say more about the details here. It can wait for further studies. Now we must discuss the second foundation for our finances and supplies — the portion obtained from the people, namely grain and tax. There is also the question of economizing. This is related to what we get from the people and what we supply ourselves. It is a question related to the whole of the resources we already possess and to the correct distribution and use of the funds for running our undertakings. Therefore, it is an important financial problem. The grain question referred to here is the grain tax alone and not all grain problems. This is part of the tax system. However, since it is related to all the needs of the army and government, and to the relationship of 80 to 90 per cent of the people of the Border Region with the Party, the Eighth Route Army and the government, it is worth specially setting it aside from the general question of taxation and dealing with it first.

More than 90 per cent of the 1,400,000 people in the Border Region are peasants. Landlords and merchants make up less than 10 per cent. Over half of these peasants have obtained a share of land and the other half have not yet done so. Why are we striving to the utmost to enable the peasants to develop agriculture? In the first place our aim is to enable the peasants to grow richer and improve their life. Secondly, we want the peasants to be capable of paying grain tax to help meet the needs of the War of Resistance. There is also a third reason which is that we want the peasants, after obtaining a reduction in rent and in interest rates, to develop agricultural production in order to be able to pay part as land rent to the landlords, and thus to unite the landlords with ourselves in the War of Resistance. We must only do one thing to achieve these three aims and that is strive to the utmost to enable the peasants to develop agriculture. The more agricultural production develops and the greater the amount of agricultural and subsidiary products the peasants harvest each year, then the less the amount of grain tax paid to the government becomes as a proportion of their total harvest. We propose to levy an annual grain tax of 180,000 *tan* beginning in 1943.

We intend to keep this amount as fixed in the following few years even if as a result of agricultural development the total amount of grain produced in the Border Region increases from its present level of around 1,500,000 *tan*. (Many comrades estimate that with better use of existing labour power, we can raise the total production of the Border Region to 2 million *tan*.) All increases will thus accrue to the peasants, making them keen to work hard to develop their own production, and enabling them to improve their own livelihood and to dress and eat well.

All comrades throughout the Border Region must learn from the way the comrades of Yanan county strive to work in the interests of the peasants, so that the peasants rapidly get richer. The richer the peasants become, the less they take exception to handing over a fixed amount of grain tax and the more they feel close to and inseparable from the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the Border Region Government. The peasant Wu Manyou of Yanan county is clear proof of this. On 30 April 1942, the Liberation Daily carried the following report on him.

THE MODEL RURAL LABOUR HERO,
WU MANYOU EXCELS IN OPENING NEW LAND AND
HARVESTING GRAIN FOR SEVERAL YEARS RUNNING,
AND INFLUENCES THE MASSES TO TAKE PART
ACTIVELY IN SPRING PLOUGHING

(Our special report.) Rural labour heroes appear one after another in the Spring Ploughing Movement. In order to express their deep devotion to the Border Region, to consolidate the Region and to improve their own life, they display the spirit of labour to a high degree. Among them, Wu Manyou from Luilin district in Yanan county is especially respected by most peasants. Every year his harvest of grain exceeds that of others by one-sixth. The two labour powers in his family farm over 120 *mou* of land. This year they opened up 35 *mou* of uncultivated land. He is already publicly recognized as a model labour hero by the peasants of the township. According to late news last night, the Reconstruction Department of the Border Region Government has decided to give him a special award.

(Our report from Yanan.) For successive years the peasant Wu

Manyou of Wujiacaoyuan in Second township, Liulin district, Yanan county has been active in spring ploughing and grown good crops. Usually people get an average of 5 *tou* from every 3 *mou*; he gets 6 *tou*. Thus when the government issued the call for great efforts in spring ploughing he said; "I have benefited from the revolution and I can never forget it. I truly love the Border Region and at the same time I work to improve my own life." He redoubled his efforts at opening up new land and influenced the masses. He created an enthusiastic spring ploughing movement in his own village. All the peasants in Yanan county know that Wu Manyou's township did the best farming this year. Wu Manyou originally planned to open up 35 *mou*. He had already opened up 15 *mou* before it rained, and he was even more active afterwards. He said: "I can finish clearing the new land in ten days, and if there is time I'll exceed the plan." As for his other 100-odd *mou* of cultivated land, some parts have already been seeded and some parts have already been turned over. All the inhabitants of Wujiacaoyuan, the village head, the head of the township, and the head of the district unanimously praise him as "a model hero in spring ploughing". Now the district government has applied to higher levels to reward him. On hearing this the Border Region Government also decided after practical investigation to give him a suitable reward as an incentive.

(Our report from Yanan county.) During the Spring Ploughing Movement many labour heroes have appeared, but in the final analysis who is best at growing crops? To clear up this question our reporters spent a month visiting various villages. Now they have found the model labour hero generally recognized by the masses. This model hero's name is Wu Manyou. This year he is forty-nine. He is well built and strong. Before the land revolution he was a tenant farmer. At that time he had to eat leaves and husks. He "suffered hardship" [worked for others] by cutting firewood. The money he earned he had to pay as taxes to the local bad officials and rich gentry, and he himself usually went hungry. After the land revolution, he joined the revolution. He was given a share of land on the hills, roughly 40 *shang* equal to 120-odd *mou*. Apart from this private land, he has actively opened up and sown uncultivated land in successive years, and he raises cows and sheep. Now all the hill land is cultivated and he has two bullocks, three cows and more than a hundred sheep. His prospects grow brighter and brighter. He has gotten married, and eats and dresses well. Last year, after govern-

ment examination, his family status was raised from poor peasant to middle peasant. He often says: "When I think of the past and then of the present, how can I forget the benefits of the revolution and of the Border Region?"

(Our report from Yanan County). Model labour hero, Wu Manyou, plants crops like any other peasant. Why does he reap more grain than others? According to the peasants in his village there are several reasons. First, he gets up earlier than anyone else and goes to bed later. Before the sky grows light he has fed his cows and gone up the hill. He only comes back from his land when the sky is dark. He can really endure hard work. Second, in winter when there is no work to do, he diligently collects manure. As he also can raise sheep and cows, he has more manure than others. On average he applies seven pack loads of manure to every 3 *mou*. Third, when the crops begin to shoot, some peasants are afraid to go up into the hills. They do not hoe the weeds or only hoe once at the most. He hoes twice at least, so his millet naturally grows well. Fourth, he ploughs deep. Other households plough down 5 inches; he ploughs down 7 inches at least. Fifth, when breaking up the earth, he breaks it finely and is not careless. Sixth, he always ploughs and sows at the correct time, neither early nor late. Because of these fine qualities, he harvests a top yield per 3 *mou* of 12 *tou* on the old scale (18 *tou* on the market scale) and a low of 4 *tou* (6 market *tou*). The average is 6 *tou* (9 market *tou*). The average for other peasants is 5 *tou* (7 market *tou*). In terms of averages, he is one-sixth better than others.

(Our report from Yanan county.) Model labour hero, Wu Manyou, is not only a model at growing crops but is also a model citizen. Next year he harvested 18 market *tan* of wheat (*xiaomai*) and 27 market *tan* of grains (equivalent to 16 *tan* 2 *tou* of hulled grains). He paid 14 *tan* 3 *tou* in grain tax, 1,000 *jin* of hay tax, contributed two lots of 150 yuan to government bonds, and paid 665 yuan cash substitute for the salt tax. The villagers said to him: "Old Wu, you pay out too much, cut down a bit! He said: "During the revolution, the Eighth Route Army protects our Border Region. People at the front loose blood. All we have to do is sweat a little more. How can you say 'Too much'?" Afterwards everyone respected his opinion and enthusiastically gave grain to the State. This year the upper levels moved some refugees to live in the village. He lent grain and hoes to them and helped them find uncultivated land. He also often en-

couraged them materially and in spirit to open up and plant land. Usually he is also the most fair person in the village. His prestige among the ordinary people is very high and everyone trusts him. In May last year he was elected a member of the township council and director of the township's work in supporting families with dependents fighting in the War of Resistance. He has a younger brother who is a soldier with the Eight Route Army, so he himself belongs to such a family but he declined public support. He said: "Fighting is the duty of the Chinese people, there is nothing strange about it. I've enough to eat, what other support do I need?" However, he is extremely correct [??] towards other families in the township with dependents at the front. At the same time he is very fair in his distribution of labour duties. There are twelve families in the township with dependents fighting in the war. This year he arranged substitute farming for 220 *mou* and all the families were grateful to him. No one in township says he is not good.

(Our report from Yanan county.) There are fourteen peasant households in Wujiacaoyuan with fourteen heads of family. When you raise the question of whether Wu Manyou is worthy of being called a model labour hero, everyone raises his thumb and says "What else can be said about old Wu. He is the best at enduring hardship. If he isn't a hero who is fit to be?"

On June 2 there was another report in the *Liberation Daily*.

Because of the influence of the labour hero, Wu Manyou, Wujiacaoyuan which originally planned to open up 147 *mou* of uncultivated land, had already opened up 225 *mou*. Wu Manyou himself opened up 15 *mou*. After Wu Manyou was rewarded the whole township (Second Township, Luilin District) opened up 540 *mou*.

On October 29 the *Liberation Daily* carried a further report.

This year the harvest of coarse millet is very good. In Wu Manyou's village the yield per 3 *mou* is in general 5 to 6 *tou* but he has got 8 *tou* (each *tou* is the large kind equivalent to 45 *jin*). Most peasants get 3 or 4 *tou* of hulled grain from husking 1 *tan* of coarse grains. He always maintains the official standard for the equivalent amount of hulled grain. Wu Manyou often puts on a propagandistic air and says to others: "If you want to get your crops as good as mine, learn from me! I have no secret, I am simply willing to labour."

Wu Manyou is already a rich peasant. Because he got benefits from the Soviet Government in the past and the Border Region Gov-

ernment now, he has united his destiny with that of the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the Border Region Government. All empty words are useless; we must give the people visible material wealth. The minds of many of our comrades have still not fully turned into the minds of communists. They only know how to do one kind of work, asking the people for this and that, for grain, for hay, for taxes and for mobilization for various kinds of work. They do not know how to do the other kind of work, striving to the utmost to help the people develop production and to improve their cultural level. It is entirely rational for us to ask things of the people for the sake of the revolution and the War of Resistance. It is good that our comrades consider that in doing this work they are doing the work they should do for the revolution. But it is only doing one aspect of work and it is not the primary aspect. The primary aspect of our work is not to ask things of the people but to give things to the people. What can we give the people? Under present conditions in the **Shaan-Kan-Ning** Border Region, we can organize, lead and help the people to develop production and increase their material wealth. And on this basis we can step-by-step raise their political awareness and cultural level. To these ends we must endure all discomforts, and we must night and day diligently and thoroughly look into the people's problems in their livelihood and production, including such important matters as plough-oxen, agricultural implements, seeds, manure, water conservancy, animal fodder, agricultural credit, immigration, opening up new land, improving agricultural methods, female labour, labour by loafers, plans for setting up households, co-operatives, exchange-labour teams, transport teams, textiles, animal husbandry, salt industry and so forth. Moreover, we must concretely help the people to solve these problems and not use empty words. This work is the primary work for all Communist Party members working in the countryside. Only after we have done this aspect of work and achieved real results can we get the people's support when we do the second aspect of our work which is to ask them for things. Only then will they say that our requests are necessary and correct. Only then will they understand that if they do not give grain, hay and other things to the government, their life cannot be good and cannot get better. Only in this way will our work not be done through coercion. Only in this way will things run smoothly, and only in this way will we be truly united with the people. This is the basic line and policy of our party. Ev-

ery comrade (including those in the army) should study this thoroughly. Only when our comrades understand and carry out the complementary nature of these two aspects of work, can we call ourselves all-round communist revolutionaries. Otherwise, although we do revolutionary work and although we are revolutionaries, we shall still not be all round revolutionaries. Furthermore, some comrades are still bureaucrats remote from the masses. Because they only know how to ask the masses for things and do not know how to or are unwilling to give things to the masses, the masses detest them. This question is extremely important. I hope everyone will pay great attention to it and propagandize the principle throughout the whole party.

In what follows we shall sum up our past experience in grain work and point out the policy for 1943.

From 1937 to 1939, the grain tax levied in the Border Region covered only a part of supplies. The deficiency each year was made up by purchase using funds issued by the government. With the exception of particular areas and periods when there were grain difficulties, there were no insurmountable problems in the whole of grain supply for the four years. During that time we actually enabled the people to build up their resources. The burdens of grain tax were heavy on the rich peasants and landlords, very light on the middle peasants and most poor peasants had none at all. In 1940 outside aid was cut off and the government had no resources to buy grain. We had to turn to raising all of it in tax. However, the principle of "calculating tax on the basis of income" had not yet changed. Also the grain tax for 1940 was raised to only 90,000 *tan* and the policies for collection were not altered. For supplies in the following year (1941) we put forward the policy of "strengthening grain administration and ensuring grain sufficiency". However, we could not provide all supplies since we had not levied much grain in 1940. There was also the related matter of achieving self-sufficiency in running costs in 1941, in connection with which the various army units and official organizations paid careful attention to grain in order to solve problems in livelihood. Another factor was that since the organizational structure of the departments doing grain work was not yet strong and the quality of the cadres was not good enough, the various regulations were not well established and we could not fully control grain income and expenditure in all places. At the time the problems of making excessive returns and rash leadership were

very serious, was constantly changing, increasing and decreasing, and was too much occasional expenditure outside the set amount. The grain tax levied in 1940 provided supplies until March 1941, when some places already had nothing to eat. Before long there was a panic over grain everywhere. It was only by successively buying grain once and borrowing twice that we lasted until November. In order to guarantee supplies for 1942 and to repay loans taken in 1941, it was estimated that a levy of 200,000 *tan* was essential. At this time the problem of grain had already become the most serious financial problem. After repeated study by the Party and government and under the new principle for collection of "calculating tax first on the basis of our expenditure and second on the basis of income", it was decided to levy 20,000 *tan* of grain and 26 million *jin* of hay. To ensure collection of this amount of grain and taking the interests of all social strata into account, the base for collection was expanded. The burden on the middle peasants was increased and the poor peasants began to bear some of it. We corrected the earlier phenomenon of bias towards the minority of wealthy.

The grain accounts at the various county granaries were not clearly kept in the past, and the great muddle in the formalities for buying and borrowing grain during 1941 had increased the difficulties of sorting them out. The Grain Office was deeply afraid that the lack of clarity over the old grain would influence the new. Therefore "grasp the new grain, ensure supplies was made the strategy for work in 1942. Events during the year showed that although there were deficiencies in implementation, the policy itself was entirely correct. Grain tax for 1942 was reduced to 160,000 *tan* and hay tax to 16 million *jin*. The policy for collection also reduced the burden on the poor peasants slightly. Furthermore, we are preparing to implement a unified progressive agricultural tax in 1943 in place of the grain-tax method. In order to raise the peasants' enthusiasm for production, we lent them some of the grain and hay during 1942 to help them solve problems during spring ploughing. In supply work the thing is to concentrate on grain and hay.

As regards the work of collection, we only levied 10,000 *tan* in 1937 and 1938. The burden on the masses was very light and everyone was willing to pay. In 1939 the amount was raised to 50,000 *tan*. The government proclaimed new regulations for collecting the grain. Work groups were sent down to the countryside to make surveys and to collect tax according to the regulations. However, in

reality, 50,000 *tan* was still a very slight amount of grain tax for the masses to bear. The cadres were used to the method of democratic apportionment of taxes and the survey work was very perfunctory. The so-called collection to regulations remained a theory. In 1940 it was just the same. Only in 1941 when the grain-tax burden suddenly increased to 200,00 *tan* did the government again seriously revise the regulations. The Finance Department sent large numbers of work groups to the counties to work with the county and district governments in carrying out fairly thorough-going surveys so that the masses' burdens were made rational. This grain collection emphasized "thorough-going surveys" and "carrying out the regulations". Summing up collection in 1941, there is clear proof that if good survey work is done, it is easy to carry out the regulations. For example, Ganquan county was very conscientious in making surveys and then implemented the regulations and rates for collection. Quzi county carried out three surveys and was able to ensure a fair and rational distribution of the burden. In Baima District of Huachi County the requirement was not filled after two allocations. Eventually the head of the grain collection work group, Comrade Wang, himself surveyed one township to get experience. As a result the whole district over-fulfilled its quota by several tens of *tan*. In places where survey work was poorly done, such as in the special military area, the regulations could not be carried out. In general county cadres still treated survey work too lightly. Only a minority of them carried out thorough-going surveys for grain collection in 1941. The majority still used the old method of democratic apportionment of taxes. In 1942 the grain collection gained from the experience of the previous year. The regulations were revised again to bring them more in line with reality. More thorough surveys were undertaken on the basis of the surveys carried out in 1941. The Finance Department issued instructions that the cadres collecting the grain had to follow the regulations. In cases where carrying out the regulations meant that the task could not be completed, they could also use the method of democratic apportionment of taxes. At the same time, during this collection the cadres were given ideological education which overcame their previously crude work-style and backward conduct, such as following personal preferences and holding things back. According to recent reports from Longdong there is once again proof of the importance of thorough-going surveys for the implementation of regulations. One district in Qingyang County

carried out a thorough survey, and because much new land was cultivated during the year and production increased, it was able to exceed the original collection target by several hundred *tan* in line with the regulations.

A further point to consider is that for several years the figures set for the grain collection have been achieved and exceeded, but the work of putting the grain into the granaries has been too muddled. Many cadres involved in grain collection think that they only have to meet the target. They do not consider quality or investigate delayed payments. As a result on one hand the quality is not good enough with 15 to 20 per cent consisting of husks in some cases, and on the other there are instances where the masses delay in paying their grain. There is a difference between the amount collected and the amount put into the granaries. In the 1941 collection, although the quality was a bit better, there were still a lot of husks mixed with the grain. The slogan "Grain to the Granary and Hay to the Cellar" was put forward to overcome the problem of late payment but there was still too much of it. In addition, because the 1941 collection was much bigger than any previous year, the difficulties of getting it into the granaries were much greater. As a result over 3,900 *tan* of the grain collected did not go into the granaries. This was nearly 2 per cent of the total. During the 1942 collection the problem of getting the grain into the granaries was specially emphasized. According to the latest examination this work has been done a little better this year. However, the question of whether the full total had been put in the granaries or not awaits a final summary before it can be answered.

Another point is that for several years the Finance Department has assigned work groups to help the county and district governments in the grain-levy work. Where county and district cadres are too weak, this method is of great help. Its shortcoming is that it easily creates dependency in the lower-levels of government, and every time there is a mobilization, the upper levels have to send people. The cadres have to go back and forth, spending much time on the road, which leads to waste of manpower and of time. Since collection in 1942 had the good foundation of work done in 1941, the Finance Department adopted the principle of "fewer and better" in its assignment of work teams. It sent fewer cadres to each county and increased the responsibility of the county and district government. In 1941, 150 people were sent down. On this basis they are

preparing to move towards not sending down anyone at all, handing all the grain collection work over to the county and district governments.

As regards supply work, because general income and expenditure was not firmly controlled in 1941 so that grain had to be bought once and borrowed twice, and because mobilization were hurried and almost cruel, the masses were not satisfied. This was a great shortcoming. In 1942 we were able to control income and expenditure. we also had the 200,000 *tan* of grain levied in 1941 as a guarantee to ensure supplies until December. However, since the drive for better troops and simpler administration was not thorough, the budget could not be strictly implemented. Occasional expenditures combined with unpaid grain tax came to over 18,000 *tan*. In addition, troop movements influenced the relationship between supply and demand in various places, and grain balances in the first half of 1942 could not be maintained as allocated. Therefore, after July places like Yanan, Nanniwan and Linzhen one after another became short of grain. Afterwards the Finance Department issued supplementary funds of 2 million yuan to buy grain and a summer collection was made. Only in this way was a grain panic avoided during 1942, and there was no bad effect on the masses. Next, for the grain in 1941 we adopted the method of "allocation as a whole and divided administration". Although this saved the bother and waste of transport to and fro, it brought about cases of uncontrolled selling of grain, which also entailed a lot of waste. There was still a gap between the amount collected and the amount needed for supplies, which also led to many shortcomings. For example the grain and hay allocated to the various counties in 1941 was biased towards the harvest situation and neglected the supply and demand situation. The grain requirement in Sanbian for the year was over 10,000 *tan* but only 1,600 *tan* was collected. A supplement of 9,000 *tan* had to be transported from Longdong, Ansai, Zichang, Zhidan and so forth. Not only was the year's grain transport work excessive for the masses of these counties, but the masses in Sanbian were also very busy handling transshipment. They called out that "this way is not as good as collecting more from us". It is now estimated that just the 4,000 *tan* of grain moved to Sanbian from Longdong cost 7 million yuan to transport, which is more than the cost of buying grain in Sanbian. Another example was the grain collected in Yanchuan. Originally it should have supplied Yanan. However in 1941 grain

from Dongyang district was collected at the **Majiapan** granary which is on the opposite side of the county near the Yellow River. As a result it took an extra three days to transport the grain to Yanan. Quite a few similar situations arose in other counties. Again, the plan for the 1941 hay collection was not thoroughly researched. It was decided everywhere to collect the hay after the grain and no attention was paid to supply and demand. As a result some places kept hay for which there was no use and it was allowed to go rotten which dissatisfied the masses. In other places which needed a lot of hay there was an exceptional shortage and supplies were only enough for eight months. Another example was the 1941 grain collection in **Guanzhong**. Millet was made the unit instead of wheat. The peasants had to go out of the Border Region to sell wheat and buy millet in order to pay the tax. As a result too much millet was collected, the troops were not used to eating it and there were many disputes. After summer begins millet rots easily which added to the troubles. Again in 1941 the relative proportion between regular and miscellaneous grains was generalized, and not reckoned according to the grain production circumstances or the relationship between supply and demand in each place. As a result some places (such as the special military area) collected a lot of miscellaneous grain which could not be issued. Some places (such as Yanan) needed horse fodder but could not get miscellaneous grains. The official organizations had to lower the relative proportions and exchange hulled grain for miscellaneous grain which in turn led to waste of grain. The above shortcomings illustrate that grain work is very concrete and meticulous, practical work. If it is done crudely and in a way divorced from reality then the results will disturb the people and disrupt the government. In 1942 after the grain collection work was handed over to the Grain Office, the management of grain collection and supplying was united. At the same time, as a means of balancing resources, it was decided to accept a money substitute for the hay tax according to the different supply-and-demand situation in each place. As for the relative proportions of grains, the earlier way of generalized application was changed into a system of deciding according to the concrete situation in each place, thus overcoming the previous shortcoming.

Next, from the winter of 1941 up to the present quite large successes have been achieved in setting up and consolidating systems for grain supply. As regards the budget system, for example, in 1942

most official organizations were able to draw up their budgets at the correct time. They have got rid of the bad practices of claiming excess grain and eating double rations, and corrected the situation where counties approved budgets haphazardly and spent grain without control. In particular they have grasped the policy of "the final account must not exceed the budget". During 1942 they have conscientiously cut down on all irrational expenditure, economizing on over 19,000 *tan* of grain. As regards the system for paying out grain, most army units and official organizations have honoured the regulations that grain cannot be paid out without a grain payment document. The responsible comrades in the counties have also paid attention to this regulation. They have not indiscriminately permitted loans from tax grain. At the same time during 1942 all the counties have used the official *lou* measure which considerably reduced the number of disputes. As for the granary regulations, because of the cadres' limitations, these could only be strengthened first in the central granaries and then gradually generalized to all granaries. For keeping accounts, the Finance Department drew up two standard account-books (one new-style and detailed, the other very simple) which were adopted by the cadres according to their ability. In 1942 most granaries, good and bad, had account-books. Gradually we can reach the goal of being able to obtain at any time statistics for grain income, expenditure and the amounts and kinds of grain in store. As for the grain coupon regulations, there was much corruption in 1941 because we issued large numbers of coupons. In 1942 we abandoned the old grain coupons and issued three kinds of meal-ticket which were only supplied for circulation among personnel in the official organizations to cover meals. This was a step forward.

However, there were still many defects in the grain-supply work. For example, a minority of large units still could not draw up their budget at the stipulated time. A comparison of the actual personnel totals and the budgets of various large units showed that there was still quite a proportion of figures without foundation. Some instances of taking double rations still occurred. The ratio of livestock was not clearly laid down, which in some cases led to quite a lot of waste. Instances of individual troop units insisting on grain loans from granaries because they had wasted grain and overspent could still not completely be avoided. As for the storage system, most granaries still only managed to do the work of receiving and paying out grain and of administration. They were not good enough at supervising

collection, safe-keeping, submitting accounts and other duties. The meal-tickets could not be circulated among the people, which caused problems for personnel sent to do outside tasks. This too was a shortcoming. Finally, there was a great defect in building up and consolidating all regulations which was that the Grain Office only emphasized its own regulations and difficulties. It could not comprehensively and concretely concern itself with solutions to the problems and difficulties facing each official organizations.

In 1942 the official organizations in charge of grain were very successful in the work of clearing up the granaries' old grain accounts. For several years the county grain accounts had not been examined and reckoned up, so that the Grain Office's accounts were no longer any use. For example, according to the Office's accounts, in the winter of 1941, Ansai should have had over 2,900 *tan* in store. In fact it had less than 100 *tan*. Again the account for the grain taken from the granary by the sanitarium had not been worked out for five years. It was discovered in 1942 that it had collected over 100 *tan* too much. There were many cases like these. Compounded by the muddle over purchases and loans in 1941, many counties had no accounts to be examined. As a result the Grain Office sent cadres down to each place to work out the accounts and adopted all kinds of accounting methods. The old granary accounts were only cleared up after six months' hard work. Now the Grain Office is able to work out how much grain is actually held by the granaries and can keep a hold on grain income and expenditure. The counties' administration of grain was also previously very poor with losses due to a combination of rats, insects, rotting and so forth. In addition there was serious corruption among the cadres. During grain collection in 1941, there were more than ten cases. It had even gone so far that individual special agents had infiltrated granary work. For example, **Zhang Bingquan**, the director of the granary of Taile District in Fuxian, was a special agent. In February 1942 he embezzled over 10 *tan* of public grain and fled from the Border Region. This shows that previously the Grain Office's supervision of granary cadres was too lax and its inspection work too infrequent. Since the granary accounts were cleared up in 1942 and the leadership of the granaries by the five sections of government at county level was strengthened, corruption and waste have been reduced and many active and hardworking cadres have been discovered.

In carrying out collection policy in the two years 1939 and 1940

the regulations were fixed so that the tax threshold began at 1.2 *tan* (that is, peasant families whose harvest per person was less than 1.2 *tan* were not taxed). Tax was progressively applied to a top level of 36 per cent (that is, the tax rate increased until it leveled 36 per cent of the harvest and thereafter the percentage did not increase). The failing here was that the tax burden was biased towards the minority of the well-off. At the same time the method of collection was that of democratic apportionment of taxes and not that laid down by the regulations. As a result, there were cases of “going for big households” and “ignoring everything but the target”. Also, the collection policy was influenced by excessive “Leftism”. In 1941 the regulations were revised. The tax threshold was fixed at 0.5 *tan* (for example, a family of five whose annual harvest of regular grain was less than 2.5 *tan* was not taxed). Taxation was progressively applied up to 30 per cent. The implementation of these regulations resulted in a broadening of the base for collection. Apart from **Huanxian**, which suffered natural disasters, the tax burden in all other counties was carried by over 80 per cent of the people and in Yanan county it reached 95 per cent. In terms of carrying for the interests of all classes and strata, with the exception of Yanan, Yanchang and Ansai, the burden in other counties did not exceed 30 per cent of the harvest. However, there were still shortcomings. For example, the counties were not entirely rational in their allocations to meet the total collection. The special military area lowered the tax threshold to 0.3 *tan* and reduced the number of steps in the tax progression. As a result the poor and middle peasants suffered and the richer middle peasants and above were let off too lightly. Also, during grain collection in 1941 we only paid attention to collecting grain and not to reducing rents and interest rates at the same time. Some new immigrants who should not have paid tax had to do so. Family dependants of troops in the War of Resistance should have received special assistance but this was stopped in some cases. Some cotton-growers should not have been taxed for grain but were. All these things contravened the government’s policies. Other policies such as caring for the interests of all strata, raising the enthusiasm or production of the peasants and so forth merely remained general slogans. Actual implementation was very deficient. With the experience of 1941, the grain collection in 1942 made some advances. However, we still did not pay enough attention to the cotton-growing policy. For example, the allocation of a quota for grain tax to

the cotton-growing areas in the three eastern counties was the same as that allocated to other counties. When it came to collection, problems arose. If grain tax was not collected on the cotton fields the requirement could not be fulfilled. Yet if it was collected, it would conflict with government orders. Ultimately they had to make accommodations and reduce the collection by half. This still damaged the authority of the government.

In any work, going beyond policies depends on whether the cadres are good or bad. Grain work is no exception. The most hardworking people doing grain work are the granary cadres. The easiest corrupted are also the granary cadres. Therefore we shall here specially quote examples of typically good and typically bad granary cadres, so that everyone can learn from the good and be warned by the bad.

GOOD EXAMPLES

(A) Comrade He Chuango, director of Panlong Granary is an old fellow of fifty-two.

He does not say much but is very careful and thoughtful, enthusiastic and hardworking. In 1939 he was assigned to work in the **Zhenwudong** Granary of the Grain Office. In 1940 he was transferred to be director of the Panlong Granary, concurrently responsible for the grain-market balancing station [*diaojizhan*] and the transport station. He is responsible for the work of three men. In the past he has been Secretary of a District Party Committee and has been trained at the Border Region Party School. Initially he was one of seven people including **Jia Zhicai** and **Ren Shengbiao** who were assigned from the Border Region Party School to do grain work but of these he alone remains at his post today. His cultural level is not among the lowest of the granary directors. He can write simple letters and keep clear accounts. He is very conscientious in studying the newly adopted account books and learns quickly. In 1941 when the "monthly report tables" were issued to the granaries some directors could not understand after three days of explanation. After hearing once he was able to raise questions and opinions. After a few questions like "What should be filled in on this section?, Would it be all right to fill in that section like this?", he could complete and send in his "monthly report tables" on time. Many fine qualities are expressed in his work. The first is meticulous attention to

detail. When receiving grain he writes a receipt for the amount and makes up his accounts every evening. When paying-out he double-checks on the abacus. The second is a deep sense of responsibility. He takes great care of the granary. One storage bin was a little damp and he paid special attention. He often had the grain spread out to dry in the sun, and when paying-out grain he always paid from this bin first. Eventually he dug a ditch behind the bin and dug the surface of the earth around the bin lower than the bin, making it a little drier. When the granary needs minor repairs he does not hire workers but **sets-to** himself to carry bricks and plaster (under his influence the personnel in charge of moving the grain also work hard and help). As administrator of the transport depot, every time a transport team arrives he helps to cut grass, draw water and prepare food. His third quality is his friendly attitude to others. Some of the personnel in leading official organizations get in a bad temper when the grain is paid-out, but he patiently finishes the job and does not get into arguments. Sometimes some of the masses send bad grain when paying-in. He just encourages them to take it back. When buying grain to balance the market, he can discuss things and get close to the masses. But he also has his own opinions. Once when it was raining and the grain in the market could not be sold, he took the opportunity to purchase it. The price was fairly low and the masses were still pleased. For these reasons he enjoys some prestige among the masses of Panlong. When receiving tax grain in 1941 a peasant from Yongping district county offered him bribes. He got angry and sent the man and the goods to the district government. His fourth quality is a plain and simple way of life. He raises very few questions about his own life and he expresses concern about receiving welfare expenses. In 1942 he was responsible for collecting 4.000 *tan* of tax grain and everyone was concerned that he might not manage since he is old and has few helpers. But every time he wrote a letter to the Grain Office, he said that he could manage.

(B) Comrade **Bai Heming** is director of the **Tianzhuang** Granary in Suide. He is a graduate of upper primary school. He had worked in the old **baojia** office. His qualities include first a deep sense of responsibility. When receiving grain he compares receipts and invoices every evening to make sure that there has been no mistake. He also makes out clear accounts for households owing grain, and supervises the districts and townships, encouraging them to send in their grain. Before receiving grain, he himself lays stones and boards

in the storage bins, spreads dry straw and puts straw mats over the straw so as to guard against dampness. After the grain is in store, he himself seals up the bins which will not be opened soon, using bricks and plaster and covering-up holes which let in the wind, with broken mats. Secondly, he is friendly towards others. When receiving grain he inspects conscientiously. However, to those who send in bad grain he simply says: "Look everybody, can you feel easy about sending grain like this for the troops?" He has never raised his voice in abuse. If someone from the army came to collect grain not in accordance with official procedures, he always courteously and patiently explained things. On the one hand, he would lend some grain to prevent shortage, and on the other, asked the them to make good the procedures. Before long if anyone from the troops stationed in Suide went to collect grain from old Bai's granary, they always went through the procedures to avoid difficulties for old Bai and embarrassment for themselves. Thirdly, he is very hardworking. He gathers firewood and draws water himself. He is careful over operating and food costs. He reports excess expenditure to the fifth government section at county level. He does not indiscriminately take grain and sell it for the cash to make up deficiencies. Now Comrade Bai Heming has been promoted to be head of the fifth section of Suide county government.

BAD EXAMPLES

(A) **Hy Dianchang** was director of the granary of Fourth District **Xinning**. When receiving grain in the winter of 1941, he sold 3 *tan* privately, took 1.3 *tan* home, and lent 3.92 *tan* to his relatives and friends. He himself and his relatives and friends, **Hy Diangong**, **Hu Qingrong** and **Liu Zixiao** should have paid 7 *tan* of grain tax. They did not hand over a single grain but he still issued tax-grain receipts. When receiving grain he did not allow the masses to sweep up the grain on the floor, but swept it up himself and shared it with the personnel helping him to receive the grain. After he had finished issuing tax-grain for deposit in citizens' homes, he was 0.2 *tan* short but he falsely reported 1 *tan* to the fifth section of the county government. After the fifth section found him out, he was sent to court, sentenced to prison and ordered to return the embezzled grain.

(B) In September 1939 after grain was sold from the **Shuifan** District Granary in the Huachi County, 14.7 *tan* of tax grain was miss-

ing. The granary director, Wang Wenbin reported to the upper levels that rats had eaten 12.7 *tan* and another 2 *tan* had been contaminated. In 1941 when the grain collection work group went to investigate, they discovered that Wang Wenbin had gone to the county town for a meeting during the time when the grain was sold. His place had been taken by the district secretary Mao Yupeng. During the grain sales Mao Yupeng had lived exceptionally richly. He had bought a flock of sheep and two skin coats. He had also bought cloth. There was suspicion of embezzlement. However, at the time the county government did not investigate. Afterwards Mao Yupeng was transferred to work elsewhere. This affair is still going on.

Above we have summed up our experience in grain work during the past five years. Below are the policies for work in 1943.

(i) Implement the unified progressive agricultural tax. In the past we have used the method of levying national salvation grain tax. It is not an entirely satisfactory method of taxation. If it is well done it can only achieve the aim of being fair burden on the people. It cannot give any effective encouragement to the peasants' feelings towards production. Therefore we must actively prepare to implement the unified progressive agricultural tax. How should our preparatory work be done? (i) Under the leadership of the Finance Department set up a specialist research team consisting of five to seven cadres selected for their experience in political work and their good understanding of land and financial problems. This team should gather, study and arrange materials concerning progressive taxation, and plan the work for introducing it. In addition, directed by the Border Region Government, responsible comrades from the relevant official organizations led by the head of the Finance Department should organize a planning committee to take charge of policy, to solve problems and to regularly lead the work of the research team. (ii) Carry out survey work. A detailed summary of grain collection work in 1942 should be supplied to the progressive taxation research team as concrete source material. The research team should first study some counties with different situations, whose collection in 1941 and 1942 was comparatively good. They should draw up an initial survey plan, and first carry out trial surveys. Afterwards they should revise the plan, draw up a format and carry out a general survey. In the light of the materials from the survey they should determine the regulations and methods. Counties with good successes who complete the work early can carry out a trial run during

1943. (iii) Carry out land registration at the same time as the surveys. (iv) Strengthen the government organization at township level, build up sound clerical records and survey thoroughly.

(2) Grasp grain and hay, ensure supplies. Supplying grain and hay is complex and detailed work. Grain and hay resources are widespread and not easily grasped. If we are unable to pay full attention at all times and cannot suitably adjust the relationship between supply and demand, it will be hard to make a good job of it. If we want to be able to grasp grain and hay and ensure supplies, we must do the following: (i) We must first ensure that all the 160,000 *tan* enters the granaries, and improve the quality so that 100 per cent is grain. Do not allow adulteration with husks. At the same time, call on all counties to eliminate evasion of payment. We must build up thorough regulations for the administration of grain and hay. Pay attention to the running and inspection of granaries. Set up central granaries. Gradually improve equipment. Prevent damage through contamination and rotting, and corruption and theft. Strictly carry out the budget system. Completely eradicate excessive claims and taking double rations. Set up grain accounts in accordance with the cultural level of the cadres in each place. Do not be too elaborate but require that receipts, issues and stocks of grain are clearly recorded. Next, the regulations for paying-out grain are even more important and must be carried out. The reason for building up regulations soundly is to ensure supplies and to prevent corruption and waste. All instances of not adhering to discipline must be strictly corrected. However, a mechanical viewpoint which one-sidedly emphasizes regulations without concern for the concrete facts must also be guarded against. (ii) To ensure supplies, we must first handle the relationship between supply and demand of grain and hay. Prepare supplements for areas deficient in grain through transport, adjustment of distribution and so forth. In 1943 we should organize any unused animals owned by the official organizations to transport grain and hay, improve the work efficiency of every transport team (on average our animals each carry 1 *tou* less than those of the common folk and we need three days to go as far as they do in two) and lay down precise transport tasks so as to economize on manpower and animal power which can then be used for production. We must depend on the grain transported by the people, making plans early and using the slack agricultural periods and unused porters and animals. Except in special circumstances, mobilizing transport in the

busy agricultural seasons is not allowed. Long distance transport must also be avoided as much as possible. In areas where the distribution of grain can be adjusted, co-ordinated plans should be made by the Grain Office. Grain should be sold or bought at the right times so as to supplement supplies, save on transport and avoid waste. In areas where official organizations and schools are excessively concentrated such as Yanan, we should consider the situation, and disperse men and horses to ease the distribution of grain and straw.

(3) Carry out the drive for better troops and simpler administration, store grain to prepare for famine. For successive years the Border Region has overdrawn its tax grain and has not got the slightest reserve. If natural disaster occurred, grain supplies for the army and people would become an extremely serious problem. Everyone should be warned by this to take the following steps: (i) Resolutely carry out the new reorganization plan of the Party and government and the drive for better troops and simpler administration. Through simplification and strict economy ensure a balance between grain income and income and expenditure in 1943. (ii) Collect 180,000 *tan* of tax grain in 1943 so that we have a chance to retain some as reserve against need. (iii) During 1943 the troops, official organizations and schools should put developing agriculture in first place. Growing grain should form a considerable proportion of farming work so that there will be an even greater surplus in 1944 and we will be prepared against disaster. The troops, official organizations and schools certainly may not relax their own grain production because we are preparing to levy 180,000 *tan* during 1943.

(4) Strive to economize, strictly prevent waste of grain. There is a serious waste of grain among the official organizations and troops. Thus, mounting a campaign to economize should be one of our central tasks for 1943. Recently in Yanan some of official organizations and schools have inspected the amount of waste and carried out economy campaigns with great success. For example, the administrators of a training squad in the supply department of the garrison forces were diligent and responsible. When issuing grain and flour, they did the weighing themselves. Thus their food supply was just right and they were often able to eat buns and noodles. The Central Party School has large kitchens. Recently administration of food has been strict. Grain-cooking has been supervised. Left-over grain has been kept and eaten as the following meal. Af-

ter this was done, only 1 *jin* of millet was consumed per head per day. Before a month was up more than 5 *tan* of "millet was saved. Another example was the collective meals at the nursery. In the past when the people there took meals in separate groups, the nursery consumed 150 *jin* of flour a meal. After collective meals were introduced, they only consumed 100 *jin* saving one-third. You see, comrades, what a surprising amount this is. Similarly the central departments and committees have implemented collective mess-halls and have also got good results. The Central Party School planned in the first half of the year to raise 2,000 chickens which required 300 bowls of millet a day. The waste was quite large. Afterwards they killed most of the chickens and only sixty were left. This saved quite a lot of grain. In addition, it is necessary to foster the habit of using meal-tickets. It can reduce the issue of large amounts of grain. In sum, in order to ensure that there are absolutely no shortages of grain, on the one hand we must levy and produce it and on the other we must seek to economize. This is the work for leading comrades and it is a mass-movement. Everyone must pay attention and complete the task given by the Party.

(Two chapters on taxation and economizing originally planned for this book could not be written in time because the Senior Cadres' Conference closed. They had to be left out.)

The Author

COMMERCIAL NOTES DISTRIBUTION

¹ These figures are the totals paid in agricultural tax (public grain) by the peasants of the Shaan-Kan-Ning Border Region from 1940 to 1942.

² For "better troops and simpler administration" see "A most Important Policy", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1967, Vol. III, pp. 99-102.

³ The "Three mountains" refer to three mythical islands where magic spirits are presumed to live.

THE COMINTERN HAS LONG CEASED TO MEDDLE IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS*

May 26, 1943

FROM MARX

. . . Comrade Mao Tse-tung first pointed out that the dissolution of the Communist International was exactly as an American press agency had reported, “a great event marking the dividing line between two epochs”. . . .

Comrade Mao Tse-tung asked: “Why should the Communist International be disbanded? Did it not devote all its efforts to the emancipation of the working class of the whole world and to the war against fascism?”

Comrade Mao Tse-tung said: “It is true that the Communist International was created by Lenin himself. During its entire existence it has rendered the greatest services in helping each country to organize a truly revolutionary workers’ party, and it has also contributed enormously to the great cause of organizing the anti-fascist war.” Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed particularly to the great services of the Communist International in aiding the cause of the Chinese Revolution. . . .

Comrade Mao Tse-tung further pointed out: “Revolutionary movements can be neither exported nor imported. Despite the fact that aid was accorded by the Communist International, the birth and development of the Chinese Communist Party resulted from the fact that China herself had a conscious working class. The Chinese working class created its own party — the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party, although it has a history of only twenty-two years, has already undertaken three great revolutionary movements”. . . .

* Extracted from a speech explaining the dissolution of the Communist International, delivered on May 26, 1943, to the cadres of Communist Party. *Chieh-fang jih-pao*, May 28, 1943.

Since the Communist International has rendered such great services to China and to various other countries, why should it be necessary to proclaim its dissolution? To this question Comrade Mao Tse-tung replied: "It is a principle of Marxism-Leninism that the forms of revolutionary organizations must be adapted to the necessities of the revolutionary struggle. If a form of organization is no longer adapted to the necessities of the struggle, then this form of organization must be abolished." Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that at present the form of revolutionary organization known as the Communist International is no longer adapted to the necessities of the struggle. To continue this organizational form would, on the contrary, hinder the development of the revolutionary struggle in each country. What is needed now is the strengthening of the national Communist Party [*min-tsu kung-chan tang*] of each country, and we no longer need this international leading centre. There are three main reasons for this. (1) The internal situation in each country and the relations between the different countries are more complicated than they have been in the past and are changing more rapidly. It is no longer possible for a unified international organization to adapt itself to these extremely complicated and rapidly changing circumstances. Correct leadership must grow out of a detailed analysis of these conditions, and this makes it even more necessary for the Communist Party of each country to undertake this itself. The Communist International, which is far removed from the concrete struggle in each country, was adapted to the relatively simple condition of the past, when changes took place rather slowly, but now it is no longer a suitable instrument. (2) The anti-fascist states are of all kinds: socialist, capitalist, colonial, semi-colonial. Among the fascist states and their vassals there are also great differences; in addition, there are also the neutral countries, which find themselves in varying circumstances. For some time it has been felt that a centralized organization of an international character was not very appropriate for organizing rapidly and efficiently the anti-fascists of all these states, and this has become particularly obvious recently. (3) The leading cadres of the Communist Parties of the various countries have already grown up and attained political maturity. Comrade Mao Tse-tung explained this point by using the example of the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party has been through three revolutionary movements. These revolutionary movements have been continuous and uninterrupted and

extraordinarily complex, even more complex than the Russian Revolution. In the course of these revolutionary movements, the Chinese Communist Party has already acquired its own excellent cadres endowed with rich personal experience. Since the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in 1935 the Communist International has not intervened in the internal affairs of the Chinese Communist Party. And yet, the Chinese Communist Party has done its work very well, throughout the whole Anti-Japanese War of National Liberation. . . .

FROM MARX

TO MAO



NOT FOR

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LETTER TO
THE YENAN PEKING OPERA THEATRE
AFTER SEEING
DRIVEN TO JOIN THE
*LIANGSHAN MOUNTAIN REBELS**
FROM MARX
January 9, 1944
TO MAO

Having seen your performance, I wish to express my thanks to you for the excellent work you have done. Please convey my thanks to the comrades of the cast! History is made by the people, yet the old opera (and all the old literature and art, which are divorced from the people) presents the people as though they were dirt, and the stage is dominated by lords, and ladies and their pampered sons and daughters. Now you have reversed this reversal of history and restored historical truth, and thus a new life is opening up for the old opera. That is why this merits congratulations. The initiative you have taken marks an epoch-making beginning in the revolutionization of the old opera. I am very happy at the thought of this. I hope you will write more plays and give more performances, and so help make this practice a common one which will prevail throughout the country.

* The Peking opera *Driven to Join the Liangshan Mountain Rebels* is an episode from *Shui Hu Chuan* (*Heroes of the Marshes*, *Water Margin* or *All Men Are Brothers*), the fourteenth-century classical novel. It tells how Lin Chung spurred on by the strength shown by the people, resolved to join their rebellion against the reactionary rulers.

MAO'S INTERVIEW WITH
AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST,
GUNTHER STEIN

FROM MARX

1944

“Communists in all countries have only one thing in common”, Mao Tse-tung said in reply to my question whether there was really no possibility of a change of “that awful word Communist” in the name of the Party. “What they have in common is their method of political thinking along the lines of Marxism.

“Communists everywhere have to distinguish between this system of thought and an entirely different matter: the Communist system of social organization which is the final political aim of their system of thought.

“Especially we in China must strictly distinguish between the Communist method of observing, studying, and solving social problems on the one hand, and the practical policies of our New Democracy on the other, which during the present stage of China’s social development must constitute our immediate aim. Without the Communist method of thinking we would be unable to direct the present, democratic stage of our social revolution. And without the political system of the New Democracy we would not apply our Communist philosophy correctly to the realities of China.

“Our present New Democracy will have to be continued under any conditions and for a long period to come. For the concrete conditions existing in China dictate to us the continuation of that policy.

“What China needs now is democracy and not socialism. To be more precise, China’s needs at present are three: (1) to drive the Japanese out; (2) to realize democracy on a nation-wide scale by giving the people all the forms of modern liberty and a system of national and local governments elected by them in genuinely free general elections, which we have already done in the areas under

our control; and (3) to solve the agrarian question, so that capitalism of a progressive character can develop in China and improve the standard of living of the people through the introduction of modern methods of production.

"These, for the present, are the tasks of the Chinese revolution. To speak of the realization of socialism before these tasks are accomplished would merely be empty talk. This is what I told our Party members in 1940 in my book *On New Democracy*. I said already then that this first democratic phase of our revolution would by no means be short. We are not utopians and we cannot isolate ourselves from the actual conditions right before our eyes."

He added with a smile, "It is quite possible that China may reach the stages of socialism and communism considerably later than your countries in the West which are so much more highly developed economically."

Mao Tse-tung gave me his views on the question of the future Communist attitude toward the landlords when I asked him what he considered the principal economic and social contents of the New Democracy.

"The central economic feature of the New Democracy", he said, "is the agrarian revolution. This holds good even during the present period when the fight against Japan is our main task. For our peasantry is the chief object of exploitation — not only of Chinese reactionaries but also of the Japanese imperialists in the occupied territories. Only the introduction of the New Democracy in our war regions has enabled us from the beginning to resist the Japanese as successfully as we do, because of its reforms in the interest of the peasant masses who constitute the very basis of our war effort.

"The present unreformed agrarian system in the rest of China, with its scattered, individual peasant economy — in which the farmers are not free but bound to the land, in which they have little contact even with one another and live a stagnant cultural life — has been the foundation of our ancient feudalism and despotism. The New Democracy of the future cannot rest on such a foundation. For the progress of Chinese society will mainly depend upon the development of industry.

"Industry must therefore be the main economic foundation of the New Democracy. Only an industrial society can be a fully democratic society. But to develop industry, the land problem must first be solved. Without a revolution against the feudal landlord system

it is impossible to develop capitalism, as the course of events in Western countries many years ago has shown quite clearly.

"Our agrarian revolution until 1937, during the period of the Civil War, was fundamentally of the same social character as the great agrarian revolutions which took place in the past in all progressive countries of the West and cleared away the feudal obstacles to the growth of the capitalistic system."

I asked whether the radical Civil War policy of confiscating land from the landlords and distributing it to the peasants would not be resumed after the present war with Japan, since Mao Tse-tung had still emphasized the need for a continued agrarian revolution.

He explained, "During the Civil War period we had no reason to prevent the farmers from confiscating land, because the landlord class not only suppressed them but actually led the fight against them. Our Party only followed the opinion of the farmers on the subject, formulated their demands into slogans, and then put them into practice as policy. Land confiscation as such was not a bad policy under Chinese conditions. The basic demand of the rural masses has always been concentrated on their desire for land ownership. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the late leader of the Kuomintang, recognized it and advocated the ownership of the land by the tillers. This was one of the main points in his programme for the improvement of the livelihood of the people."

"During a period of national war against a foreign aggressor things are of course different. A national war makes it possible to persuade the masses not to confiscate the land of the landlords, because the masses realize that, while the landlords are also willing to resist the enemy, a policy of land confiscation might drive them into the cities held by the Japanese and make them return to their villages together with Japanese troops in order to recover their land."

"In this way, the peasants understood soon after the beginning of the war with Japan that our new policy of reducing land rents instead of continuing confiscation of land had the twofold advantage of improving the peasants' livelihood and of inducing the landlords to stay on in the villages and join in the fight against Japan. The general reduction of land rents in favor of the tenants and the guarantee we gave the landlords for the actual payment of the reduced rents resulted in improved relations between tenants and landlords so that the Japanese found practically nobody to co-operate with in our areas."

I wanted to know how this change in the land policy of the Communist Party had been decided at the time.

"This is a characteristic example of the democratic ways in which our Party devises policies," Mao Tse-tung said. "This fundamental change from land confiscation to a general reduction of land rents and the guarantee for their payment to the landlords was first suggested by comrades in lower Party organizations. Our Central Committee took up their suggestion, which was clearly based on the wishes of the masses. We studied and formulated these demands and put them into effect as general policy.

"If the whole of China becomes a genuine democracy on the basis of co-operation between all political parties, it will be possible to practice our rent-reduction policy on a nation-wide scale. This would be a great reform indeed, although it would still be inferior to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's idea of ownership of the land by those who till it, which will have to be the final solution of the land problem. But it is conceivable that even the gradual transfer to the tillers of all the land now under feudal exploitation may be brought about peacefully all over China. If a genuinely democratic system of government is introduced everywhere.

"The way of bringing about such a gradual transfer of all land to the tillers would be to encourage the investment of the landlords' capital in industrial enterprises and to devise other measures of economic and fiscal policy that would be beneficial to the landlords, the tenants, and the development of Chinese economy as a whole.

"But such a solution depends upon genuine internal peace and genuine democracy in China. The possible need in the future for outright confiscation and distribution of land to the tenants can therefore not be ruled out entirely. For in the postwar period there may again be civil war if the Kuomintang insists on attacking us.

"Yet", Mao Tse-tung said with emphasis, "no matter whether we shall have internal peace or civil war, we prefer not to resume land confiscation but to continue our present policy of reduction of rents and guarantee of rent payment to the landlords; because that would reduce the obstacles to progress and reform in general.

"I want to remind you," Mao Tse-tung said, "that in 1930 the Kuomintang government in Nanking issued an agrarian law restricting land rents to 37.5 per cent of the tenant's main crops, while no rent was to be paid from secondary crops. But the Kuomintang has proved unable and unwilling to carry it out in practice. The law

was never enforced. Therefore, only the Communist Party has proved really able to realize agrarian reform, even in the shape of a mere reduction of rents."

I asked about the postwar attitude the Communist Party intended to take toward commercial and industrial capital in China.

"We are firmly convinced that private capital, Chinese as well as foreign, must be given liberal opportunities for broad development in postwar China, for China needs industrial growth," Mao Tse-tung replied.

"In China's postwar commercial relations with the outside world we want to replace Japan's principle of colonizing China by the principle of free and equal trade with all nations. In the internal sphere we want to replace the policies of the Kuomintang government, which depress the living standards of the people and thereby restrict industrial development in the country, by the policies we are already practicing in Liberated China, that is, of fostering the productive forces of the people, raising their purchasing power, and thus achieving the main prerequisites for the most rapid and most solid growth of modern industries.

There will have to be three forms of industrialization, according to the ideas of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which we consider justified by the conditions prevailing in China. Key industries in a position to control national economy, like railroads and mines, can best be developed and run by the state. Other industries will have to be developed by private capital. And for the exploitation of our great potentialities in handicraft and rural small-scale manufacture, we shall have to depend upon strong, democratically run co-operatives."

What political role did the Communist Party plan to play in postwar China, I asked.

"The membership of our Party is necessarily a small portion of the Chinese people," he said. "Only if that small portion reflects the opinions of the majority of the people's, and only if it works for their interests, can the relationship between the people and the Party be healthy.

"Today the Communist Party reflects the opinions not only of the peasants and workers but also of many anti-Japanese landlords, merchants, intellectuals, etc., that is, of all anti-Japanese people in our regions. The Communist Party is willing and will always be ready to co-operate closely with all people in China who are prepared to co-operate with it.

"This willingness is expressed in our 'Three-thirds' system of democratic representation which restricts the seats of Communist Party members in all elected bodies to a maximum of one-third of the whole and gives two-thirds of the seats to members of other parties and non-Party elements."

"Yes," Mao Tse-tung replied to my question about relations with the Kuomintang, "we are also willing to co-operate with the Kuomintang, not only while the war lasts, but afterwards, too. That is to say, if the Kuomintang lets us do so."

"And we are willing to practice in the future, as we do today, the four promises we made to the Kuomintang in 1937."

I asked him about the contents of those promises to which I had often heard vague reference in Chungking, and about the conditions that had been attached to them.

"We promised (1) not to continue the kind of agrarian revolution we had practiced in the past; (2) not to overthrow the Kuomintang government by force; (3) to reorganize our Soviet Government in the Border Region as a democratic, local government and (4) to reorganize our Red Army as part of a National Revolutionary Army."

"These promises, we stated at that time, we would carry out if the Kuomintang on its part (1) stopped the Civil War; (2) fought against Japan; (3) adopted a system of democratic government that granted the people freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association; and (4) took measures to improve the livelihood of the people."

"Is there any opposition within the Communist Party to your present policies?" I went on, "or to your interpretation of the long-term requirements of China?" I was referring to the frequent rumors in Chungking about dissension within the Communist ranks.

"No," he said, "there is no opposition in our Party now. In earlier periods there were two deviations. One was of a Trotskyite nature, identified with Chen Tu-hsiu, who died in 1942, years after his opposition had ceased to have any influence. The other was that of Chang Kuo-tao, who had for some time set himself against our party's correct policy and left it, practically alone. He is now working in the Special Service of the Kuomintang. Both deviations never influenced the solidarity of our Party and have left no trace."

I interrupted, "Do you mean to say that none of your policies are ever questioned or opposed?"

"Naturally, from time to time there may be certain differences

of opinion within our ranks. But they are always solved in democratic way, by discussion and analysis of the problems in question. If a minority is still not convinced of the correctness of a majority decision, it submits to it after thorough debates in Party meetings. The decisive factor in our work is that we always find out which of our policies the masses of the people accept and which they criticize or reject. Only, policies which prove popular with the masses become and remain the policies of our Party.

"At the time of the introduction of a new measure there may be people inside and outside the Party who do not quite understand it. But in the course of the execution of any measure a united opinion of an overwhelming majority inside and outside the Party is invariably formed, because our Party organizations are always watching out for popular reaction, and because we modify our measures continuously according to the actual needs and opinions of the people. All Party organizations, from the top to bottom, are held to observe our vital principle of not separating ourselves from the masses of the people but of being in closest harmony with their needs and wishes.

"The correctness of any of our policies has always to be tested and is always being tested by the masses themselves. We ourselves constantly examine our own decisions and policies. We correct our mistakes whenever we find them. We draw conclusions from all positive and negative experiences and apply those conclusions as widely as possible. In these ways relations between the Communist Party and the masses of the people are constantly being improved."

Mao Tse-tung had arrived at his favorite topic, his constant demand on all Party members to observe what he calls the "mass viewpoint" in all their decisions and actions. He spoke with enthusiasm.

"This is the most fundamental point. If the leading elements of a political party are really working for the interests of the broad masses of the people, and if they are sincere in this endeavor, they have unlimited opportunities of listening to the opinions of the people.

"We listen to the people. Through the media of popular meetings in villages, towns, districts, regions, and everywhere in our territories; through individual conversations between Party members and men and women of all strata of the population; through special conferences, newspapers, and the telegrams and letters we receive from the people — through all this we can, and do, always find out

the real, undisguised opinion of the masses.

“Apart from that, our method is to find typical samples both of satisfactory and unsatisfactory work in every field of activity. We study those samples thoroughly, learn from them, and sum up our experiences on the subject in order to draw concrete conclusions for the necessary improvements. The period of such observation of reality and of studying samples of good and bad work may in one case be a few weeks, in another several months, and sometimes even a few years. But in this way we always keep in close touch with actual developments, discover what the people want and need, and learn from those among the people inside and outside the Party who do the best work.

“Some of our cadres may sometimes fail to understand our policies thoroughly and make mistakes in their execution, so that such comrades have to be criticized and taught. For this purpose, too, the thorough study and analysis of a specimen of good work is of great importance.”

Mao Tse-tung showed me a copy of the *Liberation Daily*. “Take the example in tonight’s newspaper. Here is a long article covering a whole page which describes in detail the ways in which one of the companies of the Eighth Route Army got rid of its shortcomings and became one of the best units. The cadres and fighters of every company in our armies will read and study and discuss this article. This is the simple way in which the positive experiences of one company will be taught as policy to five thousand companies. On other days you may find similar articles about a co-operative, a school, a hospital, or a local administrative unit.

To come back to the vital matter of close understanding and co-operation between Party comrades and non-Party people. There has been a very great and steady improvement; but mistakes are still being made by some of our comrades.

“Some incidents and misunderstandings still occur. Here and there we still have some Communists who tend to monopolize affairs.

“We are therefore all the time calling everybody’s attention to the importance of giving non-Party people actual power under our democratic ‘Three-thirds’ system. In the course of the practical execution of our policies we show all our comrades concretely how genuine co-operation between us and non-Party people helps not only the masses but ourselves. As a consequence, mutual trust between

Party and non-Party people is growing in the process of all the practical work they have to do together.”

I asked Mao Tse-tung whether he thought that the Communist Party had made any major mistakes in its policies.

“On all basic points our policies have proved correct from the very beginning. This is true first of all of our fundamental policies under New Democracy — of letting the masses of the people organize themselves for a revolution aiming at national independence, democracy, and the improvement of the people’s livelihood on the basis of private property.

“It is only with regard to the application of these basic policies to concrete conditions that certain deviations are liable to appear from time to time, deviations partly to the left and partly to the right. They are, however, not deviations of the Party as a whole or of groups in the Party, but of certain people in our ranks. From all those mistakes the Party as a whole has learned.

“Yes, in certain periods there have been a few individuals in our Party who believed that Communism is feasible in China at this time. But the Party as such has never held that view. Even the existence within our Party of a group advocating the immediate practice of a Communist social system is impossible on account of the concrete conditions in China which make Communism unfeasible for a very long time to come.

“The Kuomintang allegation that there are groups with diverging views within our Party is completely unfounded. The Kuomintang, which is itself so badly split by cliques, cannot conceive of a really united political party, and that is probably why such rumors are believed by some in Chungking.”

“Did you ever find yourself in a minority so that your own ideas on a subject were not carried out?”

“Yes. I have been in the minority myself. The only thing for me to do at such times was to wait. But there have been very few examples of that in recent years.”

I had been asked by Chinese friends in Chungking to find out whether the Communists were “Chinese first” or “Communist first”, and I put the question to Mao Tse-tung.

He smiled. “Without a Chinese nation there could be no Chinese Communist Party. You might just as well ask, ‘What is first, children or parents?’ This is not a question of theory but of practice, like the other question people put to you in the Kuomintang

regions, whether we are working for our Party or for the people. Go and ask our people, anywhere you want. They know well enough that the Chinese Communist Party serves them. They have had their experience with us during the most difficult times."

"As to our method of thinking, I told you already that we, like Communists in any other country, are convinced of the correctness of Marxism. This is probably what people refer to when they ask whether we are 'Communist first' or 'Chinese first'. But our belief in Marxism as a correct method of thinking does not mean that we negate the Chinese cultural heritage or the value of non-Marxist foreign thought.

"It is certainly true that much is good in what Chinese history has handed down to us. And this heritage we must make our own. There are, however, certain people in China who worship the obsolete ideas of ancient times which are not suitable for our nation today but on the contrary harmful. Those things must be discarded.

"In foreign cultures, too, there is much that is good and progressive which we must accept; and, on the other hand, much that is rotten, like Fascism, which must be destroyed.

"To accept ideas from the Chinese past or from abroad does not mean to take them over unconditionally. They must be co-ordinated with actual conditions in China and practiced in accordance with them. Our attitude is that of critical acceptance of our own historical heritage and of foreign thought. We are against blind acceptance as well as blind rejection of any ideas. We Chinese must think with our own brains and must decide for ourselves what can grow on our own soil."

"I want to summarize what China needs today," Mao Tse-tung took the initiative. "China needs internal peace and democracy. Without internal peace China will not be able to win the war against Japan or win the peace. Our failure to achieve internal peace after the war with Japan might actually disturb peaceful international relations. For if there were to be another civil war in China, it would last for a long period and would influence foreign countries as well.

"Among people abroad there are still many who have not fully understood that during the last twenty-three years of China's political development the key problem has always been the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist parties. And the same will be true in the future.


"In the first stage of that important twenty-three year period of

our history, from 1924 to 1927, there would have been no national revolution in China without co-operation between the Kuomintang and Communist Parties.

“In the latter part of the second stage, from 1931 to 1936, China’s inability to resist Japan resulted from the fact that the National Government of the Kuomintang used all its strength, the proceeds of its foreign loans, the services of its foreign military advisors, and other foreign assistance for the campaigns it waged against the Chinese Communists.

“In the third stage, from 1937 to the present our war against Japan might not have been possible, or at least China would not have been able to hold out as long as she did, if it had not been for what Kuomintang-Communist co-operation there was.

“Conversely, China’s war effort against Japan today would be infinitely stronger than it is if the Kuomintang had continued to co-operate with the Communist Party at least to the extent that characterized the first short phase of the war.”



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SALUTE THE APRIL 8 MARTYRS*

1946

Dear Comrades-in-Arms and Immortal Heroes,

In the last few decades you rendered your glorious service to the people. Now in dying for them your deaths are also glorious.

Your deaths are a clarion call to deepen the Chinese people's understanding of the CCP and to strengthen their determination to defend peace, democracy, and unity.

Your deaths are a clarion call to the whole Party and the whole nation to unite in the struggle for a peaceful, democratic, and united China.

The whole Party and the whole nation will carry on your unfinished tasks and continue to struggle till victory is won. They will never relax or shrink back from their effort.

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* On April 8, 1946 the communist leaders, Chin Pang-hsien (Po-ku), Teng Fa, Wang Jo-fei, and Yeh Ting were killed in an aeroplane crash and subsequently there was a commemorative meeting held in Yen-an.

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